





'o'>7r*- % J> v*-^T'*.^ 








BOH^S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. 



KANT'S 

CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. 



i 



lokdon: printed by william ci.owes and sons 
and charing cross. 



JTAMtOKD STKKKX 




CRITIQUE 



DP 



PURE REASON. 



TRANSLATE!? FROM THE GERMAN UV 



IM MANUEL KANT. 



EY 



J. M. D. MEIKLEJOJI.N 




LONDON: 

BELL & DALDY, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN. 

1872. 



Bj Tranrfte 
Ag 9 7 



# 




BACO DE VERULAMIO, 

INSTAURATIO MAGNA-PR.EFATIO. 

.NOBIS IPSIS SILEMUS : DE RE AUTEM, QUJ5 AGITUB, PETIMU3 
UT HOMINES EAM NON OpINIONEM, SED OPUS ESSE COGITENT 
AC PRO CERTO HABEANT, NON SeCT^ NOS ALICUJUS, AUT PlaC'- 
ITI, SED UTILITATIS ET AMPLITUDINIS HUMANE FUNDAMENTJ 
MOLIRI. DEINDE UT SUIS COMMODIS ^QUI — IN COMMUNE CON- 
STANT — ET IPSI IN PARTEM VENIANT. Pe^ITEEEA UT BENE 
SPKRENT, NEQUE INSTAUEATIONEM NOSTRAM UT QUIDDAM INFI- 
NITUM ET ULTRA MORTALE FINGANT, ET ANIMO CONCIPIANT : 
QUUM EEVEEA S7T INFINITI EREORIS FINIS ET TERMINUS LB- 
GITIMUS. 






r 



CONTENTS. 



Fur,* 
Translator's Preface xi 

Preface to the First Edition of the CRniauje x T .ii 

Preface to the Second Edition xxiv 

INTRODUCTION. 

I. — Of the Difference between Pure and Empirical Know- 
ledge 1 

II. — The Human Intellect, even in an dnphilosophical 

STATE, IS LN POSSESSION OF CERTAIN COGNITIONS A PRIORI 2 

III. — Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall 

DETERMINE THE POSSIBILITY. PRINCIPLES, AND EXTENT OF 

Human Knowledge A PRIORI 4 

IV. — Of the Difference between Analytical and Syntheti- 
cal Judgments 7 

V. — In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical 

Judgments A PRIORI are contained as Principles . . 9 

VI. — The General Problem of Pure Reason 12 

VII. — Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the 

Name of a Critique of Pure Reason 15 

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS. 

PAJ^TEIRST.— TRANSCENDENT AL -ESTHETIC. 

■^ § 1. Introductory 21 

Sect. I. — Of Space. 

§ 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception 23 

§ 3. Transcendental Exposition of the conception of Space 25 

§ 4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions 25 

j Sect. II.— Of Time. 

\ 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception 28 

\ 6. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time 29 

\ 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions 30 

\ 8. Elucidation 32 

\ 9. General Remarks on Transcendental JEsthetic ...... 35 



VI CONTENT?. 

PART SECOND.— TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

Introduction. — Idea of a Transcendental Logic. 

I. — Of Logic in general 45 

II. — Of Transcendental Logic 49 

III. — Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and 

Dialectic 50 

IV. — Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Tran- 
scendental Analytic and Dialectic 53 

^TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC— EIRST DIVISION. 



Transcendental Analytic. § 1 54 

Analytic of Conceptions. § 2 55 

CHAP. I.— Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure 

Conceptions of the Understanding. g 

Introductory. §3 56 

Sect. I. — Of the Logical use of the Understanding in gene- 
ral. § 4 56 

Sect. II. — Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in 

Judgments. § 5 58 

Sect. III. — Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or 

Categories. § 6 62 

CHAP. II. — Of the Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of 
the Understanding. 
Sect. I. — Of the Principles of Transcendental Deduction in ge- 
neral. § 9 71 

Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Catego- 
ries. §10 77 

Sect. II. — Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Con- 
ceptions of the Understanding. 
Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold repre- 
sentations given by Sense. § 11 80 

Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. § 12 81 
The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is 
the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understand- 
ing. § 13 84 

What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. § 14 86 

The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective 
Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained 

therein. § 15 86 

All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as 
Conditions under which alone the manifold contents of 

them can be united in one Consciousness. § 16 88 

Observations. § 17 88 

In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is 
the only legitimate use of the Category. § 18 90 



CONTENTS. v ii 

Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses 
in general. § 20 02 

Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible em- 
ployment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the 
Understanding. § 23 97 

Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Under- 
standing. § 23 101 

Short view of the above Deduction 103 


TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC— BOOK II. 

Analytic of Principles . . 103 

Introduction. — Of the Transcendental Faculty of Judg- 
ment in general 104 

Transcendental Doctrine of the Faculty oe Judg- 
ment, or Analytic op Principles. 

CHAP. I. — Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Un- 
derstanding 107 

CHAP. II. — System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding. ... 113 

Sv>TEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING. 

Sect. I. — Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical 

Judgments 115 

Sect. II. — Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical 

Judgments., 117 

Sect. III. — Systematic Representations of all Synthetical 

Principles of the Pure Understanding 12" 

I. — Axioms of Intuition 122 

II. — Anticipations of Perception 125 

III. — Analogies of Experience 132 

A. First Analogy.— Principle of the Permanence 
of Substance % 136 

B. Second Analogy. — Principle of the Succession 
of Time 141 

C Third Analogy. — Principle of Co-existence .. 166 

IV.— The Postulates of Empirical Thought 161 

Eefutation of Idealism 166 

General Remark on the System of Principles 174 

CHAP. III. — Of the Ground of the division of all objects into Pha3- 

nomena and Noumena 173 

Appendix. Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly, the 
Conceptions of Eeflection from the Confusion of 
the Transcendental with the Empirical use of 

the Understanding 190 

Remark on the Amphiboly of the Conceptions of 
Reflection 194 



Vlli CONTENTS. 

Page 
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC— SECOND DIVISION. 

Teanscendental Dialectic. — Inteoduction. 

I. — Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance 209 

II. — Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Ap- 
pearance 

A. Op Reason in General 212 

B. Of the Logical Use op Reason 214 

C. Op the Pure Use of Reason 216 

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC— BOOK I. 

Op the Conceptions op Pure Reason 219 

Sect. L— Of Ideas in General 221 

Sect. II. — Of Transcendental Ideas 225 

Sect. III. — System of Transcendental Ideas 233 

Book II. — Of the Dialectical Peoceduee op Puee 

Reason . , 237 

CHAP. I. — Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason 237 

Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Sub- 
stantiality or Permanence of the Soul 245 

Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralo- 
gism 251 

General Remark on the Transition from Rational Psy-i 
chology to Cosmology 253 

CHAP. II. — The Antinomy of Pure Reason 255 

Sect. I. — System of Cosmological Ideas 256 

Sect. II. — Antithetic of Pure Reason . . 263 

First Antinomy 266 

Second Antinomy 271 

Third Antinomy 278 

Fourth Antinomy 284 

Sect. III. — Of the Interest of Reason in these Self-Contra- 
dictions 290 

Sect. IV. — Of the Necessity Imposed upon Pure Reason of 
presenting a Solution of" its Transcendental 

Problems 298 

Sect. V. — Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems" 

presented in the four Transcendental Ideas . . . 303 
Sect. VI. — Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution" 

of Pure Cosmological Dialectic 307 

Sect. VII. — Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problems . . 310 
Sect. VIII. — Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation 

to the Cosmological Ideas 316 

Sect. IX.— Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle 
of Reason, with regard to the Cosmological 
Ideas 321 



CONTENTS. IX 

Page 

1. — Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the 

Composition of Phaenomena in the Universe 322 

II. — Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of 

the Division of a "Whole given in Intuition 325 

Concluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcen- 
dental Mathematical Ideas — and Introductory to the 

Solution of the Dynamical Ideas 328 

III. — Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality 
of the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their 

Causes 330 

Possibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Uni- 
versal Law of Natural Necessity 333 

Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom 
in Harmony with the universal Law of Natural 

Necessity 335 

IV. — Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality 

of the Dependence of Phaenomenal Existences .... 345 
Concluding Remarks on the Antinomy of Pure 
Reason , 349 

CHAP. III. — The Ideal of Pure Reason. 

Sect. I. — Of the Ideal in General 350 

Sect. II.— Of the Transcendental Ideal 352 

Sect. III. — Of the Arguments Employed by Speculative Reason 

in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being 359 
Sect. IV. — Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the 

Existence of God 364 

Sect. V. — Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of 

the Existence of God .• 370 

Detection and Explanation of the Dialectical Illu- 
sion in all Transcendental Arguments for the 

Existence of a Necessary Being 377 

Se^t. VI. — Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological 

Proof 381 

Sect. VII. — Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative 

Principles of Reason 387 

Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure 

Reason 394 

Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of 
Human Reason 410 

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD 431 

CHAP. I. — The Discipline of Pure Reason 432 

Sect. I. — The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dog- 
matism 439 

Sect. II. — The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics 449 

Sect. III.— The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis 467 

Sect. IV.— The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs 475 



CONTENTS. 



Page 

CHAP. II.— The Canon of Pure Eeason 482 

Sect. I. — Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Eeason .... 4S3 
Sect. II. — Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Deter- 
mining Ground of the ultimate End of Pure 

Reason 487 

Sect. III. — Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief 496 

CHAP. III. — The Architectonic op Pure Eeason 503 

CHAP. IV. — The History of Pure Eeason ; 515 



TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. 



The following translation has been undertaker] w\ih the hope 
of rendering Kant's Kriiik der reinen Vernunft intelligible to 
the English student. 

The difficulties which meet the reader and the translator 
of this celebrated work arise from various causes. Kant was 
a man of clear, vigorous, and trenchant thought, and, after 
nearly twelve years' meditation, could not be in doubt as to his 
own system. But the Horatian rule of 

Verba prse^ isam rem non invita sequentur, 

will not apply to him. He had never studied the art of ex- 
pression. He wearies by frequent repetitions, and employs a 
great number of words to express, in the clumsiest way, what 
could have been enounced more clearly and distinctly in a 
few. The main statement in his sentences is often over- 
laid with a multitude of qualifying and. explanatory clauses; 
and the reader is lost in a maze, from which he has great 
difficulty in extricating himself. There are some passages 
which have no main verb ; others, in which the author loses 
sight of the subject with which he set out, and concludes with 
a predicate regarding something else mentioned in the course 
of his argument. All this can be easily accounted for. Kant, 
as he mentions in a letter to Lambert, took nearly twelve 



Xll TEANSLATOE S PEEEACE. 

years to excogitate his work, and only five months to write it. 
He was a German professor, a student of solitary habits, 
and had never, except on one occasion, been out of Konigs- 
berg. He had, besides, to propound a new system of philoso- 
phy, and to enounce ideas that were entirely to revolutionise 
European thought. Or. tie other 'aai d, there are many 
excellencies of style in this work. His expression is often 
as precise and forcible as his thought ; and, in some of 
his notes especially, he sums up, in two or three apt and 
powerful words, thoughts which, at other times, he employs 
pages to develope. His terminology, which has been so 
violently denounced, is really of great use in clearly deter- 
mining his system, and in rendering its peculiarities more easy 
of comprehension. 

A previous translation of the Kritik exists, which, had it 
been satisfactory, would have dispensed with the present. 
But the translator had, evidently, no very extensive acquaint- 
ance with the German language, and still less with his subject. 
A translator ought to be an interpreting intellect between 
the author and the reader ; but, in the present case, the only 
interpreting medium has been the dictionary. 

Indeed, Kant's fate in this country has been a very hard 
one. Misunderstood by the ablest philosophers of the time, 
illustrated, explained, or translated by the most incompetent, — 
it has been his lot to be either unappreciated, misappre- 
hended, or entirely neglected. Dugald Stewart did not 
understand his system of philosophy — as he had no proper 
opportunity of making himself acquainted with it ; Nitsch * 
and Willich'j* undertook to introduce him to the English 
philosophical public; Richardson and Haywood "traduced" 

* A General and Introductory View of Professor Kant's Principles 
By F. A. Nitsch. London, 1796. 

Willich's Elements of Kant's Philosophy, Svo. 1798. 



TEANSLATOE S PEEFACE. X1L. 

him. More recently, an Analysis of the Kritik, by Mr. 
Haywood, has been published, which consists almost entirely 
of a selection of sentences from his own translation : — a 
mode of analysis which has not served to make the subject 
more intelligible. In short, it may be asserted that there 
is not a single English work upon Kant, which deserves to 
be read, or which can be read with any profit, excepting 
Semple's translation of the " Metaphysic of Ethics." All are 
written by men who either took no pains to understand 
Kant, or were incapable of understanding him.* 

The following translation was begun on the basis of a MS. 
translation, by a scholar of some repute, placed in my hands by 
Mr. Bohn, with a request that I should revise it, as he had 
perceived it to be incorrect. After having laboured through 
about eighty pages, I found, from the numerous errors and 
inaccuracies pervading it, that hardly one-fifth of the original 
MS. remained. I, therefore, laid it entirely aside, and com- 
menced de novo. These eighty pages I did not cancel, be- 
cause the careful examination which they had undergone, 
made them, as I believed, not an unworthy representation of 
the author. 

* It is curious to observe, in all the English works written spe- 
cially upon Kant, that not one of his commentators ever ventures, for a 
moment, to leave the words of Kant, and to explain the subject he may 
be considering, in his own words. Nitsch and Willich, who professed 
to write on Kant's philosophy, are merely translators ; Haywood, even in 
his notes, merely repeats Kant; and the translator of " Beck's Principles 
of the Critical Philosophy," while pretending to give, in his " Translator's 
Preface," his own views of the Critical Philosophy, has fabricated his 
Preface out of selections from the works of Kant. The same is the 
case with the translator of Kant's "Essays and Treatises," (2 vols. 8vo. 
London, 1798.) This person has written a preface to each of the volumes, 
and both are almost literal translations from different parts of Kant's 
works. He had the impudence to present the thoughts contained in them 
as his own ; few being then able to detect the plagiarism. 



) 



XIV TEANSLATOE S PEEFACE. 

The second edition of the Kritik, from which all the sub- 
sequent ones have been reprinted without alteration, is followed 
in the present translation. Rosenkranz, a recent editor, main- 
tains that the author's first edition is far superior to the 
second ; and Schopenhauer asserts that the alterations in the 
second were dictated by unworthy motives. He thinks the 
second a Verschlimmbesserung of the first; and that the 
changes made by Kant, "in the weakness of old age," have 
rendered it a " self- contradictory and mutilated work." I am 
not insensible to the able arguments brought forward by Scho- 
penhauer ; while the authority of the elder Jacobi, Micnelet, 
and others, adds weight to his opinion. But it may be doubted 
whether the motives imputed to Kant could have influenced 
him in the omission of certain passages in the second edition, — 
whether fear could have induced a man of his character to 
retract the statements he had advanced. The opinions he 
expresses in many parts of the second edition, in pages 455 — 
460, for example,* are not those of a philosopher who would 
surrender what he believed to be truth, at the outcry of preju- 
diced opponents. Nor are his attacks on the " sacred doctrines 
of the old dogmatic philosophy," as Schopenhauer maintains, 
less bold or vigorous in the second than in the first edition. 
And, finally, Kant's own testimony must be held to be of 
greater weight than that of any number of other philosophers, 
however learned and profound. 

No edition of the Kritik is very correct. Even those of 
Rosenkranz and Schubert, and Modes and Baumann, contain 
errors which reflect somewhat upon the care of the editors. But 
the common editions, as well those printed during, as after 
Kant's life-time, are exceedingly bad. One of these, the " third 
edition improved, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1/91," swarms with 
errors, at once misleading and annoying. — Rosenkranz has 
* Of the present translation. 



I 



TRANSLATOR S PREFACE. 

made a number of very happy conjectural emendations, the 
accuracy of which cannot be doubted. 

It may be necessary to mention that it has been found 
.requisite to coin one or two new philosophical terms, to repre- 
sent those employed by Kant. It was, of course, almost im- 
possible to translate the Kritik with the aid of the philoso- 
phical vocabulary at present used in England. But these new 
expressions have been formed according to Horace's maxim — 
pared detorta. Such is the verb intuite for anschauen ; the 
manifold in intuition has also been employed for das Mannig- 
faltige der Anschauung, by which Kant designates the varied 
contents of a perception or intuition. Kant's own terminology 
has the merit of being precise and consistent. 

Whatever may be the opinion of the reader with regard to 
the possibility of metaphysics — whatever his estimate of the 
utility of such discussions, — the value of Kant's work, as an 
instrument of mental discipline, cannot easily be overrated. If 
the present translation contribute in the least to the ad- 
vancement of scientific cultivation, if it aid in the formation 
of habits of severer and more profound thought, the translator 
will consider himself well compensated for his arduous and 
long-protracted labour. 

J. M. D. M. 




PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITI0N.~(i78i.) 



Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon 
to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are 
presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as 
they transcend every faculty of the mind. 

It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It 
begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the 
field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, 
at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles 
it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever 
higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers 
that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, 
because new questions never cease to present themselves ; and 
thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles 
which transcend the region of experience, while they are 
regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into 
confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the 
presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to dis- 
cover, because the principles it employs, transcending the 
liprifcs of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The 
arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic. 

Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences ; and, 
if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far 
as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title 
of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap con- 
tempt and scorn upon her ; and the matron mourns, forlorn 
and forsaken, like Hecuba, 

" Modo maxima rerum, 
Tot generis, natisque potens . . . 
Nunc trahor exul, inops." * 

At first, her government, under the administration of the 

* Ovid, Metamorphoses. 



o> 



XVU1 PKEFACE TO THE FCEST EDITION. 

dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative 
continued to show traces ©f the ancient barbaric rule, her 
empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the 
reign of anarchy ; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who 
hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, 
attacked from time to time those who had organised them 
selves into civil communities. But their number was, very 
happily, small ; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to 
the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, 
although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the 
hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the 
legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of 
the human understanding — that of the celebrated Locke. But 
it was found that, — although it was affirmed that this so-called 
queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than 
that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily 
brought suspicion on her claims, — as this genealogy was 
incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims 
to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into 
the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again 
became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been 
made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the 
general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns 
nought but weariness and complete indifferentism — the mother 
of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same 
time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and 
reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, 
obscurity, and disuse from ill-directed effort. 

For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such 
inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity. 
Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they 
may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular 
style and by changes on the language of the schools, un- 
avoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and propositions, 
which they profess to regard with so much contempt. At 
the same time, this indifference, which has arisen in the world 
of science, and which relates to that kind of knowledge which 
we should wish to see destroyed the last, is a phaenomenou that 
well deserves our attention and reflection. It is plainly not 
the cfFect of the levity, but of the matured judgment* of the 

♦ We very often hear complaints of the shallowness of (he present age, 



PREFACE TO THE EIEST EDITION. 

age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with 
knowledge. It is, in fact, a call to reason, again to ui 
the most laborious of all tasks — that of self-examination, 
establish a tribunal, which may secure it in its well- git 
claims, while it pronounces against all baseless assumptions 
and pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but according to 
its own eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal is 
nothing less than the Critical Investigation of Pure Reason. 

I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but 
a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to 
the cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of 
experience ; in other words, the solution of the question re- 
garding the possibility or impossibility of Metaphysics, and the 
determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits 
of this science. All this must be done on the basis of 
principles. 

This path — the only one now remaining — has been entered 
upon by me ; and I flatter myself that I have, in this way, dis- 
covered the cause of — and consequently the mode of removing 
— all the errors which have hitherto set reason at variance with 
itself, in the sphere of non-empirical thought. I have not 
returned an evasive answer to the questions of reason, by 
alleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of the 
mind ; I have, on the contrary, examined them completely in 
the light of principles, and, after having discovered the cause of 
the doubts and contradictions into which reason fell, have 
solved them to its perfect satisfaction. It is true, these ques- 
tions have not been solved as dogmatism, in its vain fancies 

and of the decay of profound science. But I do not think that those 
which rest upon a secure foundation, such as Mathematics, Physical 
Science, &c, in the least deserve this reproach, but that they rather 
maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case, indeed, far surpass it. 
The same would be the case with the other kinds of cognition, if their 
principles were but firmly established. In the absence of this security, 
indifference, douVt, and finally, severe criticism are rather signs of a pro- 
found habit of thought. Our age is the age of criticism, to which every 
thing must he subjected. The sacredness of religion, and the authority 
of legislation, are by many regarded as grounds of exemption from the 
examination of this tribunal. But, if they are exempted, they become the 
subjects of just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which 
reason accords only to that which has stood the test of a free and public 
examir.ation. 

O 2 



I 



PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 

res, had expected ; for it can only be satisfied by the 
of magical arts, and of these I have no knowledge, 
jither do these come within the compass of our mental 
powers; and it was the duty of philosophy to destroy the 
illusions which had their origin in misconceptions, whatever 
darling hopes and valued expectations may be ruined by its 
explanations. My chief aim in this work has been thorough- 
ness ; and I make bold to say, that there is not a single meta- 
physical problem that does not find its solution, or at least 
the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect unity ; 
and therefore, if the principle presented by it prove to be in- 
sufficient for the solution of even a single one of those 
questions to which the very nature of reason gives birth, we 
must reject it, as we could not be perfectly certain of its suffi- 
ciency in the case of the others. 

While I say this, I think I see upon the countenance of the 
reader signs of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when 
he hears declarations which sound so boastful and extravagant; 
and yet they are beyond comparison more moderate than those 
advanced by the commonest author of the commonest philo- 
sophical programme, in which the dogmatist professes to de- 
monstrate the simple nature of the soul, or the necessity of a 
primal being. Such a dogmatist promises to extend human 
knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience ; while 
I humbly confess that this is completely beyond my power. 
Instead of any such attempt, I confine myself to the exami- 
nation of reason alone and its pure thought ; and I do not 
need to seek far for the sum-total of its cognition, because it 
lias its seat in my own mind. Besides, common logic presents 
me with a complete and systematic catalogue of all the simple 
operations of reason ; and it is my task to answer the question 
how far reason can go, without the material presented and the 
aid furnished by experience. 

So much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary 
in the execution of the present task. The aims set before us 
are not arbitrarily proposed, but are imposed upon us by the 
nature of cognition itself. 

The above remarks relate to the matter of our critical in- 
quiry. As regards the form, there are two indispensable con- 
ditions, which any one who undertakes so difficult a task as 



PIIEEACE TO THE TIItST EDITION. XXI 

that of a critique of pure reason, is bound to fulfil. These 
conditions are certitude and clearness. 

As regards certitude, I have fully convinced myself that, in 
this sphere of thought, opinion is perfectly inadmissible, and 
that everything which bears the least semblance of an hypo- 
thesis must be excluded, as of no value in such discussions. 
For it is a necessary condition of every cognition that is to be 
established upon a priori grounds, that it shall be held to be 
absolutely necessary ; much more is this the case with an at- 
tempt to determine all pure a priori cognition, and to furnish 
the standard — and consequently an example — of all apodeictic 
(philosophical) certitude. Whether I have succeeded in what 
I professed to do, it is for the reader to determine ; it is the 
author's business merely to adduce grounds and reasons, with- 
out determining what influence these ought to have on the mind 
of his judges. But, lest anything he may have said may be- 
come the innocent cause of doubt in their minds, or tend to 
weaken the effect which his arguments might otherwise pro- 
duce, — he may be allowed to point out those passages which 
may occasion mistrust or difficulty, although these do not con- 
cern the main purpose of the present work. He does this 
solely with the view of removing from the mind of the reader 
any doubts which might affect his judgment of the work as a 
whole, and in regard to its ultimate aim. 

I know no investigations more necessary for a full insight 
into the nature of the faculty which we call understanding \ 
and at the same time for the determination of the rules and 
limits of its use, than those undertaken in the second chapter 
of the Transcendental Analytic, under the title of Deduction of 
the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding ; and they have also 
cost me by far the greatest labour — labour which, I hope, will 
not remain uncompensated. The view there taken, which goes 
somewhat deeply into the subject, has two sides. The one re- 
lates to the objects of the pure understanding, and is intended 
to demonstrate and to render comprehensible the objective 
validity of its a priori conceptions ; and it forms for this 
reason an essential part of the Critique. The other considers 
the pure understanding itself, its possibility and its powers of 
cognition — that is, from a subjective point of view ; and, al- 
though this exposition is of great importance, it does not be- 
long essentially to the main purpose of the work, because the 



XX11 PBEEACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 

grand question is, what and how much can reason and under- 
standing, apart from experience, cognize, and not, how is the 
faculty of thought itself possible? As the latter is an inquiry 
into the cause of a given effect, and has thus in it some sem- 
blance of an hypothesis (although, as I shall show on another 
occasion, this is really not the fact), it would seem that, in the 
present instance, I had allowed myself to enounce a mere 
opinion, and that the reader must therefore be at liberty to hold 
a different opinion. But I beg to remind him, that, if my sub- 
jective deduction does not produce in his mind the conviction 
of its certitude at which I aimed, the objective deduction, with 
which alone the present work is properly concerned, is in every 
respect satisfactory. 

As regards clearness, the reader has a right to demand, in 
the first place, discursive or logical clearness, that is, on the 
basis of conceptions, and, secondly, intuitive or aesthetic clear- 
ness, by means of intuitions, that is, by examples or other 
modes of illustration in concreto. I have done what I could 
for the first kind of intelligibility. This was essential to my 
purpose ; and it thus became the accidental cause of my in- 
ability to do complete justice to the second requirement. I 
have been almost always at a loss, during the progress of this 
work, how to settle this question. Examples and illustrations 
always appeared to me necessary, and, in the first sketch of 
the Critique, naturally fell into their proper places. But I 
very soon became aware of the magnitude of my task, and the 
numerous problems with which I should be engaged ; and, as 
I perceived that this critical investigation would, even if de- 
livered in the driest scholastic manner, be far from being brief, 
I found it unadvisable to enlarge it still more with examples and 
explanations, which are necessary only from a popular point 
of view. I was induced to take this course from the consider- 
ation also, that the present work is not intended for popular 
use, that those devoted to science do not require such helps, 
although they are always acceptable, and that they would have 
materially interfered with my present purpose. Abbe* Ter- 
rasson remarks with great justice, that if we estimate the size 
of a work, not from the number of its pages, but from the time 
which we require to make ourselves master of it, it may be 
said of many a book — that it would be much shorte?; if it 
ivtre not so short. On the other hand, as regards the com- 



PEEFACE TO THE FIEST EDITION. XX1H 

prehensibility of a system of speculative cognition, connected 
under a single principle, we may say with equal justice — many 
a book would have been much clearer, if it had not been in- 
tended to be so very clear. For explanations and examples, 
and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the comprehension 
of parts, but they distract the attention, dissipate the mental 
power of the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a 
clear conception of the whole ; as he cannot attain soon 
enough to a survey of the system, and the colouring and em- 
bellishments bestowed upon it prevent his observing its arti- 
culation or organization, — which is the most important con- 
sideration with him, when he comes to judge of its unity 
and stability. 

The reader must naturally have a strong inducement to co- 
operate with the present author, if he has formed the intention 
of erecting a complete and solid edifice of metaphysical 
science, according to the plan now laid before him. Meta- 
physics, as here represented, is the only science which admits 
of completion — and with little labour, if it is united, in a 
short time ; so that nothing will be left to future generations 
except the task of illustrating and applying it didactically. 
For this science is nothing more than the inventory of all 
that is given us by pure reason, systematically arranged. No- 
thins: can escape our notice ; for what reason produces from 
itself cannot lie concealed, but must be brought to the light 
by reason itself, so soon as we have discovered the common 
principle of the ideas we seek. The perfect unity of this 
kind of cognitions, which are based upon pure conceptions, 
and uninfluenced by any empirical element, or any peculiar 
intuition leading to determinate experience, renders this com- 
pleteness not only practicable, but also necessary. 

Tecum habita, et noris quam sit tibi curta supellex.* 

Such a system of pure speculative reason I hope to be able 
to publish under the title of Metaphysic of Natin-e.f The 
content of this work, (which will not be half so long,) will be 
very much richer than that of the present Critique, which 

* Persius. 

t In contradistinction to the Metaphysic of Ethics. This work wau 
uever published. See page 509. — Tr. 



XXIV PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 

has to discover the sources of this cognition and expose the 
conditions of its possibility, and at the same time to clear ana 
level a fit foundation for the scientific edifice. In the present 
work, I look for the patient hearing and the impartiality of a 
judge ; in the other, for the good-will and assistance of a co- 
labourer. For, however complete the list of principles for 
this system may be in the Critique, the correctness of the 
system requires that no deduced conceptions should be absent. 
These cannot be presented a priori, but must be gradually 
discovered ; and, while the synthesis of conceptions has been 
fully exhausted in the Critique, it is necessary that, in the pro- 
posed work, the same should be the case with their analysis. 
But this will be rather an amusement than a labour. 



PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.— (1787.) 

Whether the treatment of that portion of our knowledge 
winch lies within the province of pure reason, advances with 
that undeviating certainty which characterises the progress of 
science, we shall be at no loss to determine. If we find those 
who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come to 
an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow ; 
if we find them, after the most elaborate preparations, invari- 
ably brought to a stand before the goal is reached, and com- 
pelled to retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths, we 
may then feel quite sure that they are far from having attained 
to the certainty of scientific progress, and may rather be said 
to be merely groping about in the dark. In these circum- 
stances we shall render an important service to reason if we 
succeed in simply indicating the path along which it must 
travel, in order to arrive at any results, — even if it should be 
found necessary to abandon many of those aims which, without 
reflection, have been proposed for its attainment. 

That Logic has advanced in this sure course, even from the 
earliest times, is apparent from the fact that, since Aristotle, it 
has been unable to advance a step, and thus to all appearance 
has reached its completion. For, if some of the moderns have 
thought to enlarge its domain by introducing psychological 



PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXV 

discussions on the mental faculties, such as imagination and 
wit, metaphysical discussions on the origin of knowledge and 
the different kinds of certitude, according to the difference of 
the objects (Idealism, Scepticism, and so on), or anthropological 
discussions on prejudices, their causes and remedies : this at- 
tempt, on the part of these authors, only shews their ignorance 
of the peculiar nature of logical science. We do not enlarge, 
but disfigure the sciences when we lose sight of their respective 
limits, and allow them to run into one another. Now logic is 
enclosed within limits which admit of perfectly clear defini- 
tion ; it is a science which has for its object nothing but the 
exposition and proof of the/brwza/laws of all thought, whether 
it be a priori or empirical, whatever be its origin or its object, 
and whatever the difficulties — natural or accidental — which it 
encounters in the human mind. 

The early success of logic must be attributed exclusively 
to the narrowness of its field, in- which abstraction may, or 
rather must, be made of all the objects of cognition with their 
characteristic distinctions, and in which the understanding 
has only to deal with itself and with its own forms. It is, 
obviously, a much more difficult task for reason to strike into 
the sure path of science, where it has to deal not simply with 
itself, but with objects external to itself. Hence, logic is 
properly only a propedeutic — forms, asit were, the vestibule of" 
the sciences ; and while it is necessary to enable us to form a 
correct judgment with regard to the various branches of know- 
ledge, still the acquisition of real, substantive knowledge is to 
be sought only in the sciences properly so called, that is, in 
the objective sciences. 

Now these sciences, if they can be termed rational at all, 
must contain elements of a priori cognition, and this cogni- 
tion may stand in a two-fold relation to its object. Either it 
may have to determine the conception of the object — which 
must be supplied extraneously, or it may have to establish 
its reality. The former is theoretical, the latter practical, 
rational cognition. In both, the pure or a priori element 
must be treated first, and must be carefully distinguished from 
that which is supplied from other sources. Any other method 
can only lead to irremediable confusion. 

Mathematics and Physics are the two theoretical sciences 
which have to determine their objects a priori. The former 
is purely a priori, the latter is partially so, but is also de« 
pendent on other sources of cognition. 



XXVI PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 

In the earliest times of which history affords us any record, 
mathematics had already entered on the sure course of science, 
among that wonderful nation, the Greeks. Still it is not to be 
supposed that it was as easy for this science to strike into, or 
rather to construct for itself, that royal road, as it was for 
logic, in which reason has only to deal with itself. On the 
contrary, I believe that it must have remained long — chiefly 
among the Egyptians — in the stage of blind groping after its 
true aims and destination, and that it was revolutionised by 
the happy idea of one man, who struck out and determined 
for all time the path which this science must follow, and which 
admits of an indefinite advancement. The history of this 
intellectual revolution — much more important in its results 
than the discovery of the passage round the celebrated Cape of 
Good Hope — and of its author, has not been preserved. But 
Diogenes Laertius, in naming the supposed discoverer of some 
of the simplest elements of geometrical demonstration — ele- 
ments which, according to the ordinary opinion, do not even 
require to be proved — makes it apparent that the change in- 
troduced by the first indication of this new path, must have 
seemed of the utmost importance to the mathematicians of that 
age, and it has thus been secured against the chance of ob- 
livion. A new light must have flashed on the mind of the 
first man (Thales, or whatever may have been his name) 
who demonstrated the properties of the isosceles triangle. 
For he found that it was not sufficient to meditate on the 
figure, as it lay before his eyes, or the conception of it, as it 
existed in his mind, and thus endeavour to get at the know- 
ledge of its properties, but that it was necessary to produce 
these properties, as it were, by a positive a priori construction ; 
and that, in order to arrive with certainty at a priori cognition, 
he must not attribute to the object any other properties than 
those which necessarily followed from that which he had him- 
self, in accordance with his conception, placed in the object. 

A much longer period elapsed before Physics entered on the 
highway of science. For it is only about a century and 
a half since the wise Bacon gave a new direction to physical 
studies, or rather — as others were already on the right track — 
imparted fresh vigour to the pursuit of this new direction. 
Here, too, as in the case of mathematics, we find evidence of 
a rapid intellectual revolution. — In the remarks which follow 
I shall confine myself to the empirical side of natural science. 



PBEEACE TO THE SECOND EDITIOK. XXV11 

When Galilei experimented with balls of a definite weight 
on the inclined plane, when Toeeicelli caused the air to 
sustain a weight which he had calculated beforehand to be 
equal to that of a definite column of water, or when Stahl, 
at a later period, converted metals into lime, and reconverted 
lime into metal, by the addition and subtraction of certain 
elements ;* a light broke upon all natural philosophers. 
They learned that reason only perceives that which it pro- 
duces after its own design ; that it must not be content to 
follow, as it were, in the leading-strings of nature, but 
must proceed in advance with principles of judgment 
according to unvarying laws, and compel nature to rep 1 y 
to its questions. For accidental observations, made ac- 
cording to no preconceived plan, cannot be united under a 
necessary law. But it is this that reason seeks for and 
requires. It is only the principles of reason which can give 
to concordant phenomena the validity of laws, and it is only 
when experiment is directed by these rational principles, that 
it can have any real utility. Reason must approach nature 
with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, 
however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that 
his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who 
compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he 
himself thinks fit to propose. To this single idea must the 
revolution be ascribed, by which, after groping in the dark for 
so many centuries, natural science was at length conducted 
into the path of certain progress. 

We come now to metaphysics, a purely speculative science, 
which occupies a completely isolated position, and is entirely 
independent of the teachings of experience. It deals with 
mere conceptions — not, like mathematics, with conceptions 
applied to intuition — and in it, reason is the pupil of itself 
alone. It is the oldest of the sciences,, and would still survive, 
even if all the rest were swallowed up in the abyss of an all- 
destroying barbarism. But it has not yet had the good for- 
tune to attain to the sure scientific method. This will be ap- 
parent, if we apply the tests which we proposed at the outset. 
We find that reason perpetually comes to a stand, when it 
attempts to gain a priori the perception even of those laws 

* I do not here follow with exactness the history of the experimental 
method, of which, indeed, the first steps are involved in some obscurity. 



XXV111 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 

which the most common experience confirms. We find it 
compelled to retrace its steps in innumerable instances, and to 
abandon the path on which it had entered, because this does 
not lead to the desired result. We find, too, that those who 
are engaged in metaphysical pursuits are far from being able 
to agree among themselves, but that, on the contrary, this 
science appears to furnish an arena specially adapted for the 
display of skill or the exercise of strength in mock-contests — 
a field in which no combatant ever yet succeeded in gaining 
an inch of ground, in which, at least, no victory was ever yet 
crowned with permanent possession. 

This leads us to enquire why it is that, in metaphysics, the 
sure path of science has not hitherto been found. Shall we 
suppose that it is impossible to discover it ? Why then should 
nature have visited our reason with restless aspirations after it, 
as if it were one of our weightiest concerns ? Nay, more, how 
little cause should we have to place confidence in our reason, 
if it abandons us in a matter about which, most of all, we 
desire to know the truth — and not only so, but even allures us 
to the pursuit of vain phantoms, only to betray us in the end ? 
Or, if the path has only hitherto been missed, what indications 
do we possess to guide us in a renewed investigation, and to 
enable us to hope for greater success than has fallen to the lot 
of our predecessors ? 

It appears to me that the examples of mathematics and 
natural philosophy, which, as we have seen, were brought into 
their present condition by a sudden revolution, are suffi- 
ciently remarkable to fix our attention on the essential circum- 
stances of the change which has proved so advantageous to 
them, and to induce us to make the experiment of imitating 
them, so far as the analogy which, as rational sciences, they 
bear to metaphysics may permit. It has hitherto been as- 
sumed that our cognition must conform to the objects ; but 
all attempts to ascertain anything about these objects a priori, 
by means of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our 
knowledge, have been rendered abortive by this assumption. 
Let us then make the experiment whether we may not be more 
successful in metaphysics, if we assume that the objects must 
conform to our cognition. This appears, at all events, to ac- 
cord better with the possibility of our gaining the end we 
have in view, that is to say, of arriving at the cognition of 



PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXI* 

objects a priori, of determining something with respect to these 
objects, before they are given to us. We here propose to do 
just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the celestial 
movements. When he found that he could make no progress 
by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the 
spectator, he reversed the process, and tried the experiment of 
assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained 
at rest. We may make the same experiment with regard to 
the intuition of objects. If the intuition must conform to the 
nature of the objects, I do not see how we can know anything 
of them a prio?'i. If, on the other hand, the object conforms 
to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then easily 
conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge. Now 
as I cannot rest in the mere intuitions, but — if they are to be- 
come cognitions — must refer them, as representations, to some- 
thing, as object, and must determine the latter by means of 
the former, here again there are two courses open to me. 
Either, first, I may assume that the conceptions, by which I 
etfect this determination, conform to the object — and in this 
case I am reduced to the same perplexity as before ; or secondly, 
I may assume that the objects, or, which is the same thing, 
that experience, in which alone as given objects, they are cog- 
nized, conform to my conceptions — and then I am at no loss 
how to proceed. For experience itself is a mode of cognition 
which requires understanding. Before objects are given to 
me, that is, a priori, I must presuppose in myself laws of 
the understanding which are expressed in conceptions a 
priori. To these conceptions, then, all the objects of experi- 
ence must necessarily conform. Now there are objects which 
reason thinks, and that necessarily, but which cannot be given 
in experience, or, at least, cannot be given so as reason thinks 
them. The attempt to think these objects will hereafter furnish 
an excellent test of the new method of thought which we have 
adopted, and which is based on the principle that we only 
cognize in things a priori that which we ourselves place in 
them.* 

* This method, accordingly, which we have horrowed from the natural 
philosopher, consists in seeking for the elements of pure reason in that 
.which admils of confirmation or. refutation by experiment. Now the 
propositions of pure reason, especially when they transcend the limits of 
possible experience, do not admit of our making any experiment with their 
objects, as in natural science. Hence, with regard to those conceptions 



XXX PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 

This attempt succeeds as well as we could desire, and pro- 
mises to metaphysics, in its first part — that is, where it is 
occupied with conceptions a priori, of which the correspond- 
ing objects may be given in experience — the certain course of 
science. For by this new method we are enabled perfectly to 
explain the possibility of a priori cognition, and, what is more, 
to demonstrate satisfactorily the laws which lie a priori at the 
foundation of nature, as the sum of the objects of ex- 
perience — neither of which was possible according to the pro- 
cedure hitherto followed. But from this deduction of the 
faculty of a priori cognition in the first part of Metaphysics, 
we derive a surprising result, and one which, to all appearance, 
militates against the great end of Metaphysics, as treated in 
the second part. For we come to the conclusion that our 
faculty of cognition is unable to transcend the limits of pos- 
sible experience ; and yet this is precisely the most essential 
object of this science. The estimate of our rational cognition 
a priori at which we arrive is that it has only to do with phae- 
nomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing a real 
existence, lie beyond its sphere. Here we are enabled to put 
the justice of this estimate to the test. For that which of 
necessity impels us to transcend the limits of experience and 
of all phaenomena, is the unconditioned, which reason absolutely 
requires in things as they are in themselves, in order to com- 
plete the series of conditions. Now, if it appears that when, 
on the one hand, we assume that our cognition conforms to 
its objects as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot 
be thought without contradiction, and that when, on the other 
hand, we assume that our representation of things as they 
are given to us, does not conform to these things as they are in 
themselves, but that these objects, as phaenomena, conform to 
our mode of representation, the contradiction disappears : we 

and principles which we assume a priori, our only course will be to view 
them from two different sides. We must regard one and the same con- 
ception, on the one hand, in relation to experience as an object of the 
senses and of the understanding, on the other hand, in relation to reason, 
isolated and transcending the limits of experience, as an object of mere 
thought. Now if we find that, when we regard things from this double 
point of view, the result is in harmony with the principle of pure reason, 
bat that, when we regard them from a single point of view, reason is 
involved in self-contradiction, then the experiment will establish' the 
correctness of this distinction. 



PIIEFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXXI 

shall then be convinced of the truth of that which we began 
by assuming for the sake of experiment ; we may look upon 
it as established that the unconditioned does not lie in things 
as we know them, or as they are given to us, but in things 
as they are in themselves, beyond the range of our cognition.* 

But, after we have thus denied the power of speculative 
reason to make any progress in the sphere of the supersensi- 
ble, it still remains for our consideration whether data do not 
exist in practical cognition, which may enable us to determine 
the transcendent conception of the unconditioned, to rise 
beyond the limits of all possible experience from & practical 
point of view, and thus to satisfy the great ends of metaphy- 
sics. Speculative reason has thus, at least, made room for 
such an extension of our knowledge ; and, if it must leave this 
space vacant, still it does not rob us of the liberty to fill it up, 
if we can, by means of practical data — nay, it even challenges 
us to make the attempt. f 

This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the pro- 
cedure of metaphysics, after the example of the Geometri- 
cians and Natural Philosophers, constitutes the aim of the 
Critique of Pure Speculative Reason. It is a treatise on the 
method to be followed, not a system of the science itself. 
But, at the same time, it marks out and defines both the 

* This experiment of pure reason has a great similarity to that of the 
(Jhemists, which they term the experiment of reduction, or, more usually, 
the synthetic process. The analysis of the metaphysician separates pure 
cognition a priori into two heterogeneous elements, viz., the cognition of 
things as phsenomena, and of things in themselves. Dialectic combines 
these again into harmony with the necessary rational idea of the uncon- 
ditioned, and finds that this harmony never results except through the 
above distinction, which is, therefore, concluded to be just. 

f So the central laws of the movements of the heavenly bodies es- 
tablished the truth of that which Copernicus, at first, assumed only as a 
hypothesis, and, at the same time, brought to light that invisible force 
(Newtonian attraction) which holds the universe together. The latter 
would have remained for ever undiscovered, if Copernicus had not ven- 
tured on the experiment — contraiy to the senses, but still jusjt— of looking 
for the observed movements not in the heavenly bodies, but in the spec- 
tator. In this Preface I treat the new metaphysical method as a hypothesis 
with the view of rendering apparent the first attempts at such a change of 
method, which are always hypothetical. But in the Critique itself it will 
be demonstrated, not hypothetically, but apodeictically, from the nature of 
our representations of space and time, and from the elementary concep- 
tions of the understanding. 



XXX11 PEEFACE TO THE SECOKD EDITION. 

external boundaries and the internal structure of this Science. 
For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity, that, in 
choosing the various objects of thought, it is able to define the 
limits of its own faculties, and even to give a complete enu- 
meration of the possible modes of proposing problems to itself, 
and thus to sketch out the entire system of metaphysics. For, 
on the one hand, in cognition a priori, nothing must be at- 
tributed to the objects but what the thinking subject derives 
from itself: and, on the other hand, reason is, in regard to the 
principles of cognition, a perfectly distinct, independent unity, 
in which, as in an organised body, every member exists for 
the sake of the others, and all for the sake of each, so that 
no principle can be viewed, with safety, in one relationship, 
unless it is, at the same time, viewed in relation to the total 
use of pure reason. Hence, too, metaphysics has this singular 
advantage — an advantage which falls to the lot of no other 
science which has to do with objects — that, if once it is con- 
ducted into the sure path of science, by means of this criti- 
cism, it can then take in the whole sphere of its cognitions, 
and can thus complete its work, and leave it for the use of 
posterity, as a capital which can never receive fresh acces- 
sions. For metaphysics has to deal only with principles and 
with the limitations of its own employment as determined by 
these principles. To this perfection it is, therefore, bound, as 
the fundamental science, to attain, and to it the maxim may 
justly be applied : — 

Nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum. 

But, it will be asked, what kind of a treasure is this that we 
propose to bequeath to posterity? What is the real value of 
this system of metaphysics, purified by criticism, and thereby 
reduced to a permanent condition 1 A cursory view of the 
present work will lead to the supposition that its use is merely 
negative, that it only serves to warn us against venturing, with 
speculative reason, beyond the limits of experience. This is, 
in fact, its primary use. But this, at once, assumes & positive 
value, when we observe that the principles with which specu- 
lative reason endeavours to transcend its limits, lead inevitably, 
not to the extension, but to the contraction of the use of 
reason, inasmuch as they threaten to extend the limits of sen- 
sibility, which is their proper sphere, over the entire realm of 



PREPACE TO THE SECOXD EDITION. XXX113 

thought, and thus to supplant the pure (practical) use of 
reason. So far, then, as this criticism is occupied in confining 
speculative reason within its proper bounds, it is only negative ; 
but, inasmuch as it thereby, at the same time, removes an 
obstacle which impedes and even threatens to destroy the use 
of practical reason, it possesses a positive and very important 
value. In order to admit this, we have only to be convinced 
that there is an absolutely necessary use of pure reason — 
the moral use — in which it inevitably transcends the limits 
of sensibility, without the aid of speculation, requiring 
only to be insured against the effects of a speculation which 
would involve it in contradiction with itself. To deny the 
positive advantage of the service which this criticism renders 
us, would be as absurd as to maintain that the system of 
police is productive of no positive benefit, since its main 
business is to prevent the violence whieh citizen has to appre- 
hend from citizen, that so each may pursue his vocation in 
peace and security. That space and time are only forms of 
sensible intuition, and hence are only conditions of the 
existence of things as phenomena ; that, moreover, we have 
no conceptions of the understanding, and, consequently, no 
elements for the cognition of things, except in so far as a cor- 
responding intuition can be given to these conceptions ; that, 
accordingly, we can have no cognition of an object, as a thing 
in itself, but only as an object of sensible intuition, that is, as a 
phaenomenon, — all this is proved in the Analytical part of the 
Critique ; and from this the limitation of all possible specula- 
tive cognition to the mere objects of experience, follows as a 
necessary result. At the same time, it must be carefully borne 
in mind that, while Ave surrender the power of cognizing, we 
still reserve the power of thinking objects, as things in them- 
selves.* For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the exist- 

* In order to cognize an object, I must be able to prove its possibility, 
either from its reality as attested by experience, or a priori, by means of 
reason. But I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict 
myself; that is, provided my conception is a possible thought, though I 
may be unable to answer for the existence of a corresponding object in the 
sum of possibilities. But something more is required before I can 
attribute to such a conception objective validity, that is real possibility — 
the other possibility being merely logical. We are not. however, confined 
to theoretical sources of cognition for the means of satisfying this addi- 
tional requirement, but mav derive them from practical sources. 

c 



itXXlV PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 

ence of an appearance, without something that appears — 
which would be absurd. Now let us suppose, for a moment, 
that we had not undertaken this criticism, and, accordingly, 
had not drawn the necessary distinction between things, as 
objects of experience, and things, as they are in themselves. 
The principle of causality, and, by consequence, the mecha- 
nism of nature as determined by causality, would then have 
absolute validity in relation to all things as efficient causes. I 
should then be unable to assert, with regard to one and the same 
being, e. g., the human soul, that its will is free, and yet, at 
the same time, subject to natural necessity, that is s not free, 
without falling into a palpable contradiction, for in both pro- 
positions I should take the soul in the same signification, as a 
thing in general, as a thing in itself — as, without previous 
criticism, I could not but take it. Suppose now, on the other 
hand, that we have undertaken this criticism, and have learnt 
that an object may be taken in two senses, first, as a phseno- 
menon, secondly, as a thing in itself; and that, according to the 
deduction of the conceptions of the understanding, the princi- 
ple of causality has reference only to things in the first sense. 
We then see how it does not involve any contradiction to assert, 
on the one hand, that the will, in the phaenomenal sphere — in 
visible action, is necessarily obedient to the law of nature, and, 
in so far not free; and, on the other hand, that, as belonging to 
a thing in itself, it is not subject to that law, and, accordingly, 
is free. Now, it is true that I cannot, by means of specula- 
tive reason, and still less by empirical observation, cognize my 
soul as a thing in itself, and consequently, cannot cognize 
liberty as the property of a being to which I ascribe effects in 
the world of sense. For, to do so, I must cognize this being 
as existing, and yet not in time, which — since I cannot sup- 
port my conception by any intuition — is impossible. At the 
same time, while I cannot cognize, I can quite well think 
freedom, that is to say, my representation of it involves at 
least no contradiction, if we bear in mind the critical distinc- 
tion of the two modes of representation (the sensible and the 
intellectual) and the consequent limitation of the conceptions 
of the pure understanding, and of the principles which flow 
from them. Suppose now that morality necessarily presup- 
posed liberty, in the strictest sense, as a property of our will ; 
suppose that reason contained certain practical, original prin- 



PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION XXXV 

ciples a priori, which were absolutely impossible without this 
presupposition ; and suppose, at the same time, that specula- 
tive reason nad proved that liberty was incapable of being 
thought at all. It would then follow that the moral presup- 
position must give way to the speculative affirmation, the 
opposite of which involves an obvious contradiction, and that 
liberty and, with it, morality must yield to the mechanism of 
nature ; for the negation of morality involves no contradiction, 
except on the presupposition of liberty- Now morality does 
not require the speculative cognition of liberty ; it is enough 
that I can think it, that its conception involves no contradic- 
tion, that it does not interfere with the mechanism of nature. 
But even this requirement we could not satisfy, if we had not 
learnt the two-fold sense in which things may be taken ; and 
it is only in this way that the doctrine of morality and the 
doctrine of nature are confined within their proper limits. 
For this result, then, we are indebted to a criticism which 
warns us of our unavoidable ignorance with regard to things 
in themselves, and establishes the necessary limitation of our 
theoretical cognition to mere phaenomena. 

The positive value of the critical principles of pure reason 
in relation to the conception of God and of the simple nature 
of the soul, admits of a similar exemplification ; but on this 
point I shall not dwell. I cannot even make the assumption 
— as the practical interests of morality require — of God, Free- 
dom, and Immortality, if I do not deprive speculative reason 
of its pretensions to transcendent insight. For to arrive 
at these, it must make use of principles which, in fact, extend 
only to the objects of possible experience, and which cannot 
be applied to objects beyond this sphere without converting 
them into pheenomena, and thus rendering the practical exten- 
sion of pure reason impossible. I must, therefore, abolish 
knowledge, to make room for belief. The dogmatism of 
metaphysics, that is, the presumption that it is possible to ad- 
vance in metaphysics without previous criticism, is the true 
source of the unbelief (always dogmatic) which militates 
against morality. 

Thus, while it may be no very difficult task to bequeath a 
legacy to posterity, in the shape of a system of metaphysics 
constructed in accordance with the Critique of Pure Reason, " 
still the value of such a bequest is not to be depreciated. It 



XXXVI PKEEACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 

will render an important service to reason, by substituting the 
certainty of scientific method for that random groping after 
results without the guidance of principles, which has hitherto 
characterised the pursuit of metaphysical studies. It will 
render an important service to the inquiring mind of youth, 
by leading the student to apply his powers to the cultivation 
of genuine science, instead of wasting them, as at present, on 
speculations which can never lead to any result, or on the idle 
attempt to invent new ideas and opinions. ' But, above all, it 
will confer an inestimable benefit on morality and religion, by 
showing that all the objections urged against them may be 
silenced for ever by the Socratic method, that is to say, by 
proving the ignorance of the objector. For, as the world has 
never been, and, no doubt, never will be, without a system of 
metaphysics of one kind or another, it is the highest and 
weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for 
harm, by closing up the sources of error. 

This important change in the field of the sciences, this loss 
of its fancied possessions, to which speculative reason must 
submit, does not prove in any way detrimental to the general 
interests of humanity. The advantages which the world has 
derived from the teachings of pure reason, are not at all im- 
paired. The loss falls, in its whole extent, on the monopoly of 
the schools, but does not in the slightest degree touch the in- 
terests of mankind. I appeal to the most obstinate dogmatist, 
whether the proof of the continued existence of the soul after 
death, derived from the simplicity of its substance ; of the 
freedom of the will in opposition to the general mechanism of 
nature, drawn from the subtle but impotent distinction of sub- 
jective and objective practical necessity ; or of the existence 
of God, deduced from the conception of an ens realissimum, 
— the contingency of the changeable, and the necessity of a 
prime mover, has ever been able to pass beyond the limits of 
the schools, to penetrate the public mind, or to exercise the 
slightest influence on its convictions. It must be admitted 
that this has not been the case, and that, owing to the unfitness 
of the common understanding for such subtle speculations, it 
can never be expected to take place. On the contrary, it is 
plain that the hope of a future life arises from the feeling, 
which exists in the breast of every man, that the temporal ia 
inadequate to meet and satisfy the demands of his nature. 



PEEFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXXVU 

In like manner, it cannot be doubted that the clear exhibition 
of duties in opposition to all the claims of inclination, gives 
rise to the consciousness of freedom, and that the glorious 
order, beauty, and providential care, everywhere displayed in 
nature, give rise to the belief in a wise and great Author of 
the Universe. Such is the genesis of these general convictions 
of mankind, so far as they depend on rational grounds ; and 
this public property not only remains undisturbed, but is even 
raised to greater importance, by the doctrine that the schools 
have no right to arrogate to themselves a more profound insight 
into a matter of general human concernment, than that to 
which the great mass of men, ever held by us in the highest 
estimation, can without difficulty attain, and that the schools 
should therefore confine themselves to the elaboration of these 
universally comprehensible, and, from a moral point of view, 
amply satisfactory proofs. The change, therefore, affects only 
the arrogant pretensions of the schools, which would gladly 
retain, in their own exclusive possession, the key to the truths 
which they impart to the public. 

Quod mecum nescit, solus vult scire videri. 

At the same time it does not deprive the speculative philoso- 
pher of his just title to be the sole depositor of a science 
which benefits the public without its knowledge — I mean, the 
Critique of Pure Reason. This can never become popular, 
and, indeed, has no occasion to be so ; for fine-spun argu- 
ments in favour of useful truths, make just as little impression 
on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought 
against these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably 
force themselves on every man who rises to the height of 
speculation, it becomes the manifest duty of the schools to 
enter upon a thorough investigation of the rights of specula- 
tive reason, and thus to prevent the scandal which metaphysical 
controversies are sure, sooner or later, to cause even to the 
masses. It is only by criticism that metaphysicians (and, as 
such, theologians too) can be saved from these controversies 
and from the consequent perversion of their doctrines. Criti- 
cism alone can strike a blow at the root of Materialism, Fatal- 
ism, Atheism, Free-thinking, Fanaticism, and Superstition, 
which are universally injurious — as well as of Idealism and 
Scepticism, which are dangerous to the schools, but can scarcely 



XXXV111 PREFACE TO THE SECOKD EDITION. 

pass over to the public. If governments think proper to in- 
terfere with the affairs of the learned, it would be more con- 
sistent with a wise regard for the interests of science, as well 
as for those of society, to favour a criticism of this kind, by 
which alone the labours of reason can be established on a firm 
basis, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, 
which raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the de- 
struction of cobwebs, of which the public has never taken any 
notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can 'never feel. 

This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic proce- 
dure of reason in pure cognition ; for pure cognition must 
always be dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration 
from sure principles a priori — but to dogmatism, that is, to 
the presumption that it is possible to make any progress with 
a pure cognition, derived from (philosophical) conceptions, 
according to the principles which reason has long been in the 
habit of employing — without first inquiring in what way and 
by what right reason has come into the possession of these 
principles. Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of 
pure reason without previous criticism, of its own powers, and 
in opposing this procedure, we must not be supposed to lend 
any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arro- 
gates to itself the name of popularity, nor yet to scepticism, 
which makes short work with the whole science of metaphy- 
sics. On the contrary, our criticism is the necessary pre- 
paration for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics, 
which must perform its task entirely a priori, to the com- 
plete satisfaction of speculative reason, and must, therefore, 
be treated, not popularly, but scholastically. In carrying out 
the plan which the Critique prescribes, that is, in the future sys- 
tem of metaphysics, we must have recourse to the strict method 
of the celebrated Wole, the greatest of all dogmatic philoso- 
phers. He was the first to point out the necessity of establishing 
fixed principles, of clearly defining our conceptions, and of 
subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe scrutiny, 
instead of rashly jumping at conclusions. The example which 
he set, served to awaken that spirit of profound and thorough 
investigation which is not yet extinct in Germany. He would 
have been peculiarly well fitted to give a truly scientific cha- 
racter to metaphysical studies, had it occurred to him to pre- 
pare the field bv a criticism of the orgaaum, that is, of pure 



PPEPACE TO THE BECOKD EDI1 

reason itself. That he tailed to perceive the necessity o. 
ft procedure, must be ascribed to the dogmatic mode- 
thought which characterized his age, and on this point tl 
philosophers of his time, as well as of all previous times, hai . 
nothing to reproach each other -with. Those who reject a 
once the method of Yv'olt, and of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, can have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of 
science, to change labour into sport, cert inty into opinion, 
and philosophy into philodoxy. 

In this second edition, I have endeavour as pos- 

sible, to remove the difficulties and obscurity, whicn, irkhoni 
fault of mine perhaps., have given rise to many misconceptions 
even among acute thinkers. In the propositions themselves, 
and in the demonstrations by which they are supported, as 
well as in the form and the entire plan of the work, I have 
found nothing to alter ; which must be attributed partly to 
the long examination to which I had subjected the whole 
before offering it to the public, and partly to the nature of 
the case. Tor pure speculative reason is an organic structure 
in which there is nothing isolated or independent, but every 
single part is essential to all the rest ; and hence, the slightest 
imperfection, whether defect or positive error, could not fail to 
betray itself in use. I venture, further to hope, that this system 
will maintain the same unalterable character for the future. 
I am led to entertain this confidence, not by vanity, but by 
the evidence which the equality of the result affords, when we 
proceed, first, from the simplest elements up to the complete 
whole of pure reason, and then, backwards from the whole to 
each individual part. We rind that the attempt to make the 
os: alteration, in any part, leads inevitably to contradic- 
tions, not merely in this system, but in human reason itself. 
At the same time, there is still much room for improvement 
in the exposition of the doctrines contained in this work. In 
the pi I have endeavoured to remove misappre- 

hensions of the resthetieal part, especially with regard to the 
i of Time : to clear away the obscurity which has 
been found in the deduction of the conceptions of the under- 
ing; to supply the supposed w\ant oi sufficient evidence 
in the demonstration of the principles of the pure understand- 
ing ; and, lastly, to obviate the misunderstanding of the paralo- 
gisms which immediately precede the Rational Psychology. 



PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 

d this point — the end of the second Main Division of 

iYanscen dental Dialectic — I have not extended my altera- 

3ns,* partly from want of time, and partly because I am 

* The only addition, properly so called — and that only in the method 
, f proof — which I have made in the present edition, consists of a new 
efutation of psychological Idealism, and a strict demonstration — the only 
one possible, as I believe — of the objective reality of external intuition. 
However harmless Idealism may be considered — although in reality it is 
not so — in regard to the essential ends of metaphysics, it must still remain 
a scandal to philosophy and to the general human reason to be obliged to 
assume-, as an of mere belief, the existence of things external to 

ourselves (from which, yet, we derive the whole material of cognition even 
for the internal sense), and not to be able to oppose a satisfactory proof to 
any one who may call it in question. As there is some obscurity of ex- 
pression in the demonstration as it stands in the text, I propose to alter 
the passage in question as follows : "But this permanent cannot be an in- 
tuition in me. For all the determining grounds of rny existence which 
can be found in me, are representations, and, as such, do themselves re- 
quire a permanent, distinct from them, which may determine my existence 
in relation to their changes, that is, my existence in time, wherein they 
change." It may, probably, be urged in opposition to this proof, that, 
after all, I am only conscious immediately of that which is in me, that is, 
of my representation of external things, and that, consequently, it must 
always remain uncertain whether anything corresponding to this repre- 
sentation, does or does not exist externally to me. But I am conscious, 
through internal experience, of my existence in time, (consequently, also, of 
the determinability of the former in the latter), and that is more than the 
simple consciousness of my representation. It is, in fact, the same as the 
empirical consciousness of my existence, which can only be determined in 
relation to something, which, while connected with my existence, is ex- 
ternal to me. This consciousness of my existence in time is, therefore, 
identical with the consciousness of a relation to something external to me, 
and it is, therefore, experience, not fiction, sense, not imagination, which 
inseparably connects the external with my internal sense. For the ex- 
ternal sense is, in itself, the relation of intuition to something real, ex- 
ternal to me ; and the reality of this something, as opposed to the mere 
imagination of it, rests solely on its inseparable connection with internal 
experience as the condition of its possibility. If with the intellectual 
consciousness of my existence, in the representation: / am, which accom- 
panies all my judgments, and all the operations of my understanding, I 
could, at the same time, connect a determination of my existence by in- 
tellectual intuition, then the consciousness of a relation to something ex- 
ternal to me would not be necessary. But the internal intuition in which 
alone my existence can be determined, though preceded by that purely 
intellectual consciousness, is itself sensible and attached to the condition 
of time. Hence this determination of my existence, and consequently 
my internal experience itself, must depend on something permanent which 
is not in me, which can be, therefore, only in something external to rae, 
to which I must look upon myself as being relatet 1 Tilu» ihe reality of 



PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. xli 

not aware that any portion of the remainder has given rise to 
misconceptions among intelligent and impartial critics, whom 
J do not here mention with that praise which is their due, but 
who will find that their suggestions have been attended to in 
the work itself. 

In attempting to render the exposition of my views as intel- 
ligible as possible, I have been compelled to leave out or 
abridge various passages which were not essential to the com- 
pleteness of the work, but which many readers might consider 
useful in other respects, and might be unwilling to miss. 
This trifling loss, which could not be avoided without swelling 
the book beyond due limits, may be supplied, at the pleasure of 
the reader, by a comparison with the first edition, and will, I 
hope, be more than compensated for by the greater clearness 
of the exposition as it now stands. 

I have observed, with pleasure and thankfulness, in the 
pages of various reviews and treatises, that the spirit of pro- 
found and thorough investigation is not extinct in Germany, 
though it may have been overborne and silenced for a time 
by the fashionable tone of a licence in thinking, which gives 
itself the airs of genius — and that the difficulties which beset 
the paths of Criticism have not prevented energetic and acute 
thinkers from making themselves masters of the science of 
pure reason to which these paths conduct — a science which 

the external sense is necessarily connected with that of the internal, in 
order to the possibility of experience in general; that is, I am just as 
certainly conscious that there are things external to me related to my sense, 
as I am that I myself exist, as determined in time. But in order to 
ascertain to what given intuitions objects, external to me, really correspond, 
in other words, what intuitions belong to the external sense and not to 
imagination, I must have recourse, in every particular case, to those rules 
according to which experience in general (even internal experience) is 
distinguished from imagination, and which are always based on the pro- 
position that there really is an external experience. — We may add the 
remark, that the representation of something permanent in existence, is 
not the same thing as the permanent representation ; for a representation 
may be very variable and changing — as all our representations, even that 
of matter, are — and yet refer to something permanent, which must, 
therefore, be distinct from all my representations and external to me, the 
existence of which is necessarily included in the determination of my own 
existence, and with it constitutes one experience — an experience which 
would not even be possible internally, if it were not also at the same time, 
in part, external. To the question How? we are no more able to reply, 
than we are, in general, to think the stationary in time, the co-existence of 
which with the variable, produces the conception of change. 



Xlii PBEFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 

is not popular, but scholastic in its character, and which 
alone can hope for a lasting existence or possess an abiding 
value. To these deserving men, who so happily combine 
profundity of view with a talent for lucid exposition — a 
talent which I myself am not conscious of possessing — I leave 
the task of removing any obscurity which may still adhere to 
the statement of my doctrines. For, in this case, the danger 
is not that of being refuted, but of being misunderstood. For 
my own part, I must henceforward abstain from controversy, 
although I shall carefully attend to all suggestions, whether 
from friends or adversaries, which may be of use in the future 
elaboration of the system of this Propedeutic. As, during 
these labours, I have advanced pretty far in years — this month 
I reach my sixty-fourth year — it will be necessary for me to 
economize time, if I am to carry out my plan of elaborating 
the Metaphysics of Nature as well as of Morals, in confirmation 
if the correctness of the principles established in this Critique 
of Pure Reason, both Speculative and Practical ; and I must, 
therefore, leave the task of clearing up the obscurities of the 
present work — inevitable, perhaps, at the outset — as well as 
the defence of the whole, to those deserving men who have 
made my system their own. A philosophical system cannot 
come forward armed at all points like a mathematical treatise, 
and hence it may be quite possible to take objection to parti- 
cular passages, while the organic structure of the system, con- 
sidered as a unity, has no danger to apprehend. But few 
possess the ability, and still fewer the inclination, to take a 
comprehensive view of a new system. By confining the view 
to particular passages, taking these out of their connection 
and comparing them with one another, it is easy to pick out 
apparent contradictions, especially in a work written with any 
freedom of style. These contradictions place the work in an 
unfavourable light in the eyes of those who rely on the judg- 
ment of others, but are easily reconciled by those who have 
mastered the idea of the whole, If a theory possesses stabi- 
lity in itself, the action and reaction which seemed at first to 
threaten its existence, serve only, in the course of time, to 
smooth down any superficial roughness or inequality, and — if 
men of insight, impartiality, and truly popular gifts, turn 
their attention to it — to secure to it, in a short time, the requi- 
site elegance also. 

Konigsberg, April 1787. 







INTRODUCTION. 



I. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PURE AND EMPIRICAL 
KNOWLEDGE. 

■^EAT all our knowledge begins with experience there can be 
no doubt./ For how is it possible that the faculty of cog- 
nition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by 
means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of them- 
selves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of 
understanding into activity, to compare, to connect, or to se 
parate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous 
impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called ex- 
perience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of 
ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it. 
y But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it 
by no means follows, that all arises out of experience. For, 
on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical / know- 
ledge is a compound of that which we receive through im- 
pressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies 
from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), 
an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original 
element given by sense, till long practice has made us at- 
tentive to, and skilful in separating it. At k, ihciefore, a 
question which requires close investigation, and is not to be 
answered at first sight, — whether there exists a knowledge 
altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous 
impressions ? Knowledge of this kind is called a priori, in 
contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources 
a posteriori, that is, in experience. / 

But the expression, " a priori" is not as yet definite 
enough, adequately to indicate the whole meaning of the 
question above started. For, in speaking of knowledge which 

B 



2 INTRODUCTION. 

has its sources in experience, we are wont to say, that this or 
that may be known a priori, because we do not derive this 
knowledge immediately from experience, but from a general 
rule, which, however, we have itself borrowed from experi- 
ence. Thus, if a man undermined his house, we say, " he 
might know a priori that it would have fallen ;" that is, he 
needed not to have waited for the experience that it did actu- 
ally fall. But still, a priori, he could not know even this 
much. For, that bodies are heavy, and, consequently, that 
they fall when their supports are taken away, must have been 
known to him previously, by means of experience. 

By the term " knowledge a priori" therefore, we shall in 
the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or 
that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all ex- 
perience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that 
which is possible only a posteriori, that is, through experi- 
ence. Knowledge a priori is either pure or impure. Pure 
knowledge a priori is that with which no empirical element is 
mixed up. For example, the proposition, " Every change 
has a cause," is a proposition a priori, but impure, because 
change is a conception which can only be derived from expe- 
rience. 

II. The human intellect, even in an tjnphilosophical 

STATE, IS IN POSSESSION OE CERTAIN COGNITIONS A 
PRIORI. 

The question now is as to a criterion, by which we may 
securely distinguish a pure from an empirical cognition. Ex- 
perience no doubt teaches us that this or that object is con- 
stituted in such and such a manner, but not that it could not 
possibly exist otherwise. Now, in the first place, if we have 
a proposition Which contains the idea of necessity in its very 
conception, it is a judgment a priori ; if, moreover, it is not 
derived from any other proposition, unless from one equally 
involving the idea of necessity, it is absolutely a priori. Se- 
condly, an empirical judgment never exhibits strict and abso- 
lute, but only assumed and comparative universality (by in- 
duction) ; therefore, the most we can say is, — so far as we 
have hitherto observed, there is no exception to this or that 
rule. If, on the other hand, a judgment carries with it strict 
and absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible excep- 



A PEICSI COGNITIONS. 6 

tion, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely 
a priori. 

Empirical universality is, therefore, only an arbitrary ex- 
tension of validity, from that which may be predicated of a 
proposition valid in most cases, to that which is asserted of a 
proposition which holds good in all ; as, for example, in the 
affirmation, " all bodies are heavy." When, on the contrary, 
strict universality characterizes a judgment, it necessarily 
indicates another peculiar source of knowledge, namely, a 
faculty of cognition a priori. Necessity and strict univer- 
sality, therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure 
from empirical knowledge, and are inseparably connected 
with each other. But as in the use of these criteria the 
empirical limitation is sometimes more easily detected than 
the contingency of the judgment, or the unlimited universality 
which we attach to a judgment is often a more convincing 
proof than its necessity, it may be advisable to use the criteria 
separately, each being by itself infallible. 

Now, that in the sphere of human cognition, we have 
judgments which are necessary, and in the strictest sense 
universal, consequently pure a priori, it will be an easy 
matter to shew. If we desire an example from the sciences, 
we need only take any proposition in mathematics. If 
we cast our ey s upon the commonest operations of the un- 
derstanding, the proposition, " every change must have a 
cause," will amply serve our purpose. In the latter case, 
indeed, the conception of a cause so plainly involves the con- 
ception of a necessity of connexion with an effect, and of a 
strict universality of the law, that the very notion of a cause 
would entirely disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume, 
from a frequent association of what happens with that which 
precedes, and the habit thence originating of connecting re- 
presentations — the necessity inherent in the judgment being 
therefore merely subjective. Besides, without seeking for 
such examples of principles existing a priori in cognition, 
we might easily shew that such principles are the indispen- 
sable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and con- 
sequently prove their existence a priori. For whence could 
our experience itself acquire certainty, if all the rules on which 
it depends were themselves empirical, and consequently for- 
tuitous ? No one, therefore, can admit the validity of the use 

B 2 



4 INTRODUCTION. 

of such rules as first principles. But, for the present, we 
may content ourselves with having established the fact, that 
we do possess and exercise a faculty of pure a priori cog- 
nition ; and, secondly, with having pointed out the proper 
tests of such cognition, namely, universality and necessity. 

Not only in judgments, however, but even in conceptions, 
is an a priori origin manifest. For example, if we take away 
by degrees from our conceptions of a body all that can be 
referred to mere sensuous experience — colour, hardness or 
softness, weight, even impenetrability — the body will then 
vanish ; but the space which it occupied still remains, and 
this it is utterly impossible to annihilate in thought. Again, 
if we take away, in like manner, from our empirical conception 
of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which 
mere experience has taught us to connect with it, still we 
cannot think away those through which we cogitate it as 
substance, or adhering to substance, although our conception 
of substance is more determined than that of an object. 
Compelled, therefore, by that necessity with which the con- 
ception of substance forces itself upon us, we must confess 
that it has its seat in our faculty of cognition a priori. 

III. Philosophy stands in need of a science which 

SHALL DETERMINE THE POSSIBILITY, PRINCIPLES, AND 
EXTENT OE HUMAN KNOWLEDGE A PRIORI. 

Or far more importance than all that has been above said, 
is the consideration that certain of our cognitions rise com- 
pletely above the sphere of all possible experience, and by 
means of conceptions, to which there exists in the whole ex- 
tent of experience no corresponding object, seem to extend 
the range of our judgments beyond its bounds. And just in 
this transcendental or supersensible sphere, where experience 
affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the investi- 
gations of Reason, which, on account of their importance, we 
consider far preferable to, and as having a far more elevated 
aim than, all that the understanding can achieve within the 
sphere of sensuous phsenomena. So high a value do we set 
upon these investigations, that even at the risk of error, 
we persist in following them out, and permit neither doubt 
nor disregard nor indifference to restrain us from the pur- 
suit. These unavoidable problems of mere pure reason are 



DOGMATISM. O 

God, Feeedom (of will) and Immoetaeitt. The science 
which, with all its preliminaries, has for its especial object 
the solution of these problems is named metaphysics, — a 
science which is at the very outset dogmatical, that is, it con- 
fidently takes upon itself the execution of this task without 
any previous investigation of the ability or inability of reason 
for such an undertaking. 

Now the safe ground of experience being thus abandoned, 
it seems nevertheless natural that we should hesitate to erect 
a building with the cognitions we possess, without knowing 
whence they come, and on the strength of principles, the 
origin of which is undiscovered. Instead of thus trying to 
build without a foundation, it is rather to be expected that 
we should long ago have put the question, how the under- 
standing can arrive at these a priori cognitions, and what is 
the extent, validity, and worth which they may possess 1 We 
say, this is natural enough, meaning by the word natural, that 
which is consistent with a just and reasonable way of think- 
ing ; but if we understand by the term, that which usually 
happens, nothing indeed could be more natural and more 
comprehensible than that this investigation should be left 
long unattempted. For one part of our pure knowledge, 
the science of mathematics, has been long firmly estab- 
lished, and thus leads us to form flattering expectations with 
regard to others, though these may be of quite a different 
nature. Besides, when we get beyond the bounds of ex- 
perience, we are of course safe from opposition in that 
quarter ; and the charm of widening the range of our know- 
ledge is so great, that unless we are brought to a stand-still 
by some evident contradiction, we hurry on undoubtingly in 
our course. This, however, may be avoided, if we are suffi- 
ciently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are 
not the less fictions on that account. 

Mathematical science affords us a brilliant example, how 
far, independently of all experience, we may carry our a 
priori knowledge. It is true that the mathematician occupies 
himself with objects and cognitions only in so far as they can 
be represented by means of intuition. But this circumstance 
is easily overlooked, because the said intuition can itself be 
given a priori, and therefore is hardly to be distinguished 
from a mere pure conception. Deceived by such a proof of 



° INTBODUCTION. 

the power of reason, we can perceive no limits to the ex- 
tension of our knowledge. The light dove cleaving in free 
flight the thin air, whose resistance it feels, might imagine 
that her movements would be far more free and rapid in air- 
less space. Just in the same way did Plato, abandoning the 
world of sense because of the narrow limits it sets to the 
understanding, venture upon the wings of ideas beyond it, 
into the void space of pure intellect. He did not reflect that 
he made no real progress by all his efforts ; for he met with 
no resistance which might serve him for a support, as it were, 
whereon to rest, and on which he might apply his powers, in 
order to let the intellect acquire momentum for its progress. 
It is, indeed, the common fate of human reason in speculation, 
to finish the imposing edifice of thought as rapidly as possible, 
and then for the first time to begin to examine whether the 
foundation is a solid one or no. Arrived at this point, all 
sorts of excuses are sought after, in order to console us for 
its want of stability, or rather indeed, to enable us to dispense 
altogether with so late and dangerous an investigation. But 
what frees us during the process of building from all appre- 
hension or suspicion, and flatters us into the belief of its 
solidity, is this. A great part, perhaps the greatest part, of 
the business of our reason consists in the analysation of the 
conceptions which we already possess of objects. By this 
means we gain a multitude of cognitions, which although 
really nothing more than elucidations or explanations of that 
which (though in a confused manner) was already thought 
in our conceptions, are, at least in respect of their form, 
prized as new introspections ; whilst, so far as regards their 
matter or content, we have really made no addition to our con- 
ceptions, but only disinvolved them. But as this process does 
furnish real a priori knowledge,* which has a sure progress 
and useful results, reason, deceived by this, slips in, without 
being itself aware of it, assertions of a quite different kind; 
in which, to given conceptions it adds others, a priori in- 
deed, but entirely foreign to them, without our knowing how 
it arrives at these, and, indeed, without such a question ever 
suggesting itself. I shall therefore at once proceed to examine 
the difference between these two modes of knowledge. 

* Not synthetical. — Tr. 



ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS. / 

IV. Of the difference between analytical and 

SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS. 

Tn all judgments wherein the relation of a subject to the pre- 
dicate is cogitated, (I mention affirmative judgments only 
here ; the application to negative will be very easy,) this rela- 
tion is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate 
B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is contained 
(though covertly) in the conception A ; or the predicate B 
lies completely out of the conception A, although it stands in 
connexion with it. In the first instance, I term the judgment 
analytical, in the second, synthetical. Analytical judgments 
(affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of 
the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity ; 
those in which this connexion is cogitated without identity, are 
called synthetical judgments. The former may be called 
explicative, the latter augmentative* judgments ; because the 
former add in the predicate nothing to the conception of the 
subject, but only analyse it into its constituent conceptions, 
which were thought already in the subject, although in a con- 
fused manner ; the latter add to our conceptions of the 
subject a predicate which was not contained in it, and which 
no analysis could ever have discovered therein. For example, 
when I say, " all bodies are extended," this is an analytical 
judgment. For I need not go beyond the conception of body 
in order to find extension connected with it, but merely 
analyse the conception, that is, become conscious of the 
manifold properties which I think in that conception, in 
order to discover this predicate in it : it is therefore an ana- 
lytical judgment. On the other hand, when I say, " all 
bodies are heavy," the predicate is something totally different 
from that which I think in the mere conception of a body. 
By the addition of such a predicate therefore, it becomes a 
synthetical judgment. 

Judgments of experience, as such, are always synthetical. 
For it would be absurd to think of grounding an analytical 
judgment on experience, because in forming such a judg- 
ment, I need not go out of the sphere of my conceptions, 

* That is, judgments which really add to, and do not merely analyse 
or explain the conceptions which make up the sum of our knowledge. — 
TV. 



5 INTKODTJCTTO^, 

and therefore recourse to the testimony of experience is quite 
unnecessary. That "bodies are extended" is not an em- 
pirical judgment, but a proposition which s Lands firm a 'priori. 
For before addressing myself to experience, I already have 
in my conception all the requisite conditions for the judg- 
ment, and I have only to extract the predicate from the concep- 
tion, according to the principle of contradiction, and thereby 
at the same time become conscious of the necessity of the 
judgment, a necessity which I could never learn from ex- 
perience. On the other hand, though at first I do not at all 
include the predicate of weight in my conception of body 
in general, that conception still indicates an object of ex- 
perience, a part of the totality of experience, to which I can 
still add other parts ; and this I do when I recognize by ob- 
servation that bodies are heavy. I can cognize beforehand 
by analysis the conception of body through the character- 
istics of extension, impenetrability, shape, &c, all which are 
cogitated in this conception. But now I extend my know- 
ledge, and looking back on experience from which I had 
derived this conception of body, I find weight at all times 
connected with the above characteristics, and therefore I 
synthetically add to my conceptions this as a predicate, and 
say, "all bodies are heavy." Thus it is experience upon 
which rests the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate 
of weight with the conception of body, because both con- 
ceptions, although the one is not contained in the other, still 
belong to one another (only contingently, however), as parts 
of a whole, namely, of experience, which is itself a synthesis 
of intuitions. 

But to synthetical judgments a priori, such aid is entirely 
wanting. If I go out of and beyond the conception A, 
in order to recognize another B as connected with it, what 
foundation have I to rest on, whereby to render the synthesis 
possible ? I have here no longer the advantage of looking 
out in the sphere of experience for what I want. Let us 
take, for example, the proposition, "everything that happens 
has a cause." In the conception of something that happens, 
I indeed think an existence which a certain time antecedes, 
and from this I can derive analytical judgments. But the 
conception of a cause lies quite out of the above conception, 
and indicates something entirely different from " that which 



SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS A PEIOEI. V 

happens," and is consequently not contained in that con- 
ception. How then am I able to assert concerning the general 
conception — "that which happens " — something entirely dif- 
ferent from that conception, and to recognize the conception of 
cause although not contained in it, yet as belonging to it, and 
even necessarily? what is here the unknown = X, upon which 
the understanding rests when it believes it has found, out of 
the conception A a foreign predicate B, which it nevertheless 
considers to be connected with it ? It cannot be experience, 
because the principle adduced annexes the two represent- 
ations, cause and effect, to the representation existence, not 
only with universality, which experience cannot give, but also 
with the expression of necessity, therefore completely a priori 
and from pure conceptions. Upon such synthetical, that is 
augmentative propositions, depends the whole aim of our specu- 
lative knowledge a priori ; for although analytical judgments 
are indeed highly important and necessary, they are so, only 
to arrive at that clearness of conceptions which is requisite 
for a sure and extended synthesis, and this alone is a real 
acquisition. 

V. In ALL THEORETICAL SCIENCES OE EEASON, SYNTHETICAL 
JUDGMENTS A PRIORI AEE CONTAINED AS PEINCIPLES. 

1 . Mathematical judgments are always synthetical. Hitherto 
this fact, though incontestibly true and very important in its 
consequences, seems to have escaped the analysts of the humai 
mind, nay, to be in complete opposition to all their conjec- 
tures. For as it was found that mathematical conclusions ali 
proceed according to the principle of contradiction (whict 
the nature of every apodeictic certainty requires), peoph 
became persuaded that the fundamental principles of thl 
science also were recognised and admitted in the same wa) . 
But the notion is fallacious ; for although a synthetical pro- 
position can certainly be discerned by means of the principle 
of contradiction, this is possible only when another syntheti- 
cal proposition precedes, from which the latter is deduced, 
but never of itself. 

Before all, be it observed, that proper mathematical propo- 
sitions are always judgments d priori, and not empirical, be- 
cause they carry along with them the conception of necessity, 



1 INTRODUCTION. 

which cannot be given by experience. If this be demurred 
to, it matters not ; I will then limit my assertion to pure ma- 
thematics, the very conception of which implies, that it con 
sists of knowledge altogether non-empirical and a 'priori. 

We might, indeed, at first suppose that the proposition 
7 + 5=12, is a merely analytical proposition, following (ac- 
cording to the principle of contradiction), from the concep- 
tion of a sum of seven and five. But if we regard it more 
narrowly, we find that our conception of the sum of seven and 
five contains nothing more than the uniting of both sums 
into one, whereby it cannot at all be cogitated what this single 
number is which embraces both. The conception of twelve 
is by no means obtained by merely cogitating the union of 
seven and five ; and we may analyze our conception of such 
a possible sum as long as we will, still we shall never dis- 
cover in it the notion of twelve. We must go beyond 
these conceptions, and have recourse to an intuition which 
corresponds to one of the two, — our five fingers, for ex- 
ample, or like Segner in his " Arithmetic," five points, 
and so by degrees, add the units contained in the five given 
in the intuition, to the conception of seven. For I first take 
the number 7, and, for the conception of 5 calling in the aid 
of the fingers of my hand as objects of intuition, I add the 
units, which I before took together to make up the number 
5, gradually now by means of the material image my hand, 
to the number 7, and by this process, I at length see the 
number 12 arise. That 7 should be added to 5, I have 
certainly cogitated in my conception of a sum==7-t 5, but 
not that this sum was equal to 12. Arithmetical propositions 
are therefore always synthetical, of which we may become 
more clearly convinced by trying large numbers. For it will 
thus become quite evident, that turn and twist our conceptions 
as we may, it is impossible, without having recourse to intui- 
tion, to arrive at the sum total or product by means of the 
mere analysis of our conceptions. Just as little is any princi- 
ple of pure geometry analytical. " A straight line between 
two points is the shortest," is a synthetical proposition. For 
my conception of straight, contains no notion of quantity, 
but is merely qualitative. The conception of the shortest is 
therefore wholly an addition, and by no analysis can it be ex- 
tracted from our conception of a straight line. Intuition 



SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS A PEIOET. 11 

must therefore here lend its aid, by means of which and thus 
only, our synthesis is possible. ^ 

Some few principles preposited by geometricians are, in- 
deed, really analytical, and depend on the principle of con- 
tradiction. They serve, however, like identical propositions, 
as links in the chain of method, not as principles, — for ex- 
ample, a=a, the whole is equal to itself, or (a + 6) 7 a, 
the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these 
principles themselves, though they derive their validity from 
pure conceptions, are only admitted in mathematics because 
they can be presented in intuition. What causes us here 
commonly to believe that the predicate of such apodeictic 
judgments is already contained in our conception, and that 
the judgment is therefore analytical, is merely the equivocal 
nature of the expression. We must join in thought a certain 
predicate to a given conception, and this necessity cleaves 
already to the conception. But the question is, not what we 
must join in thought to the given conception, but what we 
really think therein, though only obscurely, and then it becomes 
manifest, that the predicate pertains to these conceptions, ne- 
cessarily indeed, yet not as thought in the conception itself, 
out by virtue of an intuition, which must be added to the con- 
ception. 

2. The science of Natural Philosophy (Physics) contains 
in itself synthetical judgments a priori, as principles. I shall 
adduce two propositions. For instance, the proposition, " in 
all changes of the material world, the quantity of matter 
remains unchanged ;" or, that, " in all communication of 
motion, action and re-action must always be equal." In 
both of these, not only is the necessity, and therefore their 
origin a priori clear, but also that they are synthetical propo- 
sitions. For in the conception of matter, I do not cogitate 
its permanency, but merely its presence in space, which it 
fills. I therefore really go out of and beyond the conception of 
matter, in order to think on to it something a priori, which I 
did not think in it. The proposition is therefore not analyti- 
cal, but synthetical, and nevertheless conceived a priori ; and 
so it is with regard to the other propositions of the pure part 
of natural philosophy. 

3. As to Metaphysics, even if we look upon it merely as an 
attempted science, yet, from the nature of human reason, an 



12 INTRODUCTION. 

indispensable one, we find that it must contain synthetical 
propositions a priori. It is not merely the duty of meta- 
physics to dissect, and thereby analytically to illustrate the 
conceptions which we form a priori of things ; but we seek to 
widen the range of our a priori knowledge. For this purpose, 
we must avail ourselves of such principles as add something to 
the original conception — something not identical with, nor 
contained in it, and by means of synthetical judgments 
a priori, leave far behind us the limits of experience ; for 
example, in the proposition, " the world must have a begin- 
ning," and such like. Thus metaphysics, according to the 
proper aim of the science, consists merely of synthetical pro- 
positions a priori. 

VI. The universal problem of pure reason. 

It is extremely advantageous to be able to bring a number 
of investigations under the formula of a single problem. For 
in this manner, we not only facilitate our own labour, inas- 
much as we define it clearly to ourselves, but also render it 
more easy for others to decide whether we have done justice to 
our undertaking. The proper problem of pure reason, then, 
is contained in the question, " How are synthetical judgments 
a priori possible ?" 

That metaphysical science has hitherto remained in so va- 
cillating a state of uncertainty and contradiction, is only to be 
attributed to the fact, that this great problem, and perhaps 
even the difference between analytical and synthetical judg- 
ments, did not sooner suggest itself to philosophers. Upon 
the solution of this problem, or upon sufficient proof of the im- 
possibility of synthetical knowledge a prion, depends the 
existence or downfall of the science of metaphysics. Among 
philosophers, David Hume came the nearest of all to this 
problem : yet it never acquired in his mind sufficient preci- 
sion, nor did he regard the question in its universality. On 
the contrary, he stopped short at the synthetical proposition of 
the connection of an effect with its cause, (principium causal- 
itatis), insisting that such proposition d, priori was impos- 
sible. According to his conclusions, then, all that we term 
metaphysical science is a mere delusion, arising from the 
fancied insight of reason into that which is in truth borrowed 
from experience, and to which habit has given the appearance 



THE GRAND PROBLEM OE PURE REASON. 13 

of necessity. Against this assertion, destructive to all pure 
philosophy, he would have been guarded, had he had our 
problem before his eyes in its universality. For he would 
then have perceived that, according to his own argument, 
there likewise could not be any pure mathematical science, 
which assuredly cannot exist without synthetical propositions 
d, priori, — an absurdity from which his good understanding 
must have saved him. 

In the solution of the above problem is at the same time 
comprehended the possibility of the use of pure reason in the 
foundation and construction of all sciences which contain 
theoretical knowledge a priori of objects, that is to say, the 
answer to the following questions : 

How is pure mathematical science possible ? 

How is pure natural science possible ? 

Respecting these sciences, as they do certainly exist, it may 
with propriety be asked, how they are possible ? — for that they 
must be possible, is shewn by the fact of their really existing.* 
But as to metaphysics, the miserable progress it has hitherto 
made, and the fact that of no one system yet brought forward, 
as far as regards its true aim, can it be said that this science 
really exists, leaves any one at liberty to doubt with reason 
the very possibility of its existence. 

Yet, in a certain sense, this kind of knowledge must un- 
questionably be looked upon as given; in other words, meta- 
physics must be considered as really existing, if not as a 
science, nevertheless as a natural disposition of the human 
mind (metaphysica naturalis). For human reason, without 
any instigations imputable to the mere vanity of great know- 
ledge, unceasingly progresses, urged on by its own feeling of 
need, towards such questions as cannot be answered by any em- 
pirical application of reason, or principles derived therefrom ; 
and so there has ever really existed in every man some system 

* As to the existence of pure natural science, or physics, perhaps many 
may still express doubts. But we have only to look at the different pro- 
positions which are commonly treated of at the commencement of proper 
(empirical) physical science — those, for example, relating to the perma- 
nence of the same quantity of matter, the vis inertias, the equality of 
action and reaction. &c. — to be soon convinced that they form a science 
of pure physics (physica pura, or rationales ), which well deserves to be 
separately exposed as a special science, in its whole extent, whether that 
be great or confined. 



14 INTRODUCTION. 

of metaphysics. It will always exist, so soon as reason awakes 
to the exercise of its power of speculation. And now the 
question arises — How is metaphysics, as a natural disposition, 
possible ? In other words, how, from the nature of universal 
human reason, do those questions arise which pure reason 
proposes to itself, and which it is impelled by its own feeling* 
of need to answer as well as it can ? 

But as in all the attempts hitherto made to answer the ques- 
tions which reason is prompted by its very nature to propose 
to itself, for example, whether the world had a beginning, or 
has existed from eternity, it has always met with unavoidable 
contradictions, we must not rest satisfied with the mere natu- 
ral disposition of the mind to metaphysics, that is, with the 
existence of the faculty of pure reason, whence, indeed, some 
sort of metaphysical system always arises ; but it must be 
possible to arrive at certainty in regard to the question whether 
we know or do not know the things of which metaphysics 
treats. We must be able to arrive at a decision on the subjects of 
its questions, or on the ability or inability of reason to form 
any judgment respecting them ; and therefore either to extend 
with confidence the bounds of our pure reason, or to set 
strictly defined and safe limits to its action. This last ques- 
tion, which arises out of the above universal problem, would 
properly run thus : How is metaphysics possible as a science ? 

Tl . , the critique of reason leads at last, naturally and 
necessarily, to science ; and, on the other hand, the dogma- 
tical use of reason without criticism leads to groundless asser- 
tions, against which others equally specious can always be set, 
thus ending unavoidably in scepticism. 

Besides, this science cannot be of great and formidable 
prolixity, because it has not to do with objects of reason, the 
variety of which is inexhaustible, but merely with reason her- 
self and her problems ; problems which arise out of her own 
bosom, and are not proposed to her by the nature of outward 
things, but by her own nature. And when once reason has 
previously become able completely to understand her own 
power in regard to objects which she meets with in experience, 
it will be easy to determine securely the extent and limits of 
her attempted application to objects beyond the confines of 
experience. 

We may and must, therefore, regard the attempts hitherto 



IDEA OP A CRITIQUE OP PURE SEASON. 15 

made to establish metaphysical science dogmatically as non- 
existent. For what of analysis, that is, mere dissection of 
conceptions, is contained in one or other, is not the aim of, 
but only a preparation for metaphysics proper, which has for 
its object the extension, by means of synthesis, of our a 
priori knowledge. And for this purpose, mere analysis is of 
course useless, because it only shews what is contained in 
these conceptions, but not how we arrive, a priori, at them; 
and this it is her duty to shew, in order to be able afterwards 
to determine their valid use in regard to all objects of expe- 
rience, to all knowledge in general. But little self-denial, 
indeed, is needed to give up these pretensions, seeing the 
undeniable, and in the dogmatic mode of procedure, in- 
evitable contradictions of Reason with herself, have long 
since ruined the reputation of every system of metaphysics 
that has appeared up to this time. It will require more 
firmness to remain undeterred by difficulty from within, and 
opposition from without, from endeavouring, by a method 
quite opposed to all those hitherto followed, to further the 
growth and fruitfulness of a science indispensable to human 
reason — a science from which every branch it has borne may 
be cut away, but whose roots remain indestructible. 

VII. Idea and division op a paeticulae science, tjndee 

THE NAME OP A CeITIQTTE OP PlJEE REASON. 

Feom all that has been said, there results the idea of a par- 
ticular science, which may be called the Critique of Pure 
Reason. For reason is the faculty which furnishes us with 
the principles of knowledge a priori. Hence, pure reason 
is the'faculty which contains the principles of cognizing any 
thing absolutely a priori. An Organon of pure reason would 
be a compendium of those principles according to which 
alone all pure cognitions a priori can be obtained. The 
completely extended application of such an organon would 
afford us a system of pure reason. As this, however, is de- 
manding a great deal, and it is yet doubtful whether any 
extension of our knowledge be here possible, or if so, in 
what cases ; we can regard a science of the mere criticism of 
pure reason, its sources and limits, as the propcedeutic to a 
system of pure reason. Such a science must not be called a 
Doctrine, but only a Critique of pure Reason ; and its use, 



LO IXTEODUCTIOtf. 

m regard to speculation, would be only negative, not to en- 
large the bounds of, but to purify our reason, and to shield it 
against error, — which alone is no little gain. I apply the term 
transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occu- 
pied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these 
objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori. 
A system of such conceptions would be called Transcendental 
Philosophy. But this, again, is still beyond the bounds of 
our present essay. For as such a science must contain a 
complete exposition not only of our synthetical a priori, but 
of our analytical a priori knowledge, it is of too wide a range 
for our present purpose, because we do not require to carry 
our analysis any farther than is necessary to understand, in 
their full extent, the principles of synthesis a priori, with 
which alone we have to do. This investigation, which we 
cannot properly call a doctrine, but only a transcendental 
critique, because it aims not at the enlargement, but at the 
correction and guidance of our knowledge, and is to serve 
as a touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of all know- 
ledge d priori, is the sole object of our present essay. Such 
a critique is consequently, as far as possible, a preparation 
for an organon ; and if this new organon should be found 
to fail, at least for a canon of pure reason, according to which 
the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, 
whether it extend or limit the bounds of that reason, might 
one day be set forth both analytically and synthetically. For 
that this is possible, nay, that such a system is not of so 
great extent as to preclude the hope of its ever being com- 
pleted, is evident. For we have not here to do with the 
nature of outward objects, which is infinite, but solely with 
the mind, which judges of the nature of objects, and, again, 
with the mind only in respect of its cognition a priori. And 
the object of our investigations, as it is not to be sought 
without, but altogether within ourselves, cannot remain con- 
cealed, and in all probability is limited enough to be com- 
pletely surveyed and fairly estimated, according to its worth 
or worthlessness. Still less let the reader here expect a 
critique of books and systems of pure reason ; our present 
object is exclusively a critique of the faculty of pure reason 
itself. Only when we make this critique our foundation, do 
we possess a pure touchstone for estimating the philosophical 



IDEA OF A CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. 

value of ancient and modern writings on this subject ; and 
without this criterion, the incompetent historian or judge 
decides upon and corrects the groundless assertions of others 
with his own, which have themselves just as little foundation. 

Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for 
which the Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole 
plan architectonically, that is, from principles, with a full 
guarantee for the validity and stability of all the parts which 
enter into the building. It is the system of all the principles 
of pure reason. If this Critique itself does not assume the 
title of transcendental philosophy, it is only because, to be a 
complete system, it ought to contain a full analysis of ail 
human knowledge a priori. Our critique must, indeed, lay 
before us a complete enumeration of all the radical concep- 
tions which constitute the said pure knowledge. But from 
the complete analysis of these conceptions themselves, as 
also from a complete investigation of those derived from 
them, it abstains with reason ; partly because it would be 
deviating from the end in view to occupy itself with this 
analysis, since this process is not attended with the difficulty 
and insecurity to be found in the synthesis, to which our 
critique is entirely devoted, and partly because it would be 
inconsistent with the unity of our plan to burden this essay 
with the vindication of the completeness of such an analysis 
and deduction, with which, after all, we have at present 
nothing to do. This completeness of the analysis of these 
radical conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the 
conceptions a priori which may be given by the analysis, we 
can, however, easily attain, provided only that we are in pos- 
session of all these radical conceptions, which are to serve as 
principles of the synthesis, and that in respect of this main 
purpose nothing is wanting. 

To the Critique of Pure Reason, therefore, belongs all that 
constitutes transcendental philosophy ; and it is the complete 
idea of transcendental philosophy, but still not the science 
itself ; because it only proceeds so far with the analysis as is 
necessary to the power of judging completely of our syn- 
thetical knowledge a priori. 

The principal thing we must attend to, in the division of 
the parts of a science like this, is : that no conceptions must 
enter it which contain aught empirical ; in other words, that 

c 



nfTJBGDTJCTION 



the knowledge a priori must be completely pure. Hence, 
although the highest principles and fundamental conceptions 
of morality are certainly cognitions a priori, yet they do not 
belong to transcendental philosophy ; because, though they 
certainly do not lay the conceptions of pain, pleasure, desires, 
inclinations, &c, (which are all of empirical origin) at the 
foundation of its precepts, yet still into the conception of 
clu^—as an obstacle to be overcome, or as an incitement 
which should not be made into a motive,— these empirical 
conceptions must necessarily enter, in the construction of a 
system of pure morality. Transcendental philosophy is con- 
sequently a philosophy of the pure and merely speculative 
reason. For all that is practical, so far as it contains mo- 
tives, relates to feelings, and these belong to empirical sources 
of cognition. 

If we wish to divide this science from the universal point 
of view of a science in general, it ought to comprehend, first, 
a Doctrine of the Elements, and, secondly, a Doctrine of the 
Method of pure reason. Each of these main divisions will 
have its subdivisions, the separate reasons for which we 
cannot here particularise. Only so much seems necessary, 
by way of introduction or premonition, that there are two 
sources of human knowledge (which probably spring from a 
common, but to us unknown root), namely, sense and under- 
standing. By the former, objects are given to us ; by the 
latter, thought. So far as the faculty of sense may contain 
representations a priori, which form the conditions under 
which objects are given, in so far it belongs to transcendental 
philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of sense must form 
the first part of our science of elements, because the con- 
ditions under which alone the objects of human knowledge 
are given, must precede those under which they are thought. 



GENERAL REMARKS ON TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC 35 

to pass the limits of that sphere. The latter has, indeed, 
this advantage, that the representations of space and time 
do not come in their way when they wish to judge of ob- 
jects, not as phsenomena, but merely in their relation to the 
understanding. Devoid, however, of a true and objectively 
valid a priori intuition, they can neither furnish any basis for 
the possibility of mathematical cognitions a priori, nor bring 
the propositions of experience into necessary accordance with 
those of mathematics. In our theory of the true nature of 
these two original forms of the sensibility, both difficulties are 
surmounted. 

In conclusion, that transcendental iEsthetic cannot con- 
tain any more than these two elements — space and time, 
is sufficiently obvious from the fact that all other con- 
ceptions appertaining to sensibility, even that of motion, 
which unites in itself both elements, presuppose something 
empirical. Motion, for example, presupposes the perception 
of something moveable. But space considered in itself 
contains nothing moveable, consequently motion must be 
something which is found in space only through experience, — 
in other words, is an empirical datum. In like manner, tran- 
scendental iEsthetic cannot number the conception of change 
among its data a priori ; for time itself does not change, but 
only something which is in time. To acquire the conception 
of change, therefore, the perception of some existing object 
and of the succession of its determinations, in one word, 
experience, is necessary. 

§ 9. — General Remarks on Transcendental JEsthetic. 

I. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, it will be 
requisite, in the first place, to recapitulate, as clearly as pos- 
sible, what our opinion is with respect to the fundamental 
nature of our sensuous cognition in general. "We have in- 
tended, then, to say, that all our intuition is nothing but the 
representation of phsenomena ; that the things which we intuite, 
are not in themselves the same as our representations of them 
in intuition, nor are their relations in themselves so constituted 
as they appear to us ; and that if we take away the subject, or 
even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, 
then not only the nature and relations of objects in space 
and time, but even space and time themselves disappear ; and 

d 2 



•55 TKANSCENDEOTAl ESTHETIC. 

that these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves but only 
„ a What may be the nature of objects considered as 
Lg in themselves and without reference to the recep tmty 
of our sensibility is quite unknown to us. We know nothing 
more than our own mode of perceiving them, which is peculiar 
t°u,td which, though not of necessity pertaining :to every 
animated being, is so to the whole : human race With thx> 
alone we have to do. Space and time are the pure torms 
thereof; sensation the matter. The former alone can we cog- 
Zt priori, that is, antecedent to a act ual. percep ion ; and 
for this reason such cognition is called pure intuition. ^ ine 
atteris that in our cognition which is called cognition a pes- 
Sf that is, empirical intuition. The former appertain ab- 
solntely and necessarily to our sensibility, of whatsoever land 
onr s nsations may be ; the latter may be of very diversified 
character Supposing that we should carry our empirical 
ntufiion even^ the* very highest degree of clearness w, 
should not thereby advance one step nearer to » ^° wled f of 
the constitution of objects as things in themselves For we 
could only, at best, arrive at a complete cognition of our ov> n 
mode of intnitiom that is ; of our sensibility and to* alwa£ 
under the conditions originally attaching to the subject, 
namely, the conditions of space and time ;— while the ques- 
don-^'What are objects considered as things in them- 
selves?" remains unanswerable even after the most thorough 
examination of the phenomenal world. 

To say, then, that all our sensibility is nothing but the con 
fused representation of things containing exclusively tha 
which belongs to them as things m themselves, and this under 
In accumulation of characteristic mark, and partial -Po- 
tions which we cannot distinguish in consciousness is a W ? A- 
cation of the conception of sensibility and phamomen.za ion 
wh ch renders our 4ole doctrine thereof empty and useks 
Tlie difference between a confused and a clear representation i. 
merely ogical and has nothing to do with content. No doub 
rtie conception of right, as employed by a sound under an d 
ing, contains all that the most subtle mvestigation could unfold 
from it, although, in the ordinary practical use of the w«d, 
we are not conscious of the manifold repmentafaona ^com- 
prised in the conception. But we cannot for tin reason, 
assert that the ordinary conception is a sensuous one, con- 



GENERAL REMARKS ON TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC. 37 

taining a mere phenomenon, for right cannot appear as a 
pheenomenon ; but the conception of it lies in the understand- 
ing, and represents a property (the moral property) of actions, 
winch belongs to them in themselves. On the other hand, the 
representation in intuition of a body contains nothing which 
could belong to an object considered as a thing in itself, but 
merely the pheenomenon or appearance of something, and the 
mode in which we are affected by that appearance ; and this 
receptivity of our faculty of cognition is called sensibility, 
and remains toto coelo different from the cognition of an ob- 
ject in itself, even though we should examine the content of 
the phenomenon to the very bottom. 

It must be admitted that the Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy 
has assigned an entirely erroneous point of view to all investi- 
gations into the nature and origin of our cognitions, inasmuch 
as it regards the distinction between the sensuous and the in- 
tellectual as merely logical, whereas it is plainly transcenden- 
tal, and concerns not merely the clearness or obscurity, but 
the content and origin of both. For the faculty of sensibility 
not only does not present us with an indistinct and confused 
cognition of objects as things in themselves, but, in fact, gives 
us no knowledge of these at all. On the contrary, so soon as 
we abstract in thought our own subjective nature, the object 
represented, with the properties ascribed to it by sensuous in- 
tuition, entirely disappears, because it was only this subjective 
nature that determined the form of the object as a pheeno- 
menon. 

In phenomena, we commonly, indeed, distinguish that which 
essentially belongs to the intuition of them, and is valid for 
the sensuous faculty of every human being, from that which 
belongs to the same intuition accidentally, as valid not for the 
sensuous faculty in general, but for a particular state or organ- 
ization of this or that sense. Accordingly, we are accus- 
tomed to say that the former is a cognition which represents 
the object itself, whilst the latter presents only a particular 
appearance or pheenomenon thereof. This distinction, how- 
ever, is only empirical. If we stop here (as is usual), and do 
not regard the empirical intuition as itself a mere pheenomenon 
(as we ought to do), in which nothing that can appertain to a 
thing in itself is to be found, our transcendental distinction is 
lost, and we believe that we cognize objects as things in them- 



38 TRANSCENDENTAL JESTHETIC. 

selves, although in the whole range of the sensuous world, 
investigate the nature of its objects as profoundly as we may, 
we have to do with nothing but phaenomena. ,/Phus, we call 
the rainbow a mere appearance or phsenomenon in a sunny 
shower, and the rain, the reality or thing in itself ; and this 
is right enough, if we understand the latter conception in a 
merely physical sense, that is, as that which in universal ex- 
perience, and under whatever conditions of sensuous percep- 
tion, is known in intuition to be so and so determined, and 
not otherwise. But if we consider this empirical datum gene- 
rally, and enquire, without reference to its accordance with all 
our senses, whether there can be discovered in it aught which 
represents an object as a thing in itself (the raindrops of 
course are not such, for they are, as phenomena, empirical 
objects), the question of the relation of the representation to 
the object is transcendental ; and not only are the raindrops 
mere phsenomena, but even their circular form, nay, the space 
itself through which they fall, is nothing in itself, but both 
are mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of our 
sensuous intuition, whilst the transcendental object remains 
for us utterly unknown. 

The second important concern of our ^Esthetic is, that it 
do not obtain favour merely as a plausible hypothesis, but 
possess as undoubted a character of certainty as can be de- 
manded of any theory which is to serve for an organon. In 
order fully to convince the reader of this certainty, we shall 
select a case which will serve to make its validity apparent, 
and also to illustrate what has been said in § 3. 

Suppose, then, that Space and Time are in themselves ob- 
jective, and conditions of the possibility of objects as things in 
themselves. In the first place, it is evident that both present us 
with very many apodcictic and synthetic propositions a priori, 
but especially space, — and for this reason we shall prefer it for 
investigation at present. As the propositions of geometry are 
cognized synthetically a priori, and with apodeictic certainty, 
{enquire, — whence do you obtain propositions of this kind, and 
on what basis does the understanding rest, in order to arrive 
at such absolutely necessary and universally valid truths ? 

There is no other way than through intuitions or conceptions, 
as such ; and these are given either a priori or u posteriori. 
The latter, namely, empirical conceptions, together with the 



GENERAL REMARKS ON TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC. 39 

empirical intuition on which they are founded, cannot afford 
any synthetical proposition, except such as is itself also empi- 
rical, that is, a proposition of experience. But an empirical 
proposition cannot possess the qualities of necessity and abso- 
lute universality, which, nevertheless, are the characteristics of 
all geometrical propositions. As to the first and only means 
to arrive at such cognitions, namely, through mere concep- 
tions or intuitions a priori, it is quite clear that from mere con- 
ceptions no synthetical cognitions, but only analytical ones, can 
be obtained. Take, for example, the proposition, " Two straight 
lines cannot enclose a space, and with these alone no figure is 
possible," and try to deduce it from the conception of a 
straight line, and the number two ; or take the proposition, 
" It is possible to construct a figure with three straight lines," 
and endeavour, in like manner, to deduce it from the mere 
conception of a straight line and the number three. All your 
endeavours are in vain, and you find yourself forced to have 
recourse to intuition, as, in fact, geometry always does. You 
therefore give yourself an object in intuition. But of what 
kind is this intuition ? Is it a pure a priori, or is it an em- 
pirical intuition? If the latter, then neither an universally 
valid, much less an apodeictic proposition can arise from it, 
for experience never can give us any such proposition. You 
must therefore give yourself an object a priori in intuition, 
and upon that ground your synthetical proposition. Now if 
there did not exist within you a faculty of intuition a priori ; 
if this subjective condition were not in respect to its form also 
the universal condition a priori under which alone the object 
of this external intuition is itself possible ; if the object (that 
is, the triangle,) were something in itself, without relation to 
you the subject ; how could you affirm that that which lies 
necessarily in your subjective conditions in order to construct 
a triangle, must also necessarily belong to the triangle in 
itself? For to your conceptions of three lines, you could not 
add any thing new (that is, the figure) which, therefore, 
must necessarily be found in the object, because the object 
is given before your cognition, and not by means of it. If, 
therefore, Space (and Time also) were not a mere form of 
your intuition, which contains conditions b\ priori, under 
which alone things can become external objects for you, and 
without which subjective conditions the objects are in them- 



40 TKANSCEKDE1S-TAL JESTHETIC. 

selves nothing, you could not construct any synthetical pro- 
position whatsoever regarding external objects. It is therefore 
uot merely possible or probable, but indubitably certain, that 
Space and Time, as the necessary conditions of all our external 
and internal experience, are merely subjective conditions of all 
our intuitions, in relation to which all objects are therefore 
mere phaenomena, and not things in themselves, presented to 
us in this particular manner. And for this reason, in respect 
to the form of pheenomena, much may be said a priori, whilst 
of the thing in itself, which may lie at the foundation of these 
phsenomena, it is impossible to say any thing. 

II. In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the 
external as well as internal sense, consequently of all objects 
of sense, as mere phsenomena, we may especially remark, that 
all in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing 
more than mere relations. — The feelings of pain and pleasure, 
and the will, which are not cognitions, are excepted. — The re- 
lations, to wit, of place in an intuition (extension), change 
of place (motion), and laws according to which this change 
is determined (moving forces). That, however, which is pre- 
sent in this or that place, or any operation going on, or re- 
sult taking place in the things themselves, with the exception 
of change of place, is not given to us by intuition. Now by 
means of mere relations, a thing cannot be known in itself ; 
and it may therefore be fairly concluded, that, as through the 
external sense nothing but mere representations of relations 
are given us, the said external sense in its representation can 
contain only the relation of the object to the subject, but not 
the essential nature of the object as a thing in itself. 

The same is the case with the internal intuition, not only, 
because, in the internal intuition, the representation of the 
external senses constitutes the material with which the mind 
is occupied ; but because time, in which we place, and which 
itself antecedes the consciousness of, these representations in 
experience, and which, as the formal condition of the mode 
according to which objects are placed in the mind, lies at the 
foundation of them, contains relations of the successive, the 
co-existent, and of that which always must be co-existent with 
succession, the permanent. Now that which, as represent- 
ation, can antecede every exercise of thought (of an object), is 
intuition ; and when it contains nothing but relations, it is th« 



GENEEAL EEMAEKS ON TEANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC. 4 J 

form of the intuition, which, as it presents us with no repre- 
sentation, except in so far as something is placed in the mind, 
can be nothing else than the mode in which the mind is affected 
by its own activity, to wit — its presenting to itself represent- 
ations, consequently the mode in which the mind is affected 
by itself ; that is, it can be nothing but an internal sense in 
respect to its form. Everything that is represented through 
the medium of sense is so far phsenomenal ; consequently, we 
must either refuse altogether to admit an internal sense, or 
the subject, which is the object of that sense, could only be 
represented by it as phsenomenon, and not as it would judge 
of itself, if its intuition were pure spontaneous activity, that 
is, were intellectual. The difficulty here lies wholly in the 
question — How the subject can have an internal intuition of 
itself? — but this difficulty is common to every theory. The 
consciousness of self (apperception) is the simple represent- 
ation of the " Ego ;" and if by means of that representation 
alone, all the manifold representations in the subject were 
spontaneously given, then our internal intuition would be 
intellectual. This consciousness in man requires an internal 
perception of the manifold representations which are pre- 
viously given in the subject ; and the manner in which these 
representations are given in the mind without spontaneity, 
must, on account of this difference (the want of spontaneity), 
be called sensibility. If the faculty of self-consciousness is to 
apprehend what lies in the mind, it must affect that, and can 
in this way alone produce an intuition of self. But the form 
of this intuition, which lies in the original constitution of the 
mind, determines, in the representation of time, the manner in 
which the manifold representations are to combine themselves 
in the mind ; since the subject intuites itself, not as it would 
represent itself immediately and spontaneously, but according 
to the manner in which the mind is internally affected, conse- 
quently, as it appears, and not as it is. 

III. When we say that the intuition of external objects, and 
also the self-intuition of the subject, represent both, objects 
and subject, in space and time, as they affect our senses, that 
is, as they appear, — this is by no means equivalent to asserting 
that these objects are mere illusory appearances. For when 
we speak of things as phsenomena, the objects, nay, even the 
properties which we ascribe to them, are looked upon as really 



42 TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC. 

given ; only that, in so far as this or that property depends 
upon the mode of intuition of the subject, in the relation of 
the given object to the subject, the object as phsenomenon is 
to be distinguished from the object as a thing in itself. Thus 
I do not say that bodies seem or appear to be external to me, 
or that my soul seems merely to be given in my self-con- 
sciousness, although I maintain that the properties of space and 
time, in conformity to which I set both, as the condition of 
their existence, abide in my mode of intuition, and not in the 
objects in themselves. It would be my own fault, if out of 
that which I should reckon as phenomenon, I made mere 
illusory appearance.* But this will not happen, because of 
our principle of the ideality of all sensuous intuitions. On 
the contrary, if we ascribe objective reality to these forms of 
representation, it becomes impossible to avoid changing every 
thing into mere appearance. For if we regard space and 
time as properties, which must be found in objects as things 
in themselves, as sine quibus non of the possibility of their 
existence, and reflect on the absurdities in which we then find 
ourselves involved, inasmuch as we are compelled to admit 
the existence of two infinite things, which are nevertheless not 
substances, nor any thing really inhering in substances, nay, 
to admit that they are the necessary conditions of the exist- 
ence of all things, and moreover, that they must continue to 
exist, although all existing things were annihilated, — we can- 
not blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere 
illusory appearances. Nay, even our own existence, which 

* The predicates of the phenomenon can be affixed to the object it- 
self in relation to our sensuous faculty ; for example, the red colour or the 
perfume to the rose. But (illusory) appearance never can be attributed 
as a predicate to an object, for this very reason, that it attributes to this 
object in itself that which belongs to it only in relation to our sensuous 
faculty, or to the subject in general, e. g. the two handles which were 
formerly ascribed to Saturn. That which is never to be found in the ob- 
ject itself, but always in the relation of the object to the subject, and 
which moreover is inseparable from our representation of the object, we 
denominate phenomenon. Thus the predicates of space and time are 
rightly attributed to objects of the senses as such, and in this there is no 
illusion. On the contrary, if I ascribe redness to the rose as a thing in 
itself, or to Saturn his handles, or extension to all external objects, con- 
sidered as things in themselves, without regarding the determinate relatiou 
of these objects to the subject, and without limiting my judgment to that 
relation, — then, and then only, arises illusion. 



GENERAL REMARKS 01ST TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC. 43 

would in this case depend upon the self-existent reality of 
such a mere nonentity as time, would necessarily be changed 
with it into mere appearance — an absurdity which no one has 
as yet been guilty of. 

IV. In natural theology, where we think of an object — God 
— which never can be an object of intuition to us, and even 
to himself can never be an object of sensuous intuition, we 
carefully avoid attributing to his intuition the conditions of 
space and time — and intuition all his cognition must be, and 
not thought, which always includes limitation. But with 
what right can we do this if we make them forms of objects 
as things in themselves, and such moreover, as would con- 
tinue to exist as a priori conditions of the existence of things, 
even though the things themselves were annihilated ? For as 
conditions of all existence in general, space and time must 
be conditions of the existence of the Supreme Being also. 
But if we do not thus make them objective forms of all 
things, there is no other way left than to make them sub- 
jective forms of our mode of intuition — external and internal ; 
which is called sensuous, because it is not primitive, that 
is, is not such as gives in itself the existence of the object of 
the intuition (a mode of intuition which, so far as we can judge, 
can belong only to the Creator), but is dependent on the ex- 
istence of the object, is possible, therefore, only on condition 
that the representative faculty of the subject is affected by 
the object. 

It is, moreover, not necessary that we should limit the mode 
of intuition in space and time to the sensuous faculty of man. 
It may well be, that all finite thinking beings must neces- 
sarily in this respect agree with man, (though as to this we 
cannot decide), but sensibility does not on account of this 
universality cease to be sensibility, for this very reason, that 
it is a deduced (intuitus derivativus), and not an-original (in- 
tuitus originarius) , consequently not an intellectual intuition; 
and this intuition, as such, for reasons above mentioned, seems 
to belong solely to the Supreme Being, but never to a being 
dependent, quoad its existence, as well as its intuition (which 
its existence determines and limits relatively to given objects). 
This latter remark, however, must be taken only as au illus- 
tration, and not as any proof of the truth of our eesthetica] 
iheorv. 



44 TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC. 

§ 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental JEsthetic. 

We have now completely before us one part of the solution 
of the grand general problem of transcendental philosophy, 
namely, the question — How are synthetical propositions a 
priori possible ? That is to say, we have shown that we are in 
possession of pure a priori intuitions, namely, space and time, 
in which we find, when in a judgment a, priori we pass out 
beyond the given conception, something which is not dis- 
coverable in that conception, but is certainly found a priori 
in the intuition which corresponds to the conception, and can 
be united synthetically with it. But the judgments which 
these pure intuitions enable us to make, never reach farther 
than to objects of the senses, and are valid only for objects 
of possible experience. 



TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OP ELEMENTS, 



PART SECOND. 

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

INTRODUCTION. 

IDEA OP A TEAtfSCEKDENTAL LOGIC. 

I. 

Of Logic in general. 

Our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, 
the first of which is the faculty or power of receiving repre- 
sentations (receptivity for impressions) ; the second is the 
power of cognizing by means of these representations (spon- 
taneity in the production of conceptions). Through the first 
an object is given to us ; through the second, it is, in relation 
to the representation (which is a mere determination of the 
mind), thought. Intuition and conceptions constitute, there- 
fore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither con- 
ceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding to 
them, nor intuition without conceptions, can afford us a cog- 
nition. Both are either pure or empirical. They are empi- 
rical, when sensation (which presupposes the actual presence 
of the object) is contained in them ; and pure, when no sen- 
sation is mixed with the representation. Sensations we may 
call the matter of sensuous cognition. Pure intuition con- 
sequently contains merely the form under which something 
is intuited, and pure conception only the form of the thought 
of an object. Only pure intuitions and pure conceptions are 
possible a priori; the empirical only a posteriori. 

We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the 
mind for impressions, in so far as it is in some way affected , 
and, on the other hand, we call the faculty of spontaneously 
producing representations, or the spontaneity of cognition, 
understanding. Our nature is so constituted, that intuition 
with us never can be other than sensuous, that is, it contains 



46 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

only the mode in which we are affected by objects. On the 
other hand, the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous in- 
tuition, is the understanding. Neither of these faculties has 
a preference over the other. Without the sensuous faculty 
no object would be given to us, and without the understanding 
no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are 
void ; intuitions without conceptions, blind. Hence it is as 
necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous 
(that is, to join to them the object in intuition), as to make its 
intuitions intelligible (that is, to bring them under concep- 
tions). Neither of these faculties can exchange its proper 
function. Understanding cannot intuite, and the sensuous 
faculty cannot think. In no other way than from the united 
operation of both, can knowledge arise. But no one ought, 
on this account, to overlook the difference of the elements 
contributed by each ; we have rather great reason carefully 
to separate and distinguish them. We therefore distinguish 
the science of the laws of sensibility, that is, ^Esthetic, from 
the science of the laws of the understanding, that is, Logic. 

Now, logic in its turn may be considered as twofold, — 
namely, as logic of the general [universal],* or of the particular 

* Logic is nothing but the science of the laws of thought, as thought, 
It concerns itself only with the form of thought, and takes no cognizance 
of the matter — that is, of the infinitude of the objects to which thought 
is applied. 

Now Kant is wrong, when he divides logic into logic of the general 
and of the particular use of the understanding. 

He says the logic of the particular use of the understanding contains 
the laws of right thinking upon any particular set of objects. This sort 
of logic he calls the organon of this or that science. It is difficult to dis- 
cover what he means by his logic of the particular use of the understand- 
ing. From his description, we are left in doubt whether he means by 
this logic induction, that is, the organon of science in general, or the laws 
which regulate the objects, a science of which he seeks to establish. — In 
either case, the application of the term logic is inadmissible. To regard 
logic as the organon of science, is absurd, as indeed Kant himself afterwards 
shows (p. 51). It knows nothing of this or that object. The matter em- 
ployed in syllogisms is used for the sake of example only; all forms of 
syllogisms might be expressed in signs. Logicians have never been able 
clearly to see this. They have never been able clearly to define the ex- 
tent of their science, to know, in fact, what their science really treated of. 
They have never seen that it has to do only with the formal, and never with 
the material in thought. The science has broken down its proper barriers to 
let in contributions from metaphysics, psychology, &c. It is common 
enough, for example, to say that Bacon's Novum Organum entirely super- 



CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. 



TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE 
OF ELEMENTS. 



TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS, 



PART FIRST. 

TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC. 
§ 1. Introductory. 

In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our know- 
ledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear, that the 
only manner in which it immediately relates to them, is by 
means of an intuition. To this as the indispensable ground- 
work, all thought points. But an intuition can take place 
only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only 
possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect 
the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving re- 
presentations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are 
affected by objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensi- 
bility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes 
us with intuitions ; by the understanding they are thought, 
and from it arise conceptions. But all thought must directly, 
or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to 
intuitions ; consequently, with us, to sensibility, because in 
no other way can an object be given to us. 

The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, 
so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That 
sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensa- 
tion, is called an empirical intuition. The undetermined ob- 
ject of an empirical intuition, is called phenomenon. That 
which in the phsenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term 
its matter ; but that which effects that the content of the phseno- 
menon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its form. 
But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by 
which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, can- 
not be itself sensation. It is then, the matter of all phseno- 
mena that is given to us a posteriori ; the form must lie ready 
a priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be re- 
garded separately from all sensation. 



22 TKANSCENDEtfTAL ESTHETIC. 

I call all representations pure, in the transcendental mean- 
ing of the word, wherein nothing is met with that belongs to 
sensation. And accordingly we find existing in the mind 
a priori, the pure form of sensuous intuitions in general, in 
which all the manifold content of the phaenomenal world is 
arranged and viewed under certain relations. This pure form 
of sensibility I shall call pure intuition. Thus, if I take 
away from our representation of a body, all that the under- 
standing thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, a/visi- 
bility, &c, and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impe- 
netrability, hardness, colour, &c. ; yet there is still something 
left us from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and 
shape. These belong to pure intuition, which exists a priori 
in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any 
real object of the senses or any sensation. 

The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori, I 
call Transcendental iEsthetic* There must, then, be such a 
science, forming the first part of the transcendental doctrine 
of elements, in contradistinction to that part which contains 
the principles of pure thought, and which is called transcen- 
dental logic. 

In the science of transcendental aesthetic accordingly, we 
shall first isolate sensibility or the sensuous faculty, by sepa- 
rating from it all that is annexed to its perceptions by the 
conceptions of understanding, so that nothing be left but em- 
pirical intuition. In the next place we shall take away from 
this intuition all that belongs to sensation, so that nothing 
may remain but pure intuition, and the mere form of phae- 

* The Germans are the only people who at present use this word to 
indicate what others call the critique of taste. At the foundation of 
this terra lies the disappointed hope, which the eminent analyst, Baum- 
garten, conceived, of subjecting the criticism of the beautiful to principles 
of reason, and so of elevating its rules into a science. But his endeavours 
were vain. For the said rules or criteria are, in respect to their chief 
sources, merely empirical, consequently never can serve as determinate 
laws a priori, by which our judgment in matters of taste is to be directed. 
It is rather our judgment which forms the proper test as to the correct- 
ness of the principles. On this account it is advisable to give up the use 
of the term as designating the critique of taste, and to apply it solely to that 
doctrine, which is true science,— the science of the laws of sensibility — 
and thus come nearer to the language and the sense of the ancients in their 
well-known division of tbe objects of cognition into aloVijTa icai vor\Ta ; 
or to share it with speculative philosophy, and employ it partly in a tran- 
scendental, partly in a psychological signification. 



METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION OP SPACE. 23 

nomena, which is all that the sensibility can afford a 'priori. 
From this investigation it mil be found that there are two 
pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge 
a priori, namely, space and time. To the consideration of these 
we shall now proceed. 

SECTION I. 

OF SPACE. 

§ 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception. 

Bt means of the external sense (a property of the mind), we 
represent to ourselves objects as without us, and these all in 
space. Therein alone are their shape, dimensions, and rela- 
tions to each other determined or determinable. The internal 
sense, by means of which the mind contemplates itself or 
its internal state, gives, indeed, no intuition of the soul as 
an object; yet there is nevertheless a determinate form, under 
which alone the contemplation of our internal state is pos- 
sible, so that all which relates to the inward determinations of 
the mind is represented in relations of time. Of time we 
cannot have any external intuition, any more than we can have 
an internal intuition of space. What then are time and space ? 
Are they real existences 1 Or, are they merely relations or de- 
terminations of things, such however, as would equally belong 
to these things in themselves, though they should never become 
objects of intuition ; or, are they such as belong only to the 
form of intuition, and consequently to the subjective consti- 
tution of the mind, without which these predicates of time 
and space could not be attached to any object ? In order to 
become informed on these points, we shall first give an expo- 
sition of the conception of space. By exposition, I mean the 
clear, though not detailed, representation of that which belongs 
to a conception ; and an exposition is metaphysical, when it 
contains that which represents the conception as given a priori. 
1. Space is not a conception which has been derived 
from outward experiences. For, in order that certain sen- 
sations may relate to something without me, (that is, to 
something which occupies a different part of space from that 
in which I am) ; in like manner, in order that I may represent 
them not merely as without of and near to each other, but also 
in separate places, the representation of space must already 



24 TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC. 

exist as a foundation. Consequently, the representation of 
space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external pha> 
nomena through experience ; but, on the contrary, this ex- 
ternal experience is itself only possible through the said ante- 
cedent representation. 

2. Space then is a necessary representation a priori, which 
serves for the foundation of all external intuitions. We never 
can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non- 
existence of space, though we may easily enough think that no 
objects are found in it. It must, therefore, be considered as 
the condition of the possibility of phaenomena, and by no 
means as a determination dependent on them, and is a repre- 
sentation a priori, which necessarily supplies the basis for 
external phasnomena. 

3. Space is no discursive, or as we say, general conception 
of the relations of things, but a pure intuition. For in the 
first place, we can only represent to ourselves one space, and 
when we talk of divers spaces, we mean only parts of one 
and the same space. Moreover these parts cannot antecede 
this one all-embracing space, as the component parts from 
which the aggregate can be made up, but can be cogitated only 
as existing in it. Space is essentially one, and multiplicity in 
it, consequently the general notion of spaces, of this or that 
space, depends solely upon limitations. Hence it follows that 
an a priori intuition (which is not empirical), lies at the 
root of all our conceptions of space. Thus, moreover, the 
principles of geometry, — for example, that "in a triangle, two 
sides together are greater than the third," are never deduced 
from general conceptions of line and triangle, but from in- 
tuition, and this a priori, with apodeictic certainty. 

4. Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. Now 
every conception must indeed be considered as a representa- 
tion which is contained in an ■ infinite multitude of different 
possible representations, which, therefore, comprises these under 
itself; but no conception, as such, can be so conceived, as if it 
contained within itself an infinite multitude of representations. 
Nevertheless, space is so conceived of, for all parts of space 
are equally capable of being produced to infinity. Conse- 
quently, the original representation of space is an intuition 
% nriori, and not a conception. 



TEANSCENDENTAL EXPOSITION OE SPACE. 25 

§ 3. Transcendental exposition of the conception of Space. 

By a transcendental exposition, I mean the explanation of a 
conception, as a principle, whence can be discerned the possi- 
bility of other synthetical a priori cognitions. For this pur- 
pose, it is requisite, firstly, that such cognitions do really flow 
from the given conception ; and, secondly, that the said cog- 
nitions are only possible under the presupposition of a given 
mode of explaining this conception. 

Geometry is a science which determines the properties of 
space synthetically, and yet a priori. What, then, must be 
our representation of space, in order that such a cognition of 
it may be possible ? It must be originally intuition, for from 
a mere conception, no propositions can be deduced which go 
out beyond the conception,* and yet this happens in geometry. 
(Introd. V.) But this intuition must be found in the mind 
a priori, that is, before any perception of objects, consequently 
must be pure, not empirical, intuition. For geometrical prin- 
ciples are always apodeictic, that is, united with the conscious- 
ness of their necessity, as, " Space has only three dimen- 
sions." But propositions of this kind cannot be empirical 
judgments, nor conclusions from them. (Introd. II.) Now, 
how can an external intuition anterior to objects themselves, 
and in which our conception of objects can be determined 
a priori, exist in the human mind? Obviously not otherwise 
than in so far as it has its seat in the subject only, as the formal 
capacity of the subject'sbeing affected by objects, and thereby 
of obtaining immediate representation, that is, intuition ; con- 
sequently, only as the form of the external sense in general. 

Thus it is only by means of our explanation that the pos- 
sibility of geometry, as a synthetical science a priori, becomes 
comprehensible. Every mode of explanation which does not 
shew us this possibility, although in appearance it may be 
similar to ours, can with the utmost certainty be distinguished 
from it by these marks. 

§ 4. Conclusions from the foregoing conceptions, 
(a) Space does not represent any property of objects as 

* That is, the analysis of a conception only gives you what is contained 
in it, and does not add to your knowledge of the object of which you 
have a conception, but merely evolves it. — Tr. 



I 



26 TKAKSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC. 

things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their rela- 
tions to each other ; in other words, space does not represent 
to us any determination of objects such as attaches to the ob- 
jects themselves, and would remain, even though all subjective 
conditions of the intuition were abstracted. For neither abso- 
lute nor relative determinations of objects can be intuited 
prior to the existence of the things to which they belong, and 
therefore not a priori. 

(b) Space is nothing else than the form of all phaenomena of 
the external sense, that is, the subjective condition of the sensi- 
bility, under which alone external intuition is possible. Now, 
because the receptivity or capacity of the subject to be affected 
by objects necessarily antecedes all intuitions of these objects, 
it is easily understood how the form of all phaenomena can be 
given in the mind previous to all actual perceptions, there- 
fore d. priori, and how it, as a pure intuition, in which all 
objects must be determined, can contain principles of the 
relations of these objects prior to all experience. 

It is therefore from the human point of view only that we 
can speak of space, extended objects, &c. If we depart from 
the subjective condition, under which alone we can obtain 
external intuition, or, in other words, by means of which we 
are affected by objects, the representation of space has no 
meaning whatsoever. This predicate [of space] is only appli- 
cable to things in so far as they appear to us, that is, are 
objects of sensibility. The constant form of this receptivity, 
which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of all rela- 
tions in which objects can be intuited- as existing without us, and 
when abstraction of these objects is made, is a pure intuition, 
to which we give the name of space. It is clear that we can- 
not make the special conditions of sensibility into conditions 
of the possibility of things, but only of the possibility of their 
existence as far as they are phaenomena. And so we may 
correctly say that space contains all which can appear to us 
externally, but not all things considered as things in them- 
selves, be they intuited or not, or by whatsoever subject one 
will. As to the intuitions of other thinking beings, we can- 
not judge whether they are or are not bound by the same 
conditions which limit our own intuition, and which for us 
are universally valid. If we join the limitation of a judgment 
to the conception of the subject, then the judgment will pos- 



OF SPACE. — CONCLUSIONS EEOM THE EOBE GOING. 27 

sess unconditioned validity. For example, the proposition, 
"All objects are beside each other in space," is valid only under 
the limitation that these things are taken as objects of our 
sensuous intuition. But if I join the condition to the con- 
ception, and say, "all things, as external phsenomena, are be- 
side each other in space," then the rule is valid universally, 
and without any limitation. Our expositions, consequently, 
teach the reality {i. e. the objective validity) of space in re- 
gard of all which can be presented to us externally as object, 
and at the same time also the ideality of space in regard to 
objects when they are considered by means of reason as things 
in themselves, that is, without reference to the constitution of 
our sensibility. We maintain, therefore, the empirical reality 
of space in regard to all possible external experience, although 
we must admit its transcendental ideality ; in other words, 
that it is nothing, so soon as we withdraw the condition upon 
which the possibility of all experience depends, and look 
upon space as something that belongs to things in themselves. 
But, with the exception of space, there is no representation, 
subjective and referring to something external to us, which 
could be called objective d priori. For there are no other 
subjective representations from which we can deduce syn- 
thetical propositions a. priori, as we can from the intuition of 
space. (See § 3.) Therefore, to speak accurately, no ideality 
whatever belongs to these, although they agree in this respect 
with the representation of space, that they belong merely 
to the subjective nature of the mode of sensuous perception; 
such a mode, for example, as that of sight, of hearing, and of 
feeling, by means of the sensations of colour, sound, and 
heat, but which, because they are only sensations, and not 
intuitions, do not of themselves give us the cognition of any 
object, least of all, an a priori cognition. My purpose, in the 
above remark, is merely this : to guard any one against illus- 
trating the asserted ideality of space by examples quite insuffi- 
cient, for example, by colour, taste, &c. ; for these must be con- 
templated not as properties of things, but only as changes in the 
subject, changes which may be different in different men. For, 
in such a case, that which is originally a mere phenomenon, a 
rose, for example, is taken by the empirical understanding for 
a thing in itself, though to every different eye, in respect of 
its colour, it may appear different. On the contrary, the 



28 TRANSCEKDEtfTAL iESTHETIC. 

transcendental conception of phsenomena in space is a critical 
admonition, that, in general, nothing which is intuited in space 
is a thing in itself, and that space is not a form which be- 
longs as a property to things ; but that objects are quite 
unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward ob- 
jects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensi- 
bility, whose form is space, but whose real correlate, the 
thing in itself, is not known by means of these representa- 
tions, nor ever can be, but respecting which, in experience, 
no inquiry is ever made. 

SECTION II. 

OE TIME. 

§ 5. Metaphysical exposition of this conception. 

1. Time is not an empirical conception. For neither co- 
existence nor succession would be perceived by us, if the re- 
presentation of time did not exist as a foundation a priori. 
Without this presupposition we could not represent to our- 
selves that things exist together at one and the same time, or 
at different times, that is, contemporaneously, or in succession. 

2. Time is a necessary representation, lying at the found- 
ation of all our intuitions. With regard to phsenomena in 
general, we cannot think away time from them, and represent 
them to ourselves as out of and unconnected with time, but 
we can quite well represent to ourselves time void of pheno- 
mena. Time is therefore given a priori. In it alone is aL 
reality of phenomena possible. These may all be annihilated 
in thought, but time itself, as the universal condition of their 
possibility, cannot be so annulled. 

3. On this necessity a priori, is also founded the possibility 
of apodeictic principles of the relations of time, or axioms 
of time in general, such as, " Time has only one dimension," 
" Different times are not co-existent but successive/ ' (as dif- 
ferent spaces are not successive but co-existent). These 
principles cannot be derived from experience, for it would give 
neither strict universality, nor apodeictic certainty. We should 
only be able to say, "so common experience teaches us," but 
not it must be so. They are valid as rules, through which, 
in general, experience is possible ; and they instruct us respect- 
ing experience, and not by means of it. 



TRANSCENDENTAL EXPOSITION OP TIAtE. '2 'J 

4. Time is not a discursive, or as it is called, general con- 
ception, but a pure form of the sensuous intuition. Different 
times are merely parts of one and the same time. But the 
representation which can only be given by a single object is an 
intuition. Besides, the proposition that different times can- 
not be co-existent, could not be derived from a general con- 
ception. For this proposition is synthetical, and therefore 
cannot spring out of conceptions alone. It is therefore con- 
tained immediately in the intuition and representation of 
time. 

5. The infinity of time signifies nothing more than that 
every determined quantity of time is possible only through 
limitations of one time lying at the foundation. Consequently, 
the original representation, time, must be given as unlimited. 
But as the determinate representation of the parts of time 
and of every quantity of an object can only be obtained by 
limitation, the complete representation of time must not be 
furnished by means of conceptions, for these contain only 
partial representations. Conceptions, on the contrary, must 
have immediate intuition for their basis, 

§ 6. Transcendental exposition of the conception of time, 

I may here refer to what is said above (§ 5, 3), where, for 
the sake of brevity, I have placed under the head of metaphy- 
sical exposition, that which is properly transcendental. Here 
I shall add that the conception of change, and with it the 
conception of motion, as change of place, is possible only 
through and in the representation of time ; that if this re- 
presentation were not an intuition (internal) a priori, no con- 
ception, of whatever kind, could render comprehensible the 
possibility of change, in other words, of a conjunction of contra- 
dictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object, for ex- 
ample, the presence of a thing in a place and the non-presence 
of the same thing in the same place. It is only in time, that 
it is possible to meet with two contradictorily opposed deter- 
minations in one thing, that is, after each other.* Thus our 
conception of time explains the possibility of so much syn- 

* Kant's meaning is : You cannot affirm and deny the same thing 
of a subject, except by means of the representation, time. No other idea, 
intuition, or conception, or whatever other form of thought there be, 
can mediate the connection of such predicates. — Tr. 



30 TRANSCENDENTAL .ESTHETIC. 

thetical knowledge a priori, as is exhibited in the general 
doctrine of motion, which is not a little fruitful. 

§ 7. Conclusions from the above conceptions. 

(a) Time is not something which subsists of itself, or which 
inheres in things as an objective determination, and therefore 
remains, when abstraction is made of the subjective conditions 
of the intuition of things. For in the former case, it would 
be something real, yet without presenting to any power of 
perception any real object. In the latter case, as an order or 
determination^ inherent in things themselves, it could not be 
antecedent to things, as their condition, nor discerned or 
intuited by means of synthetical propositions a priori. But 
all this is quite possible when we regard time as merely the 
subjective condition under which all our intuitions take place. 
For in that case, this form of the inward intuition can be 
represented prior to the objects, and consequently a priori. 

(6) Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, 
that is, of the intuitions of self and of our internal state. 
For time cannot be any determination of outward phenomena. 
It has to do neither with shape nor position ; on the contrary, 
it determines the relation of representations in our internal 
state. And precisely because this internal intuition presents 
to us no shape or form, we endeavour to supply this want by 
analogies, and represent the course of time by a line pro- 
gressing to infinity, the content of which constitutes a series 
which is only of one dimension ; and we conclude from the 
properties of this line as to all the properties of time, with 
this single exception, that the parts of the line are co-existent, 
whilst those of time are successive. From this it is clear 
also that the representation of time is itself an intuition, 
because all its relations can be expressed in an external in- 
tuition. 

(c) Time is the formal condition a priori of all phsenomena 
whatsoever. Space, as the pure form of external intuition, 
is limited as a condition a priori to external phenomena 
alone. On the other hand, because all representations, 
whether they have or have not external things for their ob- 
jects, still in themselves, as determinations of the mind, belong 
to our internal state ; and because this internal state is subject 
to the formal condition of the internal intuition, that is, 



OF TIME. — CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FOREGOING. 31 

to time, — time is a condition a priori of all phaenomena what- 
soever — the immediate condition of all internal, and thereby 
the mediate condition of all external phaenomena. If I can 
say a priori, " all outward phaenomena are in space, and de- 
termined a priori according to the relations of space," I can 
also, from the principle of the internal sense, affirm univer- 
sally, " all phaenomena in general, that is, all objects of the 
senses, are in time, and stand necessarily in relations of time." 

If we abstract our internal intuition of ourselves, and all 
external intuitions, possible only by virtue of this internal 
intuition, and presented to us by our faculty of representation, 
and consequently take objects as they are in themselves, then 
time is nothing. It is only of objective validity in regard to 
phenomena, because these are things which we regard as ob- 
jects of our senses. It is no longer objective, if we make ab- 
straction of the sensuousness of our intuition, in other words, 
of that mode of representation which is peculiar to uy, and 
speak of things in general. Time is therefore merely a sub- 
active condition of our (human) intuition, (which is always 
sensuous, that is, so far as we are affected by objects,) and in 
itself, independently of the mind or subject, is nothing. 
Nevertheless, in respect of all phaenomena, consequently of ail 
things which come within the sphere of our experience, it is 
necessarily objective. We cannot say, "all things are in 
time," because in this conception of things in general, we 
abstract and make no mention of any sort of intuition of 
things. But this is the proper condition under which time 
belongs to our representation of objects. If we add the 
condition to the conception, and say, " all things, as phae- 
nomena, that is, objects of sensuous intuition, are in time," then 
the proposition has its sound objective validity and universality 
a priori. 

What we have now set forth teaches, therefore, the empirical 
reality of time ; that is, its objective validity in reference to 
all objects which can ever be presented to our senses. And 
as our intuition is always sensuous, no object ever can be pre- 
sented to us in experience, which does not come under the 
conditions of time. On the other hand, we deny to time all 
claim, to absolute reality : that is, we deny that it, without 
having regard to the form of our sensuous intuition, absolutely 
inheres in things as a condition or property. Such properties 



32 TEAlSTSCENDElSrTAL AESTHETIC. 

as belong to objects as things in themselves, never can be 
presented to us through the medium of the senses. Herein 
consists, therefore, the transcendental ideality of time, according 
to which, if we abstract the subjective conditions of sensuous 
intuition, it is nothing, and cannot be reckoned as subsisting 
or inhering in objects as things in themselves, independently 
of its relation to our intuition. This ideality, like that of 
space, is not to be proved or illustrated by fallacious analogies 
with sensations, for this reason, — that in such arguments or 
illustrations, we make the presupposition that the phenomenon, 
in which such and such predicates inhere, has objective reality, 
while in this case we can only find such an objective reality 
as is itself empirical, that is, regards the object as a mere 
phenomenon. In reference to this subject, see the remark 
in Section I. (p. 27). 

§' 8. Elucidation. 

Against this theory, which grants empirical reality to time, 
but denies to it absolute and transcendental reality, I have 
heard from intelligent men an objection so unanimously urged, 
that I conclude that it must naturally present itself to every 
reader to whom these considerations are novel. It runs thus : 
" Changes are real ;" (this the continual change in our own 
representations demonstrates, even though the existence of all 
external phenomena, together with their changes, is denied). 
Now, changes are only possible in time, and therefore time 
must be something real. But there is no difficulty in answer- 
ing this. I grant the whole argument. Time, no doubt, 
is something real, that is, it is the real form of our internal 
intuition. It therefore has subjective reality, in reference to 
our internal experience, that is, I have really the representation 
of time, and of my determinations therein. Time, therefore, 
is not to be regarded as an object, but as the mode of repre- 
sentation of myself as an object. But if I could intuite my- 
self, or be intuited by another being, without this condition 
of sensibility, then those very determinations which we now 
represent to ourselves as changes, would present to us a 
knowledge in which the representation of time, and conse- 
quently of change, would not appear. The empirical reality 
of time, therefore, remains, as the condition of all our expe- 
rience. But absolute reality, according to what has been 



OF SPACE AND TIME. ELTJCIDATOKY BEMABKS. 33 

said above, cannot be granted it. Time is nothing but the 
form of our internal intuition.* If we take away from it the 
special condition of our sensibility, the conception, of time 
also vanishes ; and it inheres not in the objects themselves, 
but solely in the subject (or mind) which intuites them. 

But the reason why this objection is so unanimously 
brought against our doctrine of time, and that too by disputants 
who cannot start any intelligible arguments against the doc- 
trine of the ideality of space, is this, — they have no hope of 
demonstrating apodeictically the absolute reality of space, be- 
cause the doctrine of idealism is against them, according to 
which the reality of external objects is not capable of any 
strict proof. On the other hand, the reality of the object of 
our internal sense (that is, myself and my internal state) is 
clear immediately through consciousness. The former — exter- 
nal objects in space — might be a mere delusion, but the latter 
— the object of my internal perception — is undeniably real. 
They do not, however, reflect that both, without question of 
their reality as representations, belong only to the genus phae- 
nomenon, which has always two aspects, the one, the object 
considered as a thing in itself, without regard to the mode 
of intuiting it, and the nature of which remains for this 
very reason problematical, the other, the form of our intui- 
tion of the object, which must be sought not in the object 
as a thing in itself, but in the subject to which it appears, — 
which form of intuition nevertheless belongs really and neces- 
sarily to the pheenomenal object. 

Time and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge, 
from which, a priori, various synthetical cognitions can be 
drawn. — Of this we find a striking example in the cognitions of 
space and its relations, which form the foundation of pure ma- 
thematics. — They are the two pure forms of all intuition, and 
thereby make synthetical propositions a priori possible. But 
these sources of knowledge being merely conditions of our 
sensibility, do therefore, and as such, strictly determine their 
own range and purpose, in that they do not and cannot present 

* I can indeed say " my representations follow one another, or are 
successive" ; but this means only that we are conscious of them as in a 
succession, that is, according to the form of the internal sense. Time, 
therefore, is not a thing' in itself, nor is it any objective determination 
oertaining to, or inherent in things. 

D 



34 TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC. 

objects as things in themselves, but are applicable to them 
solely in so far as they are considered as sensuous phseno- 
mena. The sphere of phsenomena is the only sphere of their 
validity, and if we venture out of this, no further objective 
use can be made of them. For the rest, this formal reality 
of time and space leaves the validity of our empirical know- 
ledge unshaken ; for our certainty in that respect is equally 
firm, whether these forms necessarily inhere in the things 
themselves, or only in our intuitions of them. On the other 
hand, those who maintain the "absolute reality of time and 
space, whether as essentially subsisting, or only inhering, as 
modifications, in things, must find themselves at utter variance 
with the principles of experience itself. For, if they decide 
for the first view, and make space and time into substances, this 
being the side taken by mathematical natural philosophers, 
they must admit two self-subsisting nonentities, infinite and 
eternal, which exist (yet without there being any thing real) 
for the purpose of containing in themselves every thing that 
is real. If they adopt the second view of inherence, which is 
preferred by some metaphysical natural philosophers, and 
regard space and time as relations (contiguity in space or suc- 
cession in time), abstracted from experience, though repre- 
sented, confusedly in this state of separation, they find them- 
selves in that case necessitated to deny the validity of mathe- 
matical doctrines a priori in reference to real things (for 
example, in space), — at all events their apodeictic cer- 
tainty. For such certainty cannot be found in an a posteriori 
proposition ; and the conceptions a priori of space and 
time are, according to this opinion, mere creations of the ima- 
gination,* having their source really in experience, inasmuch 
as, out of relations abstracted from experience, imagination 
has made up something which contains, indeed, general 
statements of these relations, yet of which no application can 
be made without the restrictions attached thereto by nature. 
The former of these parties gains this advantage, that they 
keep the sphere of phaenomena free for mathematical science. 
On the other hand, these very conditions (space and time) 
embarrass them greatly, when the understanding endeavours 

* This word is here used, and will be hereafter always used, in its primi- 
tive sense. That meaning of it which denotes a poetical inventive power, in 
a secondary one. — Tr. 



INTRODUCTION. — OF LOGIC IN GKENEBAL. 47 

use of the understanding. The first contains the absolutely 
necessary laws of thought, without which no use whatever 
of the understanding is possible, and gives laws therefore to 
the understanding, without regard to the difference of objects 
on which it may be employed. The logic of the particular 
use of the understanding contains the laws of correct think- 
ing upon a particular class of objects. The former may be 
called elemental logic, — the latter, the organon of this or that 
particular science. The latter is for the most part employed 
in the schools, as a propaedeutic to the sciences, although, in- 
deed, according to the course of human reason, it is the last 
thing we arrive at, when the science has been already matured, 
and needs only the finishing touches towards its correction 
and completion ; for our knowledge of the objects of our 
attempted science must be tolerably extensive and complete 
before we can indicate the laws by which a science of these 
objects can be established. 

General logic is again either pure Or applied. In the for- 
mer, we abstract all the empirical conditions under which the 
understanding is exercised ; for example, the influence of the 
senses, the play of the phantasy or imagination, the laws of 
the memory, the force of habit, of inclination, &c, conse- 
quently also, the sources of prejudice, — in a word, we abstract 
all causes from which particular cognitions arise, because 
these causes regard the understanding under certain circum- 

seded the Organon of Aristotle. But the one states the laws under 
which a knowledge of objects is possible ; the other the subjective laws 
of thought. The spheres of the two are utterly distinct. 

Kant very properly states that pure logic is alone properly science. 
Strictly speaking, applied logic cannot be a division of general logic. It is 
more correctly applied psychology ; — psychology treating in a practical 
manner of the conditions under which thought is employed. 

It may be noted here, that what Kant calls Transcendental Logic is 
properly not logic at all, but a division of metaphysics. For his Categories 
contain matter — as regards thought at least. Take, for example, the cate- 
gory of Existence. These categories, no doubt, are the forms of the 
matter given to us by experience. They are, according to Kant, not de- 
rived from experience, but purely a priori. But logic is concerned ex- 
clusively about the form of thought, and has nothing to do with this or 
that conception, whether a priori or a posteriori. 

See Sir William Hamilton's Edition of Reid's Works, passim. It is to 
Sir William Hamilton, one of the greatest logicians, perhaps the greatest, 
since Aristotle, and certainly one of the acutest thinkers of any time, that 
the Translator is indebted for the above view of the subject of logic. — Tr. 



48 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

stances of its application, and, to the knowledge of them ex- 
perience is required. Pure general logic has to do, therefore, 
merely with pure a priori principles, and is a canon of un- 
derstanding and reason, but only in respect of the formal part 
of their use, be the content what it may, empirical or trans- 
cendental. General logic is called applied, when it is directed 
to the laws of the use of the understanding, under the sub- 
jective empirical conditions which psychology teaches us. It 
has therefore empirical principles, although, at the same time, 
it is in so far general, that it applies to the exercise of the 
understanding, without regard to the difference of objects. 
On this account, moreover, it is neither a canon of the un- 
derstanding in general, nor an organon of a particular science, 
but merely a cathartic of the human understanding. 

In general logic, therefore, that part which constitutes pure 
logic must be carefully distinguished from that which con- 
stitutes applied (though still general) logic. The former alone 
is properly science, although short and dry, as the methodical 
exposition of an elemental doctrine of the understanding 
ought to be. In this, therefore, logicians must always bear 
in mind two rules : — 

1 . As general logic, it makes abstraction of all content of 
the cognition of the understanding, and of the difference of 
objects, and has to do with nothing but the mere form of 
thought. 

2. As pure logic, it has no empirical principles, and con- 
sequently draws nothing (contrary to the common persuasion) 
from psychology, which therefore has no influence on the 
canon of the understanding. It is a demonstrated doctrine, 
and every thing in it must be certain completely a priori. 

What I call applied logic (contrary to the common accep- 
tation of this term, according to which it should contain cer- 
tain exercises for the scholar, for which pure logic gives the 
rules), is a representation of the understanding, and of the 
rules of its necessary employment in concreto, that is to say, 
under the accidental conditions of the subject, which may 
either hinder or promote this employment, and which are 
all given only empirically. Thus applied logic treats of 
attention, its impediments and consequences, of the origin of 
error, of the state of doubt, hesitation, conviction, &c, and 
to it is related pure general logic in the same way that 



rNTEODTTCTIOST. — OF TEANSCEKDENTAL LOGIC. 49 

pure morality, which contains only the necessary moral laws 
of a free will, is related to practical ethics, which considers 
these laws under all the impediments of feelings, inclinations, 
and passions to which men are more or less subjected, and 
which never can furnish us with a true and demonstrated 
science, because it, as well as applied logic, requires empirical 
and psychological principles. 

II. 

Of Transcendental Logic. 

General logic, as we have seen, makes abstraction of all 
content of cognition, that is, of all relation of cognition to its 
object, and regards only the logical form in the relation of 
cognitions to each other, that is, the form of thought in gene- 
ral. But as we have both pure and empirical intuitions (as 
transcendental aesthetic proves), in like manner a distinction 
might be drawn between pure and empirical thought (of 
objects). In this case, there would exist a kind of logic, in 
which we should not make abstraction of all content of cog- 
nition ; for that logic which should comprise merely the laws 
of pure thought (of an object), would of course exclude all those 
cognitions which were of empirical content. This kind of 
logic would also examine the origin of our cognitions of ob- 
jects, so far as that origin cannot be ascribed to the objects 
themselves; while, on the contrary, general logic has nothing 
to do with the origin of our cognitions, but contemplates our 
representations, be they given primitively a priori in ourselves, 
or be they only of empirical origin, solely according to the 
laws which the understanding observes in employing them in 
the process of thought, in relation to each other. Conse- 
quently, general logic treats of the form of the understanding 
only, which can be applied to representations, from whatever 
source they may have arisen. 

And here I shall make a remark, which the reader must 
bear well in mind in the course of the followiug consider- 
ations, to wit, that not every cognition a priori, but only 
those through which we cognize that and how certain repre- 
sentations (intuitions or conceptions) are applied or are possible 
only a priori; that is to say, the a, priori possibility of 
cognition and the a priori use of it are transcendental. 
Therefore neither is space, nor any a priori geometrical 

H 



50 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC, 

determination of space, a transcendental representation, but 
only the knowledge that such a representation is not of 
empirical origin, and the possibility of its relating to objects 
of experience, although itself a priori, can be called transcen- 
dental. So also, the application of space to objects in general, 
would be transcendental; but if it be limited to objects of sense, 
it is empirical. Thus, the distinction of the transcendental and 
empirical belongs only to the critique of cognitions, and does 
not concern the relation of these to their object. 

Accordingly, in the expectation that there may perhaps be 
conceptions which relate a priori to objects, not as pure or sen- 
suous intuitions, but merely as acts of pure thought, (which 
are therefore conceptions, but neither of empirical nor sestheti- 
cal origin), — in this expectation, I say, we form to ourselves, by 
anticipation, the idea of a science of pure understanding and 
rational* cognition, by means of which we may cogitate objects 
entirely a priori. A science of this kind, which should deter- 
mine the origin, the extent, and the objective validity of such 
cognitions, must be called Transcendental Logic, because it has 
not, like general logic, to do with the laws of understanding 
and reason in relation to empirical as well as pure rational 
cognitions without distinction, but concerns itself with these 
only in an a priori relation to objects. 

III. 

Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic. 

The old question with which people sought to push logi- 
cians into a corner, so that they must either have recourse to 
pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance, and consequently 
the vanity of their whole art, is this, — "What is truth?" 
The definition of the word truth, to wit, "the accordance 
of the cognition with its object," is presupposed in the ques- 
tion ; but we desire to be told, in the answer to it, what is the 
universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition. 

To know what questions we may reasonably propose, is 
in itself a strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence. For 
if a question be in itself absurd and unsusceptible of a 
rational answer, it is attended with the danger— not to 

* Vernunfterkenntnisses. The -words reason, rational, will always be 
confined in this translation to the rendering of Vernunft and its deriva- 
tives. — Tr. 



INTRODUCTION. — OF ANALYTIC AND DIALECTIC. 51 

mention the shame that falls upon the person who proposes 
it — of seducing the unguarded listener into making absurd 
answers, and we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle 
of one (as the ancients said) "milkmg the he-goat, and the 
other holding a sieve." 

If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its 
object, this object must be, ipso facto, distinguished from all 
others ; for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the 
object to which it relates, although it contains something 
which may be affirmed of other objects. Now an universal 
criterion of truth would be that which is valid for all cog- 
nitions, without distinction of their objects. But it is evident 
that since, in the case of such a criterion, we make abstraction 
of all the content of a cognition (that is, of all relation to 
its object), and truth relates precisely to this content, it must 
be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this 
content of cognition ; and that, accordingly, a sufficient, 
and at the same time universal, test of truth cannot possibly 
be found. As we have already termed the content of a cogni- 
tion its matter, we shall say : -- Of the truth of our cog- 
nitions in respect of their matter, no universal test can be 
demanded, because such a demand is self-contradictory." 

On the other hand, with regard to our cognition in respect 
of its mere form (excluding all content), it is equally manifest 
that logic, in so far as it exhibits the universal and necessary 
laws of the understanding, must in these very laws present 
us with criteria of truth. Whatever contradicts these rules 
is false, because thereby the understanding is made to contra- 
dict its own universal laws of thought ; that is, to contradict 
itself. These criteria, however, apply solely to the form of 
truth, that is, of thought in general, and in so far they are per- 
fectly accurate, yet not sufficient. For although a cognition 
may be perfectly accurate as to logical form, that is, not self- 
contradictory, it is notwithstanding quite possible that it may 
not stand in agreement with its object. Consequently, the 
merely logical criterion of truth, namely, the accordance of a 
cognition with the universal and formal laws of understanding 
and reason, is nothing more than the conditio sine qud non, 
or negative condition of all truth. Farther than this logic 
cannot go, and the error which depends not on the form, but 
on the content of the cognition, it has no test to discover. 

e 2 



52 TRANSCEJTDEK'TAL LOGIC. 

General logic, then, resolves the whole formal business of 
understanding and reason into its elements, and exhibits 
them as principles of all logical judging of our cognitions. 
This part of logic may, therefore, be called Analytic, and 
is at least the negative test of truth, because all cognitions 
must first of all be estimated and tried according to these 
laws before we proceed to investigate them in respect of their 
content, in order to discover whether they contain positive 
truth in regard to their object. Because, however, the mere 
form of a cognition, accurately as it may accord with logical 
laws, is insufficient to supply us with material (objective) 
truth, no one, by means of logic alone, can venture to predi- 
cate any thing of or decide concerning objects, unless he, has 
obtained, independently of logic, well-grounded information 
about them, in order afterwards to examine, according to 
logical laws, into the use and connection, in a cohering whole, 
of that information, or, what is still better, merely to test it 
by them. Notwithstanding, there lies so seductive a charm in 
the possession of a specious art like this — an art which gives to 
all our cognitions the form of the understanding, although 
with respect to the content thereof we may be sadly deficient 
— that general logic, which is merely a canon of judgment, 
has been employed as an organon for the actual production, 
or rather for the semblance of production of objective asser- 
tions, and has thus been grossly misapplied. Now general 
logic, in its assumed character of organon, is called Dialectic. 

Different as are the significations in which the ancients 
used this term for a science or an art, we may safely infer, 
from their actual employment of it, that with them it was 
nothing else than a logic of illusion — a sophistical art for 
giving ignorance, nay, even intentional sophistries, the colour- 
ing of truth, in which the thoroughness of procedure which 
logic requires was imitated, and their topic* employed to cloak 
the empty pretensions. Now it may be taken as a safe and 
useful warning, that general logic, considered as an organon, 

* The Topic (Topica) of the ancients was a division of the intellectual 
instruction then prevalent, with the design of setting forth the proper 
method of reasoning on any given proposition — according to certain dis- 
tinctions of the genus, the species, &c. of the subject and predicate ; of 
words, analogies, and the like. It of course contained also a code of laws 
for syllogistical disputation. It was not necessarily an aid to sophistry. 
— Tr. 



IXTEODrCTIOH". — OF TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC, &C. 53 

must always be a logic of illusion, that is, be dialectical, for, 
as it teaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of 
our cognitions, but merely the formal conditions of their ac- 
cordance with the understanding, which do not relate to and 
are quite indifferent in respect of objects, any attempt to 
employ it as an instrument (organon) in order to extend and 
enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating ; 
any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some appear- 
ance of truth, any single assertion whatever. 

Such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of phi 
losophy. For these reasons we have chosen to denominate 
this part of logic Dialectic, in the sense of a critique of 
dialectical illusion, and we wish the term to be so understood 
in this place. 

IY. • ~ 

Of the division of Transcendental. Logic into Transcendental 
Analytic and Dialectic. 

In transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (as 
in transcendental aesthetic the sensibility) and select from 
our cognition merely that part of thought which has its origin 
in the understanding alone. The exercise of this pure cogni- 
tion, however, depends upon this as its condition, that objects 
to which it may be applied be given to us in intuition, for 
without intuition, the whole of our cognition is without 
objects, and is therefore quite void. That part of transcen- 
dental logic, then, which treats of the elements of pure 
cognition of the understanding, and of the principles 
without which no object at all can be thought, is transcen- 
dental analytic, and at the same time a logic of truth. For 
no cognition can contradict it, without losing at the same 
time all content, that is, losing all reference to an object, and 
therefore all truth. But because we are very easily seduced 
into employing these pure cognitions and principles of the 
understanding by themselves, and that even beyond the boun- 
daries of experience, which yet is the only source whence we 
can obtain matter (objects) on which those pure conceptions 
may be employed, — understanding runs the risk of making, by 
means of empty sophisms, a material and objective use of the 
mere formal principles of the pure understanding, and of 
passing judgments on objects without distinction — objects 



54 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

which are not given to us, nay, perhaps cannot be given to us 
m any way. Now, as it ought properly to be only a canon for 
judging of the empirical use of the understanding, this kind of 
iogic is misused when we seek to employ it as an organon of 
the universal and unlimited exercise of the understanding, and 
attempt with the pure understanding alone to judge synthe- 
tically, affirm, and determine respecting objects in general. 
In this case the exercise of the pure understanding becomes 
dialectical. The second part of our transcendental logic must 
therefore be a critique of dialectical illusion, and this critique 
we shall term Transcendental Dialectic, — not meaning it 
as an art of producing dogmatically such illusion (an art 
which is unfortunately too current among the practitioners of 
metaphysical juggling), but as a critique of understanding and 
reason in regard to their hyperphysical use. This critique 
will expose the groundless nature of the pretensions of these 
two faculties, and invalidate their claims to the discovery 
and enlargement of our cognitions merely by means of trans- 
cendental principles, and shew that the proper employment of 
these faculties is to test the judgments made by the pure un- 
derstanding, and to guard it from sophistical delusion. 



TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

FIRST DIVISION. 

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC. 

§ 1. 
Transcendental analytic is the dissection of the whole of our 
a 'priori knowledge into the elements of the pure cognition of 
the understanding. In order to effect our purpose, it is ne- 
cessary, 1st, That the conceptions be pure and not empirical; 
2d, That they belong not to intuition and sensibility, but to 
thought and understanding ; 3d, That they be elementary 
conceptions, and as such, quite different from deduced or 
compound conceptions ; 4th, That our table of these ele- 
mentary conceptions be complete, and fill up the whole 
sphere of the pure understanding. Now this completeness 
of a science cannot be accepted with confidence on the gua- 
rantee of a mere estimate of its existence in an aggre* 



TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTIONS. 55 

gate formed only by means of repeated experiments and at- 
tempts. The completeness which we require is possible only 
by means of an idea of the totality of the a priori cognition 
of the understanding, and through the thereby determined 
division of the conceptions which form the said whole ; con- 
sequently, only by means of their connection in a system. 
Pure understanding distinguishes itself not merely from every 
thing empirical, but also completely from all sensibility. It 
is a unity self-subsistent, self-sufficient, and not to be enlarged 
by any additions from without. Hence the sum of its cogni- 
tion constitutes a system to be determined by and comprised 
under an idea ; and the completeness and articulation of this 
system can at the same time serve as a test of the correctness 
and genuineness of all the parts of cognition that belong to 
it. The whole of this part of transcendental logic consists of 
two books, of which the one contains the conceptions, and 
the other the principles of pure understanding. 

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC. 
BOOK I. 

Analytic oe Conceptions. 

§ 2. 
By the term "Analytic of Conceptions," I do not under- 
stand the analysis of these, or the usual process in phi- 
losophical investigations of dissecting the conceptions which 
present themselves, according to their content, and so making 
them clear; but I mean the hitherto little attempted dissection 
of the faculty of understanding itself, in order to investigate 
the possibility of conceptions a priori, by looking for them in 
the understanding alone, as their birth-place, and analysing 
the pure use of this faculty. For this is the proper duty of 
a transcendental philosophy ; what remains is the logical 
treatment of the conceptions in philosophy in general. We 
shall therefore follow up the pure conceptions even to their 
germs and beginnings in the human understanding, in which 
they lie, until they are developed on occasions presented 
by experience, and, freed by the same understanding from the 
empirical conditions attaching to them, are set forth in their 
unalloyed purity. 



56 transcendental logic. 

Analytic oe Conceptions. 
CHAPTER I. 

OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL CLUE TO THE DISCOVERY OF ALX 
PURE CONCEPTIONS OE THE UNDERSTANDING. 

Introductory. 

§ 3. 
When we call into play a faculty of cognition, different 
conceptions manifest themselves according to the different cir- 
cumstances, and make known this faculty, and assemble them- 
selves into a more or less extensive collection, according to 
the time or penetration that has been applied to the consider- 
ation of them. Where this process, conducted as it is, me- 
chanically, so to speak, will end, cannot be determined with 
certainty. Besides, the conceptions which we discover in this 
hap-hazard manner present themselves by no means in order 
and systematic unity, but are at last coupled together only 
according to resemblances to each other, and arranged in 
series, according to the quantity of their content, from the 
simpler to the more complex, — series which are anything but 
systematic, though not altogether without a certain kind of 
method in their construction. 

Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, and moreover 
the duty, of searching for its conceptions according to a prin- 
ciple; because these conceptions spring pure and unmixed out 
of the understanding as an absolute unity, and therefore must 
be connected with each other according to one conception or 
idea. A connection of this kind, however, furnishes us with a 
ready prepared rule, by which its proper place may be as- 
signed to every pure conception of the understanding, and 
the completeness of the system of all be determined a priori, 
— both which would otherwise have been dependent on mere 
choice or chance. 

TRANSCENDENTAL CLUE TO THE DISCOVERY OF ALL PURE 
CONCEPTIONS OE THE UNDERSTANDING. 

Sect. I. Of the Logical use of the Understanding in general. 

§ 4. 
The understanding was defined above only negatively, at 
a non-sensuous faculty of cognition. Now, independently 
of sensibility, we cannot possibly have any intuition ; con- 



THE LOGICAL TJSE OF UKDEKSTAKDIFG. 57 

sequently, the understanding is no faculty of intuition. But 
besides intuition there is no other mode of cognition, except 
through conceptions ; consequently, the cognition of every, 
at least of every human, understanding is a cognition through 
conceptions, — not intuitive, but discursive. All intuitions, 
as sensuous, depend on aiFections; conceptions, therefore, upon 
functions. By the word function, I understand the unity of 
the act of arranging diverse representations under one common 
representation. Conceptions, then, are based on the spon- 
taneity of thought, as sensuous intuitions are on the recepti- 
vity of impressions. Now, the understanding cannot make any 
other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them. 
As no representation, except an intuition, relates immedi- 
ately to its object, a conception never relates immediately to an 
object, but only to some other representation thereof, be that 
an intuition or itself a conception. A judgment, therefore, is the 
mediate cognition of an object, consequently the representation 
of a representation of it. In every judgment there is a con- 
ception which applies to, and is valid for many other concep- 
tions, and which among these comprehends also a given repre- 
sentation, this last being immediately connected with an object. 
For example, in the judgment — " All bodies are divisible," 
our conception of divisible applies to various other conceptions ; 
among these, however, it is here particularly applied to the 
conception of body, and this conception of body relates tc 
certain phsenomena which occur to us. These objects, therefore, 
are mediately represented by the conception of divisibility. All 
judgments, accordingly, are functions of unity in our represent- 
ations, inasmuch as, instead of an immediate, a higher repre- 
sentation, which comprises this and various others, is used for 
our cognition of the object, and thereby many possible cogni- 
tions are collected into one. But we can reduce all acts of the 
understanding to judgments, so that understanding may be re- 
presented as the faculty of judging. For it is, according to what 
has been said above, a faculty of thought. Now thought is 
cognition by means of conceptions. But conceptions, as pre- 
dicates of possible judgments, relate to some representation of 
a yet undetermined object. Thus the conception of body in- 
dicates something — for example, metal — which can be cognized 
by means of that conception. It is therefore a conception, for the 
reason alone that other representations are contained under it, 
by means of which it can relate to objects. It is therefore the 



58 



TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 



predicate to a possible judgment ; for example, "Every metal 
is a body." All the functions of the understanding therefore 
can be discovered, when we can completely exhibit the func- 
tions of unity in judgments. And that this may be effected 
very easily, the following section will shew. 

Sect. II. — Of the Logical Function of the Understanding 
in Judgments. 

§ 5. 
If we abstract all the content of a judgment, and consider 
only the intellectual form thereof, we find that the function 
of thought in a judgment can be brought under four heads, of 
which each contains three momenta. Thes'e may be con- 
veniently represented in the following table : — 



Quantity of judgments. 
Universal. 
Particular. 
Singular. 


ii. 

Quality. 

Affirmative. 

Negative. 
Infinite. 




in. 
Relation. 
Categorical. 
Hypothetical. 
Disjunctive. 



IV. 

Modality. 
Problematical. 
Assertorical. 
Apodeictical. 

As this division appears to differ in some, though not essential 
points, from the usual technic of logicians, the following ob- 
servations, for the prevention of otherwise possible misunder- 
standing, will not be without their use. 

1. Logicians say, with justice, that in the use of judgments 
in syllogisms, singular judgments may be treated like universal 
ones. For, precisely because a singular judgment has no extent 
at all, its predicate cannot refer to a part of that which is con- 
tained in the conception of the subject and be excluded from 
the rest. The predicate is valid for the whole conception just as 
if it were a general conception, and had extent, to the whole of 
.which the predicate applied. On the other hand, let us compare 



THE LOGICAL FACTION IN JUDGMENTS. 59 

a singular with a general judgment, merely as a cognition, in 
regard to quantity. The singular judgment relates to the 
general one, as unity to infinity, and is therefore in itself essen- 
tially different. Thus, if we estimate a singular judgment 
(judicium singulare) not merely according to its intrinsic valid- 
ity as a judgment, but also as a cognition generally, according 
to its quantity in comparison with that of other cognitions, it 
is then entirely different from a general judgment (judicium 
commune], and in a complete table of the momenta of thought 
deserves a separate place, — though, indeed, this would not be 
necessary in a logic limited merely to the consideration of the 
use of judgments in reference to each other. 

2. In like manner, in transcendental logic, infinite mustbe dis- 
tinguished from affirmative judgments, although in general logic 
they are rightly enough classed under affirmative. General 
logic abstracts allcontentof the predicate (though it be negative), 
and only considers whether the said predicate be affirmed or 
denied of the subject. But transcendental logic considers also 
the worth or content of this logical affirmation — an affirmation 
by means of a merely negative predicate, and enquires how much 
the sum total of our cognition gains by this affirmation. For 
example, if I say of the soul, " It is not mortal," — by this ne- 
gative judgment I should at least ward off error. Now, by the 
proposition, " The soul is not mortal," I have, in respect of the 
logical form, really affirmed, inasmuch as I thereby place the 
soul in the unlimited sphere of immortal beings. Now, because, 
of the whole sphere of possible existences, the mortal occupies 
one part, and the immortal the other, neither more nor less is 
affirmed by the proposition, than that the soul is one among the 
infinite multitude of things which remain over, when I take 
away the whole mortal part. But by this proceeding we accom- 
plish only this much, that the infinite sphere of all possible 
existences is in so far limited, that the mortal is excluded from it, 
and the soul is placed in the remaining part of the extent of this 
sphere. • But this part remains, notwithstanding this exception, 
infinite, and more and more parts may be taken away from the 
whole sphere, without in the slightest degree thereby augmenting 
or affirmatively determining our conception of the soul. These 
judgments, therefore, infinite in respect of their logical extent, are, 
in respect of the content of their cognition, merely limitative ; 
and are consequently entitled to a place in our transcendental 
table of all the momenta of thought in judgments, because the 



63 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

function of the understanding exercised by them may perhaps 
be of importance in the field of its pure a priori cognition. 

3. All relations of thought in judgments are those (a) of the 
predicate to the subject; (6) of the principle to its consequence ; 
(c) of the divided cognition and all the members of the division 
to each other. In the first of these three classes, we consider only 
two conceptions ; in the second, two judgments ; in the third, 
several judgments in relation to each other. The hypothetical 
proposition, " If perfect justice exists, the obstinately wicked are 
punished," contains properly the relation to each other of two 
propositions, namely, " Perfect justice exists," and " The ob- 
stinately wicked are punished." Whether these propositions are 
in themselves true, is a question not here decided. Nothing is 
cogitated by means of this judgment except a certain conse- 
quence. Finally, the disjunctive judgment contains a relation 
of two or more propositions to each other, — a relation not of 
consequence, but of logical opposition, in so far as the sphere 
of the one proposition excludes that of the other. But it con- 
tains at the same time a relation of community, in so far as 
all the propositions taken together fill up the sphere of the cog- 
nition. The disjunctive judgment contains, therefore, the rela- 
tion of the parts of the whole sphere of a cognition, since the 
sphere of each part is a complemental part of the sphere of the 
other, each contributing to form the sum total of the divided 
cognition. Take, for example, the proposition, " The world 
exists either through blind chance, or through internal neces- 
sity, or through an external cause." Each of these propo- 
sitions embraces a part of the sphere of our possible cognition 
as to the existence of a world ; all of them taken together, 
the whole sphere. To take the cognition out of one of these 
spheres, is equivalent to placing it in one of the others ; find, 
on the other hand, to place it in one sphere is equivalent to 
taking it out of the rest. There is, therefore, in a disjunctive 
judgment a certain community of cognitions, which consists in 
this, that they mutually exclude each other, yet thereby deter- 
mine, as a whole, the true cognition, inasmuch as, taken to- 
gether, they make up the complete content of a particular given 
cognition. And this is all that. I find necessary, for the sake 
of what follows, to remark in this place. 

4. The modality of judgments is a quite peculiar function, 
with this distinguishing characteristic, that it contributes 
nothing to tin; content of a judgment (for besides quantity, 



THE LOGICAL FTJ^CTIOS E& JUDGMENTS. 61 

quality, and relation, there is nothing more that constitutes 
the content of a judgment), but concerns itself only with the 
value of the copula in relation to thought in general. Pro- 
blematical judgments are those in which the affirmation or 
negation is accepted as merely possible (ad libitum). In the 
assertorical, we regard the proposition as real (true) ; in the 
apodeictical, we look on it as necessary * Thus the two 
judgments {antecedens et consequens), the relation of which 
constitutes a hypothetical judgment, likewise those (the mem- 
bers of the division) in whose reciprocity the disjunctive con- 
sists, are only problematical. In the example above given, 
the proposition, " There exists perfect justice," is not stated 
assertorically, but as an ad libitum judgment, which some one 
may choose to adopt, and the consequence alone is assertorical. 
Hence such judgments maybe obviously false, and yet, taken 
problematically, be conditions of our cognition of the truth. 
Thus the proposition, " The world exists only by blind chance," 
is in the disjunctive judgment of problematical import only : 
that is to say, one may accept it for the moment, and it helps 
us (like the indication of the wrong road among all the roads 
that one can take) to find out the true proposition. The pro- 
blematical proposition is, therefore, that which expresses only 
logical possibility (which is not objective) ; that is, it expresses 
a free choice to admit the validity of such a proposition, — a 
merely arbitrary reception of it into the understanding. The 
assertorical speaks of logical reality or truth ; as, for example, 
in a hypothetical syllogism, the antecedens presents itself in a 
problematical form in the major, in an assertorical form in the 
minor, and it shows that the proposition is in harmony with 
the laws of the understanding. The apodeictical proposition 
cogitates the assertorical as determined by these very laws of 
the understanding, consequently as affirming a priori, and in 
this manner it expresses logical necessity. Now because all is 
Here gradually incorporated with the understanding, — inas- 
much as in the first place we judge problematically ; then 
accept assertorically our judgment as true ; lastly, affirm it 
as inseparably united with the understanding, that is, as ne- 
cessary and apodeictical, — we may safely reckon these three 
functions of modality as so many momenta of thought. 

* Just as if thought were in the first instance a function of the under- 
standing ; in the second, of judgment ; in the third of reason. A remark 
which will be explained in the sequel. 



62 TBANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

Sect. III. — Of the pure Conceptions of the Understanding, 
or Categories. 

§o. 

General logic, as has been repeatedly said, makes abstrac- 
tion of all content of cognition, and expects to receive repre- 
sentations from some other quarter, in order, by means of ana- 
lysis, to convert them into conceptions. On the contrary, 
transcendental logic has lying before it the manifold content oi 
a priori sensibility, which transcendental aesthetic presents to 
it in order to give matter to the pure conceptions of the un- 
derstanding, without which transcendental logic would have 
no content, and be therefore utterly void. Now space and 
time contain an infinite diversity of determinations* of pure 
a priori intuition, but are nevertheless the condition of the 
mind's receptivity, under which alone it can obtain repre- 
sentations of objects, and which, consequently, must always 
affect the conception of these objects. But the spontaneity of 
thought requires that this diversity be examined after a certain 
manner, received into the mind, and connected, in order after- 
wardsto forma cognition out of it. This process I call synthesis. 

By the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I 
understand the process of joining different representations to 
each other, and of comprehending their diversity in one cog- 
nition. This synthesis is pure when the diversity is not given 
empirically but a priori (as that in space and time). Our re- 
presentations must be given previously to any analysis of them ; 
and no conceptions can arise, quoad their content, analytically. 
But the synthesis of a diversity (be it given a priori or em- 
pirically) is the first requisite for the production of a cognition, 
which in its beginning, indeed, may be crude and confused, 
and therefore in need of analysis, — still, synthesis is that by 
which alone the elements of our cognitions are collected and 
united into a certain content, consequently it is the first thing 
on which we must fix our attention, if we wish to investigate 
the origin of our knowledge. 

Synthesis, generally speaking, is, as we shall afterwards see, 
the mere operation of the imagination — a blind but indis- 

* Kant employs the words Mannigfaltiges, Mannigfaltigke.it, indiffe- 
rently, for the infinitude of the possible determination of matter, of an 
intuition (such as that of space \ &c— Tr. 



THE CATEGORIES. 63 

pensable function of the soul, without which we should have 
no cognition whatever, but of the working of which we are 
seldom even conscious. But to reduce this synthesis to con- 
ceptions, is a function of the understanding, by means of which 
we attain to cognition, in the proper meaning of the term. 

Pure synthesis, represented generally, gives us the pure 
conception of the understanding. But by this pure synthesis, 
I mean that which rests upon a basis of a priori synthetical 
unity. Thus, our numeration (and this is more observable 
in large numbers) is a synthesis according to conceptions, 
because it takes place according to a common basis of unity 
(for example, the decade). By means of this conception, 
therefore, the unity in the synthesis of the manifold becomes 
necessary. 

By means of analysis different representations are brought 
under one conception, — an operation of which general 
logic treats. On the other hand, the duty of transcendental 
logic is to reduce to conceptions, not representations, but the 
pure synthesis of representations. The first thing which 
must be given to us in order to the a priori cognition of 
all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition ; the syn- 
thesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the se- 
cond ; but this gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions 
which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely 
in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish 
the third requisite for the cognition of an object, and these 
conceptions are given by the understanding. 

The same function which gives unity to the different repre- 
sentations in a judgment, gives also unity to the mere syn- 
thesis of different representations in an intuition ; and this 
unity we call the pure conception of the understanding. Thus, 
the same understanding, and by the same operations, whereby 
in conceptions, by means of analytical unity, it produced 
the logical form of a judgment, introduces, by means of the 
synthetical unity of the manifold in intuition, a transcendental 
content into its representations, on which account they are 
called pure conceptions of the understanding, and they apply 
a priori to objects, a result not within the power of general 



* Only because this is beyond the sphere of logic proper. Kant's re- 
mark is unnecessary. — Tr. 



64 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

In this manner, there arise exactly so many pure concep- 
tions of the understanding, applying a priori to objects 
of intuition in general, as there are logical functions in all 
possible judgments. For there is no other function or faculty 
existing in the understanding besides those enumerated in 
that table. These conceptions we shall, with Aristotle, call 
categories, our purpose being originally identical with his, 
notwithstanding the great difference in the execution. 

Table of the Categories. 

i. ii. 

Of Quantity. Of Quality. 

Unity. Reality. 

Plurality. Negation. 

Totality. Limitation, 
in. 
Of Relation. 

Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens). 

Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect). 

Of Community (reciprocity between the agent and patient). 

IV. 

Of Modality. 

Possibility. — Impossibility. 
Existence . — Non-existen ce . 
Necessity. — Contingence. 

This, then, is a catalogue of all the originally pure concep- 
tions of the synthesis which the understanding contains a 
priori, and these conceptions alone entitle it to be called a 
pure understanding ; inasmuch as only by them it can render 
the manifold of intuition conceivable, in other words, think an 
object of intuition. This division is made systematically from 
a common principle, namely, the faculty of judgment (which 
is just the same as the power of thought), and has not arisen 
rhapsodical] y from a search at hap-hazard after pure concep- 
tions, respecting the full number of which we never could be 
certain, inasmuch as we employ induction alone in our search, 
without considering that in this way we can never understand 



THE CATEGORIES. 65 

wherefore precisely these conceptions, and none others abide 
in the pure understanding. It was a design worthy of an 
acute thinker like Aristotle, to search for these fundamental 
conceptions.* Destitute, however, of any guiding principle, 
he picked them up just as they occurred to him, and at first 
hunted out ten, which he called categories {predicaments). 
Afterwards he believed that he had discovered five others, 
which were added under the name of post predicaments. But 
his catalogue still remained defective. Besides, there are to 
be found among them some of the modes of pure sensibility 
(quando, ubi, situs, also prius,simul), and likewise an empirical 
conception (motus), — which can by no means belong to this ge- 
nealogical register of the pure understanding. Moreover, there 
are deduced conceptions (actio, passio,) enumerated among 
the original conceptions, and of the latter, some are entirely 
wanting;. 

With regard to these, it is to be remarked, that the categories, 
as the true primitive conceptions of the pure understanding, 
have also their pure deduced conceptions, which, in a complete 
system of transcendental philosophy, must by no means be 

* " It is a serious error to imagine that, in his Categories, Aristotle pro- 
posed, like Kant, ' an analysis of the elements of human reason.' The 
ends proposed by the two philosophers were different, even opposed. In 
their several Categories, Aristotle attempted a synthesis of things in their 
multiplicity, — a classification of objects real, but in relation to thought : 
Kant, an analysis of mind in its unity, — a dissection of thought, pure, but 
in relation to its objects. The predicaments of Aristotle are thus ob- 
jective, of things as understood ; those of Kant subjective, of the mind 
as understanding. The former are results a posteriori — the creations of 
abstraction and generalisation ; the latter, anticipations a priori— -the con- 
ditions of those acts themselves. It is true, that as the one scheme 
exhibits the unity of thought diverging into plurality, in appliance to its 
objects, and as the other exhibits the multiplicity of these objects con- 
verging towards unity by the collective determination of thought ; while, 
at the same time, language usually confounds the subjective and objective 
under a common term ; — it is certainly true, that some elements in the one 
table coincide in name with some elements in the other. This coinci- 
dence is, however, only equivocal. In reality, the whole Kantian cate- 
gories must be excluded from the Aristotelic list, as entia rationis, as 
notiones secundce — in short, as determinations of thought, and not genera 
of real things ; while the several elements would be specially excluded, 
as partial, privative, transcendent," &c. — Hamilton's (Sir W.) Essnys 
and Discussions 

X 



66 TKANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

passed over ; though in a merely critical essay we must be 
contented with the simple mention of the fact. 

Let it be allowed me to call these pure, but deduced con- 
ceptions of the understanding, the predicables* of the pure 
understanding, in contradistinction to predicaments. If we 
are in possession of the original and primitive, the deduced 
and subsidiary conceptions can easily be added, and the gene- 
alogical tree of the understanding completely delineated. As 
my present aim is not to set forth a complete system, but 
merely the principles of one, I reserve this task for another 
time. It may be easily executed by any one who will refer 
to the ontological manuals, and subordinate to the category of 
causality, for example, the predicables of force, action, passion ; 
to that of community, those of presence and resistance ; to the 
categories of modality, those of origination, extinction, change ; 
and so wilh the rest. The categories combined with the modes 
of pure sensibility, or with one another, afford a great num- 
ber of deduced a priori conceptions ; a complete enumeration 
of which would be a useful and not unpleasant, but in this 
place a perfectly dispensable occupation. 

I purposely omit the definitions of the categories in this 
treatise. I shall analyze these conceptions only so far as 
is necessary for the doctrine of method, which is to form a 
part of this critique. In a system of pure reason, definitions 
of them would be with justice demanded of me, but to give 
them here would only hide from our view the main aim of out 
investigation, at the same time raising doubts and objections, 
the consideration of which, without injustice to our main pur- 
pose, may be very well postponed till another opportunity. 
Meanwhile, it ought to be sufficiently clear, from the little we 
have already said on this subject, that the formation of a 
complete vocabulary of pure conceptions, accompanied by all 
the requisite explanations, is not only a possible, but an easy 
undertaking. The compartments already exist; it is only 
necessary to fill them up ; and a systematic topic like the 

* The predicables of Kant are quite different from those of Aristotle and 
ancient and modern logicians. The, five predicables are of a logical, and 
not, like those of Kant, of a metaphysico-ontological import. They were 
enounced as a complete enumeration of all the possible modes of predica- 
tion. Kant's predicables, on the contrary, do not possess this merely 
formal and logical character, but have a real or metaphysical content. — Tr 



THE CATEGOBIES. 67 

present, indicates with perfect precision the proper place to 
which each conception belongs, while it readily points out any 
that have not yet been filled up. 

§ 7. 

Our table of the categories suggests considerations of some 
importance, which may perhaps have significant results in 
regard to the scientific form of all rational cognitions. For, 
that this table is useful in the theoretical part of philosophy, 
nay, indispensable for the sketching of the complete plan of 
a science, so far as that science rests upon conceptions a priori, 
and for dividing it mathematically, according to fixed princi- 
ples, is most manifest from the fact that it contains all the 
elementary conceptions of the understanding, nay, even the 
form of a system of these in the understanding itself, and 
consequently indicates all the momenta, and also the internal 
arrangement of a projected speculative science, as I have else- 
where shown.* Here follow some of these observations. 

I. This table, which contains four classes of conceptions of 
the understanding, may, in the first instance, be divided into 
two classes, the first of which relates to objects of intuition — 
pure as well as empirical ; the second, to the existence of 
these objects, either in relation to one another, or to the un- 
derstanding. 

The former of these classes of categories I would entitle 
the mathematical, and the latter the dynamical categories. 
The former, as we see, has no correlates ; these are only to be 
found in the second class. This difference must have a ground 
in the nature of the human understanding. 

II. The number of the categories in each class is always 
the same, namely, three ; — a fact which also demands some 
consideration, because in all other cases division a priori 
through conceptions is necessarily dichotomy. It is to be 
added, that the third category in each triad always arises 
from the combination of the second with the first. 

Thus Totality is nothing else but Plurality contemplated 
as Unity; Limitation is merely Keality conjoined with Ne- 
gation ; Community is the Causality of a Substance, recipro- 
cally determining, and determined by other substances ; and 

* In the " Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science." 



68 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

finally, Necessity is nothing but Existence, which is given 
through the Possibility itself.* Let it not be supposed, how- 
ever, that the third category is merely a deduced, and not a 
primitive conception of the pure understanding. For the con- 
junction of the first and second, in order to produce the third 
conception, requires a particular function of the understanding, 
which is by no means identical with those which are exercised 
in the first and second. Thus, the conception of a number 
(which belongs to the category of Totality), is not always 
possible, where the conceptions of multitude and unity exist 
(for example, in the representation of the infinite). Or, if I 
conjoin the conception of a cause with that of a substance, it 
does not follow that the conception of influence, that is, how 
one substance can be the cause of something in another sub- 
stance, will be understood from that. Thus it is evident, that 
a particular act of the understanding is here necessary ; and 
so in the other instances. 

III. With respect to one category, namely, that of com- 
munity, which is found in the third class, it is not so easy as 
with the others to detect its accordance with the form of the 
disjunctive judgment which corresponds to it in the table of 
the logical functions. 

In order to assure ourselves of this accordance, we must 
observe : that in every disjunctive judgment, the sphere of 
the judgment (that is, the complex of all that is contained in 
it) is represented as a whole divided into parts ; and, since 
one part cannot be contained in the other, they are cogitated 
as co-ordinated with, not subordinated to each other, so that 
they do not determine each other unilaterally, as in a linear 
series, but reciprocally, as in an aggregate — (if one member 
of the division is posited, all the rest are excluded; and con- 
versely). 

Now a like connection is cogitated in a whole of things ; 
for one thing is not subordinated, as effect, to another as 
cause of its existence, but, on the contrary, is co-ordinated 
contemporaneously and reciprocally, as a cause in relation to 
the determination of the others (for example, in a body — the 
parts of which mutually attract and repel each other). And 

* Kant's meaning is ; A necessary existence is an existence whose 
existence is given in the very possibility of its existence.— Tr. 



THE C ATE GOBIES. 69 

this is an entirely different kind of connection from that 
which we find in the mere relation of the cause to the effect 
(the principle to the consequence), for in such a connection 
the consequence does not in its turn determine the principle, 
and therefore does not constitute, with the latter, a whole, — 
just as the Creator does not with the world make up a whole. 
The process of understanding by which it represents to itself 
the sphere of a divided conception, is employed also when we 
think of a thing as divisible ; and, in the same manner as the 
members of the division in the former exclude one another, 
and yet are connected in one sphere, so the understanding 
represents to itself the parts of the latter, as having — each of 
them — an existence (as substances), independently of the 
others, and yet as united in one whole. 

§8. 

In the transcendental philosophy of the ancients, there 
exists one more leading division, which contains pure concep- 
tions of the understanding, and which, although not num- 
bered among the categories, ought, according to them, as con- 
ceptions a priori, to be valid of objects. But in this case they 
would augment the number of the categories ; which cannot 
be. These are set forth in the proposition, so renowned 
among the schoolmen, — " Quodlibet ens est UjSTTM, yebttm, 
bo^um." Now, though the inferences from this principle 
were mere tautological propositions, and though it is allowed 
only by courtesy to retain a place in modern metaphysics, yet 
a thought which maintained itself for such a length of time, 
however empty it seems to be, deserves an investigation of its 
origin, and justifies the conjecture that it musfbe grounded 
in some law of the understanding, which, as is often the case, 
has only been erroneously interpreted. These pretended 
transcendental predicates are, in fact, nothing but logical re- 
quisites and criteria of all cognition of objects, and they em 
ploy, as the basis for this cognition, the categories of Quan 
tity, namely, Unity, Plurality, and Totality. But these, which 
must be taken as material conditions, that is, as belonging to 
the possibility of things themselves, they employed merely in 

formal signification, as belonging to the logical requisites 
ftf all cognition, and yet most unguardedly changed these 
criteria of thought into properties of objects, as things in 



70 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

themselves. Now, in every cognition of an object, there is 
unity of conception, which may be called qualitative unity, 
so far as by this term we understand only the unity in our 
connection of the manifold ; for example, unity of the theme 
in a play, an oration, or a story. Secondly, there is truth in 
respect of the deductions from it. The more true deductions 
we have from a given conception, the more criteria of its ob- 
jective reality. This we might call the qualitative plurality 
of characteristic marks, which belong to a conception as to a 
common foundation, but are not cogitated as a quantity in it. 
Thirdly, there is perfection, — which consists in this, that the 
plurality falls back upon the unity of the conception, and 
accords completely with that conception, and wifch no other. 
This we may denominate qualitative completeness. Hence it 
is evident that these logical criteria of the possibility of cog- 
nition, are merely the three categories of Quantity modified 
and transformed to suit an unauthorized manner of applying 
them. That is to say, the three categories, in which the unity 
in the production of the quantum must be homogeneous 
throughout, are transformed solely with a view to the con- 
nexion of heterogeneous parts of cognition in one act of con- 
sciousness, by means of the quality of the cognition, which is 
the principle of that connexion. Thus the criterion of the 
possibility of a conception (not of its object), is the definition 
of it, in which the unity of the conception, the truth of all 
that may be immediately deduced from it, and finally, the 
completeness of what has been thus deduced, constitute the 
requisites for the reproduction of the whole conception. Thus 
also, the criterion or test of an hypothesis is the intelligibility 
of the received principle of explanation, or its unity (without 
help from any subsidiary hypothesis), — the truth of our deduc- 
tions from it (consistency with each other and with experience), 
— and lastly, the completeness of the principle of the explanation 
of these deductions, which refer to neither more nor less than 
what was admitted in the hypothesis, restoring analytically 
and a posteriori, what was cogitated synthetically and a priori. 
By the conceptions, therefore, of Unity, Truth, and Perfection, 
we have made no addition to the transcendental table of the 
categories, which is complete without them. We have, on the 
contrary, merely employed the three categories of quantity, 
netting aside their application to objects of experience, as 



DEDUCTION OP THE CATEGORIES. 7 1 

general logical laws of the consistency of cognition with it 
self.* 

Analytic of Conceptions. 

CHAPTER II. 

OP THE deduction op the puee conceptions op the 

UNDERSTANDING. 

Sect. I. — Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in 
general. 

§ 9. 
Teachers of jurisprudence, when speaking of rights and 
claims, distinguish in a cause the question of right (quid juris) 
from the question of fact (quid facti), and while they demand 
proof of both, they give to the proof of the former, which 
goes to establish right or claim in law, the name of Deduction. 
Now we make use of a great number of empirical conceptions, 
without opposition from any one ; and consider ourselves, 
even without any attempt at deduction, justified in attaching 
to them a sense, and a supposititious signification, because we 
have always experience at hand to demonstrate their objective 
reality. There exist also, however, usurped conceptions, such 
as fortune, fate, which circulate with almost universal in- 
dulgence, and yet are occasionally challenged by the ques- 
tion, quid juris ? In such cases, we have great difficulty 
in discovering any deduction for these terms, inasmuch as 
we cannot produce any manifest ground of right, either from 
experience or from reason, on which the claim to employ them 
can be founded. 

* Kant's meaning in the foregoing chapter is this : — These three con- 
ceptions of unity, truth, and goodness, applied as predicates to things, 
are the three categories of quantity under a different form. These three 
categories have an immediate relation to things, as phenomena ; without 
them we could form no conceptions of external objects. But in the above- 
mentioned proposition, they are changed into logical conditions of thought, 
and then unwittingly transformed into properties of things in themselves. 
These conceptions are properly logical or formal, and not metaphysical or 
material. The three categories are quantitative ; these conceptions, quali- 
tative. They are logical conditions employed as metaphysical con- 
ceptions, — one of the very commonest error? in the sphere of mental 
science. — Tr. 



7 A TKANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

Among the many conceptions, which make up the very 
variegated web of human cognition, some are destined for 
pure use a priori, independent of all experience ; and their 
title to be so employed always requires a deduction, inasmuch 
as, to justify such use of them, proofs from experience are 
not sufficient ; but it is necessary to know how these concep- 
tions can apply to objects without being derived from expe- 
rience. I term, therefore, an explanation of the manner in 
which conceptions can apply a priori to objects, the transcen- 
dental deduction of conceptions, and I distinguish it from the 
empirical deduction, which indicates the mode in which a 
conception is obtained through experience and reflection 
thereon ; consequently, does not concern itself with the right, 
but only with the fact of our obtaining conceptions in such 
and such a manner. We have already seen that we are in pos- 
session of two perfectly different kinds of conceptions, which 
nevertheless agree with each other in this, that they both 
apply to objects completely a priori. These are the concep- 
tions of space and time as forms of sensibility, and the cate- 
gories as pure conceptions of the understanding. To attempt 
an empirical deduction of either of these classes would be 
labour in vain, because the distinguishing characteristic of 
their nature consists in this, that they apply to their objects, 
without having borrowed anything from experience towards 
the representation of them. Consequently, if a deduction of 
these conceptions is necessary, it must always be transcen- 
dental. 

Meanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with 
respect to all our cognition, we certainly may discover in 
experience, if not the principle of their possibility, yet the 
occasioning causes * of their production. It will be found 
that the impressions of sense give the first occasion for 
bringing into action the whole faculty of cognition, and for 
the production of experience, which contains two very dis- 
similar elements, namely, a matter for cognition, given by 
the senses, and a certain form for the arrangement of this 
matter, arising out of the inner fountain of pure intuition and 
thought ; and these, on occasion given by sensuous impres- 
sions, are called into exercise and produce conceptions. Such 

* Gelegenheitsursachen. 



DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOKIES. 73 

an investigation into the first efforts of our faculty of cognition 
to mount from particular perceptions to general conceptions, 
is undoubtedly of great utility ; and we have to thank the 
celebrated Locke, for having first opened the way for this en- 
quiry. But a deduction of the pure a priori conceptions of 
course never can be made in this way, seeing that, in regard 
to their future employment, which must be entirely inde- 
pendent of experience, they must have a far different certificate 
of birth to show from that of a descent from experience. This 
attempted physiological derivation, which cannot properly be 
called deduction, because it relates merely to a qxicestio facti, 
I shall entitle an explanation of the possession of a pure cog- 
nition. It is therefore manifest that there can only be a tran- 
scendental deduction of these conceptions, and by no means 
an empirical one ; also, that all attempts at an empirical de- 
duction, in regard to pure a priori conceptions, are vain, and 
can only be made by one who does not understand the alto- 
gether peculiar nature of these cognitions. 

But although it is admitted that the only possible deduction 
of pure a priori cognition is a transcendental deduction, it is not, 
for that reason, perfectly manifest that such a deduction is 
absolutely necessary. We have already traced to their sources 
the conceptions of space and time, by means of a transcen- 
dental deduction, and we have explained and determined their 
objective validity a priori. Geometry, nevertheless, advances 
steadily and securely in the province of pure a priori cogni- 
tions, without needing to ask from Philosophy any certificate 
as to the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental concep- 
tion of space. But the use of the conception in this science 
extends only to the external world of sense, the pure form of 
the intuition of which is space ; and in this world, therefore, 
all geometrical cognition, because it is founded upon a priori 
intuition, posesses immediate evidence, and the objects of this 
cognition are given a priori (as regards their form) in intuition 
by and through the cognition itself.* With the pure concep- 
tions of Understanding, on the contrary, commences the ab- 

* Kant's meaning is : The objects of cognition in Geometry, — angles, 
lines, figures, and the like, — are not different from the act of cognition 
which produces them, except in thought. The object does not exist but 
while we think it — does not exist apart from our thinking it. The act of 
thinking aud the object of thinking, are but one thing regarded from two 
different points of view. — Tr. 



74 TKAFSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

solute necessity of seeking a transcendental deduction, not 
only of these conceptions themselves, but likewise of space, 
because, inasmuch as they make affirmations* concerning 
objects not by means of the predicates of intuition and sen- 
sibility, but of pure thought a priori, they apply to objects 
without any of the conditions of sensibility. Besides, not being 
founded on experience, they are not presented with any 
object in a priori intuition upon which, antecedently to expe- 
rience, they might base their synthesis. Hence results, not 
only doubt as to the objective validity and proper limits of 
their use, but that even our conception of space is rendered 
equivocal; inasmuch as we are very ready with the aid of 
the categories, to carry the use of this conception beyond the 
conditions of sensuous intuition ; — and for this reason, we 
have already found a transcendental deduction of it needful. 
The reader, then, must be quite convinced of the absolute neces- 
sity of a transcendental deduction, before taking a single step 
in the field of pure reason ; because otherwise he goes to work 
blindly, and after he has wandered about in all directions, 
returns to the state of utter ignorance from which he started. 
He ought, moreover, clearly to recognize beforehand, the un- 

* I have been compelled to adopt a conjectural reading here. All the 
editions of the Critik der reinen Vernunft, both those published during 
Kant's lifetime, and those published by various editors after his death, 
have sie. . von Gegenstdnden. . . . redet. But it is quite plain that the sie 
is the pronoun for die reine Verstandesbegriffe ; and we ought, there- 
fore, to read reden. In the same sentence, all the editions (except Har- 
tenstein's) insert die after the first und, which makes nonsense. In 
page 75 also, sentence beginning "For that objects," I have altered "syn- 
thetischen Einsicht des Denkens" into " synthetischen Einheit" And in 
page 77, sentence beginning, " But it is evident," we find "die erste 
Bedingung liegen." Some such word as muss is plainly to be understood. 

Indeed, I have not found a single edition of the Critique trust- 
worthy. Kant must not have been very careful in his correction of the 
press. Those published by editors after Kant's death seem in most cases 
to follow Kant's own editions closely. That by Rosencrantz is perhaps the 
best; and he has corrected a number of Kant's errors. But although I have 
adopted several uncommon and also conjectural readings, I have not done 
so hastily or lightly. It is only after diligent comparison of all the editions 
I could gain access to, that I have altered the common reading ; while a 
conjectural reading has been adopted only when it was quite clear that 
the reading of every edition was a misprint. 

Other errors, occurring previously to those mentioned above, have been, 
and others after them will be. corrected in silence. — Tr. 



DEDUCTION OP THE CATEGOKIES, 75 

avoidable difficulties in his undertaking, so that he may not 
afterwards complain of the obscurity in which the subject 
itself is deeply involved, or become too soon impatient of the 
obstacles in his path ; — because we have a choice of only two 
things — either at once to give up all pretensions to know- 
ledge beyond the limits of possible experience, or to bring 
this critical investigation to completion. 

We have been able, with very little trouble, to make it com- 
prehensible how the conceptions of space and time, although 
a priori cognitions, must necessarily apply to external ob- 
jects, and render a synthetical cognition of these possible, 
independently of all experience. For inasmuch as only by 
means of such pure form of sensibility an object can appear 
to us, that is, be an object of empirical intuition, space and 
time are pure intuitions, which contain a priori the con- 
dition of the possibility of objects as phsenomena, and an 
a priori synthesis in these intuitions possesses objective 
validity. 

On the other hand, the categories of the understanding do 
not represent the conditions under which objects are given 
to us in intuition ; objects can consequently appear to us 
without necessarily connecting themselves with these, and 
consequently without any necessity binding on the under- 
standing to contain a priori the conditions of these objects. 
Thus we find ourselves involved in a difficulty which did not 
present itself in the sphere of sensibility, that is to say, we 
cannot discover how the subjective conditions of thought can 
have objective validity, in other words, can become con- 
ditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects ; — for 
phsenomena may certainly be given to us in intuition without 
any help from the functions of the understanding. Let us 
take, for example, the conception of cause, which indicates a 
peculiar kind of synthesis, namely, that with something, A, 
something entirely different, B, is connected according to a 
law. It is not a priori manifest why phaenomena should 
contain anything of this kind (we are of course debarred 
from appealing for proof to experience, for the objective 
validity of this conception must be demonstrated a priori), 
and it hence remains doubtful a priori, whether such a con- 
ception be not quite void, and without any corresponding 
object among phsenomena. For that objects of sensuous 



76 TEANSCEKDENTAL LOGIC. 

intuition must correspond to the formal conditions of sen 
sibility existing a priori in the mind, is quite evident, from 
the fact, that without these they could not be objects for 
us ; but that they must also correspond to the conditions 
which understanding requires for the synthetical unity or 
thought, is an assertion, the grounds for which are not so 
easily to be discovered. For phsenomena might be so con- 
stituted, as not to correspond to the conditions of the unity 
of thought ; and all things might lie in such confusion, 
that, for example, nothing could be met with in the sphere 
of phsenomena to suggest a law of synthesis, and so cor- 
respond to the conception of cause and effect ; so that this 
conception would be quite void, null, and without significance. 
Phsenomena would nevertheless continue to present objects 
to our intuition ; for mere intuition does not in any respect 
stand in need of the functions of thought. 

If we thought to free ourselves from the labour of these 
investigations by saying, " Experience is constantly offering 
us examples of the relation of cause and effect in phseno- 
mena, and presents us with abundant opportunity of ab- 
stracting the conception of cause, and so at the same time of 
corroborating the objective validity of this conception ;" — we 
should in this case be overlooking the fact, that the concep- 
tion of cause cannot arise in this way at all ; that, on the con- 
trary, it must either have an a priori basis in the understand- 
ing, or be rejected as a mere chimsera. For this conception 
demands that something, A, should be of such a nature, that 
something else, B, should follow from it necessarily, and ac- 
cording to an absolutely universal law. We may certainly 
collect from phaenomena a law, according to which this or 
that usually happens, but the element of necessity is not tc 
be found in it. Hence it is evident that to the synthesis of 
cause and effect belongs a dignity, which is utterly wanting in 
any empirical synthesis ; for it is no mere mechanical syn- 
thesis, by means of addition, but a dynamical one, that is to 
say, the effect is not to be cogitated as merely annexed to the 
cause, but as posited by and through the cause, and resulting 
from it. The strict universality of this law never can be a 
characteristic of empirical laws, which obtain through in- 
duction only a comparative universality, that is, an extended 
range of practical application. But the pure conceptions ol 



DEDUCTION 01' THE CATEGORIES. /, 

the understanding would entirely lose all their peculiar cha- 
racter, if we treated them merely as the productions of ex- 
perience. 

Transition to the Transcendental Deduction oe the 
Categories. 

§ 10. 
There are only two possible ways in which synthetical re- 
presentation and its objects can coincide with and relate 
necessarily to each other, and, as it were, meet together. 
Either the object alone makes the representation possible, or 
the representation alone makes the object possible. In the 
former case, the relation between them is only empirical, and 
an a priori representation is impossible. And this is the 
case with phsenomena, as regards that in them which is refer- 
able to mere sensation. In the latter case — although repre- 
sentation alone (for of its causality, by means of the will, we 
do not here speak,) does not produce the object as to its ex- 
istence, it must nevertheless be a priori determinative in re- 
gard to the object, if it is only by means of the represent- 
ation that we can cognize any thing as an object. Now there 
are only two conditions of the possibility of a cognition of 
objects ; firstly, Intuition, by means of which the object, 
though only as phaenomenon, is given; secondly, Conception, by 
means of which the object which corresponds to this intuition 
is thought. But it is evident from what has been said on aes- 
thetic, that the first condition, under which alone objects can 
be intuited, must in fact exist, as a formal basis for them, 
a priori in the mind. With this formal condition of sensi- 
bility, therefore, all phaenomena necessarily correspond, because 
it is only through it that they can be phaenomena at all ; that 
is, can be empirically intuited and given. Now the question is, 
whether there do not exist a priori in the mind, conceptions of 
understanding also, as conditions under which alone something, 
if not intuited, is yet thought as object. If this question be 
answered in the affirmative, it follows that all empirical cogni- 
tion of objects is necessarily conformable to such conceptions, 
since, if they are not presupposed, it is impossible that anything 
can be an object of experience. Now all experience contains, 
besides the intuition of the senses, through which an object is 



78 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

given, a conception also of an object that is given in intuition. 
Accordingly, conceptions of objects in general must lie as a priori 
conditions at the foundation of all empirical cognition; and con- 
sequently, the objective validity of the categories, as a priori 
conceptions, will rest upon this, that experience (as far as re- 
gards the form of thought) is possible only hy their means. 
For in that case they apply necessarily and a priori to objects 
of experience, because only through them can an object of ex- 
perience be thought. 

The whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all a priori 
conceptions is to show that these conceptions are a priori 
conditions of the possibility of all experience. Conceptions 
which afford us the objective foundation of the possibility of 
experience, are for that very reason necessary. But the 
analysis of the experiences in which they are met with is not 
deduction, but only an illustration of them, because from 
experience they could never derive the attribute of necessity. 
Without their original applicability and relation to all pos- 
sible experience, in which all objects of cognition present 
themselves, the relation of the categories to objects, of what- 
ever nature, would be quite incomprehensible. 

The celebrated Locke, for want of due reflection on these 
points, and because he met with pure conceptions of the un- 
derstanding in experience, sought also to deduce them from 
experience, and yet proceeded so inconsequently as to attempt, 
with their aid, to arrive at cognitions which lie far beyond 
the limits of all experience. David Hume perceived that, to 
render this possible, it was necessary that the conceptions 
should have an a priori origin. But as he could not explain 
how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected 
with each other in the understanding, must nevertheless be 
thought as necessarily connected in the object, — and it never 
occurred to him that the understanding itself might, perhaps, 
by means of these conceptions, be the author of the experi- 
ence in which its objects were presented to it, — he was forced 
to derive these conceptions from experience, that is from 
a subjective necessity arising from repeated association of 
experiences erroneously considered to be objective, — in one 
word, from " habit." But he proceeded with perfect con- 
sequence, and declared it to be impossible with such con- 



DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOEIES. 79 

ceptions and the principles arising from them, to overstep 
the limits of experience. The empirical derivation, however, 
which both of these philosophers attributed to these concep- 
tions, cannot possibly be reconciled with the fact that we d<r 
possess scientific a priori cognitions, namely, those of pure 
mathematics and general physics. 

The former of these two celebrated men opened a wide 
door to extravagance — (for if reason has once undoubted right 
on its side, it will not allow itself to be confined to set limits, 
by vague recommendations of moderation) ; the latter gave 
himself up entirely to scepticism, — a natural consequence, 
after having discovered, as he thought, that the faculty of 
cognition was not trust-worthy. We now intend to make a 
trial whether it be not possible safely to conduct reason be- 
tween these two rocks, to assign her determinate limits, and 
yet leave open for her the entire sphere of her legitimate 
activity. 

I shall merely premise an explanation of what the categories 
are. They are conceptions of an object in general, by means 
of which its intuition is contemplated as determined in rela- 
tion to one of the logical functions of judgment. The fol- 
lowing will make this plain. The function of the categorical 
judgment is that of the relation of subject to predicate ; for 
example, in the proposition, " All bodies are divisible." But 
in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding, it 
still remains undetermined to which of these two conceptions 
belongs the function of subject, and to which that of predi- 
cate. For we could also say, " Some divisible is a body." 
But the category of substance, when the conception of a body 
is brought under it, determines that ; and its empirical intui- 
tion in experience must be contemplated always as subject, 
and never as mere predicate. And so with all the other cate- 
gories. 



80 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

Deduction oe the pure Conceptions or the Under- 
standing. 

SECTION II. 

Transcendental Deduction oe the pure Conceptions 
or the- Understanding. 

§ 11. 

Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold repre- 
sentations given by Sense. 

Tiie manifold content in our representations can be given 
in an intuition which is merely sensuous — in other words, is 
nothing but susceptibility ; and the form of this intuition can 
exist a priori in our faculty of representation, without being 
any thing else but the mode in which the subject is affected. 
But the conjunction (conjunctio) of a manifold in intuition 
never can be given us by the senses ; it cannot therefore be 
contained in the pure form of sensuous intuition, for it is a 
spontaneous act of the faculty of representation. And as we 
must, to distinguish it from sensibility, entitle this faculty 
understanding ; so all conjunction — whether conscious or un- 
conscious, be it of the manifold in intuition, sensuous or non- 
sensuous, or of several conceptions — is an act of the under- 
standing. To this act we shall give the general appellation 
of synthesis, thereby to indicate, at the same time, that we 
cannot represent any thing as conjoined in the object without 
having previously conjoined it ourselves. Of all mental 
notions, that of conjunction is the only one which cannot be 
given through objects, but can be originated only by the sub- 
ject itself, because it is an act of its purely spontaneous activity. 
The reader will easily enough perceive that the possibility of 
conjunction must be grounded in the very nature of this act, 
and that it must be equally valid for all conjunction ; and 
that analysis, which appears to be its contrary, must, never- 
theless, always presuppose it ; for where the understanding 
has not previously conjoined, it cannot dissect or analyse, 
because only as conjoined by it, must that which is to be 
analysed have been given to our faculty of representation. 

But the conception of conjunction includes, besides the 
conception of the manifold and of the synthesis of it, that of the 



TBAFS CEDENT AL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOEIES. 81 

unity of it also. Conjunction is the representation of the 
synthetical unity of the manifold.* This idea of unity, there- 
fore, cannot arise out of that of conjunction ; much rather 
does that idea, by combining itself with the representation 
of the manifold, render the conception of conjunction pos- 
sible. This unity, which a priori precedes all conceptions 
of conjunction, is not the category of unity (§ 6); for all the 
categories are based upon logical functions of judgment, 
and in these functions we already have conjunction, and 
consequently unity of given conceptions. It is therefore 
evideut that the category of unity presupposes conjunction. 
We must therefore look still higher for this unity (as quali- 
tative, § 8), in that, namely, which contains the ground of 
the unity of diverse conceptions in judgments, the ground, 
consequently, of the possibility of the existence of the under- 
standing, even in regard to its logical use. 

Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception^ 

§ 12. 

The I think must accompany all my representations, for 
otherwise something would be represented in me which could 
not be thought ; in other words, the representation would 
either be impossible, or at least be, in relation to me, nothing. 
That representation which can be given previously to all 
thought, is called intuition. All the diversity or manifold 
content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the 
I think, in the subject in which this diversity is found. 
But this representation, I think, is an act of spontaneity ; 
that is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere 
sensibility. I call it pure apperception, in order to distin- 

* "Whether the representations are in themselves identical, and conse- 
quently whether one can be thought analytically by means of and through 
the other, is a question which we need not at present consider. Our con- 
sciousness of the one. when we speak of the manifold, is always distinguish- 
able from our consciousness of the other ; and it is only respecting the 
synthesis of this (possible) consciousness that we here treat. 

f Apperception simply means consciousness. But it has been considered 
better to employ this term, not only because Kant saw fit to have another 
word besides Bewusstseyn, but because the term consciousness denotes a 
state, apperception an act of the ego; and from this alone the superiority 
of the latter is apparent. — Tr. 

O 



82 TEANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

guisb. it from empirical ; or primitive apperception, because it 
is a self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the re- 
presentation I think, must necessarily be capable of accom- 
panying all our representations. It is in all acts of conscious- 
ness one and the same, and unaccompanied by it, no repre- 
sentation can exist for me. The unity of this apperception I 
call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order 
to indicate the possibility of a priori cognition arising from it. 
For the manifold representations which are given in an intui- 
tion would not all of them be my representations, if they 
did not all belong to one self-consciousness, that is, as my 
representations (even although I am not conscious of them as 
such), they must conform to the condition under which alone 
they can exist together in a common self-consciousness, be- 
cause otherwise they would not all without exception belong 
to me. From this primitive conjunction follow many impor- 
tant results. 

For example, this universal identity of the apperception of 
the manifold given in intuition, contains a synthesis of repre- 
sentations, and is possible only by means of the consciousness 
of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness which 
accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary 
and disunited, and without relation to the identity of the 
subject. This relation, then does not exist because I accom- 
pany every representation with consciousness, but because I 
join one representation to another, and am conscious of the 
synthesis of them. Consequently, only because I can connect 
a variety of given representations in one consciousness, is it 
possible that I can represent to myself the identity of con- 
sciousness in these representations ; in other words, the ana- 
lytical unity of apperception is possible only under the pre- 
supposition of a synthetical unity.* The thought, "These repre- 

* All general conceptions — as such — depend, for their existence, on the 
analytical unity of consciousness. For example, when I think of red in 
general, I thereby think to myself a property which (as a characteristic 
mark) can be discovered somewhere, or can be united with other repre- 
sentations ; consequently, it is only by means of a forethought possible 
synthetical unity that I can think to myself the analytical. A represen- 
tation which is cogitated as common to different representations, is re- 
garded as belonging to such as, besides this common representation, con- 
tain something different; consequently it must be previously thought in 
synthetical unity with other although only possible representations, before 



DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOEIES. 83 

sentaticms given in intuition, belong all of them to me," is 
accordingly just the same as, "I unite them in one self-con- 
sciousness, or can at least so unite them ;'' and although this 
thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of re- 
presentations, it presupposes the possibility of it ; that is to 
say, for the reason alone, that I can comprehend the variety 
of my representations in one consciousness, do I call them 
my representations, for otherwise I must have as many- 
coloured and various a self as are the representations of which 
I am conscious. Synthetical unity of the manifold in intui- 
tions, as given a priori, is therefore the foundation of the 
identity of apperception itself, which antecedes a priori all 
determinate thought. But the conjunction of representations 
into a conception is not to be found in objects themselves, nor 
can it be, as it were, borrowed from them and taken up into 
the understanding by perception, but it is on the contrary an 
operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more 
than the faculty of conjoining a priori, and of bringing the 
variety of given representations under the unity of apper- 
ception. This principle is the highest in all human cog- 
nition. 

This fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apper- 
ception is indeed an identical, and therefore analytical propo- 
sition ; but it nevertheless explains the necessity for a synthesis 
of the manifold given in an intuition, without which the 
identity of self-consciousness would be incogitable. For the 
Ego, as a simple representation, presents us with no manifold 
content ; only in intuition, which is quite different from the 
representation Ego, can it be given us, and by means of con- 
junction, it is cogitated in one self-consciousness. An under- 
standing, in which all the manifold should be given by means 
of consciousness its„elf, would be intuitive ; our understanding 
can only think, and must look for its intuition to sense. I 
am, therefore, conscious of my identical self, in relation to 
all the variety of representations given to me in an intuition, 
because I call all of them my representations. In other 

I can think in it the analytical unity of consciousness which makes it a 
conceptas communis. And thus the synthetical unity of apperception is the 
highest point with which we must connect every operation of the under- 
standing, even the whole of logic, and after it our transcendental philo- 
sophy : indeed, this faculty is the understanding itself. 

g2 



84 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

words, I am conscious myself of a necessary a priori syn- 
thesis of my representations, which is called the original 
synthetical unity of apperception, under which rank all the 
representations presented to me, but that only by means of a 

synthesis. 

The principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the 
highest principle of all exercise of the Understanding. 

§ 13. 

The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in 
relation to sensibility was, according to our transcendental 
aesthetic, that all the manifold in intuition be subject to the 
formal conditions of Space and Time. The supreme prin- 
ciple of the possibility of it in relation to the Understanding 
is : that all the manifold in it be subject to conditions of the 
originally synthetical Unity of Apperception.* To the former 
of these two principles are subject all the various representa- 
tions of Intuition, in so far as they are given to us ; to the 
latter, in so far as they must be capable of conjunction in one 
consciousness ; for without this nothing can be thought or 
cognized, because the given representations would not have 
in common the act of the apperception / think ; and there- 
fore could not be connected in one self-consciousness. 

Understanding is, to speak generally, the faculty of Cog- 
nitions. These consist in the determined relation of given 
representations to an object. But an object is that, in the 
conception of which the manifold in a given intuition is 
united. Now all union of representations requires unity of 
consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently, it is 
the unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the possibility 
of representations relating to an object, and therefore of their 
objective validity, and of their becoming cognitions, and con- 

* Space and Time, and all portions thereof, are Intuitions ; conse- 
quently are, with a manifold for their content, single representations. 
(See the Transcendental ^Esthetic.) Consequently, they are not pure 
conceptions, hy means of which the same consciousness is found in a 
great number of representations ; but, on the contrary, they are many 
representations contained in one, the consciousness of which is, so to 
speak, compounded. The unity of consciousness is nevertheless syn- 
thetical, and therefore primitive. From this peculiar character of con- 
sciousness follow many important consequences. (See § 21.) 



DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOEIES. S5 

sequently, the possibility of the existence of the understanding 
itself. 

The first pure cognition of understanding, then, upon which 
is founded all its other exercise, and which is at the same 
time perfectly independent of all conditions of mere sensuous 
intuition, is the principle of the original synthetical unity of 
apperception. Thus the mere form of external sensuous in- 
tuition, namely, space, affords us, per se, no cognition ; it 
merely contributes the manifold in a priori intuition to a pos- 
sible cognition. But, in order to cognize something in space, 
(for example, a line,) I must draw it, and thus produce syn- 
thetically a determined conjunction of the given manifold, so 
that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of con- 
sciousness, (in the conception of a line,) and by this means 
alone is an object (a determinate space) cognized. The syn- 
thetical unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective con- 
dition of all cognition, which I do not merely require in order 
to cognize an object, but to which every intuition must neces- 
sarily be subject, in order to become an object for me ; be- 
cause in any other way, and without this synthesis, the mani- 
fold in intuition could not be united in one consciousness. 

This proposition is, as already said, itself analytical, al- 
though it constitutes the synthetical unity, the condition of all 
thought ; for it states nothing more than that all my repre- 
sentations in any given intuition, must be subject to the con- 
dition which alone enables me to connect them, as my repre- 
sentation with the identical self, and so to unite them syn- 
thetically in one apperception, by means of the general ex 
pression, J think. 

But this principle is not to be regarded as a principle for 
every possible understanding, but only for that understanding 
by means of whose pure apperception in the thought J am, 
no manifold content is given. The understanding or mind 
which contained the manifold in intuition, in and through 
the act itself of its own self-consciousness, in other words, an 
understanding by and in the representation of which the 
objects of the representation should at the same time exist, 
would not require a special act of synthesis of the manifold 
as the condition of the unity of its consciousness, an act of 
which the human understanding, which thinks only and can- 
not intuite, has absolute need. But this principle is the first 



86 TRA^SCEINDENTAL LOGIC. 

principle of all the operations of our understanding, so that 
we cannot form the least conception of any other possible un- 
derstanding, either of one such as should be itself intuition, or 
possess a sensuous intuition, but with forms different from 
those of space and time. 

What Objective Unity of Self -consciousness is. 

§ 14. 
It is by means of the transcendental unity of apperception 
that all the manifold given in an intuition is united into a 
conception of the object. On this account it is called ob- 
jective, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity 
of consciousness, which is a determination of the internal 
sense, by means of which the said manifold in intuition is given 
empirically to be so united. Whether I can be empirically 
conscious of the manifold as co-existent or as successive, de- 
pends upon circumstances, or empirical conditions. Hence 
the empirical unity of consciousness by means of association 
of representations, itself relates to a phsenomenal world, and is 
wholly contingent. On the contrary, the pure form of intui- 
tion in time, merely as an intuition, which contains a given 
manifold, is sutyect to the original unity of consciousness, and 
that solely by means of the necessary relation of the manifold 
in intuition to the I think, consequently by means of the pure 
synthesis of the understanding, which lies a priori at the 
foundation of all empirical synthesis. The transcendental 
unity of apperception is alone objectively valid ; the empirical 
which we do not consider in this essay, and which is merely a 
unity deduced from the former under given conditions in con- 
creto, possesses only subjective validity. One person connects 
the notion conveyed in a word with one thing, another with 
another thing ; and the unity of consciousness in that which 
is empirical, is, in relation to that which is given by experi- 
ence, not necessarily and universally valid. 

The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective 
Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein. 

§ 15. 
T could never satisfy myself with the definition which lo- 
gicians give of a judgment. It is, according to them, the 



DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES. 87 

representation of a relation between twovconceptions. I shall 
not dwell here on the faultiness of this definition, in that it 
suits only for categorical and not for hypothetical or disjunc- 
tive judgments, these latter containing a relation not of con- 
ceptions but of judgments themselves ; — a blunder from which 
many evil results have followed.* It is more important for 
our present purpose to observe, that this definition does not 
determine in what the said relation consists. 

But if I investigate more closely the relation of given 
cognitions in every judgment, and distinguish it, as belonging 
to the understanding, from the relation which is produced ac- 
cording to laws of the reproductive imagination, (which has 
only subjective validity), I find that a judgment is nothing but 
the mode of bringing given cognitions under the objective unity 
of apperception. This is plain from our use of the term of 
relation is in judgments, in order to distinguish the objective 
unity of given representations from the subjective unity. For 
this term indicates the relation of these representations to the 
original apperception, and also their necessary unity, even al- 
though the judgment is empirical, therefore contingent, as in 
the judgment, " All bodies are heavy." I do not mean by 
this, that these representations do necessarily belong to each 
other in empirical intuition, but that by means of the necessary 
unity of apperception they belong to each other in the syn- 
thesis of intuitions, that is to say, they belong to each other 
according to principles of the objective determination of all our 
representations, in so far as cognition can arise from them, 
these principles being all deduced from the main principle of 
the transcendental unity of apperception. In this way alone 
can there arise from this relation a judgment, that is, a rela- 
tion which has objective validity, and is perfectly distinct 
from that relation of the very same representations which 

* The tedious doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns only 
categorical syllogisms ; and although it is nothing more than an artifice 
by surreptitiously introducing immediate conclusions {consequently imme- 
diatce) among the premises of a pure syllogism, to give rise to an appearance 
of more modes of drawing a conclusion than that in the first figure, the 
artifice would not have had much success, had not its authors succeeded 
in bringing categorical judgments into exclusive respect, as those to which 
all others must be referred — a doctrine, however, which, according to § 5, 
is utterly false. 



88 TBAKSCEKDENTAL LOGIC. 

has only subjective validity — a relation, to wit, which is 
produced according to laws of association. According to 
these laws, I could only say : "When I hold in my hand or 
carry a body, I feel an impression of weight ;" but I could 
not say : " It, the body, is heavy ;" for this is tantamount to 
saying both these representations are conjoined in the ob- 
ject, that is, without distinction as to the condition of the 
subject, and do not merely stand together in my perception, 
however frequently the perceptive act may be repeated. 

All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions 
under which alone the manifold Content of them can be united 
in one Consciousness. 

§ 16. 
The manifold content given in a sensuous intuition comes 
necessarily under the original synthetical unity of appercep- 
tion, because thereby alone is the unity of intuition possible 
(§ 13). But that act of the understanding, by which the mani- 
fold content of given representations (whether intuitions or 
conceptions), is brought under one apperception, is the logical 
function of judgments (§ 15). All the manifold therefore, in so 
far as it is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in 
relation to one of the logical functions of judgment, by means 
of which it is brought into union in one consciousness. Now 
the categories are nothing else than these functions of judg- 
ment, so far as the manifold in a given intuition is deter- 
mined in relation to them(§ 9). Consequently, the manifold 
in a given intuition is necessarily subject to the categories 
of the understanding. 

Observation. 
§ 17. 
The manifold in an intuition, which I call mine, is repre- 
sented by means of the synthesis of the understanding, as 
belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness, and 
this takes place by means of the category.* The category 

* The proof of this rests on the represented unity of intuition, by 
means of which an object is given, and which always includes in itself 
a synthesis of the manifold to be intuited, and also the relation of this 
latter to unity of apperception. 



DEDUCTION 01" THE CATEGOEIES. 89 

indicates accordingly, that the empirical consciousness of a 
given manifold in an intuition is subject to a pure self-con- 
sciousness a priori, in the same manner as an empirical in- 
tuition is subject to a pure sensuous intuition, which is also 
a priori. — In the above proposition, then, lies the beginning 
of a deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding. 
Now, as the categories have their origin in the understanding 
alone, independently of sensibility, I must in my deduction 
make abstraction of the mode in which the manifold of an em- 
pirical intuition is given, in order to fix my attention exclu- 
sively on the unity which is brought by the understanding 
into the intuition by means of the category. In what follows 
(§ 22), it will be shown from the mode in which the empirical 
intuition is given in the faculty of sensibility, that the unity 
which belongs to it is no other than that which the category 
(according to § 16) imposes on the manifold in a given intui- 
tion, and thus its a priori validity in regard to all objects of 
sense being established, the purpose of our deduction will be 
fully attained. 

But there is one thing in the above demonstration, of which 
I could not make abstraction, namely, that the manifold to be 
intuited must be given previously to the synthesis of the un- 
derstanding, and independently of it. How this takes place 
remains here undetermined. For if I cogitate an understand- 
ing which was itself intuitive (as, for example, a divine un- 
derstanding which should not represent given objects, but by 
whose representation the objects themselves should be given 
or produced) — the categories would possess no signification 
in relation to such a faculty of cognition. They are merely 
rules for an understanding, whose whole power consists in 
thought, that is, in the act of submitting the synthesis of the 
manifold which is presented to it in intuition from a very 
different quarter, to the unity of apperception ; — a faculty, 
therefore, which cognizes nothing per se, but only connects 
and arranges the material of cognition, the intuition, namely, 
which must be presented to it by means of the object. But to 
show reasons for this peculiar character of our understandings, 
that it produces unity of apperception a priori only by means 
of categories, and a certain kind and number thereof, is as 
impossible as to explain why we are endowed with precisely 
so many functions of judgment and no more, or why time and 
space are the only forms of our intuition. 



00 TBAN'SCENDENTAL LOGIO. 

§ 18. 

In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is the 
only legitimate use of the Category. 

To think an object and to cognize an object are by no 
means the same thing. In cognition there are two elements : 
firstly, the conception, whereby an object is cogitated (the 
category) ; and, secondly, the intuition, whereby the object is 
given. For supposing that to the conception a corresponding 
intuition could not be given, it would still be a thought as re- 
gards its form, but without any object, and no cognition of 
anything would be possible by means of it, inasmuch as, so far 
as I knew, there existed and could exist nothing to which my 
thought could be applied. Now all intuition possible to us 
is sensuous ; consequently, our thought of an object by means 
of a pure conception of the understanding, can become cogni- 
tion for us, only in so far as this conception is applied to objects 
of the senses. Sensuous intuition is either pure intuition 
(space and time) or empirical intuition — of that which is im- 
mediately represented in space and time by means of sensation 
as real. Through the determination of pure intuition we ob- 
tain a, priori cognitions of objects, as in mathematics, but 
only as regards their form as phenomena ; whether there 
can exist things which must be intuited in this form is not 
thereby established. All mathematical conceptions, therefore, 
are not per se cognition, except in so far as we presuppose 
that there exist things, which can only be represented con- 
formably to the form of our pure sensuous intuition. But things 
in space and time are given, only in so far as they are percep- 
tions (representations accompanied with sensation), therefore 
only by empirical representation. Consequently the pure con- 
ceptions of the understanding, even when they are applied to 
intuitions a priori (as in mathematics), produce cognition 
only in so far as tbese (and therefore the conceptions of the 
understanding by means of them,) can be applied to empirical 
intuitions. Consequently the categories do not, even by means 
of pure intuition, afford us any cognition of things ; they can 
only do so in so far as they can be applied to empirical intui- 
tion. That is to say, the categories serve only to render em- 
pirical cognition possible. But this is what we call experience ; 



DEDUCTION OF THE CATE GOBIES. 91 

Consequently, in cognition, their application to objects of ex* 
perience is the only legitimate use of the categories. 

§ 19. 

The foregoing proposition is of the utmost importance, for 
it determines the limits of the exercise of the pure conceptions 
of the understanding in regard to objects, just as transcen- 
dental aesthetic determined the limits of the exercise of the 
pure form of our sensuous intuition. Space and time, as 
conditions of the possibility of the presentation of objects to 
us, are valid no further than for objects of sense, con- 
sequently, only for experience. Beyond these limits they re- 
present to us nothing, for they belong only to sense, and 
have no reality apart from it. The pure conceptions of the 
understanding are free from this limitation, and extend to 
objects of intuition in general, be the intuition like or unlike 
to ours, provided only it be sensuous, and not intellectual. 
But this extension of conceptions beyond the range of our in- 
tuition is of no advantage ; for they are then mere empty con- 
ceptions of objects, as to the possibility or impossibility of 
the existence of which they furnish us with no means of dis- 
covery. They are mere forms of thought, without objective 
reality, because we have no intuition to which the synthetical 
unity of apperception, which alone the categories contain, 
could be applied, for the purpose of determining an object. 
Our sensuous and empirical intuition can alone give them 
significance and meaning. 

If, then, we suppose an object of a non-sensuous intuition 
to be given, we can in that case represent it by all those pre- 
dicates, which are implied in the presupposition that nothing 
appertaining to sensuous intuition belongs to it ; for example 
that it is not extended, or in space ; that its duration is not time 
that in it no change (the effect of the determinations in time) 
is to be met with, and so on. But it is no proper knowledge if 
I merely indicate what the intuition of the object is not, with- 
out being able to say what is contained in it, for I have not 
shown the possibility of an object to which my pure con- 
ception of understanding could be applicable, because I have 
not been able to furnish any intuition corresponding to it, 
but am only able to say that our intuition is not valid for it. 
But the most important point is this, that to a something of 



92 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

this kind not one category can be found applicable. Take, 
for example, the conception of substance, that is something 
that can exist as subject, but never as mere predicate ; in 
regard to this conception I am quite ignorant whether there 
can really be anything to correspond to such a determination 
of thought, if empirical intuition did not afford me the occa- 
sion for its application. But of this more in the sequel. 

§ 20. 

Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses 

in general. 

The pure conceptions of the understanding apply to objects 
of intuition in general, through the understanding alone, 
whether the intuition be our own or some other, provided 
only it be sensuous, but are, for this very reason, mere 
forms of thought, by means of which alone no determined 
object can be cognized. The synthesis or conjunction of the 
manifold in these conceptions relates, we have said, only to 
the unity of apperception, and is for this reason the ground of 
the possibility of a priori cognition, in so far as this cognition 
is dependent on the understanding. This synthesis is, there- 
fore, not merely transcendental, but also purely intellectual. 
But because a certain form of sensuous intuition exists in the 
mind d priori which rests on the receptivity of the representa- 
tive faculty (sensibility), the understanding, as a spontaneity, 
is able to determine the internal sense by means of the di- 
versity of given representations, conformably to the synthetical 
unity of apperception, and thus to cogitate the synthetical 
unity of the apperception of the manifold of sensuous in- 
tuition a priori, as the condition to which must necessarily 
be submitted all objects of human intuition. And in this 
nanner the categories as mere forms of thought receive ob- 
jective reality, that is application to objects which are given 
to us in intuition, but that only as phsenomena, for it is only 
of phsenomena that we are capable of a priori intuition. 

This synthesis of the manifold of sensuous intuition, which 
is possible and necessary a priori, may be called figurative 
(synthesis speciosa), in contra-distinction to that which is co- 
gitated in the mere category in regard to the manifold of an 
intuition in general, and is called connexion or conjunction of 
the understanding {synthesis intellectualis). Both are trans- 



DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOEIES. 93 

cendental, not merely because they themselves precede a prion 
all experience, but also because they form the basis for the 
possibility of other cognition a priori. 

But the figurative synthesis, when it has relation only to 
the originally synthetical unity of apperception, that is to the 
transcendental unity cogitated in the categories, must, to be 
distinguished from the purely intellectual conjunction, be en- 
titled the transcendental synthesis of imagination* Imagina- 
tion is the faculty of representing an object even without its 
presence in intuition. Now, as all our intuition is sensuous, 
imagination, by reason of the subjective condition under which 
alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the conceptions 
of the understanding, belongs to sensibility. But in so far 
as the synthesis of the imagination is an act of spontaneity, 
which is determinative, and not, like sense, merely determinable, 
and which is consequently able to determine sense a priori, 
according to its form, conformably to the unity of appercep- 
tion, in so far is the imagination a faculty of determining sen- 
sibility a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions according to the 
categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagi- 
nation. It is an operation of the understanding on sensibility, 
and the first application of the understanding to objects of 
possible intuition, and at the same time the basis for the exer- 
cise of the other functions of that faculty. As figurative, it is 
distinguished from the merely intellectual synthesis, which is 
produced by the understanding alone, without the aid of 
imagination. Now, in so far as imagination is spontaneity, I 
sometimes call it also the productive imagination, and distin- 
guish it from the reproductive, the synthesis of which is sub- 
ject entirely to empirical laws, those of association, namely, 
and which, therefore, contributes nothing to the explanation 
of the possibility of a priori cognition, and for this reason 
belongs not to transcendental philosophy, but to psychology. 

"We have now arrived at the proper place for explaining the 
paradox, which must have struck every one in our exposition 
of the internal sense (§ 6), namely, — how this sense repre- 
sents us to our own consciousness, only as we appear to our- 
selves, not as we are in ourselves, because, to wit, we intuite 
* See note on p. 34 



94 TKANSCEITOENTAL LOGIC. 

ourselves only as we are inwardly affected. Now this appears 
to be contradictory, inasmuch as we thus stand in a passive re- 
lation to ourselves ; and therefore in the systems of psychology, 
the internal sense is commonly held to be one with the faculty 
of apperception, while we, on the contrary, carefully distin- 
guish them. 

That which determines the internal sense is the under- 
standing, and its original power of conjoining the manifold of 
intuition, that is, of bringing this under an apperception 
(upon which rests the possibility of the understanding itself). 
Now, as the human understanding is not in itself a faculty of 
intuition, and is unable to exercise such a power, in order to 
conjoin, as it were, the manifold of its own intuition, the syn- 
thesis of understanding is, considered per se, nothing but the 
unity of action, of which, as such, it is self-conscious, even apart 
from sensibility, by which, moreover, it is able to determine 
our internal sense in respect of the manifold which may be 
presented to it according to the form of sensuous intuition. 
Thus, under the name of a transcendental synthesis of imagi- 
nation, the understanding exercises an activity upon the passive 
subject, whose faculty it is ; and so we are right in saying that 
the internal sense is affected thereby. Apperception and its 
synthetical unity are by no means one and the same with the 
internal sense. The former, as the source of all our synthetical 
conjunction, applies, under the name of the categories, to the 
manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition 
of objects. The internal sense, on the contrary, contains 
merely the form of intuition, but without any synthetical con- 
junction of the manifold therein, and consequently does not con- 
tain any determined intuition, which is possible only through 
consciousness of the determination of the manifold by the 
transcendental act of the imagination (synthetical influence of 
the understanding on the internal sense), which I have named 
figurative synthesis. 

This we can indeed always perceive in ourselves. We can- 
not cogitate a geometrical line without drawing it in thought, 
nor a circle without describing it, nor represent the three 
dimensions * of space without drawing three lines from the 
same point f perpendicular to one another. We cannot even 
cogitate time, unless, in drawing a straight line (which is to 

* Length, breadth, and thickness.— Tr. f In different planes.— T*- 



DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES. 95 

serve as the external figurative representation of time), we fix 
onr attention on the act of the synthesis of the manifold, 
whereby we determine successively the internal sense, and 
thus attend also to the succession of this determination. 
Motion as an act of the subject (not as a determination of an 
object),* consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space, 
if we make abstraction of space and attend merely to the act by 
which we determine the internal sense according to its form, 
is that which produces the conception of succession. The un- 
derstanding, therefore, does by no means find in the internal 
sense any such synthesis of the manifold, but produces it, in 
that it affects this sense. At the same time how [the] 
I who think is distinct from the I which intuites itself 
(other modes of intuition being cogitable as at least possible), 
and yet one and the same with this latter as the same subject ; 
how, therefore, I am able to say : " I, as an intelligence and 
thinking subject, cognize myself as an object thought, so far as 
I am, moreover, given to myself in intuition, — only, like other 
phenomena, not as I am in myself, and as considered by the 
understanding, but merely as I appear," — is a question that has 
in it neither more nor less difficulty than the question, — " How 
can I be an object to myself," or this, — "How I can be an object 
of my own intuition and internal perceptions." But that such 
must be the fact, if we admit that space is merely a pure form 
of the phsenomena of external sense, can be clearly proved by 
the consideration that we cannot represent time, which is not 
an object of external intuition, in any other way than under 
the image of a line, which we draw in thought, a mode of re- 
presentation without which we could not cognize the unity 
of its dimension, and also that we are necessitated to take 
our determination of periods of time, or of points of time, 
for all our internal perceptions from the changes which we 
perceive in outward things. It follows that we must arrange 
the determinations of the internal sense, as phenomena in 
time, exactly in the same manner as we arrange those of the 

* Motion of an object in space does not belong to a pure science, con- 
sequently not to geometry ; because, that a thing is moveable cannot ne 
known a priori, but only from experience. But motion, considered as the 
description of a space, is a pure act of the successive synthesis of the mani- 
fold in external intuition by means of productive imagination, and belongs 
not only to geometry, but even to transcendental philosophy. 



96 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

external senses in space. And consequently, if we grant 
respecting this latter, that by means of them we know objects 
only in so far as we are affected externally, we must also con- 
fess, with regard to the internal sense, that by means of it we 
intuite ourselves only as we are internally affected by ourselves ; 
in other words, as regards internal intuition, we cognize our 
own subject only as phaenomenon, and not as it is in itself.* 

§ 21. 

On the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the 
manifold content of representations, consequently in the syn- 
thetical unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not 
as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that 1 
am. This representation is a Thought, not an Intuition. 
Now, as in order to cognize ourselves, in addition to the act of 
thinking, which subjects the manifold of every possible intui- 
tion to the unity of apperception, there is necessary a deter- 
minate mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is given ; 
although my own existence is certainly not mere phaenomenon 
(much less mere illusion), the determination of my existence f 

* I do not see why so much difficulty should be found in admitting 
that our internal sense is affected by ourselves. Every act of attention 
exemplifies it. In such an act the understanding determines the internal 
sense by the synthetical conjunction which it cogitates, conformably to 
the internal intuition which corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis 
of the understanding. How much the mind is usually affected thereby 
every one will be able to perceive in himself. 

f The / think expresses the act of determining my own existence. My 
existence is thus already given by the act of consciousness ; but the mode 
in which I must determine my existence, that is, the mode in which I must 
place the manifold belonging to my existence, is not thereby given. For 
this purpose intuition of self is required, and this intuition possesses a 
form given a priori, namely, time, which is sensuous, and belongs to our 
receptivity of the determinable. Now, as I do not possess another in- 
tuition of self which gives the determining in me (of the spontaneity of 
which I am conscious), prior to the act of determination, in the same 
manner as time gives the determinable, it is clear that I am unable to 
determine my own existence as that of a spontaneous being, but I am only 
able to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of my 
determination, and my existence remains ever determinable in a purely 
sensuous manne?, that is to say, like the existence of a phaenomenon. 
But it is because of this spontaneity that I call myself an intelligence. 



DEDUCTION Or THE CATEOOlllES. 97 

can cnly take place conformably to the form of the internal 
sense, according to the particular mode in which the mani- 
fold which I conjoin is given in internal intuition, and I 
have therefore no knowledge of myself as I am, but merely 
as I appear to myself. The consciousness of self is thus 
very far from a knowledge of self, in which I do not use 
tiie categories, whereby I cogitate an object, by means of 
the conjunction of the manifold in one apperception. In 
the same way as I require, in order to the cognition of an 
object distinct from myself, not only the thought of an object 
in general (in the category), but also an intuition by which 
to determine that general conception, in the same way do I 
require, in order to the cognition of myself, not only the con- 
sciousness of myself or the thought that I think myself, but 
in addition an intuition of the manifold in myself, by which 
to determine this thought. It is true that I exist as an intel- 
ligence which is conscious only of its faculty of conjunction 
or synthesis, but subjected in relation to the manifold which 
this intelligence has to conjoin to a limitative conjunction 
called the internal sense. My intelligence (that is, I) can 
render that conjunction or synthesis perceptible only accord- 
ing to the relations of time, which are quite beyond the proper 
sphere of the conceptions of the understanding, and conse- 
quently cognize itself in respect to an intuition (which cannot 
possioly be intellectual, nor given by the understanding), only 
as it appears to itself, and not as it would cognize itself, if its 
intuition were intellectual. 

§ 22. 
Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible employ- 
ment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Under- 
standing. 

In the metaphysical deduction, the a priori origin of the 
categories was proved by their complete accordance with the 
general logical functions of thought ; in the transcendental 
deduction was exhibited the possibility of the categories as 
a priori cognitions of objects of an intuition in general (§16 
and 17). At present we are about to explain the possibility 
of cognizing, a priori, by means of the categories^ all objects 
which can possibly be presented to our senses, not, indeed, 
according to the form of their intuition, but according to the 



93 TEA^SCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

laws of their conjunction or synthesis, and thus, as it were, oi 
prescribing laws to nature, and even of rendering nature pos- 
sible. For if the categories were adequate to this task, it 
would not be evident to us why everything that is presented 
to our senses must be subject to those laws which have an 
a priori origin in the understanding itself. 

I premise, that by the term synthesis of apprehension, I 
understand the combination of the manifold in an empirical 
intuition, whereby perception, that is, empirical consciousness 
of the intuition (as phsenomenon), is possible. 

We have a priori forms of the external and internal sensuous 
intuition in the representations of space and time, and to these 
must the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold in a phseno- 
menon be always conformable, because the synthesis itself can 
only take place according to these forms. But space and time 
are not merely forms of sensuous intuition, but intuitions them- 
selves (which contain a manifold), and therefore contain a 
priori the determination of the unity of this manifold.* (See 
the Trans. JEsthetic.) Therefore is unity of the synthesis of 
the manifold without or within us, consequently also a con- 
junction to which all that is to be represented as determined 
in space or time must correspond, given a priori along with 
(not in) these intuiti©ns, as the condition of the synthesis of 
all apprehension of them. But this synthetical unity can be 
no -other than that of the conjunction of the manifold of a 
given intuition in general, in a primitive act of consciousness, 
according to the categories, but applied to our sensuous intui- 
tion. Consequently all synthesis, whereby alone is even per- 
ception possible, is subject to the categories. And, as experience 

* Space represented as an object (as geometry really requires it to 
be) contains more than the mere form of the intuition ; namely, a com- 
bination of the manifold given according to the form of sensibility into a 
representation that can be intuited ; so that the form of the intuition 
gives us merely the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of 
representation. In the ^Esthetic I regarded this unity as belonging entirely 
to sensibility, for the purpose of indicating that it antecedes all conceptions, 
although it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to sense, 
through which alone, however, all our conceptions of space and time are 
possible. For as by means of this unity alone (the understanding deter- 
mining the sensibility) space and time are given as intuitions, it follows 
that the unity of this intuition a priori belongs to space and time, and 
not to the conception of the understanding (§ 20). 



DEDUCTION OE THE CATEGOEIES. 99 

is cognition by means of conjoined perceptions, the categories 
are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are there- 
tore valid a priori for all objects of experience. 

* * * * * 

When, then, for example, I make the empirical intuition of 
a house by apprehension of the manifold contained therein 
into a perception, the necessary unity of space and of my 
external sensuous intuition lies at the foundation of this act, 
and I, as it were, draw the form of the house conformably 
to this synthetical unity of the manifold in space. But this 
very synthetical unity remains, even when I abstract the form 
of space, and has its seat in the understanding, and is in fact 
the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intui- 
tion ; that is to say, the category of quantity, to which the 
aforesaid synthesis of apprehension, that is, the perception, 
must be completely conformable.* 

To take another example, when I perceive the freezing of 
water, I apprehend two states (fluidity and solidity), which 
as such, stand toward each other mutually in a relation of time. 
But in the time, which I place as an internal intuition, at the 
foundation of this phenomenon, I represent to myself syn- 
thetical unity of the manifold, without which the aforesaid 
relation could not be given in an intuition as determined (in 
regard to the succession of time) . Now this synthetical unity, 
as the a priori condition under which I conjoin the manifold 
of an intuition, is, if I make abstraction of the permanent form 
of my internal intuition (that is to say, of time), the category 
of cause, by means of which, when applied to my sensibility, 
I determine everything that occurs according to relations of 
time. Consequently apprehension in such an event, and the 
event itself, as far as regards the possibility of its perception, 
stands under the conception of the relation of cause and effect : 

and so in all other cases. 

***** 

Categories are conceptions which prescribe laws a priori to 

* In this manner it is proved, that the synthesis of apprehension, which 
is empirical, must necessarily be conformable to the synthesis of apper- 
ception, which is intellectual, and contained a priori in the category. It is 
one and the same spontaneity which at one time, under the name of ima- 
gination, at another under that of understanding, producos conjunction ia 
the manifold of intuition. 

h2 
LOFC. 



100 TKANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

phenomena, consequently to nature as the complex of all 
phsenomena (natura materialiter spectata). • And now the 
question arises — inasmuch as these categories are not derived 
from nature, and do not regulate themselves according to her 
as their model (for in that case they would be empirical) — 
how it is conceivable that nature must regulate herself accord- 
ing to them, in other words, how the categories can determine 
a priori the synthesis of the manifold of nature, and yet not 
derive their origin from her. The following is the solution of 
this enigma. 

It is not in the least more difficult to conceive how the 
laws of the phsenomena of nature must harmonize with the 
understanding and with its <% priori form — that is, its fa- 
culty of conjoining the manifold — than it is to understand 
how the phsenomena themselves must correspond with the 
a priori form of our sensuous intuition. For laws do not 
exist in the phsenomena any more than the phenomena exist 
as things in themselves. Laws do not exist except by re- 
lation to the subject in which the phsenomena inhere, in so 
far as it possesses understanding, just as phsenomena have no 
existence except by relation to the same existing subject in so 
far as it has senses. To things as things in themselves, con- 
formability to lav/ must necessarily belong independently of 
an understanding to cognize them. But phenomena are only 
representations of things which are utterly unknown in re- 
spect to what they are in themselves. But as mere repre- 
sentations, they stand under no law of conjunction except that 
which the conjoining faculty prescribes. Now that which 
conjoins the manifold of sensuous intuition is imagination, 
a mental act to which understanding contributes unity of 
intellectual synthesis, and sensibility, manifoldness of appre- 
hension. Now as all possible perception depends on the syn- 
thesis of apprehension, and this empirical synthesis itself on 
the transcendental, consequently on the categories, it is evident 
that all possible perceptions, and therefore .everything that 
can attain to empirical consciousness, that is, all phsenomena 
of nature, must, as regards their conjunction, be subject to 
the categories. And nature (considered merely as nature in 
general) is dependent on them as the original ground of her 
necessary conformability to law (as naturaformaliter spectata). 
But the pure faculty (of the understanding) of prescribing lave 



RESULT OP THE DEDUCTION. 101 

a priori to phenomena by means of mere categories, is not 
competent to enounce other or more laws than those on which 
a nature in general, as a conform ability to law of phsenomena 
of space and time, depends. Particular law's, inasmuch as 
they concern empirically determined phsenomena, cannot be 
entirely deduced from pure laws, although they all stand 
under them. Experience must be superadded in order to 
know these particular laws ; but in regard to experience in 
general, and everything that can be cognized as an object 
thereof, these a priori laws are our only rule and guide. 

§ 23, 

Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Under- 
standing. 

We cannot think any object except by means of the catego- 
ries ; we cannot cognize any thought except by means of in- 
tuitions corresponding to these conceptions. Now all our in- 
tuitions are sensuous, and our cognition, in so far as the object 
of it is given, is empirical. But empirical cognition is expe- 
rience ; consequently no a priori cognition is possible for us, 
except of objects of possible experience * 

But this cognition, which is limited to objects of experience, 
is not for that reason derived entirely from experience, but — 
and this is asserted of the pure intuitions and the pure con- 
ceptions of the understanding — there are, unquestionably, 
elements of cognition, which exist in the mind a priori. Now 
there are only two ways in which a necessary harmony of ex- 
perience with the conceptions of its objects can be cogitated. 
Either experience makes these conceptions possible, or the 
conceptions make experience possible. The former of these 

* Lest ray readers should stumble at this assertion, and the conclusions 
that may be too rashly drawn from it, I must 'remind them that the 
categories in the act of thought are by no means limited by the conditions 
of our sensuous intuition, but have an unbounded sphere of action. It is 
only the cognition of the object of thought, the determining of the object, 
which requires intuition. In the absence of intuition, our thought of an 
object may still have true and useful consequences in regard to the exer. 
cise of reason by the subject. But as this exercise of reason is not always 
directed on the determination of the object, in other words, on cognition 
thereof, hut also on the determination of the subject and its volition, 1 dv 
not intend to treat of it in this place. 



102 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

statements will not hold good with respect to the categories 
(nor in regard to pure sensuous intuition), for they are a priori 
conceptions, and therefore independent of experience. The 
assertion of an empirical origin would attribute to them a sort 
of generatio cequivoca. Consequently, nothing remains but to 
adopt the second alternative (which presents us with a system, 
as it were, of the Epigenesis of pure reason), namely, that on 
the part of the understanding the categories do contain the 
grounds of the possibility of all experience. But with respect to 
the questions how they make experience possible, and what are 
the principles of the possibility thereof with which they pre- 
sent us in their application to phsenomena, the following sec- 
tion on the transcendental exercise of the faculty of judgment 
will inform the reader. 

It is quite possible that some one may propose a species of 
prceformation-system of pure reason — a middle way between 
the two — to wit, that the categories are neither innate and 
first a priori principles of cognition, nor derived from expe- 
rience, but are merely subjective aptitudes for thought 
implanted in us contemporaneously with our existence, 
which were so ordered and disposed by our Creator, that their 
exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws of nature which 
regulate experience. Now, not to mention that with such 
an hypothesis it is impossible to say at what point we 
must stop in the employment of predetermined aptitudes, 
the fact that the categories would in this case entirely lose 
that character of necessity which is essentially involved in 
the very conception of them, is a conclusive objection to it. 
The conception of cause, for example, which expresses the 
necessity of an effect under a presupposed condition, would 
be false, if it rested only upon such an arbitrary subjective 
necessity of uniting certain empirical representations according 
to such a rule of relation. I could not then say — " The effect 
is connected with its cause in the object (that is, necessarily)," 
but only, " I am so constituted that I can think this representa- 
tion as so connected, and not otherwise." Now this is just 
what the sceptic wants. For in this case, all our knowledge, 
depending on the supposed objective validity of our judg- 
ment, is nothing but mere illusion ; nor would there be want- 
ing people who would deny any such subjective necessity in 
respect to themselves, though they must feel it. At all events, 



ANALYTIC OE PRINCIPLES. 103 

we could not dispute with any one on that which merely de- 
pends on the manner in which his subject is organized. 

Short view of the above Deduction. 

The foregoing deduction is an exposition of the pure con- 
ceptions of the understanding (and with them of all theo- 
retical a priori cognition), as principles of the possibility of 
experience, but of experience as the determination of all phse- 
nomena in space and time in general — of experience, finally, 
from the principle of the original synthetical unity of apper- 
ception, as the form of the understanding in relation to time 

and space as original forms of sensibility. 

# * * * * 

I consider the division by paragraphs to be necessary only 
up to this point, because we had to treat of the elementary 
conceptions. As we now proceed to the exposition of the em- 
ployment of these, I shall not designate the chapters in this 
manner any further, 

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC. 

BOOK II. 
ANALYTIC OE PRINCIPLES. 

General logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides 
exactly with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. 
These are, Understanding, Judgment, and Reason. This 
science, accordingly, treats in its analytic of Conceptions, 
Judgments, and Conclusions in exact correspondence with the 
functions and order of those mental powers which we include 
generally under the generic denomination of understanding. 

As this merely formal logic makes abstraction of all con- 
tent of cognition, whether pure or empirical, and occupies 
itself with the mere form of thought (discursive cognition), 
it must contain in its analytic a canon for reason. For the 
form of reason has its law, which, without taking into consi- 
deration the particular nature of the cognition about which it 
is employed, can be discovered a priori, by the simple analysis 
of the action of reason into its momenta. 

Transcendental logic, limited as it is to a determinate con- 
tent, that of pure a priori cognitions, tc wit, cannot imitate 
general logic in this division. For it is evident that the 



104 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 

transcendental employment of reason is not objectively valid, 
and therefore does not belong to the logic of truth (that is, 
to analytic), but as a logic of illusion, occupies a particular 
department in the scholastic system under the name of tran- 
scendental Dialectic. 

Understanding and judgment accordingly possess in tran- 
scendental logic a canon of objectively valid, and therefore 
true exercise, and are comprehended in the analytical depart- 
ment of that logic. But reason, in her endeavours to arrive 
by a priori means at some true statement concerning objects, 
and to extend cognition beyond the bounds of possible expe- 
rience, is altogether dialectic, and her illusory assertions cannot 
be constructed into a canon such as an analytic ought to 
contain. 

Accordingly, the analytic of principles will be merely a 
canon for the faculty of judgment, for the instruction of this 
faculty in its application to phsenomena of the pure concep- 
tions of the understanding, which contain the necessary con- 
dition for the establisbment of a priori laws. On this account, 
although the subject of the following chapters is the especial 
principles of understanding, I shall make use of the term 
"Doctrine of the faculty of judgment" in order to define 
more particularly my present purpose. 

INTRODUCTION. 

OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EACULTT OE JUDGMENT IN 
GENERAL. 

If understanding in general be defined as the faculty of 
laws or rules, the faculty of judgment may be termed the 
faculty of subsumption under these rules ; that is, of dis- 
tinguishing whether this or that does or does not stand under 
a given rule (casus data legis). General logic contains no 
directions or precepts for the faculty of judgment, nor can it 
contain any such. For as it makes abstraction of all con- 
tent of cognition, no duty is left for it, except that of ex- 
posing analytically the mere form of cognition in conceptions, 
judgments and conclusions, and of thereby establishing formal 
rules for all exercise of the understanding. Now if this logic 
wished to give some general direction how we should sub- 
sume under these rules, that is, how we should distinguish 



ANALYTIC OF PELNCIPLES. . 1U5 

whether this or that did or did not stand under them, this 
again, could not be done otherwise than by means of a rule. 
But this rule, precisely because it is a rule, requires for itself 
direction from the faculty of judgment. Thus, it is evident, 
that the understanding is capable of being instructed by 
rules, but that the judgment is a peculiar talent, which does 
not, and cannot require tuition, but only exercise. This 
faculty is therefore the specific quality of the so-called mother- 
wit, the want of which no scholastic discipline can compen- 
sate. For although education may furnish, and, as it were, 
ingraft upon a limited understanding rules borrowed from 
other minds, yet the power of employing these rules cor- 
rectly must belong to the pupil himself; and no rule which 
we can prescribe to him with this purpose, is, in the absence 
or deficiency of this gift of nature, secure from misuse.* A 
physician therefore, a judge or a statesman, may have in his 
head many admirable pathological, juridical, or political 
rules, in a degree that may enable him to be a profound 
teacher in his particular science, and yet in the application of 
these rules, he may very possibly blunder, — either because he 
is wanting in natural judgment (though not in understand- 
ing), and whilst he can comprehend the general in abstracto, 
cannot distinguish whether a particular case in concreto 
ought to rank under the former ; or because his faculty of 
judgment has not been sufficiently exercised by examples 
and real practice. Indeed, the grand and only use of ex- 
amples, is to sharpen the judgment. For as regards the 
correctness and precision of the insight of the understand- 
ing, examples are commonly injurious rather than other- 
wise, because, as casus in terminis, they seldom adequately 
fulfil the conditions of the rule. Besides, they often weaken 
the power of our understanding to apprehend rules or laws 
in their universality, independently of particular circum- 
stances of experience ; and hence, accustom us to employ 

* Deficiency in judgment is properly that which is called stupidity ; 
and for such a failing we know no remedy. A dull or narrow-minded 
person, to whom nothing is wanting hut a proper degree of understand- 
ing, may be improved by tuition, even so far as to deserve the epithet of 
learned. But as such persons frequently labour under a deficiency in the 
faculty of judgment, it is not uncommon to find men extremely learned, 
who in the application of their science betray to a lamentable degree this 
irremediable want. 



1(K" TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC. 

them more as formulae than as principles. Examples arc 
thus the go-cart of the judgment, which he who is naturally 
deficient in that faculty, cannot afford to dispense with. 

But although general logic cannot give directions to the 
faculty of judgment, the case is very different as regards trans- 
cendental logic, insomuch that it appears to be the especial duty 
of the latter to secure and direct, by means of determinate 
rules, the faculty of judgment in the employment of the pure 
understanding. For, as a doctrine, that is, as an endeavour to 
enlarge the sphere of the understanding in regard to pure a 
priori cognitions, philosophy is worse than useless, since from all 
the attempts hitherto made, little or no ground has been gained. 
But, as a critique, in order to guard against the mistakes of the 
faculty of judgment (lapsus judicii) in the employment of the 
few pure conceptions of the understanding which we possess, 
although its use is in this case purely negative, philosophy 
is called upon to apply all its acuteness and penetration. 

But transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity, that 
besides indicating the rule, or rather the general condition for 
rules, which is given in the pure conception of the understand- 
ing, it can, at the same time, indicate a priori the case to which 
the rule must be applied. The cause of the superiority which, 
in this respect, transcendental philosophy possesses above all 
other sciences except mathematics, lies in this : — it treats of 
conceptions which must relate a priori to their objects, whose 
objective validity consequently cannot be demonstrated a 
posteriori, and is, at the same time, under the obligation of 
presenting in general but sufficient tests, the conditions 
under which objects can be given in harmony with those con- 
ceptions ; otherwise they would be mere logical forms, without 
content, and not pure conceptions of the understanding. 

Our transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment 
will contain two chapters. The first wiR treat of the sensuous 
condition under which alone pure conceptions of the under- 
standing can be employed, — that is, of the schematism of the 
pure understanding. The second will treat of those synthetical 
judgments which are derived a priori from pure conceptions 
of the understanding under those conditions, and which lie 
ft priori at the foundation of all other cognitions, that is 
to say, it will treat of the principles of the pure understanding. 



OF THE SCHEMATISM OP THE CATEGORIES. 107 



TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF 
JUDGMENT, 

Or, Analytic oe Principles. 

CHAPTER I. 

Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. 

for all subsumptions of an object under a conception, the 
representation of the object must be homogeneous with the 
conception ; in other words, the conception must contain that 
which is represented in the object to be subsumed under it. 
For this is the meaning of the expression, An object is con- 
tained under a conception. Thus the empirical conception of 
a plate is homogeneous with the pure geometrical conception ot 
a circle, inasmuch as the roundness which is cogitated m the 
former is intuited in the latter. 

But pure conceptions of the understanding, when compared 
with empirical intuitions, or even with sensuous intuitions in 
general, are quite heterogeneous, and never can be discovered 
in any intuition. How then is the siibsumption of the latter 
under the former, and consequently the application of the cate- 
gories to phenomena, possible ?— For it is impossible to say 
for example, Causality can be intuited through the senses, and 
is contained in the phenomenon.— This natural and important 
qnestion forms the real cause of the necessity of a transcen- 
dental doctrine of the faculty of judgment with the purpose, 
to wit, of shewing how pure conceptions of the understand- 
ing can be applied to phenomena. In all other sciences, 
where the conceptions by which the object is thought in the 
general are not so different and heterogeneous from those 
which represent the object in concreto-n* it is given, it is quite 
unnecessary to institute any special inquiries concerning the 
application of the former to the latter. 

Now it is quite clear, that there must be some third thing 
which on the one side is homogeneous with the category and 
with the phenomenon on the other, and so makes the applica- 
tion of the former to the latter possible. This mediating repro- 



108 ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES. 

sentation must be pure (without any empirical content), and 
yet must on the one side be intellectual, on the other sensuous. 
Such a representation is the transcendental schema. 

The conception of the understanding contains pure syn- 
thetical unity of the manifold in general. Time, as the formal 
condition of the manifold of the internal sense, consequently 
of the conjunction of all representations, contains a priori a 
manifold in the pure intuition. Now a transcendental deter- 
mination of time is so far homogeneous with the category, 
which constitutes the unity thereof, that it is universal, and 
rests upon a rule a priori. On the other hand, it is so far ho- 
mogeneous with the phenomenon, inasmuch as time is con- 
tained in every empirical representation of the manifold. 
Thus an application of the category to phoenomena becomes 
possible, by means of the transcendental determination of time, 
which, as the schema of the conceptions of the understanding, 
mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former. 

After what has been proved in our deduction of the catego- 
ries, no one, it is to be hoped, can hesitate as to the proper de- 
cision of the question, whether the employment of these pure 
conceptions of the understanding ought to be merely empirical 
or also transcendental ; in other words, whether the categories, 
as conditions of a possible experience, relate a priori solely to 
phsenomena, or whether, as conditions of the possibility of 
things in general, their application can be extended to objects 
as things in themselves. For we have there seen that con- 
ceptions are quite impossible, and utterly without signification, 
unless either to them, or at least to the elements of which they 
consist, an object be given ; and that, consequently, they cannot 
possibly apply to objects as things in themselves without re- 
gard to the question whether and how these may be given to 
us ; and further, that the only manner in which objects can be 
given to us, is by means of the modification of our sensibility ; 
and finally, that pure a priori conceptions, in addition to the 
function of the understanding in the category, must contain a 
priori formal conditions of sensibility (of the internal sense, 
namely), which again contain the general condition under which 
alone the category can be applied to any object. This formal and 
pure condition of sensibility, to which the conception of the 
understanding is restricted in its employment, we shall name 
the schema of the conception of the understanding, and the 



OF THE SCHEMATISM OE THE CATEGrOEIES. J 09 

procedure of the understanding with these schemata, we shall 
call the Schematism of the pure understanding. 

The Schema is, in itself, always a mere product of the ima- 
gination.* But as the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no 
single intuition, but merely unity in the determination of sen- 
sibility, the schema is clearly distinguishable from the image. 

Thus, if I place five points one after another, this is 

an image of the number five. On the other hand, if I only 
think a number in general, which may be either five or a hun- 
dred, this thought is rather the representation of a method of 
representing in an image a sum (e. g. a thousand) in con- 
formity with a conception, than the image itself, an image 
which I should find difficulty in rendering perceptible to sight, 
and comparing with the conception. Now this representation 
of a general procedure of the imagination to present its image 
to a conception, I call the schema of this conception. 

In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie 
at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions. No image 
could ever be adequate to our conception of a triangle in 
general. For the generalness of the conception it never could 
attain to, as this includes under itself all triangles, whether 
right-angled, acute-angled, &c, whilst the image would always 
be limited to a single part of this sphere. The schema of the 
triangle can exist nowhere else than in thought, and it indi- 
cates a rule of the synthesis of the imagination in regard to 
pure figures in space. Still less is an object of experience, or 
an image of the object, ever adequate to the empirical concep- 
tion. On the contrary, the conception always relates imme- 
diately to the schema of the imagination, as a rule for the de- 
termination of our intuition, in conformity with a certain ge- 
neral conception. The conception of a dog indicates a rule, 
according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of 
a four-footed animal in general, without being limited to any 
particular individual form which experience presents to me, or 
indeed to any possible image that I can represent to myself 
in concreto. This schematism of our understanding: in regard 
to phsenomena and their mere form, is an art, hidden in the 
depths of the human soul, whose true modes of action we shall 
only with difficulty discover and unveil. Thus much only can 

* See note at p. 34. — Tr. 



110 ANALYTIC OP PRINCIPLES. 

we say : — The image is a product of the empirical faculty of the 
productive imagination, — the schema of sensuous conceptions 
(of figures in space, for example) is a product, and, as it 
were, a monogram of the pure imagination a priori, whereby 
and according to which images first become possible, which, 
however, can be connected with the conception only mediately 
by means of the schema which they indicate, and are in 
themselves never fully adequate to it. On the other hand, 
the schema of a pure conception of the understanding is 
something that cannot be reduced into any image, — it is nothing 
else than the pure synthesis expressed by the category, con- 
formably to a rule of unity according to conceptions. It is 
a transcendental product of the imagination, a product which 
concerns the determination of the internal sense, according 
to conditions of its form (time) in respect to all representa- 
tions, in so far as these representations must be conjoined a 
priori in one conception, conformably to the unity of apper- 
ception. 

Without entering upon a dry and tedious analysis of the 
essential requisites of transcendental schemata of the pure 
conceptions of the understanding, we shall rather proceed at 
once to give an explanation of them according to the order of 
the categories, and in connection therewith. 

For the external sense the pure image of all" quantities 
(quant orum) is space ; the pure image of all objects of sense in 
general, is time. But the pure schema of quantity (quantita- 
tis) as a conception of the understanding, is number, a re- 
presentation which comprehends the successive addition of 
one to one (homogeneous quantities). Thus, number is no- 
thing else than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold in a 
homogeneous intuition, by means of my generating time * it- 
self in my apprehension of the intuition. 

Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that 
which corresponds to a sensation in general ; that, conse- 
quently, the conception of which indicates a being (in time). 
Negation is that the conception of which represents a not- 
being (in time). The opposition of these two consists there- 
fore in the difference of one and the same time, as a time filled 
or a time empty. Now as time is only the form of intuition, 

* I generate time because I generate succession, namely, in the suc- 
cessive addition of one to one. — Tr. 



OF THE SCHEMATISM OE THE CATEGORIES, i 1 1 

consequently of objects as phsenoniena, that which in objects 
corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all 
objects as things in themselves (Sachheii, reality). Now every 
sensation has a degree or quantity by which it can fill time, that 
is to say, the internal sense in respect of the representation of 
an object, more or less, until it vanishes into nothing (=0= 
negatio). Thus there is a relation and connection between 
reality and negation, or rather a transition from the former 
to the latter, which makes every reality representable to us as 
a quantum ; and the schema of a reality as the quantity of 
something in so far as it fills time, is exactly this continuous 
and uniform generation of the reality in time, as we descend 
in time from the sensation which has a certain degree, down 
to the vanishing thereof, or gradually ascend from negation to 
the quantity thereof. 

The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in 
time ; that is, the representation of it as a substratum of the 
empirical determination of time ; a substratum which there- 
fore remains, whilst all else changes. (Time passes not, but in 
it passes the existence of the changeable. To time, therefore, 
which is itself unchangeable and permanent, corresponds that 
which in the phsenomenon is unchangeable in existence, that 
is, substance, and it is only by it that the succession and co- 
existence of phsenomena can be determined in regard to time.) 
The schema of cause and of the causality of a thing is the 
real which, when posited, is always followed by something else. 
It consists, therefore, in the succession of the manifold, in so 
far as that succession is subjected to a rule. 

The schema of community (reciprocity of action and re- 
action), or the reciprocal causality of substances in respect of 
their accidents, is the co-existence of the determinations of the 
one with those of the other, according to a general rule. 

The schema of possibility is the accordance of the synthesis 
of different representations 'with the conditions of time in ge- 
neral (as, for example, opposites cannot exist together at the 
same time in the same thing, but only after each other), and 
is therefore the determination of the representation of a thing 
at any time. 

The schema of reality* is existence in a determined time. 

* Wirklichkeit : In the table of categories it is called Existence 
(Daseyn). — Tr. 



112 OP ANiJDYTIC PRINCIPLES. 

The schema of necessity is the existence of an object in all 
time. 

It is clear, from all this, that the schema of the category of 
quantity contains and represents the generation (synthesis) of 
time itself, in the successive apprehension of an object ; the . 
schema of quality the synthesis of sensation with the repre- 
sentation of time, or the filling up of time ; the schema of 
relation the relation of perceptions to each other in all time 
(that is, according to a rule of the determination of time): 
and finally, the schema of modality and its categories, time 
itself, as the correlative of the determination of an object — whe- 
ther it does belong to time, and how. The schemata, there- 
fore, are nothing but a priori determinations of time according 
to rules, and these, in regard to all possible objects, following 
the arrangement of the categories, relate to the series in time, 
the content in time, the order in time, and finally, to the com- 
plex or totality in time. 

Hence it is apparent that the schematism of the under- 
standing, by means of the transcendental synthesis of the ima- 
gination, amounts to nothing else than the unity of the mani- 
fold of intuition in the internal sense, and thus indirectly to the 
unity of apperception, as a function corresponding to the in- 
ternal sense (a receptivity). Thus, the schemata of the pure 
conceptions of the understanding are the true and only condi- 
tions whereby our understanding receives an application to 
objects, and consequently significance. Finally, therefore, the 
categories are only capable of empirical use, inasmuch as they 
serve merely to subject phsenomena to the universal rules of 
synthesis, by means of an a priori necessary unity (on account 
of the necessary union of all consciousness in one original ap- 
perception) ; and so to render them susceptible of a complete 
connection in one experience. But within this whole of pos- 
sible experience lie all our cognitions, and in the universal re- 
lation to this experience consists transcendental truth, which 
antecedes all empirical truth, and renders the latter possible. 

It is, however, evident at first sight, that although the 
schemata of sensibility are the sole agents in realizing the 
categories, they do, nevertheless, also restrict them, that is, 
they limit the categories by conditions which lie beyond the 
sphere of understanding — namely, in sensibility. Hence the 
schema is properly only the phenomenon, or the sensuous 



SYSTEM 01' ALL PRINCIPLES. 113 

conception of an object in harmony with the category. (Nu- 
merus est quantitas phsenomenon,* — sensatio realitas pheno- 
menon ; constans et perdurabile rerum substantia pheenomenon 
— csternitas, neeessitas, phenomena, &c.) Now, if we re- 
move a restrictive condition, we thereby amplify, it appears, 
the formerly limited conception. In this way, the categories 
in their pure signification, free from all conditions of sensibi- 
lity, ought to be valid of things as they are, and not, as 
the schemata represent them, merely as they appear, and 
consequently the categories must have a significance far more 
extended, and wholly independent of all schemata. In truth, 
there does always remain to the pure conceptions of the under- 
standing, after abstracting every sensuous condition, a value and 
significance, which is, however, merely logical. But in this 
case, no object is given them, and therefore they have no 
meaning sufficient to afford us a conception of an object. The 
notion of substance, for example, if we leave out the sensuous 
determination of permanence, would mean nothing more than 
a something which can be cogitated as subject, without the 
possibility of becoming a predicate to anything else. Of this 
representation I can make nothing, inasmuch as it does not 
indicate to me what determinations the thing possesses which 
must thus be valid as premier subject. Consequently, the 
categories, without schemata, are merely functions of the un- 
derstanding for the production of conceptions, but do not 
represent any object. This significance they derive from 
sensibility, which at the same time realizes the understanding 
and restricts it. 

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF JUDGMENT, 

or Analytic of Principles . 

CHAPTER II. 

System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding. 

In the foregoing chapter we have merely considered the ge- 
neral conditions under which alone the transcendental faculty 
of judgment is justified in using the pure conceptions of the 
inderstanding for synthetical judgments. Our duty at pre- 
* Phenomenon is here an adjective. — Trans. 

I 



114 ANALYTIC OF PEINCIPLES. 

sent is to exhibit in systematic connection those judgments 
which the understanding really produces a priori. For this 
purpose, our table of the categories will certainly afford us the 
natural and safe guidance. For it is precisely the categories 
whose application to possible experience must constitute all 
pure a priori cognition of the understanding ; and the rela- 
tion of which to sensibility will, on that very account, pre- 
sent us with a complete and systematic catalogue of all the 
transcendental principles of the use of the understanding. 

Principles a priori are so called, not merely because they 
contain in themselves the grounds of other judgments, but 
also because they themselves are not grounded in higher and 
more general cognitions. This peculiarity, however, does not 
raise them altogether above the need of a proof. For although 
there could be found no higher cognition, and therefore no 
objective proof, and although such a principle rather serves 
as the foundation for all cognition of the object, this by no 
means hinders us from drawing a proof from the subjective 
sources of the possibility of the cognition of an object. Such 
a proof is necessary moreover, because without it the prin- 
ciple might be liable to the imputation of being a mere gratu- 
itous assertion. 

In the second place, we shall limit our investigations to 
those principles which relate to the categories. For as to the 
principles of transcendental aesthetic, according to which 
space and time are the conditions of the possibility of things 
as phsenomena, as also the restriction of these principles, 
namely, that they cannot be applied to objects as things in 
themselves ; — these, of course, do not fall within the scope of 
our present enquiry. In like manner, the principles of ma- 
thematical science form no part of this system, because they 
are all drawn from intuition, and not from the pure concep- 
tion of the understanding. The possibility of these principles, 
however, will necessarily be considered here, inasmuch as 
they are synthetical judgments a priori, not indeed for the 
purpose of proving their accuracy and apodeictic certainty, 
which is unnecessary, but merely to render conceivable and 
deduce the possibility of such evident a priori cognitions. 

But we shall have also to speak of the principle of analy- 
tical judgments, in opposition to synthetical judgments, which 
is the proper subject of our enquiries, because this very oppo 



SYSTEM OF PEINCTPLES. 115 

sition will free the theory of the latter from all ambiguity, and 
place it clearly before our eyes in its true nature. 

System oe the Peen'ciplek; or the Puee Uxdeb- 

ST AJSTDTSQt. 

SECTION FIRST. 

Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgments. 

Whatever may be the content of our cognition, and in 
whatever manner our cognition may be related to its object, 
the universal, although only negative condition of all our 
judgments is that they do not contradict themselves ; other- 
wise these judgments are in themselves (even without respect 
to the object) nothing. But although there may exist no 
contradiction in our judgment, it may nevertheless connect 
conceptions in such a manner, that they do not correspond to 
the object, or without any grounds either a priori or a pos- 
teriori for arriving at such a judgment, and thus, without 
being self-contradictory, a judgment may nevertheless be 
either false or groundless. 

Now, the proposition, " No subject can have a predicate 
that contradicts it," is called the principle of contradiction, 
and is an universal but purely negative criterion of all truth. 
But it belongs to logic alone, because it is valid of cognitions, 
merely as cognitions, and without respect to their content, 
and declares that the contradiction entirely nullifies them. 
We can also, however, make a positive use of this princi- 
ple, that is, not merely to banish falsehood and error (in 
so far as it rests upon contradiction), but also for the cog- 
nition of truth. For if the judgment is analytical, be it 
affirmative or negative, its truth must always be recognizable 
by means of the principle of contradiction. For the contrary 
of that which lies and is cogitated as conception in the cogni- 
tion of the object will be always properly negatived, but the 
conception itself must always be affirmed of the object, inas- 
much as the contrary thereof would be in contradiction to the 
object. 

We must therefore hold the principle of contradiction to be 
the universal and fully sufficient principle of all analytical 
cognition. But as a sufficient criterion of truth, it has no further 



116 ANALYTIC Or PRINCIPLES. 

utiLty or authority. For the fact that no cognition can be at 
variance with this principle without nullifying itself, consti- 
tutes this principle the sine qua non, but not the determining 
ground of the truth of our cognition. As our business at 
present is properly with the synthetical part of our knowledge 
only, we shall always be on our guard not to transgress this 
inviolable principle ; but at the same time not to expect from 
it any direct assistance in the establishment of the truth of any 
synthetical proposition. 

There exists, however, a formula of this celebrated principle 
— a principle merely formal and entirely without content — 
which contains a synthesis that has been inadvertently and 
quite unnecessarily mixed up with it. It is this : — " It is 
impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time." 
Not to mention the superfluousness of the addition of the 
word impossible to indicate the apodeictic certainty, which 
ought to be self-evident from the proposition itself, the propo- 
sition is affected by the condition of time, and as it were says : 
" A thing=^, which is something=i?, cannot at the same 
time be non-B." But both, B as well as non-B, may quite well 
exist in succession. For example, a man who is young cannot 
at the same time be old ; but the same man can very well be 
at one time young, and at another not young, that is, old. 
Now the principle of contradiction as a merely logical propo- 
sition must not by any means limit its application merely to 
relations of time, and consequently a formula like the pre- 
ceding is quite foreign to its true purpose. The misunder- 
standing arises in this way. We first of all separate a 
predicate of a thing from the conception of the thing, and 
afterwards connect with this predicate its opposite, and hence 
do not establish any contradiction with the subject, but 
only with its predicate, which has been conjoined with the 
subject synthetically, — a contradiction, moreover, which ob- 
tains only when the first and second predicate are affirmed 
in the same time. If I say : " A man who is ignorant is not 
learned," the condition "at the same time" must be added, 
for he who is at one time ignorant, may at another be learned. 
But if I say : "No ignorant man is a learned man," the pro- 
position is analytical, because the characteristic ignorance is 
now a constituent part of the conception of the subject ; and 
in this case the negative proposition is evident immediately 



SYSTEM OP PBLFCIPLES. U7 

from the proposition of contradiction, without the necessity of 
adding the condition "at the same time." — This is the reason 
why I have altered the formula of this principle, — an alteration 
which shows very clearly the nature of an analytical proposition. 

The System oe the Principles oe the Ptjee Under- 
standing. 

SECTION SECOND. 

Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgments. 
The explanation of the possibility of synthetical judgments 
is a task with which general Logic has nothing to do ; indeed 
she needs not even be acquainted with its name. But in trans- 
cendental Logic it is the most important matter to be dealt 
with, — indeed the only one, if the question is of the possibility 
of synthetical judgments a priori, the conditions and extent of 
their validity. For when this question is fully decided, it can 
reach its aim with perfect ease, the determination, to wit, of 
the extent and limits of the pure understanding. 

In an analytical judgment I do not go beyond the given 
conception, in order to arrive at some decision respecting it. 
If the judgment is affirmative, I predicate of the conception 
only that which was already cogitated in it ; if negative, I 
merely exclude from the conception its contrary. But in syn- 
thetical judgments, I must go beyond the given conception, 
in order to cogitate, in relation with it, something quite dif- 
ferent from that which was cogitated in it, a relation which is 
consequently never one either of identity or contradiction, and 
by means of which the truth or error of the judgment cannot 
be discerned merely from the judgment itself. 

Granted then, that we must go out beyond a given concep- 
tion, in order to compare it synthetically with another, a third 
thing is necessary, in which alone the synthesis of two con- 
ceptions can originate. Now what is this tertium quid, that 
is to be the medium of all synthetical judgments ? It is only 
a complex,* in which all our representations are contained, 
the internal sense to wit, and its form a priori, Time - 

The synthesis of our representations rests upon the imagi- 
nation ; their synthetical unity (which is requisite to a judg- 
ment), upon the unity of apperception. In this, therefore, is 
* inbcgriff. 



118 ANALYTIC OF PKINCIPLES. 

to be sought the possibility of synthetical judgments, and as 
all three contain the sources of a priori representations, the 
possibility of pure synthetical judgments also ; nay, they are 
necessary upon these grounds, if we are to possess a know- 
ledge of objects, which rests solely upon the synthesis of re- 
presentations. 

If a cognition is to have objective reality, that is, to relate 
to an object, and possess sense and meaning in respect to it, 
it is necessary that the object be given in some way or ano- 
ther. Without this, our conceptions are empty, and we may 
indeed have thought by means of them, but by such thinking, we 
have not, in fact, cognized anything, we have merely played 
with representation. To give an object, if this expression be 
understood in the sense of to present the object, not mediately 
but immediately in intuition, means nothing else than to apply 
the representation of it to experience, be that experience real 
or only possible. Space and time themselves, pure as these 
conceptions are from all that is empirical, and certain as it is 
that they are represented fully a priori in the mind, would be 
completely without objective validity, and without sense and 
significance, if their necessary use in the objects of experi- 
ence were not shewn. Nay, the representation of them is a 
mere schema, that always relates to the reproductive imagina- 
tion, which calls up the objects of experience, without which 
they have no meaning. And so is it with all conceptions 
without distinction. 

The possibility of 'experience is, then, thatwhich gives objective 
reality to all our a priori cognitions. Now experience depends 
upon the synthetical unity of phsenomena, that is, upon a 
synthesis according to conceptions of the object of phaeno- 
mena in general, a synthesis without which experience never 
could become knowledge, but would be merely a rhapsody of 
perceptions, never fitting together into any connected text, 
according to rules of a thoroughly united (possible) conscious- 
ness, and therefore never subjected to the transcendental and 
necessary unity of apperception. Experience has therefore 
for a foundation, a priori principles of its form, that is to 
say, general rules of unity in the synthesis of phenomena, 
the objective reality of which rules, as necessary conditions — 
even of the possibility of experience — can always be shewn in 
experience. But apart from this relation, a priori synthetical 



SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES. 119 

propositions are absolutely impossible, because they have no 
third term,' that is, no pure object, in which the synthetical 
unity can exhibit the objective reality of its conceptions. 

Although, then, respecting space, or the forms which pro- 
ductive imagination describes therein, we do cognize much 
a priori in synthetical judgments, and are really in no need 
of experience for this purpose, such knowledge would never- 
theless amount to nothing but a busy trifling with a mere 
chimera, were not space to be considered as the condition 
of the phsenomena which constitute the material of ex- 
ternal experience. Hence those pure synthetical judgments 
do relate, though but mediately, to possible experience, or 
rather to the possibility of experience, and upon that alone 
is founded the objective validity of their synthesis. 

While then, on the one hand, experience, as empirical syn- 
thesis, is the only possible mode of cognition which gives 
reality to all other synthesis ;* on the other hand, this latter 
synthesis, as cognition a priori, possesses truth, that is, ac- 
cordance with its object, only in so far as it contains nothing 
more than what is necessary to the synthetical unity of ex- 
perience. 

Accordingly, the supreme principle of all synthetical judg- 
ments is : Every object is subject to the necessary conditions 
of the synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition in a 
possible experience. 

A priori synthetical judgments are possible, when we ap- 
ply the formal conditions of the a priori intuition, the synthe- 
sis of the imagination, and the necessary unity of that syn- 
thesis in a transcendental apperception, to a possible cognition 
of experience, and say : The conditions of the possibility of ex- 
perience in general, are at the same time conditions of the pos- 
sibility of the objects of experience, and have, for that reason, 
objective validity in an a priori synthetical judgment. 

* Mental synthesis. — Tr, 



120 ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES. 



System oe the Principles oe the Pure Under- 
standing. 

SECTION THIRD. 

Systematic Representation of all Synthetical Principles thereof. 

That principles exist at all is to be ascribed solely to the pure 
understanding, which is not only the faculty of rules in regard 
to that which happens, but is even the source of principles ac- 
cording to which every thing that can be presented to us as an 
object is necessarily subject to rules, because without such 
rules we never could attain to cognition of an object. Even 
the laws of nature, if they are contemplated as principles of 
the empirical use of the understanding, possess also a charac- 
teristic of necessity, and we may therefore at least expect them 
to be determined upon grounds which are valid a priori and 
antecedent to all experience. But all laws of nature, without 
distinction, are subject to higher principles of the under- 
standing, inasmuch as the former are merely applications of 
the latter to particular cases of experience. These higher 
principles alone therefore give the conception, which contains 
the necessary condition, and, as it were, the exponent of a 
rule ; experience, on the other hand, gives the case which 
comes under the rule. 

There is no danger of our mistaking merely empirical prin- 
ciples for principles of the pure understanding, or conversely ; 
for the character of necessity, according to conceptions which 
distinguishes the latter, and the absence of this in every em- 
pirical proposition, how extensively valid soever it may be, is a 
perfect safeguard against confounding them. There are, how- 
ever, pure principles a priori, which nevertheless I should not 
ascribe to the pure understanding — for this reason, that they 
are not derived from pure conceptions, but (although by the 
mediation of the understanding) from pure intuitions. But 
understanding is the faculty of conceptions. Such principles 
mathematical science possesses, but their application to ex- 
perience, consequently their objective validity, nay the possi- 
bility of such a priori synthetical cognitions (the deduction 
thereof) rests entirely upon the pure understanding. 

On this account, I shall not reckon among my principles 



^BINCIPLES Or PX7EE UNDERSTANDING. 121 

those of mathematics ; though I shall include those upon 
the possibility and objective validity a priori, of principles of 
the mathematical science, which, consequently, are to be looked 
upon as the principle of these, and which proceed from con- 
ceptions to intuition, and not from intuition to conceptions. 

In the application of the pure conceptions of the under- 
standing to possible experience, the employment of their syn- 
thesis is either mathematical or dynamical, for it is directed 
partly on the intuition alone, partly on the existence of a phseno- 
menon. But the a priori conditions of intuition are in relation 
to a possible experience absolutely necessary, those of the ex- 
istence of objects of a possible empirical intuition are in them- 
selves contingent. Hence the principles of the mathematical 
use of the categories will possess a character of absolute 
necessity, that is, will be apodeictic ; those, on the other hand, 
of the dynamical use, the character of an a priori necessity 
indeed, but only under the condition of empirical thought in 
an experience, therefore only mediately and indirectly. Con- 
sequently they will not possess that immediate evidence which is 
peculiar to the former, although their application to experience 
does not, for that reason, lose its truth and certitude. But of 
this point we shall be better able to judge at the conclusion 
of this system of principles. 

The table of the categories is naturally our guide to the 
table of principles, because these are nothing else than rules 
for the objective employment of the former. Accordingly, 
all principles of the pure understanding are — 



Axioms of 

Intuition. 

2. 

Anticipations 

of 

Perception. 

4. 

Postulates of 

Empirical Thougl 

in general. 


3. 

Analogies 

of 
Experience. 


it 



These appellations I have chosen advisedly, in order that 
we might not lose sight of the distinctions m respect of the 



122 TKANSCENDENTAL DOCTKIKE. 

evidence and the employment of these principles. It will, 
however, soon appear that — a fact which concerns bcth the 
evidence of these principles, and the a priori determination of 
phsenomena — according to the categories of Quantity and 
Quality (if we attend merely to the form of these), the prin- 
ciples of these categories are distinguishable from those of the 
two others, inasmuch as the former are possessed of an intui- 
tive, but the latter of a merely discursive, though in both 
instances a complete certitude. I shall therefore call the 
former mathematical,* and the latter dynamical principles. f 
It must be observed, however, that by these terms I mean, 
just as little in the one case the principles of mathematics, 
as those of general (physical) dynamics, in the other. I have 
here in view merely the principles of the pure understanding, 
in their application to the internal sense, (without distinction 
of the representations given therein), by means of which the 
sciences of mathematics and dynamics become possible. Ac- 
cordingly, I have named these principles rather with reference 
to their application, than their content ; and I shall now pro- 
ceed to consider them in the order in which they stand in the 
table. 

I. 

Axioms oe Intuition. 

The principle of these is, "All Intuitions are Extensive 
Quantities" 

* Mathematically, in the Kantian sense. — Tr. 

f All combination (conjunctio) is either composition (comjwsitio) or 
connection (nexus). The former is the synthesis of a manifold, the parts 
of which do not necessarily belong to each other. For example, the two 
triangles into which a square is divided by a diagonal, do not necessarily 
belong to each other, and of this kind is the synthesis of the homogeneous 
in every thing that can be mathematically considered. This synthesis 
can be divided into those of aggregation and coalition, the former of which 
is applied to extensive, the latter to intensive quantities. The second sort 
of combination (nexus) is the synthesis of a manifold, in so far as its parts 
do belong necessarily to each other ; for example, the accident to a sub- 
stance, or the effect to the cause. Consequently it is a synthesis of that 
which, though heterogeneous, is represented as connected, a priori. This 
combination — not an arbitrary one — I entitle dynamical, because it con- 
cerns the connection of the existence of the manifold. This, again, may 
be divided into the physical synthesis of the phenomena among each 
other, and the metaphysical synthesis, or the connection of phenomena 
a priori in the faculty of cognition. 



AXIOMS OF tNTUITTOK. 123 



Proof. 

All phenomena contain, as regards their form, an intuition in 
space and time, which lies a priori at the foundation of all with- 
out exception. Phaenomena, therefore, cannot be apprehended, 
that is, received into empirical consciousness otherwise than 
through the synthesis of a manifold, through which the repre- 
sentations of a determinate space or time are generated ; that 
is to say, through the composition of the homogeneous, and 
the consciousness of the synthetical unity of this manifold 
(homogeneous). Now the consciousness of a homogeneous 
manifold in intuition, in so far as thereby the representation 
of an object is rendered possible, is the conception of a quan- 
tity (quanti). Consequently, even the perception of an object 
as phaenomenon is possible only through the same synthetical 
unity of the manifold of the given sensuous intuition, through 
which the unity of the composition of the homogeneous mani- 
fold in the conception of a quantity is cogitated ; that is to 
say, all phsenomena are quantities, and extensive quantities, 
because as intuitions in space or time, they must be repre- 
sented by means of the same synthesis, through which space 
and time themselves are determined. 

An extensive quantity I call that wherein the representa- 
tion of the parts renders possible (and therefore necessarily 
antecedes) the representation of the whole. I cannot repre- 
sent to myself any line, however small, without drawing it in 
thought, that is, without generating from a point all its parts 
one after another, and in this way alone producing this intui- 
tion. Precisely the same is the case with every, even the 
smallest portion of time. I cogitate therein only the succes- 
sive progress from one moment to another, and hence, by 
means of the different portions of time and the addition of 
them, a determinate quantity of time is produced. As the 
pure intuition in all phaenomena is either time or space, so is 
every phaenomenon in its character of intuition an extensive 
quantity, inasmuch as it can only be cognized in our appre- 
hension by successive synthesis (from part to part). All 
phaenomena are, accordingly, to be considered as aggregates, 
that is, as a collection of previously given parts ; which is not 
the case with every sort of quantities, but only with those 
which are represented and apprehended by us as extensive. 



124 TRANS CENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

On this successive synthesis of the productive imagination, 
in the generation of figures, is founded the mathematics of 
extension, or geometry, with its axioms, which express the 
conditions of sensuous intuition a priori, under which alone 
the schema of a pure conception of external intuition can 
exist ; for example, " between two points only one straight 
line is possible," "two straight lines cannot enclose a space," 
&c. These are the axioms which properly relate only to 
quantities (quanta) as such. 

But, as regards the quantity of a thing (quantitas), that is 
to say, the answer to the question, How large is this or that 
object ? although, in respect to this question, we have vari- 
ous propositions synthetical and immediately certain (inde- 
monstrabilia) ; we have, in the proper sense of the term, no 
axioms. For example, the propositions, " If equals be added 
to equals, the wholes are equal ;" "If equals be taken from 
equals, the remainders are equal ;" are analytical, because I 
am immediately conscious of the identity of the produc- 
tion of the one quantity with the production of the other ; 
whereas axioms must be a priori synthetical propositions. 
On the other hand, the self-evident propositions as to the 
relation of numbers, are certainly synthetical, but not uni- 
versal, like those of geometry, and for this reason cannot 
be called axioms, but numerical formulae. That 7+5 = 12, 
is not an analytical proposition. For neither in the represen- 
tation of seven, nor of five, nor of the composition of the two 
numbers, do I cogitate the number twelve. (Whether I cogitate 
t*he number in the addition of both, is not at present the ques- 
tion ; for in the case of an analytical proposition, the only 
point is, whether I really cogitate the predicate in the repre- 
sentation of the subject.) But although the proposition is 
synthetical, it is nevertheless only a singular proposition. In 
so far as regard is here had merely to the synthesis of the 
homogeneous (the units), it cannot take place except in one 
manner, although our use of these numbers is afterwards ge- • 
neral. If I say, " A triangle can be constructed with three 
lines, any two of which taken together are greater than the 
third," I exercise merely the pure function of the productive 
imagination, which may draw the lines longer or shorter, and 
construct the angles at its pleasure. On the contrary, the 
number seven is possible only in one manner, and so is like- 



ANTICIPATIONS OF PEKCEPTION 125 

wise the number twelve, which results from the synthesis of 
seven and five. Such propositions, then, cannot be termed 
axioms (for in that case we should have an infinity of these), 
but numerical formulae. 

This transcendental principle of the mathematics of phe- 
nomena greatly enlarges our & priori cognition. For it is by 
this principle alone that pure mathematics is rendered appli- 
cable in all its precision to objects of experience, and without 
it the validity of this application would not be so self-evident ; 
on the contrary, contradictions and confusions have often arisen 
on this very point. Phenomena are not things in themselves. 
Empirical' intuition is possible only through pure intuition 
(of space and time) ; consequently, what geometry affirms of 
the latter, is indisputably valid of the former. All evasions, 
such as the statement that objects of sense do not conform to 
Yhe rules of construction in space (for example, to the rule of the 
infinite divisibility of lines or angles), must fall to the ground. 
For, if these objections hold good, w T e deny to space, and with 
it to all mathematics, objective validity, and no longer know 
wherefore, and how far, mathematics can be applied to phse- 
nomena. The synthesis of spaces and times as the essential 
form of all intuition, is that which renders possible the appre- 
hension of a phsenomenon, and therefore every external expe- 
rience, consequently all cognition of the objects of experience ; 
and whatever mathematics in its pure use proves of the former, 
must necessarily hold good of the latter. All objections are 
but the chicaneries of an ill-instructed reason, which errone- 
ously thinks to liberate the objects of sense from the formal 
conditions of our sensibility, and represents these, although 
mere phsenomena, as things in themselves, presented as such 
to our understandings. But in this case, no & priori syn- 
thetical cognition of them could be possible, consequently not 
through pure conceptions of space, and the science which 
determines these conceptions, that is to say, geometry, would 
itself be impossible. 

II. 

Anticipations of Peeception. 

The principle of these is, "In all phenomena the Real, that 
which is an object of sensation, has Intensive Quantity, that is, has 
a Degree." 



126 TRAILS CENDENTAL DOCTEINE. 



Proof. 

Perception is empirical consciousness, that is to say, a con- 
sciousness, which contains an element of sensation. Phsenomena 
as objects of perception are not pure, that is, merely formal in- 
tuitions, like space and time, for they cannot be perceived in 
themselves.* They contain, then, over and above the intui- 
tion, the materials for an object (through which is represented 
something existing in space or time), that is to say, they con- 
tain the real of sensation, as a representation merely subjec- 
tive, which gives us merely the consciousness that the subject 
is affected, and which we refer to some external object. Now, 
a gradual transition from empirical consciousness to pure con- 
sciousness is possible, inasmuch as the real in this conscious- 
ness entirely evanishes, and there remains a merely formal 
consciousness (a priori) of. the manifold in time and space ;' 
consequently there is possible a synthesis also of the production 
of the quantity of a sensation from its commencement, that is, 
from the pure intuition = onwards, up to a certain quantity 
of the sensation. Now as sensation in itself is not an objective 
representation, and in it is to be found neither the intuition of 
space nor of time, it cannot possess any extensive quantity, and 
yet there does belong to it a quantity (and that by means of its 
apprehension, in which empirical consciousness can within a 
certain time rise from nothing = up to its given amount), 
consequently an intensive quantity . And thus we must ascribe 
intensive quantity, that is, a degree of influence on sense to 
all objects of perception, in so far as this perception contains 
sensation. 

All cognition, by means of which I am enabled to cognize 
and determine a priori what belongs to empirical cognition, 
may be called an Anticipation ; and without doubt this is the 
sense in which Epicurus employed his expression tpokr^is. 
But as there is in phsenomena something which is never cog- 
nized a priori, which on this account constitutes the proper 
difference between pure and empirical cognition, that is to 
say, sensation (as the matter of perception), it follows, that 
sensation is just that element in cognition which cannot be at 

* They can be perceived only as phsenomena, and some part of them 
must always belong to the non-ego ; whereas pure intuitions are entirely 
the products of the mind itself, and as such are cognized in themselves. — Tr. 



ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION. 12? 

all anticipated. On the other hand, we might very well term 
the pure determinations in space and time, as well in regard 
to figure as to Quantity, anticipations of phaenomena, because 
they represent a priori that which may always be given a pos- 
teriori in experience. But suppose that in every sensation, as 
sensation in general, without any particular sensation being 
thought of, there existed something which could be cognized 
it priori, this would deserve to be called anticipation in a special 
sense — special, because it may seem surprising to forestall 
experience, in that which concerns the matter of experience, 
and which we can only derive from itself. Yet such really is 
the case here. 

Apprehension,* by means of sensation alone, fills only one 
moment, that is, if I do not take into consideration a succes- 
sion of many sensations. As that in the phaenomenon, the 
apprehension of which is not a successive synthesis advancing 
from parts to an entire representation, sensation has therefore 
no extensive quantity ; the want of sensation in a moment of 
time would represent it as empty, consequently = 0. That 
which in the empirical intuition corresponds to sensation is rea- 
lity (realitas phenomenon) ; that which corresponds to the 
absence of it, negation = 0. Now every sensation is capable 
of a diminution, so that it can decrease, and thus gradually 
disappear. Therefore, between reality in a phenomenon and 
negation, there exists a continuous concatenation of many pos- 
sible intermediate sensations, the difference of which from 
each other is always smaller than that between the given sen- 
sation and zero, or complete negation. That is to say, the 
real in a phsenomenon has always a quantity, which however is 
not discoverable in Apprehension, inasmuch as Apprehension 
takes place by means of mere sensation in one instant, and 
not by the successive synthesis of many sensations, and there- 
fore does not progress from parts to the whole. Consequently, 
it has a quantity, but not an extensive quantity. 

Now that quantity which is apprehended only as unity, and 
in which plurality can be represented only by approximation 
to negation = 0, I term intensive quantity. Consequently, rea- 
lity in a phsenomenon has intensive quantity, that is, a degree. 

* Apprehension is the Kantian word for perception, in the largest sense 
in which we employ that term. It is the genus which includes under it 
as species, perception proper and sensation proper. — Tr. 



128 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

If we consider this reality as cause (be it of sensation or of 
another reality in the phaenomenon, for example, a change) ; 
we call the degree of reality in its character of cause a momen- 
tum, for example, the momentum of weight ; and for this 
reason, that the degree only indicates that quantity the appre- 
hension of which is not successive, but instantaneous. This, 
however, I touch upon only in passing, for with Causality I 
have at present nothing to do. 

Accordingly, every sensation, consequently every reality in 
phaenomena, however small it may be, has a degree, that is, an 
intensive quantity, which may always be lessened, and between 
reality and negation there exists a continuous connection of 
possible realities, and possible smaller perceptions. Every 
colour — for example, red — has a degree, which, be it ever so 
small, is never the smallest, and so is it always with heat, the 
momentum of weight, &c. 

This property of quantities, according to which no part of 
them is the smallest possible (no part simple*), is called their 
continuity. Space and time are quanta continua, because no 
part of them can be given, without enclosing it within bound- 
aries (points and moments), consequently, this given part is 
itself a space or a time. Space, therefore, consists only of 
spaces, and time of times. Points and moments are only 
boundaries, that is, the mere places or positions of their limi- 
tation. But places always presuppose intuitions which are 
to limit or determine them ; and we cannot conceive either 
space or time composed of constituent parts which are given 
before space or time. Such quantities may also be called 
flowing, because the synthesis (of the productive imagination) 
in the production of these Quantities is a progression in time, 
the continuity of which we are accustomed to indicate by the 
expression flowing. 

All phaenomena, then, are continuous quantities, in respect 
both to intuition and mere perception (sensation, and with 
it reality). In the former case they are extensive quanti- 
ties ; in the latter, intensive. When the synthesis of the 
manifold of a phaenomenon is interrupted, there results merely 
an aggregate of several phaenomena, and not properly a phae- 
nomenon as a quantity, which is not produced by the mere 
continuation of the productive synthesis of a certain kind, but 
* Simplex. — TV. 



ANTICIPATIONS OF PEUCEPTION. 129 

by the repetition of a synthesis always ceasing. For example, 
if I call thirteen dollars a sum or quantity of money, I employ 
the term quite correctly, inasmuch as I understand by thirteen 
dollars the value of a mark in standard silver, which is, to be 
sure, a continuous quantity, in which no part is the smallest, 
but every part might constitute a piece of money, which would 
contain material for still smaller pieces. If, however, by the 
words thirteen dollars I understand so many coins (be their 
value in silver what it may), it would be quite erroneous to 
use the expression a quantity of ■ dollars ; on the contrary, I 
must call them aggregate, that is, a number of coins. And as 
in every number we must have unity as the foundation, so a 
phenomenon taken as unity is a quantity, and as such always 
a continuous quantity (quantum continuum). 

Now, seeing all phenomena, whether considered as extensive 
or intensive, are continuous quantities, the proposition, " All 
change (transition of a thing from one state into another) is con- 
tinuous," might be proved here easily, and with mathematical 
evidence, were it not that the causality of a change lies entirely 
beyond' the bounds of a transcendental philosophy, and presup- 
poses empirical principles. For of the possibility of a cause 
which changes the condition of things, that is, which de- 
termines them to the contrary of a certain given state, the under- 
standing gives us a priori no knowledge; not merely because it 
has no insight into the possibility of it (for such insight is ab- 
sent in several a priori cognitions), but because the notion of 
change concerns only certain determinations of phenomena, 
which experience alone can acquaint us with, while their 
cause lies in the unchangeable. But seeing that we have 
nothing which we could here employ but the pure funda- 
mental conceptions of all possible experience, among which 
of course nothing empirical can be admitted, we dare not, 
without injuring the unity of our system, anticipate general 
physical science, which is built upon certain fundamental 
experiences. 

Nevertheless, we are in no want of proofs of the great in- 
fluence which the principle above developed exercises in the 
anticipation of perceptions, and even in supplying the want 
of them, so far as to shield us against the false conclusions 
which otherwise we might rashly draw. 

If all reality in perception has a degree, between which and 

K 



130 TBANSCEKDE^TAL DOCTBrNE. 

negation there is an endless sequence of ever smaller degrees, 
and if nevertheless every sense must have a determinate degree 
of receptivity for sensations ; no perception, and consequently 
no experience is possible, which can prove, either immediately 
or mediately, an entire absence of all reality in a phenomenon ; 
in other words, it is impossible ever to draw from experience 
a proof of the existence of empty space or of empty time. 
For in the first place, an entire absence of reality in a sensuous 
intuition cannot of course be an object of perception ; secondly, 
such absence cannot be deduced from the contemplation of 
any single phoenomenon, and the difference of the degrees in 
its reality ; nor ought it ever to be admitted in explanation 
of any phaenomenon. For if even the complete intuition of a 
determinate space or time is thoroughly real, that is, if no part 
thereof is empty, yet because every reality has its degree, 
which, with the extensive quantity of the phsenomenon un- 
changed, can diminish through endless gradations down to 
nothing (the void), there must be infinitely graduated degrees, 
with which space or time is filled, and the intensive quantity in 
different phenomena maybe smaller or greater, although the ex- 
tensive quantity of the intuition remains equal and unaltered. 

We shall give an example of this. Almost all natural philo- 
sophers, remarking a great difference in the quantity of the 
matter * of different kinds in bodies with the same volume 
(partly on account of the momentum of gravity or weight, 
partly on account of the momentum of resistance to other 
bodies in motion), conclude unanimously, that this volume 
(extensive quantity of the phsenomenon) must be void in all 
bodies, although in different proportion. But who would sus- 
pect that these for the most part mathematical and mechanical 
inquirers into nature should ground this conclusion solely 
on a metaphysical hypothesis — a sort of hypothesis which they 
profess to disparage and avoid ? Yet this they do, in assuming 
that the real in space (I must not here call it impenetrability or 
weight, because these are empirical conceptions) is always iden- 
tical, and can only be distinguished according to its extensive 
quantity, that is, multiplicity. Now to this presupposition, for 
which they can have no ground in experience, and which conse- 
quently is merely metaphysical, I oppose a transcendental de- 

* It should be remembered that Kant means by matter, that which in 
the object corresponds to 6ensation in the suhject — the real in a pheno- 
menon. — Tr. 



ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION. 131 

monstration, which it is true will not explain the difference in 
the filling up of spaces, but which nevertheless completely does 
away with the supposed necessity of the above-mentioned pre- 
supposition that we cannot explain the said difference otherwise 
than by the hypothesis of empty spaces. This demonstration, 
moreover, has the merit of setting the understanding at liberty to 
conceive this distinction in a different manner, if the explanation 
of the fact requires any such hypothesis. For we perceive that 
although two equal spaces may be completely filled by matters 
altogether different, so that in neither of them is there left a 
single point wherein matter is not present, nevertheless, every 
reality has its degree (of resistance or of weight), which, without 
diminution of the extensive quantity, can become less and less 
ad infinitum,, before it passes into nothingness and disappears. 
Thus an expansion which fills a space — for example, caloric, or 
any other reality in the phaenomenal world — can decrease in 
its degrees to infinity, yet without leaving the smallest part of 
the space empty ; on the contrary, filling it with those lesser 
degrees, as completely as another phenomenon could with 
greater. My intention here is by no means to maintain that 
this is really the case with the difference of matters, in regard 
to their specific gravity ; I wish only to prove, from a prin- 
ciple of the pure understanding, that the nature of our per- 
ceptions makes such a mode of explanation possible, and that 
it is erroneous to regard the real in a phaenomenon as equal 
quoad its degree, and different only quoad its aggregation and 
extensive quantity, and this, too, on the pretended authority 
of an a priori principle of the understanding. 

Nevertheless, this principle of the anticipation of perception 
must somewhat startle an enquirer whom initiation into tran- 
scendental philosophy has rendered cautious. We may natu- 
rally entertain some doubt whether or not the understanding 
can enounce any such synthetical proposition as that respecting 
the degree of all reality in phsenomena, and consequently the 
possibility of the internal difference of sensation itself — ab- 
straction being made of its empirical quality. Thus it is a 
question not unworthy of solution : How the understanding 
can pronounce synthetically and a priori respecting phaeno- 
mena, and thus anticipate these, even in that which is pecu- 
liarly and merely empirical, that, namely, which concerns sen- 
sation itself? 

K 2 



132 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

The quality of sensation is in all cases merely empirical, 
and cannot be represented a 'priori (for example, colours, taste, 
&c). But the real — that which corresponds to sensation — 
in opposition to negation=0, only represents something the 
conception of which in itself contains a being (ein seyn), 
and signifies nothing but the synthesis in an empirical con- 
sciousness. That is to say> the empirical consciousness in 
the internal sense can be raised from to every higher 
degree, so that the very same extensive quantity of intuition, 
an illuminated surface, for example, excites as great a sen- 
sation as an aggregate of many other surfaces less illumi- 
nated. We can therefore make complete abstraction of the 
extensive quantity of a phaenomenon, and represent to our- 
selves in the mere sensation in a certain momentum,* a syn- 
thesis of* homogeneous ascension from up to the given 
empirical consciousness. All sensations therefore as such are 
given only cL posteriori, but this property thereof, namely, 
that they have a degree, can be known a priori. It is worthy 
of remark, that in respect to quantities in general, we can 
cognize a priori only a single quality, namely, continuity ; but 
in respect to all quality (the real in phaenomena), we cannot 
cognize a priori any thing more than the intensive quantity 
thereof, namely, that they have a degree. All else is left to 
experience. 

III. 

ANALOGIES OE EXPERIENCE. 

The principle of these is : Experience is possible only 
through the representation of a necessary connection of per- 
ceptions. 

Prooe. 

Experience is an empirical cognition ; that is to say, a 
cognition which determines an object by means of perceptions. 
It is therefore a synthesis of perceptions, a synthesis which is 
not itself contained in perception, but which contains the 
synthetical unity of the manifold of perception in a consci- 

* The particular degree of " reality," that is, the particular power or 
intensive quantity in the cause of a sensation, for example, redness, 
weight. &c, is called in the Kantian terminology, its moment. The term 
momentum which we employ, must not be confounded with the word com 
tnonly employed in natural science. — Tr. 



ANALOGIES OF EXPEEIENCE. 133 

ousness ; and this unity constitutes the essential of our cog- 
nition of objects of the senses, that is, of experience (not 
merely of intuition or sensation). Now in experience our 
perceptions come together contingently, so that no character 
of necessity in their connexion appears, or can appear from 
the perceptions themselves, because apprehension is only a 
placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition, and 
no representation of a necessity in the connected existence of 
the phenomena which apprehension brings together, is to be 
discovered therein. But as experience is a cognition of 
objects by means of perceptions, it follows that the relation of 
the existence of the manifold must be represented in expe- 
rience not as it is put together in time, but as it is objectively 
in time. And as time itself cannot be perceived, the determina- 
tion of the existence of objects in time can only take place 
by means of their connexion in time in general, consequently 
only by means of a priori connecting conceptions. Now as 
these conceptions always possess the character of necessity, 
experience is possible only by means of a representation of 
the necessary connexion of perception. 

The three modi of time are 'permanence, succession, and co- 
existence. Accordingly, there are three rules of all relations 
of time in phsenomena, according to which the existence of 
every phenomenon is determined in respect of the unity of 
all time, and these antecede all experience, and render it 
possible. 

The general principle of all three analogies rests on the 
necessary unity of apperception in relation to all possible 
empirical consciousness (perception) at every time, conse- 
quently, as this unity lies a priori at the foundation of ail 
mental operations, the principle rests on the synthetical unity 
of all phsenomena according to their relation in time. For the 
original apperception relates to our internal sense (the com- 
plex of all representations), and indeed relates a priori to its 
form, that is to say, the relation of the manifold empirical 
consciousness in time. Now this manifold must be combined 
in original apperception according to relations of time, — a 
necessity imposed by the a priori transcendental unity of ap- 
perception, to which is subjected all that can belong to my 
(i. e. my own) cognition, and therefore all that can become 
an object for me. This synthetical and a priori determined 



134 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

unity in relation of perceptions in tinre is therefore the rule : 
" All empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules 
of the general determination of time ;" and the analogies of 
experience, of which we are now about to treat, must be rules 
of this nature. 

These principles have this peculiarity, that they do not 
concern phsenomena, and the synthesis of the empirical in- 
tuition thereof, but merely the existence of phsenomena and 
their relation to each other in regard to this existence. Now the 
mode in which we apprehend a tiling in a phsenomenon can 
be determined a priori in such a manner, that the rule of its 
synthesis can give, that is to say, can produce this a priori 
intuition in every empirical example. But the existence of phse- 
nomena cannot be known a priori, and although we could arrive 
by this path at a conclusion of the fact of some existence, we 
could not cognize that existence determinately, that is to say, 
we should be incapable of anticipating in what respect the 
empirical intuition of it would be distinguishable from that of 
others. 

The two principles above mentioned, which I called mathe- 
matical, in consideration of the fact of their authorizing the 
application of mathematic to phsenomena, relate to these 
phsenomena only in regard to their possibility, and instruct us 
how phsenomena, as far as regards their intuition or the real 
in their perception, can be generated according to the rules of 
a mathematical synthesis. Consequently, numerical quan- 
tities, and with them the determination of a phsenomenon as 
a quantity, can be employed in the one case as well as in the 
other. Thus, for example, out of 200,000 illuminations by 
the moon, I might compose, and give a priori, that is con- 
struct, the degree of our sensations of the sun-light.* We 
may therefore entitle these two principles constitutive. 

The case is very different with those principles whose pro- 
vince it is to subject the existence of phsenomena to rules 
a priori. For as existence does not admit of being con- 

* Kant's meaning is : The two principles enunciated under the heads 
of "Axioms of Intuition," and "Anticipations of Perception," authorize 
the application to phsenomena of determinations of size and number, that 
is, of mathematic. For example, I may compute the light of the sun, and 
say, that its quantity is a certain number of times greater than that of the 
moon. In the same way, heat is measured hy the comparison of its dif- 
ferent effects on water, &c, and on mercury in a thermometer. — Tr. 



ANALOGIES OF EXPEEIEKCE. 13f> 

Btructed, it is clear that they must only concern the relations 
of existence, and be merely regulative principles. In this case, 
therefore, neither axioms nor anticipations are to be thought 
of. Thus, if a perception is given us, in a certain relation of 
time to other (although undetermined) perceptions, we can- 
not then say & priori, what and how great (in quantity) 
the other perception necessarily connected with the for- 
mer is, but only how it is connected, quoad its existence, in 
this given modus of time. Analogies in philosophy mean 
something very different from that which they represent in 
mathematics. In the latter they are formulae, which enounce 
the equality of two relations of quantity,* and are always 
constitutive, so that if two terms of the proportion are given, 
the third is also given, that is, can be constructed by the aid 
of these formulae. But in philosophy, analogy is not the 
equality of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations. In 
this case, from three given terms, I can give a priori and 
cognize the relation to a fourth member,*}* but not this fourth 
term itself, although I certainly possess a rule to guide me 
in the search for this fourth term in experience, and a mark 
to assist me in discovering it. An analogy of experience is 
therefore only a rule according to which unity of experience 
must arise out of perceptions in respect to objects (phseno- 
mena) not as a constitutive, but merely as a regulative principle. 
The same holds good also of the postulates of empirical thought 
in general, which relate to the synthesis of mere intuition 
(which concerns the form of phsenomena), the synthesis of per- 
ception (which concerns the matter of phsenomena), and the 
synthesis of experience (which concerns the relation of these 
perceptions). For they are only regulative principles, and 
clearly distinguishable from the mathematical, which are con- 
stitutive, not indeed in regard to the certainty which both 

* Known the two terms 3 and 6, and the relation of 3 to 6, not only 
the relation of 6 to some other number is given, but that number itself, 
12, is given, that is, it is constructed. Therefore 3:6=6: 12. — Tr. 

f Given a known effect, a known cause, and another known effect, we 
reason, by analogy, to an unknown cause, which we do not cognize, but 
whose relation to the known effect we know from tbe comparison of the 
three given terms. Thus, our own known actions : our own known 
motives = the known actions of others : x, that is, the motives of others 
which we cannot immediately cognize. — Tr. 



135 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

possess a priori , but in the mode of evidence thereof, conse- 
quently also in the manner of demonstration. 

But what has been observed of all synthetical propositions, 
and must be particularly remarked in this place, is this, 
that these analogies possess significance and validity, not as 
principles of the transcendental, but only as principles of the 
empirical use of the understanding, and their truth can 
therefore be proved only as such, and that consequently 
the phsenomena must not be subjoined directly under the 
categories, but only under their schemata. For if the objects 
to which those principles must be applied were things in 
themselves, it would be quite impossible to cognize aught con- 
cerning them synthetically a priori. But they are nothing 
but phaenomena ; a complete knowledge of which — a know- 
ledge to which all principles a priori must at last relate — is the 
only possible experience. It follows that these principles can 
have nothing else for their aim, than the conditions of the 
unity of empirical cognition in the synthesis of phsenomena. 
But this synthesis is cogitated only in the schema of the pure 
conception of the understanding, of whose unity, as that of a 
synthesis in general, the category contains the function unre- 
stricted by any sensuous condition. These principles will 
therefore authorize us to connect phsenomena according to an 
analogy, with the logical and universal unity of conceptions, and 
consequently to employ the categories in the principles them- 
selves ; but in the application of them to experience, we shall 
use only their schemata, as the key to their proper application, 
instead of the categories, or rather the latter as restricting 
conditions, under the title of formulae of the former. 

A. 

FIRST ANALOGY. 

PRINCIPLE OF THE PERMANENCE OF SUBSTANCE. 

In all changes of phcenomena, substance is permanent, and 
the quantum thereof in nature is neither increased nor dimi- 
nished. 

Proof. 

All phsenomena exist in time, wherein alone as substratum, 
that is, as the permanent form of the internal intuition, co- 
existence and succession can be represented. Consequently 



OF THE PERMANENCE OF SUBSTANCE. 13? 

time, in which all changes of phenomena must be cogitated, 
remains and changes not, because it is that in which suc- 
cession and co-existence can be represented only as determina- 
tions thereof. Now, time in itself cannot be an object of per- 
ception. It follows that in objects of perception, that is, 
in phaenomena, there must be found a substratum which repre- 
sents time in general, and in which all change or co-existence 
can be perceived by means of the relation of phaenornena to 
it. But the substratum of all reality, that is, of all that per- 
tains to the existence of things, is substance ; all that per- 
tains to existence can be cogitated only as a determination of 
substance. Consequently, the permanent, in relation to which 
alone can all relations of time in phenomena be determined, 
is substance in the world of phaenomena, that is, the real in 
phaenomena, that which, as the substratum of all change, re- 
mains ever the same. Accordingly, as this cannot change in 
existence, its quantity in nature can neither be increased nor 
diminished. 

Our apprehension of the manifold in a phaenomenon is 
always successive, is consequently always changing. By it 
alone we could, therefore, never determine whether this mani- 
fold, as an object of experience, is co-existent or successive, 
unless it had for a foundation something that exists always, 
that is, something fixed and permanent, of the existence of 
which all succession and co-existence are nothing but so many 
modes (modi of time). Only in the permanent, then, are re- 
lations of time possible (for simultaneity and succession are 
the only relations in time) ; that is to say, the permanent is 
the substratum of our empirical representation of time itself, in 
which alone ail determination of time is possible. Permanence 
is, in fact, just another expression for time, as the abiding 
correlate of all existence of phsenomena, and of all change, 
and of all co-existence. For change does not affect time 
itself, but only the phaenomena in time (just as co- existence 
cannot be regarded as a modus of time itself, seeing that in 
time no parts are co-existent, but all successive).* If we were 
to attribute succession to time itself, we should be obliged to 
cogitate another time, in which this succession would be pos- 
sible. It is only by means of the permanent that existence 

* The latter part of this sentence seems to contradict the former. The 
sequel will explain. — ZV. 



138 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

in different parts of the successive series of time receives a 
quantity, which we entitle duration. For in mere succession, 
existence is perpetually vanishing and recommencing, and 
therefore never has even the least quantity. Without the 
permanent, then, no relation in time is possible. Now, time 
in itself is not an object of perception ; consequently the 
permanent in phaenomena must be regarded as the substratum 
of all determination of time, and consequently also as the con- 
dition of the possibility of ail synthetical unity of perceptions, 
that is, of experience ; and all existence and all change in 
time can only be regarded as a mode in the existence of that 
which abides unchangeably. Therefore, in all phaenomena, 
the permanent is the object in itself, that is, the substance 
(phaenomenon) ;* but all that changes or can change belongs 
only to the mode of the existence of this substance or sub- 
stances, consequently to its determinations. 

I find that in all ages not only the philosopher, but even 
the common understanding, has preposited this permanence 
as a substratum of all change in phaenomena ; indeed, I am 
compelled to believe that they will always accept this as an 
indubitable fact. Only the philosopher expresses himself in 
a more precise and definite manner, when he says : " In all 
changes in the world, the substance remains, and the accidents 
alone are changeable." But of this decidedly synthetical pro- 
position, I nowhere meet with even an attempt at proof ; nay, 
it very rarely has the good fortune to stand, as it deserves to 
do, at the head of the pure and entirely a, priori laws of na- 
ture. In truth, the statement that substance is permanent, is 
tautological. For this very permanence is the ground on 
which we apply the category of substance to the phaenome- 
non ; and we should have been obliged to prove that in all 
phaenomena there is something permanent, of the existence of 
which the changeable is nothing but a determination. But 
because a proof of this nature cannot be dogmatical, that is, 
cannot be drawn from conceptions, inasmuch as it concerns a 
synthetical proposition d, priori, and as philosophers never re- 
flected that such propositions are valid only in relation to 
possible experience, and therefore cannot be proved except, by 
means of a deduction of the possibility of experience, it is no 
wonder that while it has served as the foundation of all ex- 
* Not substantia uuumenon. — TV. 



Or THE PERMANENCE oe sue stance. 13& 

perience (for we feel the need of it in empirical cognition), 
it has never been supported by proof. 

A philosopher was asked, " What is the weight of smoke ?" 
He answered, " Subtract from the weight of the burnt wood 
the weight of the remaining ashes, and you will have the 
weight of the smoke." Thus he presumed it to be incon- 
trovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) does not 
perish, but that only the form of it undergoes a change. In like 
manner was the saying, " From nothing comes nothing," only 
another inference from the principle of permanence, or rather 
of the ever-abiding existence of the true subject in pheno- 
mena. For if that in the phenomenon which we call substance 
is to be the proper substratum of all determination of time, it 
follows that all existence in past as well as in future time, must 
be determinable by means of it alone. Hence we are entitled 
to apply the term substance to a phenomenon, only because 
we suppose its existence in all time, a notion which the word 
permanence does not fully express, as it seems rather to be 
referable to future time. However, the internal necessity per- 
petually to be, is inseparably connected with the necessity always 
to have been, and so the expression may stand as it is. " Gigni de 
nihilo nihil" — " in nihilum nil posse reverti" are two propo- 
sitions which the ancients never parted, and which people now- 
a-days sometimes mistakenly disjoin, because they imagine 
that the propositions apply to objects as things in themselves, 
and that the former might be inimical to the dependence (even 
in respect of its substance also) of the world upon a su- 
preme cause. But this apprehension is entirely needless, for 
the question in this case is only of phenomena in the sphere 
of experience, the unity of which never could be possible, if 
we admitted the possibility that new things (in respect of their 
substance) should arise. For in that case, we should lose 
altogether that which alone can represent the unity of time, 
to wit, the identity of the substratum, as that through which 
alone all change possesses complete and thorough unity. 
This permanence is, however, nothing but the manner in which 
we represent to ourselves the existence of things in the phe- 
nomenal world. 

The determinations of a substance, which are only par- 
ticular modes of its existence, are called accidents. They 
are always real, because they concern the existence of sub- 



140 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

stance (negations are only determinations, which express the 
non-existence of something in the substance). Now, if to 
this real in the substance we ascribe a particular existence 
(for example, to motion as an accident of matter), this ex- 
istence is called inherence, in contradistinction to the ex- 
istence of substance, which we call subsistence. But hence 
arise many misconceptions, and it would be a more accurate 
and just mode of expression to designate the accident only as 
the mode in which the existence of a substance is positively 
determined. Meanwhile, by reason of the conditions of the 
logical exercise of our understanding, it is impossible to avoid 
separating, as it were, that which in the existence of a sub- 
stance is subject to change, whilst the substance remains, and 
regarding it in relation to that which is properly permanent and 
radical. On this account, this category of substance stands 
under the title of relation, rather because it is the condition 
thereof, than because it contains in itself any relation. 

Now, upon this notion of permanence rests the proper 
notion of the conception change. Origin and extinction are 
not changes of that wh ch originates or becomes extinct. 
Change is but a mode of existence, which follows on another 
mode of existence of the same object ; hence all that changes 
is permanent, and only the condition thereof changes. Now 
since this mutation affects only determinations, which can have 
a beginning or an end, we may say, employing an expression 
which seems somewhat paradoxical, " Only the permanent 
(substance) is subject to change ; the mutable suffers no 
change, but rather alternation, that is, when certain deter- 
minations cease, others begin." 

Change, then, cannot be perceived by us except in sub- 
stances, and origin or extinction in an absolute sense, that 
does not concern merely a determination of the permanent, 
cannot be a possible perception, for it is this very notion of 
the permanent which renders possible the representation of a 
transition from one state into another, and from non-being 
to being, which, consequently, can be empirically cognized 
only as alternating determinations of that which is perma- 
nent. Grant that a thing absolutely begins to be ; we must 
then have a point of time in which it was not. But how and 
by what can we fix and determine this point of time, unless 
by that which already exists 1 For a void time — preceding — 



OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. i4J 

is not an object of perception ; but if we connect this begin- 
ning with objects which existed previously, and which con- 
tinue to exist till the object in question begins to be, then the 
latter can only be a determination of the former as the per- 
manent. The same holds good of the notion of extinction, 
for this presupposes the empirical representation of a time, in 
which a phenomenon no longer exists. 

Substances (in the world of phsenomena) are the substratum 
of all determinations of time. The beginning of some, and 
the ceasing to be of other substances, would utterly do away 
with the only condition of the empirical unity of time ; and 
in that case phsenomena would relate to two different times, 
in which, side by side, existence would pass ; which is absurd. 
For there is only one time in which all different times must be 
placed, not as co-existent, but as successive. 

Accordingly, permanence is a necessary condition under 
which alone phsenomena, as things or objects, are deter- 
minable in a possible experience. But as regards the empi- 
rical criterion of this necessary permanence, and with it of the 
substantiality of phsenomena, we shall find sufficient oppor- 
tunity to speak in the sequel. 

B. 
SECOND ANALOGY 

PRINCIPLE OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME ACCORDING TO THE 
LAW OF CAUSALITY. 

All changes take place according to the law of the connection 
of Cause and Effect. 

Proof. 
(That all phenomena in the succession of time are only 
changes, that is, a successive being and non-being of the de- 
terminations of substance, which is permanent ; consequently 
that a being of substance itself which follows on the non- 
being thereof, or a non-being of substance which follows on 
the being thereof, in other words, that the origin or extinction 
of substance itself, is impossible — all this has been fully es- 
tablished in treating of the foregoing principle. This prin- 
ciple might have been expressed as follows : "All alteration 
(succession) of phenomena is merely change ;" for the changes 



142 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

of substance are not origin or extinction, because the concep- 
tion cf change presupposes the same subject as existing with 
two opposite determinations, and consequently as permanent. 
After this premonition, we shall proceed to the proof.) 

I perceive that phsenomena succeed one another, that is to 
say, a state of things exists at one time, the opposite of which 
existed in a former state. In this case then, I really connect 
together two perceptions in time. Now connection is not an 
operation of mere sense and intuition, but is the product of a 
synthetical faculty of imagination, which determines the in- 
ternal sense in respect of a relation of time. But imagination 
can connect these two states in two ways, so that either the 
one or the other may antecede in time ; for time in itself can- 
not be an object of perception, and what in an object precedes 
and what follows cannot be empirically determined in relation 
to it. I am only conscious then, that my imagination places 
one state before, and the other after ; not that the one 
state antecedes the other in the object. In other words, the 
objective relation of the successive pheenomena remains 
quite undetermined by means of mere perception. Now in 
order that this relation may be cognized as determined, the 
relation between the two states must be so cogitated that it is 
thereby determined as necessary, which of them must be 
placed before and which after, and not conversely. But the 
conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetical unity, 
can be none other than a pure conception of the understanding 
which does not lie in mere perception ; and in this case it is the 
conception of the relation of cause and effect, the former of 
which determines the latter in time, as its necessary conse- , 
quence, and not as something which might possibly antecede 
(or which might in some cases not be perceived to follow). 
It follows that it is only because we subject the sequence of 
phsenomena, and consequently all change to the law of caus- 
ality, that experience itself, that is, empirical cognition of phe- 
nomena, becomes possible ; and consequently, that phsenomena 
themselves, as objects of experience, are possible only by virtue 
of this law. 

Our apprehension of the manifold of phaenomena is always 
successive. The representations of parts succeed one another. 
Whether they succeed one another in the object also, is a second 
point for reflection, which was not contained in the former. 



OF THE SUCCESSION OE TIME. 143 

Now we may certainly give the name of object to every thing, 
even to every representation, so far as we are conscious there- 
of ; but what this word may mean in the case of phsenomena, 
not merely in so far as they (as representations) are objects, 
but only in so far as they indicate an object, is a question re- 
quiring deeper consideration. In so far as they, regarded 
merely as representations, are at the same time objects of con- 
sciousness, they are not to be distinguished from apprehension, 
that is, reception into the synthesis of imagination, and we 
must therefore say : " The manifold of phenomena is always 
produced successively in the mind." If phsenomena were 
things in themselves, no man would be able to conjecture from 
the succession of our representations how this manifold is con- 
nected in the object ; for we have to do only with our repre- 
sentations. How things maybe in themselves, without regard 
to the representations through which they affect us, is utterly 
beyond the sphere of our cognition. Now although phsenom- 
ena are not things in themselves, and are nevertheless the only 
thing given to us to be cognized, it is my duty to show what 
sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold in phe- 
nomena themselves, while the representation of this manifold in 
apprehension is always successive. For example, the apprehen- 
sion of the manifold in the phenomenon of a house which 
stands before me, is successive. Now comes the question, whether 
the manifold of this house is in itself also successive ; — which 
no one will be at all willing to grant. But, so soon as I raise 
my conception of an object to the transcendental signifi- 
cation thereof, I find that the house is not a thing in itself, 
but only a phenomenon, that is, a representation, the trans- 
cendental object of which remains utterly unknown. What then 
am I to understand by the question, How can the manifold be 
connected in the phenomenon itself — not considered as a thing 
in itself, but merely as a phenomenon ? Here that which 
lies in my successive apprehension is regarded as representation, 
whilst the phenomenon which is given me, notwithstanding 
that it is nothing more than a complex of these representations, 
is regarded as the object thereof, with which my conception, 
drawn from the representations of apprehension, must har- 
monize. It is very soon seen that, as accordance of the cog- 
nition with its object constitutes truth, the question now before 
us can only relate to the formal conditions of empirical truth ; 



144 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

and that the phenomenon, in opposition to the representations 
of apprehension, can only be distinguished therefrom as the 
object of them, if it is subject to a rule, which distinguishes 
it from every other apprehension, and which renders necessary 
a mode of connection of the manifold. That in the pheno- 
menon which contains the condition of this necessary rule 01 
apprehension, is the object. 

Let us now proceed to our task. That something happens, 
that is to say, that something or some state exists which be- 
fore was not, cannot be empirically perceived, unless a phe- 
nomenon precedes, which does not contain in itself this state. 
For a reality which should follow upon a void time, in other 
words, a beginning, which no state of things precedes, can 
just as little be apprehended as the void time itself. Every 
apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which fol- 
lows upon another perception. But as this is the case with 
all synthesis of apprehension, as I have shown above in the 
example of a house, my apprehension of an event is not yet 
sufficiently distinguished from other apprehensions. But I 
remark also, that if in a phenomenon which contains an oc- 
currence, I call the antecedent state of my perception, A, and 
the following state, B, the perception B can only follow A in 
apprehension, and the perception A cannot follow B, but 
only precede it. For example, I see a ship float down the 
stream of a river. My perception of its place lower down 
follows upon my perception of its place higher up the course 
of the river, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of 
this phenomenon, the vessel should be perceived first below 
and afterwards higher up the stream. Here, therefore, the 
order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is deter- 
mined ; and by this order apprehension is regulated. In the 
former example, my perceptions in the apprehension of a house, 
might begin at the roof and end at the foundation, or vice 
versa; or I might apprehend the manifold in this empirical 
intuition by going from left to right, and from right to left. Ac- 
cordingly, in the series of these perceptions, there was no de- 
termined order, which necessitated my beginning at a certain 
point, in order empirically to connect the manifold. But this 
rule is always to be met with in the perception of that which 
happens, and it makes the order of the successive perceptions 
in the apprehension of such a phenomenon necessary. 



Or THE SUCCESSION 01 TIME. 145 

I must therefo re^in the present case, deduce the subjec- 
tive sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence 
of phsenomena, for otherwise the former is quite undeter- 
mined, and one phenomenon is not distinguishable from 
another. The former alone proves nothing as to the con- 
nection of the manifold in an object, for it is quite arbi- 
trary. The latter must consist in the order of the manifold 
in a phenomenon, according to which order the apprehen- 
sion of one thing (that which happens) follows that of an- 
other thing (which precedes), in conformity with a rule. In 
this way alone can 1 be authorized to say of the phenomenon 
itself, and not merely of my own apprehension, that a certain 
order or sequence is to be found therein. That is, in other 
words, I cannot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in 
this order. 

In conformity with this rule, then, it is necessary that in 
that which antecedes an event there be found the condition of 
a rule, according to which this event follows always and ne- 
cessarily ; but I cannot reverse this and go back from the event, 
and determine (by apprehension) that which antecedes it. 
For no phaenomenon goes back from the succeeding point of 
time to the preceding point, although it does certainly relate 
to a preceding point of time ; from a given time, on the other 
hand, there is always a necessary progression to the deter- 
mined succeeding time. Therefore, because there certainly is 
something that follows, I must of necessity connect it with 
something else, which antecedes, and upon which it follows, 
in conformity with a rule, that is necessarily, so that the event, 
as conditioned, affords certain indication of a condition, and 
this condition determines the event. 

Let us suppose that nothing precedes an event, upon which 
this event must follow in conformity with a rule. All sequence 
of perception would then exist only in apprehension, that is to 
say, would be merely subjective, and it could not thereby be 
objectively determined what thing ought to precede, and what 
ought to follow in perception. In such a case, we should have 
nothing but a play of representations, which would possess no 
application to any object. That is to say, it would not be 
possible through perception to distinguish one phsenomenon 
from another, as regards relations of time ; because the suc- 
cession in the act of apprehension would always be of the same 



146 T.BANSCEKDENTAL D0CTE1NE. 

sort, and therefore there would be nothing in the phenomenon 
to determine the succession, and to render a certain sequence 
objectively necessary. And, in this case, I cannot say that two 
states in a phaenomenon follow one upon the other, but only 
that one apprehension follows upon another. But this is 
merely subjective, and does not determine an object, and con- 
sequently cannot be held to be cognition of an object, — not 
even in the phsenomenal world. 

Accordingly, when we know in experience that something 
happens, we always presuppose that something precedes, 
whereupon it follows in conformity with a rule. For other- 
wise I could not say of the object, that it follows ; because the 
mere succession in my apprehension, if it be not determined 
by a rule in relation to something preceding, does not autho- 
rize succession in the object. Only therefore, in reference 
to a rule, according to which phaenomena are determined in 
their sequence, that is, as they happen, by the preceding 
state, can I make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) 
objective, and it is only under this presupposition that even 
the experience of an event is possible. 

No doubt it appears as if this were in thorough contradic- 
tion to all the notions which people have hitherto entertained 
in regard to the procedure of the human understanding. Ac- 
cording to these opinions, it is by means of the perception and 
comparison of similar consequences following upon certain 
antecedent phaenomena, that the understanding is led to the 
discovery of a rule, according to which certain events always 
follow certain phaenomena, and it is only by this process that 
we attain to the conception of cause. Upon such a basis, it 
is clear that this conception must be merely empirical, and the 
rule which it furnishes us with — " Everything that happens 
must have a cause" — would be just as contingent as expe- 
rience itself. The universality and necessity of the rule or 
law would be perfectly spurious attributes of it. Indeed, it 
could not possess universal validity, inasmuch as it would not 
in this case be a priori, but founded on deduction. But 
the same is the case with this law as with other pure a 
priori representations (e. g. space and time), which we can , 
draw in perfect clearness and completeness from experience, 
only because we had already placed them therein, and by that 
means, and by that alone', had rendered experience possible. 



OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. 14/ 

Indeed, the logical clearness of this representation of a rule, 
determining the series of events, is possible only when we have 
made use thereof in experience. Nevertheless, the recogni- 
tion of this rule, as a condition of the synthetical unity of 
phsenomena in time, was the ground of experience itself, and 
consequently preceded it a priori. 

It is now our duty to show by an example, that we never, 
even in experience, attribute to an object the notion of suc- 
cession or effect (of an event — that is, the happening of some- 
thing that did not exist before), and distinguish it from the 
subjective succession of apprehension, unless when a rule lies 
at the foundation, which compels us to observe this order of 
perception in preference to any other, and that, indeed, it is 
this necessity which first renders possible the representation of 
a succession in the object. 

We have representations within us, of which also we can be 
conscious. But, however widely extended, however accurate 
and thorough-going this consciousness may be, these repre- 
sentations are still nothing more than representations, that is, 
internal determinations of the mind in this or that relation of 
time. Now how happens it, that to these representations we 
should set an object, or that, in addition to their subjective 
reality, as modifications, we should still further attribute to 
them a certain unknown objective reality? It is clear that ob- 
jective significancy cannot consist in a relation to another re- 
presentation (of that which we desire to term object), for in 
that case the question again arises : " How does this other 
representation go out of itself, and obtain objective signifi- 
cancy over and above the subjective, which is proper to it, as 
a determination of a state of mind V s If we try to discover 
what sort of new property the relation to an object gives to our 
subjective representations, and what new importance they 
thereby receive, we shall find that this relation has no other 
effect than that of rendering necessary the connexion of our 
representations in a certain manner, and of subjecting them to 
a rule ; and that conversely, it is only because a certain order 
is necessary in the relations of time of our representations, 
that objective significancy is ascribed to them. 

In the synthesis of phaenomena, the manifold of our repre- 
sentations is always successive. Now hereby is not repre- 
sented an object, for by means of this succession, which is 

l2 



148 TEANSCEHDENTAI DOCIBINE. 

common to all apprehension, no one thing is totbgmsh ed from 

certain determinate posmon m time, wm c h 

nomenon obtains its proper relation of t™°, ™ .™"^ rt 
Sft et^r^SreVplale 11 in le^by the 

conditions it, and connects it necessardy with iteelf m 
ae ff S then n it e 'be admitted as a necessary law of sensibility, 



Or THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. MO 

derstanding is indispensable, and the first step which it takes in 
this sphere is not to render the representation of objects clear,* 
but to render the representation of an object in general, pos- 
sible. It does this by applying the order of time to phaeno- 
mena, and their existence. In other words, it assigns to 
each phaenomenon, as a consequence, a place in relation to 
preceding phaenomena, determined d. priori in time, without 
which it could not harmonize with time itself, which deter- 
mines a place a priori to all its parts. This determination of 
place cannot be derived from the relation of phaenomena to 
absolute time (for it is not an object of perception) ; but, on 
the contrary, phaenomena must reciprocally determine the 
places in time of one another, and render these necessary in 
the order of time. In other words, whatever follows or 
happens, must follow in conformity with an universal rule 
upon that which was contained in the foregoing state. Hence 
arises a series of phaenomena, which, by means of the under- 
standing, produces and renders necessary exactly the same 
order and continuous connection in the series of our possible 
perceptions, as is found a priori in the form of internal intui- 
tion (time), in which all our perceptions must have place. 

That something happens, then, is a perception which belongs 
to a possible experience, which becomes real, only because I 
look upon the phaenomenon as determined in regard to its 
place in time, consequently as an object, which can always be 
found by means of a rule in the connected series of my per- 
ceptions. But this rule of the determination of a thing ac- 
cording to succession in time is as follows : " In what pre- 
cedes may be found the condition, under which an event 
always (that is, necessarily) follows." From all this it is 
obvious that the principle of cause and effect is the principle 
of possible experience, that is, of objective cognition of phae- 
nomena, in regard to their relations in the succession of time. 

The proof of this fundamental proposition rests entirely on 
the following momenta of argument. To all empirical cog- 
nition belongs the synthesis of the manifold by the imagination, 
a synthesis which is always successive, that is, in which the 
representations therein always follow one another. But the 
order of succession in imagination is not determined, and the 
series of successive representations may be taken retrogres- 
* This was the opinion of Wolf and Leibnitz. — Tr. 



150 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

sively as- well as progressively. But if this synthesis is a syn- 
thesis of apprehension (of the manifold of a given phe- 
nomenon), then the order is determined in the object, or, to 
speak more accurately, there is therein an order of succes- 
sive synthesis which determines an object, and according to 
which something necessarily precedes, and when this is po- 
sited, something else necessarily follows. If, then, my per- 
ception is to contain the cognition of an event, that is, of 
something which really happens, it must be an empirical 
judgment, wherein we think that the succession is determined ; 
that is, it presupposes another phenomenon, upon which 
this event follows necessarily, or in conformity with a rule. 
If, on the contrary, when I posited the antecedent, the event 
did not necessarily follow, I should be obliged to con- 
sider it merely as a subjective play of my imagination, and if 
In this I represented to myself anything as objective, I must 
look upon it as a mere dream. Thus, the relation of phaeno- 
mena (as possible perceptions), according to which that which 
happens is, as to its existence, necessarily determined in time 
by something which antecedes, in conformity with a rule, — in 
other words, the relation of cause and effect — is the condition 
of the objective validity of our empirical judgments in regard 
to the sequence of perceptions, consequently of their empirical 
truth, and therefore of experience. The principle of the re- 
lation of causality in the succession of phenomena is there- 
fore valid for all objects of experience, because it is itself the 
ground of the possibility of experience. 

Here, however, a difficulty arises, which must be resolved. 
The principle of the connection of causality among pheno- 
mena is limited in our formula to the succession thereof, 
although in practice we find that the principle applies also 
when the phenomena exist together in the same time, and 
that cause and effect may be simultaneous. For example, 
there is heat in a room, which does not exist in the open air. 
I look about for the cause, and find it to be the fire. Now 
*he fire as the cause, is simultaneous with its effect, the heat 
tf the room. In this case, then, there is no succession as 
regards time, between cause and effect, but they are simul- 
taneous ; and still the law holds good. The greater part of 
operating causes in nature are simultaneous with their effects, 
and the succession in time of the latter is produced only b> 



OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. 161 

cause the cause cannot achieve the total of its effect in one 
moment. But at the moment when the effect first arises, it 
is always simultaneous with the causality of its cause, because 
if the cause had but a moment before ceased to be, the effect 
could not have arisen. Here it must be specially remem- 
bered, that we must consider the order of time, and not the 
lame thereof. The relation remains, even though no time has 
elapsed. The time between the causality of the cause and its 
immediate effect may entirely vanish, and the cause and effect 
be thus simultaneous, but the relation of the one to the other 
remains always determinable according to time. If, for ex- 
ample, I consider a leaden ball, which lies upon a cushion and 
makes a hollow in it, as a cause, then it is simultaneous with 
the effect. But I distinguish the two through the relation of 
time of the dynamical connection of both. For if I lay the 
ball upon the cushion, then the hollow follows upon the before 
smooth surface ; but supposing the cushion has, from some 
cause or another, a hollow, there does not thereupon follow a 
leaden ball. 

Thus, the law of succession of time is in all instances the 
only empirical criterion of effect in relation to the causality of 
the antecedent cause. The glass is the cause of the rising of 
the water above its horizontal surface, although the two phse- 
nornena are contemporaneous. For, as soon as I draw some 
water with the glass from a larger vessel, an effect follows 
thereupon, namely, the change of the horizontal state which 
the water had in the large vessel into a concave, which it 
assumes in the glass. 

This conception of causality leads us to the conception of 
action ; that of action, to the conception of force ; and through 
it, to the conception of substance. As I do not wish this 
critical essay, the sole purpose of which is to treat of the sources 
of our synthetical cognition a priori, to be crowded with 
analyses which merely explain, but do not enlarge the sphere 
of our conceptions, I reserve the detailed explanation of the 
above conceptions for a future system of pure reason. Such an 
analysis, indeed, executed with great particularity, may already 
be found in well-known works on this subject. But I cannot at 
present refrain from making a few remarks on the empirical 
criterion of a substance, in so far as it seems to be more evi- 
dent and more easily recognised through the conception of 



152 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

action, than through that of the permanence of a pheno- 
menon. 

Where action (consequently activity and force) exists, sub- 
stance also must exist, and in it alone must be sought the seat 
of that fruitful source of phenomena. Very well. But if we 
are called upon to explain what we mean by substance, and 
wish to avoid the vice of reasoning in a circle, the answer is 
by no means so easy. How shall we conclude immediately 
from the action to the permanence of that which acts, this 
being nevertheless an essential and peculiar criterion of sub- 
stance (phenomenon) 1 But after what has been said above, 
the solution of this question becomes easy enough, although 
by the common mode of procedure — merely analysing our 
conceptions — it would be quite impossible. The conception 
of action indicates the relation of the subject of causality 
to the effect. Now because all effect consists in that which 
happens, therefore in the changeable, the last subject 
thereof is the permanent, as the substratum of all that 
changes, that is, substance. For according to the prin- 
ciple of causality, actions are always the first ground of all 
change in phenomena, and consequently cannot be a pro- 
perty of a subject which itself changes, because if this were 
the case, other actions and another subject would be necessary 
to determine this change. From all this it results that action 
alone, as an empirical criterion, is a sufficient proof of the 
presence of substantiality, without any necessity on my part 
of endeavouring to discover the permanence of substance by 
a comparison. Besides, by this mode of induction we could 
not attain to the completeness which the magnitude and strict 
universality of the conception requires. For that the primary 
subject of the causality of all arising and passing away, all 
origin and extinction, cannot itself (in the sphere of phenom- 
ena) arise and pass away, is a sound and safe conclusion, a con- 
clusion which leads us to the conception of empirical necessity 
and permanence in existence, and consequently to the concep- 
tion of a substance as phenomenon. 

When something happens, the mere fact of the occurrence, 
without regard to that which occurs, is an object requiring in- 
vestigation. The transition from the non-being of a state into 
the existence of it, supposing that this state contains no quality 
which previously existed in the phenomenon, is a fact of itself 



OE THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. 153 

demanding inquiry. Such an event, as lias been shown in Nl. 
A, does not concern substance (for substance does not thus 
originate), but its condition or state. It is therefore only 
change, and not origin from nothing. If this origin be re- 
garded as the effect of a foreign cause, it is termed creation, 
which cannot be admitted as an event among phsenomena, be- 
cause the very possibility of it would annihilate the unity of 
experience. If, however, I regard all things not as phsenomena, 
but as things in themselves, and objects of understanding alone, 
they, although substances, may be considered as dependent, in 
respect of their existence, on a foreign cause. But this would 
require a very different meaning in the words, a meaning which 
could not apply to phsenomena as objects of possible ex- 
perience. 

How a thing can be changed, how it is possible that upon 
one state existing in one point of time, an opposite state 
should follow in another point of time — of this we have not 
the smallest conception a priori. There is requisite for this the 
knowledge of real powers, which can only be given empirically ; 
for example, knowledge of moving forces, or, in other words, 
of certain successive phaenomena (as movements) which in- 
dicate the presence of such forces. But the form of every 
change, the condition under which alone it can take place as 
the coming into existence of another state (be the content of 
the change, that is, the state which is changed, what it may), 
and consequently the succession of the states themselves, can 
very well be considered ct priori, in relation to the law of 
causality and the conditions of time.* 

When a substance passes from one state, a, into another state, 
b, the point of time in which the latter exists is different from, 
and subsequent to that in which the former existed. In like 
manner, the second state, as reality (in the phsenomenon), differs 
from the first, in which the reality of the second did not exist, 
as b from zero. That is to say, if the state, b, differs from 
the state, «, only in respect to quantity, the change is a coming 
into existence of b — a, which in the former state did not exist, 
and in relation to which that state is = 0. 

* It must be remarked, that I do not speak of the change of certain 
relations, but of the change of the state. Thus, when a bod) moves in an 
uniform manner, it does not change its state (of motion) ; but only wheu 
its motion increases or decreases. 



154 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

Now the question arises, how a thing passes from one stata 
=a, into another state = b. Between two moments there 
is always a certain time, and between two states existing in 
the^ moments, there is always a difference having a certain 
quantity (for all parts of phsenomena are in their turn quan- 
tities). Consequently, every transition from one state into 
another, is always effected in a time contained between two 
moments, of which the first determines the state which the 
thing leaves, and the second determines the state into which 
the thing passes. Both moments, then, are limitations of the 
time of a change, consequently of the intermediate state be- 
tween both, and as such they belong to the total of the change. 
Now every change has a cause, which evidences its causality 
in the whole time during which the change takes place. The 
cause, therefore, does not produce the change all at once or 
in one moment, but in a time, so that, as the time gradually 
increases from the commencing instant, a, to its completion 
at b, in like manner also, the quantity of the reality (b — a) is 
generated through the lesser degrees which are contained 
between the first and last. All change is therefore possible 
only through a continuous action of the causality, which, in 
so far as it is uniform, we call a momentum. The change does 
not consist of these momenta, but is generated or produced 
by them as their effect. 

Such is the law of the continuity of all change, the ground 
of which is, that neither time itself nor any phsenomenon in 
time consists of parts which are the smallest possible, but that, 
notwithstanding, the state of a thing passes in the process of 
a change through all these parts, as elements, to its second 
state. There is no smallest degree of reality in a phsenomenon, 
just as there is no smallest degree in the quantity of time ; and 
so the new state of the reality grows up out of the former 
state, through all the infinite degrees thereof, the differences 
of which one from another, taken all together, are less than 
the difference between and a. 

It is not our business to enquire here into the utility of this 
principle in the investigation of nature. But how such a pro- 
position, which appears so greatly to extend our knowledge of 
nature, is possible completely a priori, is indeed a question which 
deserves investigation, although the first view seems to de- 
monstrate the truth and reality of the principle, and the .Hies- 



OE THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. .165 

tion, how it is possible, may be considered superfluous. For 
there are so many groundless pretensions to the enlargement 
of our knowledge by pure reason, that we must take it as a 
general rule to be mistrustful of all such, and without a 
thorough-going and radical deduction, to believe nothing of 
the sort even on the clearest dogmatical evidence. 

Everyaddition toour empirical knowledge, and every advance 
made in the exercise of our perception, is nothing more than 
an extension of the determination of the internal sense, that 
is to say, a progression in time, be objects themselves what 
they may, phsenomena, or pure intuitions. This progression 
in time determines everything, and is itself determined by 
nothing else. That is to say, the parts of the progression 
exist only in time, and by means of the synthesis thereof, and 
are not given antecedently to it. For this reason, every 
transition in perception to anything which follows upon an- 
other in time, is a determination of time by means of the pro- 
duction of this perception. And as this determination of time 
is, always and in all its parts, a quantity, the perception pro- 
duced is to be considered as a quantity which proceeds through 
all its degrees — no one of which is the smallest possible — from 
zero up to its determined degree. From this we perceive the 
possibility of cognizing a priori a law of changes — a law, how- 
ever, which concerns their form merely. We merely antici- 
pate our own apprehension, the formal condition of which, 
inasmuch as it is itself to be found in the mind antecedently 
to all given phenomena, must certainly be capable of being 
cognized a priori. 

Thus, as time contains the sensuous condition a priori of 
the possibility of a continuous progression of that which exists 
to that which follows it, the understanding, by virtue of the 
unity of apperception, contains the condition a priori of the 
possibility of a continuous determination of the position in 
time of all phsenomena, and this by means of the series of 
causes and effects, the former of which necessitate the sequence 
of the latter, and thereby render universally and for all time, 
and by consequence, objectively, valid the empirical cognition 
of the relations of time. 



]f>6 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

c. 

THIRD ANALOGY. 

PRINCIPLES OE CO-EXISTENCE, ACCORDING TO THE LAW OE 
RECIPROCITY OR COMMUNITY. 

All substances, in so far as they can be perceived in space at the 
same time, exist in a state of complete reciprocity of action. 

Proof. 
Things are co-existent, when in empirical intuition the per- 
ception of the one can follow upon the perception of the 
other, and vice versa — which cannot occur in the succession 
of phenomena, as we have shown in the explanation of the 
second principle. Thus I can perceive the moon and then 
the earth, or conversely, first the earth and then the moon ; 
and for the reason that my perception of these objects can 
reciprocally follow each other, I say, they exist contempo- 
raneously. Now co-existence is the existence of the manifold 
in the same time. But time itself is not an object of percep- 
tion ; and therefore we cannot conclude from the fact that 
things are placed in the same time, the other fact, that the 
perceptions of these things can follow each other reciprocally. 
The synthesis of the imagination in apprehension would only 
present to us each of these perceptions as present in the subject 
when the other is not present, and contrariwise ; but would not 
show that the objects are co-existent, that is to say, that, if the 
one exists, the other also exists in the same time, and that this 
is necessarily so, in order that the perceptions may be capable 
of following each other reciprocally. It follows thataconception 
of the understanding or category of the reciprocal sequence of 
the determinations of phenomena (existing, as they do, apart 
from each other, and yet contemporaneously), is requisite 
to justify us in saying that the reciprocal succession of per- 
ceptions has its foundation in the object, and to enable us to 
represent co-existence as objective. But that relation of sub- 
stances in which the one contains determinations the ground 
of which is in the other substance, is the relation of influence. 
And, when this influence is reciprocal, it is the relation of 
community or reciprocity. Consequently the co-existence of 
substances in space cannot be cognized in experience other- 



PRINCIPLES OF CO-EXISTENCE. 157 

wise than under the precondition of their reciprocal action. 
This is therefore the condition of the possibility of things 
themselves as objects of experience. 

Things are co-existent, in so far as they exist in one and the 
same time. But how can we know that they exist in one and 
the same time . 7 Only by observing that the order in the syn- 
thesis of apprehension of the manifold is arbitrary and a 
matter of indifference, that is to say, that it can proceed from 
A, through B, C, D, to E, or contrariwise from E to A. For 
if they were successive in time (and in the order, let us 
suppose, which begins with A), it is quite impossible for the 
apprehension in perception to begin with E and go backwards 
to A, inasmuch as A belongs to past time, and therefore cannot 
be an object of apprehension. 

Let us assume that in a number of substances considered as 
phaenomena each is completely isolated, that is, that no one acts 
upon another. Then I say that the co-existence of these cannot 
be an object of possible perception, and fhat the existence of 
one cannot, by any mode of empirical synthesis, lead us to 
the existence of another. For we imagine them in this case 
to be separated by a completely void space, and thus percep- 
tion, which proceeds from the one to the other in time, would 
indeed determine their existence by means of a following per- 
ception, but would be quite unable to distinguish whether 
the one phsenomenon follows objectively upon the first, or is 
co-existent with it. 

Besides the mere fact of existence then, there must be 
something by means of which A determines the position of 
B in time, and conversely, B the position of A ; because only 
under this condition can substances be empirically represented 
as existing contemporaneously. Now that alone determines 
the position of another thing in time, which is the cause of it 
or of its determinations. Consequently every substance (inas- 
much as it can have succession predicated of it only in respect 
of its determinations) must contain the causality of certain 
determinations in another substance, and at the same time the 
effects of the causality of the other in itself. That is to say 
substances must stand (mediately or immediately) in dyna- 
mical community with each other, if co-existence is to be cog- 
nized in any possible experience. But, in regard to objects 
of experience, that is absolutely necessary, without which the 



158 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

experience of these objects would itself be impossible. Con- 
sequently it is absolutely necessary that all substances in the 
world of phsenomena, in so far as they are co-existent, stand in 
a relation of complete community of reciprocal action to each 
other. 

The word community has in our language* two meanings, 
and contains the two notions conveyed in the Latin communio, 
andcommercium. We employ it in this place in the latter sense — 
that of a dynamical community, without which even the com- 
munity of place (communio spatli) could not be empirically 
cognized. In our experiences it is easy to observe, that it is 
only the continuous influences in all parts of space that can 
conduct our senses from one object to another ; that the light 
which plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies pro- 
duces a mediating community between them and us, and 
thereby evidences their co-existence with us ; that we cannot 
empirically change our position (perceive this change), unless 
the existence of matter throughout the whole of space .ren- 
dered possible the perception of the positions we occupy ; 
and that this perception can prove the contemporaneous ex- 
istence of these places only through their reciprocal influence, 
and thereby also the co-existence of even the most remote ob- 
jects — although in this case the proof is only mediate. With- 
out community, every perception (of a phsenomenon in space) 
is separated from every other and isolated, and the chain of 
empirical representations, that is, of experience, must, with 
the appearance of a new object, begin entirely de novo, without 
the least connexion with preceding representations, and 
without standing towards these even in the relation of time. 
My intention here is by no means to combat the notion of 
empty space ; for it may exist where our perceptions cannot 
exist, inasmuch as they cannot reach thereto, and where, there- 
fore, no empirical perception of co-existence takes place. But 
in this case it is not an object of possible experience. 

The following remarks may be useful in the way of explana- 
tion. In the mind, all phenomena, as contents of a possible 
experience, must exist in community (communio) of apper- 
ception or consciousness, and in so far as it is requisite that 
objects be represented as co-existent and connected, in so far 
must they reciprocally determine the positron in time of each 
* Gemma. 



PRINCIPLES OF CO-EXISTENCE. 159 

other, and thereby constitute a whole. If this subjective 
community is to rest upon an objective basis, or to be applied 
to substances as phenomena, the perception of one substance 
must render possible the perception of another, and conversely. 
For otherwise succession, which is always found in percep- 
tions as apprehensions, would be predicated of external 
objects, and their representation of their co-existence be thus 
impossible. But this is a reciprocal influence, that is to say, 
a real community (commercium) of substances, without which 
therefore the empirical relation of co-existence#*rouid be a 
notion beyond the reach of our minds. By virtue of this com- 
mercium, phenomena, in so far as they are apart from, and 
nevertheless in connection with each other, constitute a com- 
positum reale. Such comjJosita are possible in many different 
ways. The three dynamical relations then, from which all 
others spring, are those of Inherence, Consequence, and Com- 
position. 



Ihese, then, are the three analogies of experience. They 
are nothing more than principles of the determination of the 
existence of phsenomena in time, according to the three modi 
of this determination ; to wit, the relation to time itself as a 
quantity (the quantity of existence, that is, duration), the re- 
lation in time as a series or succession, finally, the relation 
in time as the complex of all existence (simultaneity). This 
unity of determination in regard to time is thoroughly 
dynamical ; that is to say, time is not considered as that in 
which experience determines immediately to every existence 
its position ; for this is impossible, inasmuch as absolute 
time is not an object of perception, by means of which 
phsenomena can be connected with each other. On the 
contrary, the rule of the understanding, through which 
alone the existence of phsenomena can receive synthetical 
unity as regards relations of time, determines for every phee- 
nomenon its position in time, and consequently h priori, and 
with validity for all and every time. 

By nature, in the empirical sense of the word, we under- 
stand the totality of phsenomena connected, in respect of their 
existence, according to necessary rules, that is, laws. There 
are therefore certain laws (which are moreover a jjrion) which 



160 TBANSCENDENTAL DOCTEI1TE. 

make nature possible ; and all empirical laws can exist only by 
means of experience, and by virtue of those primitive laws 
through which experience itself becomes possible. The pur- 
pose of the analogies is therefore to represent to us the unity of 
nature in the connection of all phaenomena under certain ex- 
ponents, the only business of which is to express the relation 
of time (in so far as it contains all existence in itself) to the 
unity of apperception, which can exist in synthesis only ac- 
cording to rules. The combined expression of all is this : All 
phsenomena exist in one nature, and must so exist, inasmuch 
as without this a priori unity, no unity of experience, and 
consequently no determination of objects in experience, is pos- 
sible. 

As regards the mode of proof which we have employed in 
treating of these transcendental laws of nature, and the pecu- 
liar character of it, we must make one remark, which will at 
the same time be important as a guide in every other attempt 
to demonstrate the truth of intellectual and likewise synthe- 
tical propositions a priori. Had we endeavoured to prove 
these analogies dogmatically, that is, from conceptions ; that 
is tc say, had we employed this method in attempting to show 
ihat every thing which exists, exists only in that which is per- 
manent, — that every thing or event presupposes the existence of 
something in a preceding state, upon which it follows in con- 
formity with a rule — lastly, that in the manifold, which is co- 
existent, the states co-exist in connection with each other 
according to a rule, — all our labour would have been utterly in 
vain. For mere conceptions of things, analyse them as we may, 
cannot enable us to conclude from the existence of one object 
to the existence of another. What other course was left for 
us to pursue 1 This only, to demonstrate the possibility of 
experience as a cognition in which at last all objects must be 
capable of being presented to us, if the representation of them 
is to possess any objective reality. Now in this third, this 
mediating term, the essential form of which consists in the 
synthetical unity of the apperception of all phsenomena, we 
found d priori conditions of the universal and necessary de- 
termination as to time of all existences in the world of phse- 
nomena, without which the empirical determination thereof as 
to time would itself be impossible, and we also discovered 
rules of synthetical unity a priori, by means of which we could 



THE POSTULATES OF EMPIRICAL THOUGHT. 161 

anticipate experience. For want of this method, and from 
the fancy that it was possible to discover a dogmatical proof 
of the synthetical propositions which are requisite in the em- 
pirical employment of the understanding, has it happened, 
that a proof of the principle of sufficient reason has been so 
often attempted, and always in vain. The other two analogies 
nobody has ever thought of, although they have always been 
silently employed by the mind,* because the guiding thread 
furnished by the categories was wanting, the guide which 
alone can enable us to discover every hiatus, both in the system 
of conceptions and of principles. 

TV. 

The Postulates oe Empirical Thought. 

1 . That which agrees with the formal conditions (intuition 
and conception) of experience, is possible. 

2. That which coheres with the material conditions of ex- 
perience (sensation), is real. 

'6. That whose coherence with the real is determined ac- 
cording to universal conditions of experience is (exists) ne- 
cessary. 

Explanation. 

The categories of modality possess this peculiarity, that they 
do not in the least determine the object, or enlarge the con- 
ception to which they are annexed as predicates, but only ex- 
press its relation to the faculty of cognition. Though my 
conception of a thing is in itself complete, I am still entitled 
to ask whether the object of it is merely possible, or whether 
it is also real, or, if the latter, whether it is also necessary. 
But hereby the object itself is not more definitely determined 

* The unity of the universe, in which all phsenomena must be con- 
nected, is evidently a mere consequence of the tacitly admitted principle 
of the community of all substances which are co-existent. For were sub- 
stances isolated, they could not as parts constitute a whole, and were their 
connection (reciprocal action of the manifold) not necessary from the very 
fact of co-existence, we could not conclude from the fact of the latter as 
a merely ideal relation to the former as a real one. We have, however, 
shown in its place, that community is the proper ground of the possibility 
of an empirical cognition of co-existence, and that we may therefore pro- 
perly reason from the latter to the former as its condition. 

M 



16? TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

in thought, out the question is only in what relation it, in- 
cluding all its determinations, stands to the understanding 
and its employment in experience, to the empirical faculty 
of judgment, and to the reason in its application to expe- 
rience. 

For this very reason, too, the categories of modality are 
nothing more than explanations of the conceptions of possi- 
bility, reality, and necessity, as employed in experience, and 
at the same time, restrictions of all the categories to empirical 
use alone, not authorizing the transcendental employment of 
them. For if they are to have something more than a merely 
logical significance, and to be something more than a mere 
analytical expression of the form of thought, and to have a 
relation to things and their possibility, reality or necessity, 
they must concern possible experience and its synthetical 
unity, in which alone objects of cognition can be given. 

The postulate of the possibility of things requires also, that 
the conception of the things agree with the formal conditions 
of our experience in general. But this, that is to say, the ob- 
jective form of experience, contains all the kinds of synthesis 
which are requisite for the cognition of objects. A concep- 
tion which contains a synthesis must be regarded as empty 
and without reference to an object, if its synthesis does not 
belong to experience — either as borrowed from it, and in this 
case it is called an empirical conception, or such as is the 
ground and a priori condition of experience (its form), and in 
this case it is a, pure conception, a conception which neverthe- 
less belongs to experience, inasmuch as its object can be 
found in this alone. For where shall we find the criterion or 
character of the possibility of an object which is cogitated by 
means of an a priori synthetical conception, if not in the syn- 
thesis which constitutes the form of empirical cognition of ob- 
jects ? That in such a conception no contradiction exists is 
indeed a necessary logical condition, but very far from being 
sufficient to establish the objective reality of the conception, 
that is, the possibility of such an object as is thought in the 
conception. Thus, in the conception of a figure which is 
contained within two straight lines, there is no contradiction, 
for the conceptions of two straight lines and of their junction 
contain no negation of a figure. The impossibility in such a 
case does not rest upon the conception in itself, but upon the 



THE POSTULATES OF EMPIEICAL THOUGHT. 163 

construction of it in space, that is to say, upon the conditions 
of space and its determinations. But these have themselves 
objective reality, that is, they apply to possible things, because 
they contain a priori the form of experience in general. 

And now we shall proceed to point out the extensive utility 
and influence of this postulate of possibility. When I repre- 
sent to myself a thing that is permanent, so that everything 
in it which changes belongs merely to its state or condition, 
from such a couception aione I never can cognize that such a 
thing is possible. Or, if I represent to myself something 
which is so constituted that, when it is posited, something else 
follows always and infallibly, my thought contains no self- 
contradiction ; but whether such a property as causality is to 
be found in any possible thing, my thought alone affords no 
means of judging. Finally, I can represent to myself different 
things (substances) which are so constituted, that the state or 
condition of one causes a change in the state of the other, 
and reciprocally ; but whether such a relation is a property of 
things cannot be perceived from these conceptions, which con- 
tain a merely arbitrary synthesis. Only from the fact, there- 
fore, that these conceptions express a priori the relations of 
perceptions in every experience, do we know that they possess 
objective reality, that is, transcendental truth ; and that inde- 
pendent of experience, though not independent of all relation 
to the form of an experience in general and its synthetical 
unity, in which alone objects can be empirically cognized. 

But when we fashion to ourselves new conceptions of sub- 
stances, forces, action and reaction, from the material pre- 
sented to us by perception, without following the example of 
experience in their connexion, we create mere chimeras, of the 
possibility of which we cannot discover any criterion, because 
we have not taken experience for our instructress, though we 
have borrowed the conceptions from her. Such fictitious 
conceptions derive their character of possibility not, like the 
categories, a priori, as conceptions on which all experience de- 
pends, but only, a posteriori, as conceptions given by means of 
experience itself, and their possibility must either be cog- 
nized a posteriori and empirically, or it cannot be cognized at 
all. A substance, which is permanently present in space, yet 
without filling it (like that tertium quid between matter and 
the thinking subject which some have tried to introduce into 

M 2 



164 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

metaphysics), or a peculiar fundamental power of the mind of 
intuiting the future by anticipation (instead of merely infer- 
ring from past and present events), or, finally, a power of the 
mind to place itself in community of thought with other men, 
however distant they may be — these are conceptions, the pos- 
sibility of which has no ground to rest upon. For they are 
not based upon experience and its known laws ; and with- 
out experience, they are a merely arbitrary conjunction of 
thoughts, which, though containing no internal contradiction, 
has no claim to objective reality, neither, consequently, to the 
possibility of such an object as is thought in these concep- 
tions. As far as concerns reality, it is self-evident that we 
cannot cogitate such a possibility in concreto without the aid 
of experience ; because reality is concerned only with sensa- 
tion, as the matter of experience, and not with the form of 
thought, with which we can no doubt indulge in shaping 
fancies. 

But I pass by everything which derives its possibility from 
reality in experience, and I purpose treating here merely of 
the possibility of things by means of a priori conceptions. I 
maintain, then, that the possibility of things is not derived 
from such conceptions per se, but only when considered as 
formal and objective conditions of an experience in general. 

It seems, indeed, as if the possibility of a triangle could be 
cognized from the conception of it alone (which is certainly 
independent of experience) ; for we can certainly give to the 
conception a corresponding object completely d priori, that is 
to say, we can construct it. But as a triangle is only the 
form of an object, it must remain a mere product of the ima- 
gination, and the possibility of the existence of an object cor- 
responding to it must remain doubtful, unless we can discover 
some other ground, unless we know that the figure can be 
cogitated under the conditions upon which all objects of ex- 
perience rest. Now, the facts that space is a formal condition 
d priori of external experience, that the formative synthesis, by 
which we construct a triangle in imagination, is the very same 
ms that we employ in the apprehension of a phsenomenon for 
the purpose of making an empirical conception of it, are what 
alone connect the notion of the possibility of such a thing with 
the conception of it. In the same manner, the possibility of 
continuous quantities, indeed of quantities in general, for the 



THE POSTULATES OE EMPIEICAL THOUGHT. 16.M 

conceptions of them are without exception synthetical, is never 
evident from the conceptions in themselves, but only when 
they are considered as the formal conditions of the determina- 
tion of objects in experience. And where, indeed, should we 
look for objects to correspond to our conceptions, if not in 
experience, by which alone objects are presented to us ? It 
is, however, true that without antecedent experience we can 
cognize and characterize the possibility of things, relatively to 
the formal conditions, under which something is determined 
in experience as an object, consequently completely a priori. 
But still this is possible only in relation to experience and 
within its limits. 

The postulate concerning the cognition of the reality of 
things requires perception, consequently conscious sensation, 
not indeed immediately, that is, of the object itself, whose 
existence is to be cognized, but still that the object have some 
connection with a real perception, in accordance with the ana- 
logies of experience, which exhibit all kinds of real connec- 
tion in experience. 

From the mere conception of a thing it is impossible to con- 
clude its existence. For, let the conception be ever so com- 
plete, and containing a statement of all the determinations of 
the thing, the existence of it has nothing to do with all this, 
but only with the question — whether such a thing is given, so 
that the perception of it can in every case precede the concep- 
tion. For the fact that the conception of it precedes the per- 
ception, merely indicates the possibility of its existence ; it is 
perception, which presents matter to the conception, that is 
the sole criterion of reality. Prior to the perception of the 
thing, however, and therefore comparatively a priori, we are 
able to cognize its existence, provided it stands in connection 
with some perceptions according to the principles of the em- 
pirical conjunction of these, that is, in conformity with the 
analogies of perception. For, in this case, the existence of 
the supposed thing is connected with our perceptions in a 
possible experience, and we are able, with the guidance of 
these analogies, to reason in the series of possible perceptions 
from a thing which we do really perceive to the thing we do 
not perceive. Thus, we cognize the existence of a magnetic 
matter penetrating all bodies from the perception of the at- 
traction of the steel- tilings by the magnet, although the con- 



166 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

stitution of our organs renders an immediate perception of 
this matter impossible for us. For, according to the laws of 
sensibility and the connected context of our perceptions, we 
should in an experience come also on an immediate empirical 
intuition of this matter, if our senses were more acute, — but 
this obtuseness has no influence upon and cannot alter the 
form of possible experience in general. Our knowledge of 
the existence of things reaches as far as our perceptions, and 
what may be inferred from them according to empirical laws, 
extend. If we do not set out from experience, or do not pro- 
ceed according to the laws of the empirical connection of 
phaenomena, our pretensions to discover the existence of a 
thing which we do not immediately perceive are vain. Idealism, 
however, brings forward powerful objections to these rules for 
proving existence mediately. This is, therefore, the proper 
place for its refutation. 

REFUTATION OF IDEALISM. 

Idealism — I mean material* idealism — is the theory which 
declares the existence of objects in space without us to be 
either (1) doubtful and indemonstrable, or (2) false and im- 
possible. The first is the problematical idealism of Des Cartes, 
who admits the undoubted certainty of only one empirical as- 
sertion (assertio), to wit, I am. The second is the dogmatical 
idealism of Berkeley, who maintains that space, together with 
all the objects of which it is the inseparable condition, is a 
thing which is in itself impossible, and that consequently the 
objects in space are mere products of the imagination. The 
dogmatical theory of idealism is unavoidable, if we regard 
space as a property of things in themselves ; for in that case 
it is, with all to which it serves as condition, a nonentity. 
But the foundation for this kind of idealism we have already 
destroyed in the transcendental aesthetic. Problematical ideal- 
ism, which makes no such assertion, but only alleges our in- 
capacity to prove the existence of anything besides ourselves 
by means of immediate experience, is a theory rational and evi- 
dencing a thorough and philosophical mode of thinking, for 
it observes the rule, not to form a decisive judgment before 

* In opposition to formal or critical idealism — the theory of Kant — 
which denies to us a knowledge of things as things in themselves, and 
maintains that we can know only phenomena. — Tr. 



EEETJTATIOF OF IDEALISM. l07 

sufficient proof be shown. The desired proof must therefore 
demonstrate that we have experience of external things, and 
not mere fancies. For this purpose, we must prove, that our 
internal and, to Des Cartes, indubitable experience is itself 
possible only under the previous assumption of external ex- 
perience. 

Theoeem. 

The simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own 
existence proves the existence of external objects in space. 

Peooe. 

I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. 
All determination in regard to time presupposes the exist- 
ence of something permanent in perception. But this perma- 
nent something cannot be something in me, for the very 
reason that my existence in time is itself determined by this 
permanent something. It follows that the perception of this 
permanent existence is possible only through a thing without 
me, and not through the mere representation of a thing with- 
out me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in 
time is possible only through the existence of real things ex- 
ternal to me. Now, consciousness in time is necessarily con- 
nected with the consciousness of the possibility of this deter- 
mination in time. Hence it follows, that consciousness in 
time is necessarily connected also with the existence of things 
without me, inasmuch as the existence of these things is the 
condition of determination in time. That is to say, the con- 
sciousness of my own existence is at the same time an im- 
mediate consciousness of the existence of other things with- 
out me. 

Remark I. The reader will observe, that in the foregoing 
proof the game which idealism plays, is retorted upon itself, 
and with more justice. It assumed, that the only immediate 
experience is internal, and that from this we can only infer 
the existence of external things. But, as always happens, 
when we reason from given effects to determined causes, 
idealism has reasoned with too much haste and uncertainty, 
for it is quite possible that the cause of our representations 
may lie in ourselves, and that we ascribe it falsely to external 
things. But our proof shows that external experience is pro- 



168 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

perly immediate,* that only by virtue of it — not, indeed, the 
consciousness of our own existence, but certainly the deter- 
mination of our existence in time, that is, internal experi- 
ence — is possible. It is true, that the representation / am, 
which is the expression of the consciousness which can ac- 
company all my thoughts, is that which immediately includes 
the existence of a subject. But in this representation we 
cannot find any knowledge of the subject, and therefore also 
no empirical knowledge, that is, experience. For experience 
contains, in addition to the thought of something existing, 
intuition, and in this case it must be internal intuition, that 
is, time, in relation to which the subject must be determined. 
But the existence of external things is absolutely requisite for 
this purpose, so that it follows that internal experience is 
itself possible only mediately and through external experience. 
Remark II. Now with this view all empirical use of our faculty 
of cognition in the determination of time is in perfect accord- 
ance. Its truth is supported by the fact, that it is possible to 
perceive a determination of time only by means of a change in 
external relations (motion) to the permanent in space ; (for ex- 
ample, we become aware of the sun's motion, by observing the 
changes of his relation to the objects of this earth). But this is 
not all. We find that we possess nothing permanent that can 
correspond and be submitted to the conception of a substance 
as intuition, except matter. This idea of permanence is not 
itself derived from external experience, but is an a priori 
necessary condition of all determination of time, consequently 
also of the internal sense in reference to our own existence, 
and that through the existence of external things. In the 
representation I, the consciousness of myself is not an intui- 

* The immediate consciousness of the existence of external things is, 
in the preceding theorem, not presupposed, but proved, he the possibility 
of this consciousness understood by us or not. The question as to the 
possibility of it would stand thus : Have we an internal sense, but no ex- 
ternal sense, and is our belief in external perception a mere delusion ? 
But it is evident that, in order merely to fancy to ourselves anything as 
external, that is, to present it to the sense in intuition, we must already 
possess an external sense, and must thereby distinguish immediately the 
mere receptivity of an external intuition from the spontaneity which cha- 
racterises every act of imagination. For merely to imagine also an exter- 
nal sense, would annihilate the faculty of intuition itself which is to be 
determined by the imagination. 



REFUTATION OF IDEALISM. 169 

tion, but a merely intellectual representation produced by the 
spontaneous activity of a thinking subject. It follows, that 
this I has not any predicate of intuition, which, in its cha- 
racter of permanence, could serve as correlate to the deter- 
mination of time in the internal sense — in the same way as 
impenetrability is the correlate of matter as an empirical 
intuition. 

Remark III. From the fact that the existence of external 
things is a necessary condition of the possibility of a deter- 
mined consciousness of ourselves, it does not follow that every 
intuitive representation of external things involves the exist- 
ence of these things, for their representations may very well 
be the mere products of the imagination (in dreams as well as 
in madness) ; though, indeed, these are themselves created by 
the reproduction of previous external perceptions, which, as 
has been shown, are possible only through the reality of ex- 
ternal objects. The sole aim of our remarks has, however, 
been to prove that internal experience in general is possible 
only through external experience in general. Whether this 
or that supposed experience be purely imaginary, must be dis- 
covered from its particular determinations, and by comparing 
these with the criteria of all real experience. 



Finally, as regards the third postulate, it applies to material 
necessity in existence, and not to merely formal and logical 
necessity in the connection of conceptions. Now as we cannot 
cognize completely a priori the existence of any object of sense, 
though we can do so comparatively a priori, that is, relatively to 
some other previously given existence, — a cognition, however, 
which can only be of such an existence as must be contained 
in the complex of experience, of which the previously given 
perception is a part, — the necessity of existence can never be 
cognized from conceptions, but always, on the contrary, from 
its connection with that which is an object of perception. 
But the only existence cognized, under the condition of other 
given phsenomena, as necessary, is the existence of effects 
from given causes in conformity with the laws of causality. 
It is consequently not the necessity of the existence of things 
(as substances), but the necessity of the state of things that 
we cognise, and that not immediately, but by means of the 
existence of other states given in perception, according to 



170 TRANSCENDENTAL TjOCTTIINE. 

empirical laws of causality. Hence it follows, that the crite- 
rion of necessity is to be found only in the law of a possible 
experience, — that every thing which happens is determined 
a priori in the phsenomenon by its cause. Thus we cognise 
only the necessity of effects in nature, the causes of which 
are given us. Moreover, the criterion of necessity in exist- 
ence possesses no application beyond the field of possible ex- 
perience, and even in this it is not valid of the existence of 
things as substances, because these can never be considered 
as empirical effects, or as something that happens and has a 
beginning. Necessity, therefore, regards only the relations 
of phsenomena according to the dynamical law of causality, 
and the possibility grounded thereon, of reasoning from some 
given existence (of a cause) a priori to another existence (of 
an effect) . Every thing that happens is hypothetically necessary, 
is a principle which subjects the changes that take place in the 
world to a law, that is, to a rule of necessary existence, without 
which nature herself could not possibly exist Hence the 
proposition, Nothing happens by blind chance (in mundo non 
datur casus), is an a priori law of nature. The case is the 
same with the proposition, Necessity in nature is not blind, 
that is, it is conditioned, consequently intelligible necessity 
(non datur fatum). Both laws subject the play of change to 
a nature of things (as phsenomena), or, which is the same 
thing, to the unity of the understanding, and through the un- 
derstanding alone can changes belong to an experience, as the 
synthetical unity of phsenomena. Both belong to the class 
of dynamical principles. The former is properly a conse- 
quence of the principle of causality — one of the analogies of 
experience. The latter belongs to the principles of modality, 
which to the determination of causality adds the conception 
of necessity, which is itself, however, subject to a rule of the 
understanding. The principle of continuity forbids any leap 
in the series of phsenomena regarded as changes (in mundo non 
datur saltus) ; and likewise, in the complex of all empirical 
intuitions in space, any break or hiatus between two phseno- 
mena (non datur hiatus), — for we can so express the principle, 
that experience can admit nothing which proves the existence 
of a vacuum, or which even admits it as a part of an empirical 
synthesis. For, as regards a vacuum or void, which we may 
cogitate as out and beyond of the field of possible experience 



REFUTATION OT IDEALISM. 171 

(the world), such a question cannot come before the tribunal 
of mere understanding, which decides only upon questions 
that concern the employment of given phsenomena for the 
construction of empirical cognition. It is rather a problem 
for ideal reason, which passes beyond the sphere of a pos- 
sible experience, and aims at forming a judgment of that 
which surrounds and circumscribes it, and the proper place 
for the consideration of it is the transcendental dialectic. 
These four propositions, In mundo non datur hiatus, non datur 
saltus, non datur casus, non datur fatum, as well as all principles 
of transcendental origin, we could very easily exhibit in their 
proper order, that is, in conformity with the order of the cate- 
gories, and assign to each its proper place. But the already 
practised reader will do this for himself, or discover the clue 
to such an arrangement. But the combined result of all is 
simply this, to admit into the empirical synthesis nothing 
which might cause a break in or be foreign to the under- 
standing and the continuous connection of all phsenomena, 
that is, the unity of the conceptions of the understanding. 
For in the understanding alone is the unity of experience, in 
which all perceptions must have their assigned place, possible. 
Whether the field of possibility be greater than that of 
reality, and whether the field of the latter be itself greater 
than that of necessity, are interesting enough questions, and 
quite capable of synthetical solution, questions, however, 
which come under the jurisdiction of reason alone. For they 
are tantamount to asking, whether all things as phsenomena 
do without exception belong to the complex and connected 
whole of a single experience, of which every given perception 
is a part, a part which therefore cannot be conjoined with any 
other phsenomena — or, whether my perceptions can belong to 
more than one possible experience ? The understanding gives 
to experience, according to the subjective and formal condi- 
tions, of sensibility as well as of apperception, the rules which 
alone make this experience possible. Other forms of intui- 
tion, besides those of space and time, other forms of under- 
standing besides the discursive forms of thought, or of cog- 
nition by means of conceptions, we can neither imagine nor 
make intelligible to ourselves ; and even if we could, they 
would still not belong to experience, which is the only mode 
of cognition by which objects are presented to us. Whether 



1/2 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

other perceptions besides those which belong to the total of 
our possible experience, and consequently whether some other 
sphere of matter exists, the understanding has no power to 
decide, its proper occupation being with the synthesis of that 
which is given. Moreover, the poverty of the usual argu- 
ments which go to prove the existence of a vast sphere of pos- 
sibility, of which all that is real (every object of experience) 
is but a small part, is very remarkable. " Ail real is possible ;" 
from this follows naturally, according to the logical laws of 
conversion, the particular proposition, " Some possible is 
real." Now this seems to be equivalent to " Much is possible 
that is not real." No doubt it does seem as if we ought to 
consider the sum of the possible to be greater than that of 
the real, from the fact that something must be added to the 
former to constitute the latter. But this notion of adding to 
the possible is absurd. For that which is not in the sum of 
the possible, and consequently requires to be added to it, is 
manifestly impossible. In addition to accordance with the 
formal conditions of experience, the understanding requires a 
connection with some perception ; but that which is connected 
with this perception, is real, even although it is not immediately 
perceived. But that another series of phsenomena, in com- 
plete coherence with that which is given in perception, con- 
sequently more than one all-embracing experience is possible, 
is an inference which cannot be concluded from the data 
given us by experience, and still less without any data at all. 
That which is possible only under conditions which are them- 
selves merely possible, is not possible in any respect. And yet 
we can find no more certain ground on which to base the dis- 
cussion of the question whether the sphere of possibility is 
wider than that of experience, 

I have merely mentioned these questions, that in treating 
of the conception of the understanding, there might be no 
omission of anything that, in the common opinion, belongs to 
them. In reality, however, the notion of absolute possibility 
(possibility which is valid in every respect) is not a mere con- 
ception of the understanding, which can be employed empi- 
rically, but belongs to reason alone, which passes the bounds 
of all empirical use of the understanding. We have, therefore, 
contented ourselves with a merely critical remark, leaving the 
subject to be explained in the sequel. 



o 



REFUTATION OF IDEALISM. 1/3 

Before concluding this fourth section, and at the same time 
the system of all principles of the pure understanding, it 
seems proper to mention the reasons which induced me to term 
the principles of modality postulates. This expression I do 
not here use in the sense which some more recent philoso- 
phers, contrary to its meaning with mathematicians, to whom 
the word properly belongs, attach to it — that of a proposition, 
namely, immediately certain, requiring neither deduction nor 
proof. For if, in the case of synthetical propositions, however 
evident they may be, we accord to them without deduction, and 
merely on the strength of their own pretensions, unqualified 
belief, all critique of the understanding is entirely lost ; and, 
as there is no want of bold pretensions, which the common 
belief (though for the philosopher this is no credential) does 
not reject, the understanding lies exposed to every delusion and 
conceit, without the power of refusing its assent to those as- 
sertions, which, though illegitimate, demand acceptance as 
veritable axioms. When, therefore, to the conception of a 
thing an a priori determination is synthetically added, such a 
proposition must obtain, if not a proof, at least a deduction 
of the legitimacy of its assertion. 

The principles of modality are, however, not objectively 
synthetical, for the predicates of possibility, reality, and ne- 
cessity do not in the least augment the conception of that of 
which they are affirmed, inasmuch as they contribute nothing 
to the representation of the object. But as they are, never- 
theless, always synthetical, they are so merely subjectively. 
That is to say, they have a reflective power, and apply to the 
conception of a thing, of which, in other respects, they affirm 
nothing, the faculty of cognition in which the conception 
originates and has its seat. So that if the conception merely 
agree with the formal conditions of experience, its object is 
called possible; if it is in connection with perception, and deter- 
mined thereby, the object is real ; if it is determined according 
to conceptions by means of the connection of perceptions, 
the object is called necessary. The principles of modality 
therefore predicate of a conception nothing more than the pro- 
cedure of the faculty of cognition which generated it. Now a 
postulate in mathematics is a practical proposition which con- 
tains nothing but the synthesis by which we present an object 
to ourselves, and produce the conception of it, for example — 
" With a given line, to describe a circle upon a plane, from 



1/4 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

a given point ;" and such a proposition does not admit of 
proof, because the procedure, which it requires, is exactly 
that by which alone it is possible to generate the conception 
of such a figure. With the same right, accordingly, can we 
postulate the principles of modality, because they do not aug- 
ment* the conception of a thing, but merely indicate the 
manner in which it is connected with the faculty of cognition. 

GENERAL REMARK ON THE SYSTEM OE PRINCIPLES. 

It is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility 
of a thing from the category alone, but must always have an 
intuition, by which to make evident the objective reality of 
the pure conception of the understanding. Take, for ex- 
ample, the categories of relation. How (1) a thing can exist 
only as a subject, and not as a mere determination of other 
things, that is, can be substance ; or how (2), because 
something exists, some other thing must exist, consequently 
how a thing can be a cause ; or (3) how, when several 
things exist, from the fact that one of these things exists, 
some consequence to the others follows, and reciprocally, and 
in this way a community of substances can be possible — are 
questions whose solution cannot be obtained from mere con- 
ceptions. The very same is the case with the other cate- 
gories ; for example, how a thing can be of the same sort with 
many others, that is, can be a quantity, and so on. So long 
as we have not intuition we cannot know, whether we do 
really think an object by the categories, and where an object 
can anywhere be found to cohere with them, and thus the 
truth is established, that the categories are not in themselves 
cognitions, but mere forms of thought for the construction of 
cognitions from given intuitions. For the same reason is it 
true that from categories alone no synthetical proposition can 
be made. For example, " In every existence there is sub- 
stance," that is, something that can exist only as a subject 
and not as mere predicate ; or, "everything is a quantity," — 
to construct propositions such as these, we require something 

* When I think the reality of a thing, I do really think more than the 
possibility, but not in the thing ; for that can never contain more in rea- 
lity than was contained in its complete possibility. But while the notion 
of possibility is merely the notion of a position of a thing in relation to 
the understanding (its empirical use), reality is the conjunction of the 
thing with perception. 



ON THE SYSTEM OE PEINCIPLES. 175 

to enable us to go out beyond the given conception and con- 
nect another with it. For the same reason the attempt to 
prove a synthetical proposition by means of mere conceptions, 
for example, " Everything that exists contingently has a cause," 
has never succeeded. We could never get further than prov- 
ing that, without this relation to conceptions, we could not 
conceive the existence of the contingent, that is, could not a 
priori through the understanding cognize the existence of such 
a thing ; but it does not hence follow that this is also the 
condition of the possibility of the thing itself that is said to be 
contingent. If, accordingly, we look back to our proof of 
the principle of causality, we shall find that we were able to 
prove it as valid only of objects of possible experience, and, 
indeed, only as itself the principle of the possibility of expe- 
rience, consequently of the cognition of an object given in 
empirical intuition, and not from mere conceptions. That, 
however, the proposition, " Everything that is contingent 
must have a cause," is evident to every one merely from con- 
ceptions, is not to be denied. But in this case the conception 
of the contingent is cogitated as involving not the category of 
modality (as that the non-existence of which can be conceived), 
but that of relation (as that which can exist only as the con- 
sequence of something else), and so it is really an identical 
proposition, " That which can exist only as a consequence, 
has a cause." In fact, when we have to give examples of con- 
tingent existence, we always refer to changes, and not merely 
to the possibility of conceiving the opposite.* But change is 
an event, which, as such, is possible only through a cause, 
and considered per se its non-existence is therefore possible, 
and we become cognizant of its contingency from the fact 

* We can easily conceive the non-existence of matter ; but the ancients 
did not thence infer its contingency. But even the alternation of the 
existence and non-existence of a given state in a thing, in which all change 
consists, by no means proves the contingency of that state — the ground 
of proof being the reality of its opposite. For example, a body is in a 
state of rest after motion, but we cannot infer the contingency of the mo- 
tion from the fact that the former is the opposite of the latter. For this 
opposite is merely a logical and not a real opposite to the other. If we 
wish to demonstrate the contingency of the motion, what we ought to 
prove is, that, instead of the motion which took place in the preceding 
point of time, it was possible for the body to have been then in rest, not, 
that it is afterwards in rest ; for, in this case, both opposites are perfectly 
consistent with each other. 



176 TEA^SCEKDENTAL DOCTKINE. 

that it can exist only as the effect of a cause. Hence, if a 
thing is assumed to be contingent, it is an analytical proposi- 
tion to say, it has a cause. 

But it is still more remarkable that, to understand the pos- 
sibility of things according to the categories, and thus to de- 
monstrate the objective reality of the latter, we require not 
merely intuitions, but external intuitions. If, for example, 
we take the pure conceptions of relation, we find that (1) for 
the purpose of presenting to the conception of substance some- 
thing permanent in intuition corresponding thereto, and thus 
of demonstrating the objective reality of this conception, we 
require an intuition (of matter) in space, because space alone 
is permanent and determines things as such, while time, and 
with it all that is in the internal sense, is in a state of con- 
tinual flow ; (2) in order to represent change as the intuition 
corresponding to the conception of causality, we require the 
representation of motion as change in space ; in fact, it is 
through it alone that changes, the possibility of which no pure 
understanding can perceive, are capable of being intuited. 
Change is the connection of determinations contradictorily 
opposed to each other in the existence of one and the same 
tiling. Now, how it is possible that out of a given state one 
quite opposite to it in the same thing should follow, reason 
without an example can not only not conceive, but cannot 
even make intelligible without intuition ; and this intuition 
is the motion of a point in space ; the existence of which in 
different spaces (as a consequence of opposite determinations) 
alone makes the intuition of change possible. For, in order 
to make even internal change cogitable, we require to repre- 
sent time, as the form of the internal sense, figuratively by a 
line, and the internal change by the drawing of that line 
(motion), and consequently are obliged to employ external 
intuition to be able to represent the successive existence of 
ourselves in different states. The proper ground of this fact 
is, that all change to be perceived as change pre-supposes 
something permanent in intuition, while in the internal sense 
no permanent intuition is to be found. Lastly, the objective 
possibility of the category of community cannot be conceived 
by mere reason, and consequently its objective reality cannot 
be demonstrated without an intuition, and that external in 
space. For how can we conceive the possibility of commu- 



OH THE SYSTEM OE PBENCIPLES. 177 

nity, that is, when several substances exist, that some effect 
on the existence of the one follows from the existence of the 
other, and reciprocally, and therefore that, because something 
exists in the latter, something else must exist in the former, 
which could not be understood from its own existence alone ? 
For this is the very essence of community — which is incon- 
ceivable as a property of things which are perfectly isolated. 
Hence, Leibnitz, in attributing to the substances of the world 
— as cogitated by the understanding alone — a community, re- 
quired the mediating aid of a divinity ; for, from their ex- 
istence, such a property seemed to him with justice incon- 
ceivable. But we can very easily conceive the possibility of 
community (of substances as phaenomena) if we represent 
them to ourselves as in space, consequently in external intui- 
tion. For external intuition contains in itself a priori formal 
external relations, as the conditions of the possibility of the 
real relations of action and reaction, and therefore of the pos- 
sibility of community. "With the same ease can it be demon- 
strated, that the possibility of things as quantities, and conse- 
quently the objective reality of the category of quantity, can 
be grounded onlv in external intuition, and that bv its means 
alone is the notion of quantity appropriated by the internal 
sense. But I must avoid prolixity, and leave the task of il- 
lustrating this by examples to the reader's own reflection. 

The above remarks are of the greatest importance, not only 
for the confirmation of our previous confutation of idealism, 
but still more, when the subject of self-cognition by mere 
internal consciousness and the determination of our own na- 
ture without the aid of external empirical intuitions is under 
discussion, for the indication of the grounds of the possibility 
of such a cognition. 

The result of the whole of this part of the Analytic of 
Principles is, therefore — All principles of the pure understand- 
ing are nothing more than a priori principles of the possibi- 
lity of experience, and to experience alone do all a priori syn- 
thetical propositions apply and relate — indeed, their possibility 
itself rests entirely on this relation. 



1/8 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 



TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF 
JUDGMENT, 

or Analytic of Principles. 
CHAPTER III. 

OE THE GROUND OE THE DIVISION OE ALL OBJECTS INTO 
PHENOMENA AND NOTJMENA. 

We have now not only traversed the region of the pure un- 
derstanding, and carefully surveyed every part of it, but we 
have also measured it, and assigned to everything therein its 
proper place. But this land is an island, and enclosed by 
nature herself within unchangeable limits. It is the land of 
truth (an attractive word), surrounded by a wide and stormy 
ocean, the region of illusion, where many a fog-bank, many 
an iceberg, seems to the mariner, on his voyage of discovery, 
a new country, and while constantly deluding him with vain 
hopes, engages him in dangerous adventures, from which he 
never can desist, and which yet he never can bring to a ter- 
mination. But before venturing upon this sea, in order to 
explore it in its whole extent, and to arrive at a certainty 
whether anything is to be discovered there, it will not be with- 
out advantage if we cast our eyes upon the chart of the land 
that we are about to leave, and to ask ourselves, firstly, 
whether we cannot rest perfectly contented with what it con- 
tains, or whether we must not of necessity be contented with 
it, if we can find nowhere else a solid foundation to build 
upon ; and, secondly, by what title we possess this land itself, 
and how we hold it secure against all hostile claims? Although, 
in the course of our analytic, we have already given sufficient 
answers to these questions, yet a summary recapitulation of 
these solutions may be useful in strengthening our conviction, 
by uniting in one point the momenta of the arguments. 

We have seen that everything which the understanding 
draws from itself, without borrowing from experience, it never- 
theless possesses only for the behoof and use of experience. 
The principles of the pure understanding, whether constitu- 
tive a priori (as the mathematical principles), or merely regu- 
lative (as the dynamical), contain nothing but the pure schema, 
as it were, of possible experience. For experience possesses 



OF PHENOMENA AND NOTJMENA. 179 

its unity from the synthetical unity which the understanding, 
originally and from itself, imparts to the synthesis of the ima- 
gination in relation to apperception, and in a priori relation 
to and agreement with which phsenomena, as data for a pos- 
sible cognition, must stand. But although these rules of the 
understanding are not only a priori true, but the very source 
of all truth, that is, of the accordance of our cognition with 
objects, and on this ground, that they contain the basis of the 
possibility of experience, as the ensemble* of all cognition, it 
seems to us not enough to propound what is true — we desire 
also to be told what we want to know. If, then, we learn 
nothing more by this critical examination, than what we should 
have practised in the merely empirical use of the understand- 
ing, without any such subtle enquiry, the presumption is, that 
the advantage we reap from it is not worth the labour be- 
stowed upon it. It may certainly be answered, that no rash 
curiosity is more prejudicial to the enlargement of our know- 
ledge than that which must know beforehand the utility of 
this or that piece of information which we seek, before we 
have entered on the needful investigations, and before one 
could form the least conception of its utility, even though it 
were placed before our eyes. But there is one advantage in 
such transcendental enquiries which can be made comprehen- 
sible to the dullest and most reluctant learner — this, namely, 
that the understanding which is occupied merely with empiri- 
cal exercise, and does not reflect on the sources of its own 
cognition, may exercise its functions very well and very suc- 
cessfully, but is quite unable to do one thing, and that of very 
great importance, to determine, namely, the bounds that limit 
its employment, and to know what lies within or without its 
own sphere. This purpose can be obtained only by such 
profound investigations as we have instituted. But if it 
cannot distinguish whether certain questions lie within its 
horizon or not, it can never be sure either as to its claims or 
possessions, but must lay its account with many humiliating 
corrections, when it transgresses, as it unavoidably will, the 
limits of its own territory, and loses itself in fanciful opinions 
and blinding illusions. 

* Inbegriff. The word coniifient, in the sense of that which contains 
the content (inhalt), if I niitrht. he allowed to use an old word in a new 
sense, would exactly hit the meaning. — Tr. 

K 2 



]>0 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

That the understanding, therefore, cannot make of its & 
priori principles, or even of its conceptions other than an 
empirical use, is a proposition which leads to the most impor- 
tant results. A transcendental use is made of a conception 
in a fundamental proposition or principle, when it is referred 
to things in general and considered as things in themselves ; 
an empirical use, when it is referred merely to phenomena, 
that is, to objects of a possible experience. That the latter 
use of a conception is the only admissible one, is evident from 
the reasons following. For every conception are requisite, 
firstly, the logical form of a conception (of thought) in general ; 
and, secondly, the possibility of presenting to this an object to 
which it may apply. Failing this latter, it has no sense, and 
is utterly void of content, although it may contain the logical 
function for constructing a conception from certain data. Now 
object cannot be given to a conception otherwise than by in- 
tuition, and, even if a pure intuition antecedent to the object 
is a priori possible, this pure intuition can itself obtain objec- 
tive validity only from empirical intuition, of which it is itself 
but the form. All conceptions, therefore, and with them all 
principles, however high the degree of their a priori possibi- 
lity, relate to empirical intuitions, that is, to data towards a 
possible experience. Without this they possess no objective 
validity, but are a mere play of imagination or of understand- 
ing with images or notions. Let us take, for example, the 
conceptions of mathematics, and first in its pure intuitions. 
" Space has three dimensions" — " Between two points there 
can be only one straight line," &c. Although all these prin- 
ciples, and the representation of the object with which this 
science occupies itself are generated in the mind entirely a 
priori, they would nevertheless have no significance, if we 
were not always able to exhibit their significance in and by 
means of phsenomena (empirical objects). Hence it is requi- 
site that an abstract conception be made sensuovs, that is, that 
an object corresponding to it in intuition be forthcoming, 
otherwise the conception remains, as we say, without sense, 
that is, without meaning. Mathematics fulfils this require- 
ment by the construction of the figure, which is a phsenome- 
non evident to the senses. The same science finds support 
and significance in number ; this in. its turn finds it in the 
fingers, or in counters, or in lines and points. The conception 



Or PHENOMENA AND NOTJMENA. 181 

itself is always produced a priori, together with the synthetical 
principles or formulas from such conceptions ; but the proper 
employment of them, and their application to objects, can exist 
nowhere but in experience, the possibility of which, as regards 
its form, they contain a priori. 

That this is also the case with all of the categories and the 
principles based upon them, is evident from the fact, that we 
cannot render intelligible the possibility of an object corre- 
sponding to them, without having recourse to the conditions of 
sensibility, consequently, to the form of phsenomena, to which, 
as their only proper objects, their use must therefore be con- 
fined, inasmuch as, if this condition is removed, all signifi- 
cance, that is, all relation to an object disappears, and no 
example can be found to make it comprehensible what sort 
of things we ought to think under such conceptions. 

The conception of quantity cannot be explained except by 
saying that it is the determination of a thing whereby it can 
be cogitated how many times one is placed in it. * But this 
" how many times" is based upon successive repetition, con- 
sequently upon time and the synthesis of the homogeneous 
therein. Reality, in contradistinction to negation, can be ex- 
plained only by cogitating a time which is either filled there- 
with or is void. If I leave out the notion of permanence 
(which is existence in all time), there remains in the concep- 
tion of substance nothing but the logical notion of subject, a 
notion of which I endeavour to realise by representing to 
myself something that can exist only as a subject. But not 
only am I perfectly ignorant of any conditions under which 
this logical prerogative can belong to a thing, I can make no- 
thing out of the notion, and draw no inference from it, because 
no object to w r hich to apply the conception is determined, and 
we consequently do not know whether it has any meaning at 
all. In like manner, if I leave out the notion of time, in 
which something follows upon some other thing in conformity 
with a rule, I can find nothing in the pure category, except 
that there is a something of such a sort that from it a con- 
clusion may be drawn as to the existence of some other thing. 

* Kant's meaning is, that we cannot have any conception of the size, 
quantity, &c, of a thing, without cogitating or constructing arbitrarily a 
unit, which shall be the standard of measurement. Tins is observable in 
weights, measures, &c. Number is the schema of quantity. — Tr. 



182 TKANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

But in this case it would not only be impossible to distinguish 
between a cause and an effect, but, as this power to draw con- 
clusions requires conditions of which I am quite ignorant, the 
conception is not determined as to the mode in which it ought 
to apply to an object. The so-called principle, Everything 
that is contingent has a cause, comes with a gravity and self- 
assumed authority that seems to require no support from 
without. But, I ask, what is meant by contingent? The 
answer is, that the non-existence of which is possible. But I 
should like very well to know, by what means this possibility 
of non-existence is to be cognized, if we do not represent to 
ourselves a succession in the series of phsenomena, and in this 
succession an existence which follows a non-existence, or 
conversely, consequently, change. For to say, that the non- 
existence of a thing is not self-contradictory, is a lame appeal 
to a logical condition, which is no doubt a necessary condition 
of the existence of the conception, but is far from being 
sufficient for the real objective possibility of non-existence. I 
can annihilate in thought every existing substance without 
self-contradiction, but I cannot infer from this their objective 
contingency in existence, that is to say, the possibility of their 
non-existence in itself. As regards the category of commu- 
nity, it may easily be inferred that, as the pure categories of 
substance and causality are incapable of a definition and ex- 
planation sufficient to determine their object without the aid 
of intuition, the category of reciprocal causality in the relation 
of substances to each other {commercium) is just as little sus- 
ceptible thereof. Possibility, Existence, and Necessity nobody 
has ever yet been able to explain without being guilty of mani- 
fest tautology, when the definition has been drawn entirely 
from the pure understanding. For the substitution of the 
logical possibility of the conception — the condition of which is 
that it be not self-contradictory, for the transcendental pos- 
sibility of things — the condition of which is, that there be an 
object corresponding to the conception, is a trick which can 
only deceive the inexperienced.* 

* In one word, to none of these conceptions belongs a corresponding 
object, and consequently their real possibility cannot be demonstrated, 
if we take away sensuous intuition — the only intuition which we possess, 
and there then remains nothing but the logical possibility, that is, the fact 
that the conception or thought is possible — which, however, is not the 
question ; what we want to know being, whether it relates to an * bject 
and thus possesses any meaning. 



OE PHENOMENA AND NOTJMENA. 183 

It follows incontestably, that the pure conceptions of the 
understanding are incapable of transcendental, and must always 
be of empirical use alone, and that the principles of the pure 
understanding relate only to the general conditions of a pos- 
sible experience, to objects of the senses, and never to things 
in general, apart from the mode in which we intuite them. 

Transcendental Analytic has accordingly this important re- 
sult, to wit, that the understanding is competent to effect 
nothing a priori, except the anticipation of the form of a pos- 
sible experience in general, and, that, as that which is not phse- 
nomenon cannot be an object of experience, it can never 
overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects 
are presented to us. Its principles are merely principles of 
the exposition of phaenomena, and the proud name of an 
Ontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions 
a priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give 
place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding. 

Thought is the act of referring a given intuition to an object. 
If the mode of this intuition is unknown to us, the object is 
merely transcendental, and the conception of the understanding 
is employed only transcendentally, that is, to produce unity 
in the thought of a manifold in general. Now a pure cate- 
gory, in which all conditions of sensuous intuition — as the 
only intuition we possess — are abstracted, does not determine 
an object, but merely expresses the thought of an object in 
general, according to different modes. Now, to employ a 
conception, the function of judgment is required, by which an 
object is subsumed under the conception, consequently the at 
least formal condition, under which something can be given in 
intuition. Failing this condition of judgment (schema), sub- 
sumption is impossible ; for there is in such a case nothing 
given, which may be subsumed under the conception. The 
merely transcendental use of the categories is therefore, in 
fact, no use at all, and has no determined, or even, as regards 
its form, determinable object. Hence it follows, that the pure 
category is incompetent to establish a synthetical a priori 
principle, and that the principles of the pure understanding 
are only of empirical and never of transcendental use, and 
that beyond the sphere of possible experience no synthetical 
a priori principles are possible. 

It may be advisable, therefore, to express ourselves thus. 
The pure categories, apart from the formal conditions of sen- 



184 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTEINE. 

sibility, have a merely transcendental meaning, but are never- 
theless not of transcendental use, because this is in itself im- 
possible, inasmuch as all the conditions of any employment or 
use of them (in judgments) are absent, to wit, the formal con* 
ditions of the subsumption of an object under these concep- 
tions. As, therefore, in the character of pure categories, 
they must be employed empirically, and cannot be employed 
transcendentally, they are of no use at all, when separated from 
sensibility, that is, they cannot be applied to an object. They 
are merely the pure form of the employment of the under- 
standing in respect of objects in general and of thought, with- 
out its being at the same time possible to think or to deter- 
mine any object by their means. 

But there lurks at the foundation of this subject an illusion 
which it is very difficult to avoid. The categories are not 
based, as regards their origin, upon sensibility, like the forms 
of intuition, space and time ; they seem, therefore, to be capa- 
ble of an application beyond the sphere of sensuous objects. 
But this is not the case. They are nothing but mere forms of 
thought, which contain only the logical faculty of uniting 
a priori in consciousness the manifold given in intuition. 
Apart, then, from the only intuition possible for us, they 
have still less meaning than the pure sensuous forms, space 
and time, for through them an object is at least given, while 
a mode of connection of the manifold, when the intuition 
which alone gives the manifold is wanting, has no meaning at 
all. At the same time, when we designate certain objects as 
phsenomena or sensuous existences, thus distinguishing our 
mode of intuiting them from their own nature as things in 
themselves, it is evident that by this very distinction we as it 
were place the latter, considered in this their own nature, 
although we do not so intuite them, in opposition to the 
former, or, on the other hand, we do so place other possible 
things, which are not objects of our senses, but are cogitated 
by the understanding alone, and call them intelligible exist- 
ences (noumena). Now the question arises, whether the pure 
conceptions of our understanding do possess significance in 
respect of these latter, and may possibly be a mode of cog- 
nising them. 

But we are met at the very commencement with an am- 
biguity, which may easily occasion great misapprehension 



Or PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA. 185 

The understanding, when it terms an object in a certain rela- 
tion phsenomenon, at the same time forms oat of this relation 
a representation or notion of an object in itself, and hence be- 
lieves that it can form also conceptions of such objects. Now 
as the understanding possesses no other fundamental concep- 
tions besides the categories, it takes for granted that an object 
considered as a thing in itself must be capable of being 
thought by means of tbese pure conceptions, and is thereby 
led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intel- 
ligible existence, a something out of the sphere of our sen- 
sibility, for a determinate conception of an existence which 
we can cognize in some way or other by means of the under- 
standing. 

If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as 
it is not an object of our sensuous intuition, thus making ab- 
straction of our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in 
the negative sense of the word. But if we understand by it 
an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we in this case assume a 
peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, 
which does not, however, belong to us, of the very possibility 
of which we have no notion — and this is a noumenon in the 
positive sesise. 

The doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena 
in the negative sense, that is, of things which the under- 
standing is obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our 
mode of intuition, consequently not as mere phaenomena, but 
as things in themselves. But the understanding at the same 
time comprehends that it cannot employ its categories for the 
consideration of things in themselves, because these possess 
significance only in relation to the unity of intuitions in space 
and time, and that they are competent to determine this unity 
by means of general a priori connecting conceptions only on 
account of the pure ideality of space and time. Where this 
unity of time is not to be met with, as is the case with nou- 
mena, the whole use, indeed the whole meaning of the cate- 
gories is entirely lost, for even the possibility of things to 
correspond to the categories, is in this case incomprehensible. 
On this point, I need only refer the reader to what I have 
said at the commencement of the General Remark appended 
to the foregoing chapter. Now, the possibility of a thing 
can never be proved from the fact that the conception of it is 



186 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

tiot self-contradictory, but only by means of an intuition cor- 
responding to the conception. If, therefore, we wish to apply 
the categories to objects which cannot be regarded as phseno- 
mena, we must have an intuition different from the sensuous, 
and in this case the objects would be a noumena in the positive 
sense of the word. Now, as such an intuition, that is, an in- 
tellectual intuition, is no part of our faculty of cognition, it is 
absolutely impossible for the categories to possess any appli- 
cation beyond the limits of experience. It may be true that 
there are intelligible existences to which our faculty of sen- 
suous intuition has no relation, and cannot be applied, but 
our conceptions of the understanding, as mere forms of thought 
for our sensuous intuition, do not extend to these. What, 
therefore, we call noumenon, must be understood by us as 
such in a negative sense. 

If I take away from an empirical intuition all thought (by 
means of the categories), there remains no cognition of any 
object ; for by means of mere intuition nothing is cogitated, 
and from the existence of such or such an affection of sensi- 
bility in me, it does not follow that this affection or repre- 
sentation has any relation to an object without me. But if I 
take away all intuition, there still remains the form of thought, 
that is, the mode of determining an object for the manifold 
of a possible intuition. Thus the categories do in some mea- 
sure really extend further than sensuous intuition, inasmuch 
as they think objects in general, without regard to the mode 
(of sensibility) in which these objects are given. But they do 
not for this reason apply to and determine a wider sphere of 
objects, because we cannot assume that such can be given, 
without presupposing the possibility of another than the sen- 
suous mode of intuition, a supposition we are not justified in 
making. 

I call a conception problematical which contains in itself 
no contradiction, and which is connected with other cogni- 
tions as a limitation of given conceptions, but whose ob- 
jective reality cannot be cognised in any manner. The con- 
ception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be co- 
gitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself 
(solely through the pure understanding) is not self-contra- 
dictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is 
the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this con- 



OF PHENOMENA AND NOITMENA. 187 

ception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the 
bounds of phaenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity 
of sensuous cognition ; for things in themselves, which lie 
beyond its province, are called noumena, for the very purpose 
of indicating that this cognition does not extend its applica- 
tion to all that the understanding thinks. But, after all, the 
possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehensible, and 
beyond the sphere of phsenomena, all is for us a mere void ; 
that is to say, we possess an understanding whose province 
does problematically extend beyond this sphere, but we do not 
possess an intuition, indeed, not even the conception of a possi- 
ble intuition, by means of which objects beyond the region 
of sensibility could be given us, and in reference to which the 
understanding might be employed assertorically . The concep- 
tion of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception, 
and therefore only of negative use. But it is not an arbitrary 
or fictitious notion, but is connected with the limitation of 
sensibility, without, however, being capable of presenting us 
with any positive datum beyond this sphere. 

The division of objects into phaenomena and noumena, and 
of the world into a mundus sensibilis and inielligibilis is there- 
fore quite inadmissible in a positive sense, although conceptions 
do certainly admit of such a division ; for the class of nou- 
mena have no determinate object corresponding to them, and 
cannot therefore possess objective validity. If we abandon 
the senses, how can it be made conceivable that the catego- 
ries (which are the only conceptions that could serve as concep- 
tions for noumena) have any sense or meaning at all, inasmuch 
as something more than the mere unity of thought, namely, a 
possible intuition, is requisite for their application to an 
object. The conception of a noumenon, considered as merely 
problematical, is, however, not only admissible, but, as a 
limitative conception of sensibility, absolutely necessary. But, 
in this case, a noumenon is not a particular intelligible object 
for our understanding ; on the contrary, the kind of under- 
standing to which it could belong is itself a problem, for we 
cannot form the most distant conception of the possibility of 
an understanding which should cognize an object, not discur- 
sively by means of categories, but intuitively in anon-sensuous 
intuition. Our understanding attains in this way a sort of 
negative extension. That is to say, it is not limited by, but 
rather limits, sensibility, by giving the name of noumena to 



188 TRANSCEKDEKTAL DOCTRINE. 

things, not considered as phaenomena, but as things in them- 
selves. But it at the same time prescribes limits to itself, for 
it confesses itself unable to cognize these by means of the 
categories, and hence is compelled to cogitate them merely as 
an unknown something. 

I find, however, in the writings of modern authors, an en- 
tirely different use of the expressions, mundus sensibilis and 
intelligibilis* which quite departs from the meaning of the 
ancients — an acceptation in which, indeed, there is to be 
found no difficulty, but which at the same time depends on 
mere verbal quibbling. According to this meaning, some 
have chosen to call the complex of phenomena, in so far as it is 
intuited, mundus sensibilis, butin so far as the connection thereof 
is cogitated according to general laws of thought, mundus in- 
telligibilis . Astronomy, in so far as we mean by the word 
the mere observation of the starry heaven, may represent 
the former ; a system of astronomy, such as the Copernican 
or Newtonian, the latter. But such twisting of words is a 
mere sophistical subterfuge, to avoid a difficult question, by 
modifying its meaning to suit our own convenience. To be 
sure, understanding and reason are employed in the cognition 
of phaenomena ; but the question is, whether these can be ap- 
plied, when the object is not a phaenomenon — and in this 
sense we regard it if it is cogitated as given to the under- 
standing alone, and not to the senses. The question therefore 
is, whether over and above the empirical use of the under- 
standing, a transcendental use is possible, which applies to 
the noumenon as an object. This question we have answered 
in the negative. 

When therefore we say, the senses represent objects as they 
appear, the understanding as they are, the latter statement 
must not be understood in a transcendental, but only in an 
empirical signification, that is, as they must be represented in 
the complete connexion of phaenomena, and not according to 
what they may be, apart from their relation to possible expe- 
rience, consequently not as objects of the pure understanding. 
For this must ever remain unknown to us. Nay, it is also quite 
unknown to us, whether any such transcendental or extraordi- 

* We must not translate this expression by intellectual, as is com- 
monly done in German works ; for it is cognitions alone that are intel- 
lectual or sensuous. Objects of th-e one 6*! 1 the other mode of intuition ought 
to be called, however harshly it may sound, intelligible or sensible. — 



OF PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA. 189 

nary cognition is possible under any circumstances, at least, 
whether it is possible by means of our categories. Under- 
standing and sensibility, with us, can determine objects only in 
conjunction. If we separate them, we have intuitions without 
conceptions, or conceptions without intuitions ; in both cases, 
representations, which we cannot apply to any determinate 
object. 

If, after all our inquiries and explanations, any one still 
hesitates to abandon the mere transcendental use of the cate- 
gories, let him attempt to construct with them a synthetical 
proposition. It would, of course, be unnecessary for this pur- 
pose to construct an analytical proposition, for that does not 
extend the sphere of the understanding, but, being concerned 
only about what is cogitated in the conception itself, it leaves 
it quite undecided whether the conception has any relation to 
objects, or merely indicates the unity of thought — complete 
abstraction being made of the modi in which an object may be 
given : in such a proposition, it is sufficient for the under- 
standing to know what lies in the conception — to what it ap- 
plies, is to it indifferent. The attempt must therefore be made 
with a synthetical and so-called transcendental principle, for 
example, Everything that exists, exists as substance, or, Every- 
thing that is contingent exists as an effect of some other thing, 
viz., of its cause. Now I ask, whence can the understanding 
draw these synthetical propositions, when the conceptions 
contained therein do not relate to possible experience but to 
things in themselves (noumena) ? Where is to be found the 
third term, which is always requisite in a synthetical propo- 
sition, which may connect in the same proposition conceptions 
which have no logical (analytical) connection with each other 1 
The proposition never will be demonstrated, nay, more, the 
possibility of any such pure assertion never can be shown, 
without making reference to the empirical use of the under- 
standing, and thus, ipso facto, completely renouncing pure and 
non-sensuous judgment. Thus the conception of pure and 
merely intelligible objects is completely void of all principles 
of its application, because we cannot imagine any mode in 
tvhich they might be given, and the problematical thought 
tvhich leaves a place open for them serves enly, like a void 
space, to limit the use of empirical principles, without con- 
taining at the same time any other object of cognitior beyond 
their sphere. 



190 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 



APPENDIX. 

OE THE EQUIVOCAL NATURE OR AMPHIBOLY OF THE CON- 
CEPTIONS OE REELECTION EROM THE SUBSTITUTION 01 
THE TRANSCENDENTAL EOR THE EMPIRICAL USE OE THE 
UNDERSTANDING. 

Reelection (rejlexio) is not occupied about objects them- 
selves, for the purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of 
them, but is that state of the mind in which we set ourselves 
to discover the subjective conditions under which we obtain 
conceptions. It is the consciousness of the relation of given 
representations to the different sources or faculties of cogni- 
tion, by which alone their relation to each other can be rightly 
determined. The first question which occurs in considering 
our representations is, to what faculty of cognition do they 
belong ? To the understanding or to the senses ? Many 
judgments are admitted to be true from mere habit or inclina- 
tion ; but, because reflection neither precedes nor follows, it is 
held to be a judgment that has its origin in the understand- 
ing. All judgments do not require examination, that is, investi- 
gation into the grounds of their truth. For, when they are 
immediately certain (for example, Between two points there 
can be only one straight line), no better or less mediate test 
of their truth can be found than that which they themselves 
contain and express. But all judgment, nay, all comparisons 
require reflection, that is, a distinction of the faculty of cog- 
nition to which the given conceptions belong. The act where- 
by I compare my representations with the faculty of cognition 
which originates them, and whereby I distinguish whether 
they are compared with each other as belonging to the pure 
understanding or to sensuous intuition, I term transcendental re- 
flection. Now, the relations in which conceptions can stand 
to each other are those of identity and difference, agreement and 
opposition, of the internal and external, finally, of the deter- 
minable and the determining (matter and form). The proper 
determination of these relations rests on the question, to what 
faculty of cognition they subjectively belong, whether to sensi- 
bility or understanding ? For, on the manner in which we 
solve this question depends the manner in which we must 
cogitate these relations. 



OF THE EQU1TOCAL NATTJBE OT THE CONCEPTIONS. 191 

Before constructing any objective judgment, we compare 
the conceptions that are to be placed in the judgment, and 
observe whether there exists identity (of many representations 
in one conception), if a general judgment is to be constructed, 
or difference, if a particular ; whether there is agreement when 
affirmative, and opposition when negative judgments are to be 
constructed, and so on. For this reason we ought to call 
these conceptions, conceptions of comparison (conceptus com- 
parationis). But as, when the question is not as to the logical 
form, but as to the content of conceptions, that is to say, 
whether the things themselves are identical or different, in 
agreement or opposition, and so on, the things can have a 
twofold relation to our faculty of cognition, to wit, a relation 
either to sensibility or to the understanding, and as on this 
relation depends their relation to each other, transcendental 
reflection, that is, the relation of given representations to one 
or the other faculty of cognition, can alone determine this 
latter relation. Thus we shall not be able to discover whether 
the things are identical or different, in agreement or opposi- 
tion, &c, from the mere conception of the things by means of 
comparison (comparatio), but only by distinguishing the mode 
of cognition to which they belong, in other words, by means 
of transcendental reflection. We may, therefore, with justice 
say, that logical reflection is mere comparison, for in it no ac- 
count is taken of the faculty of cognition to which the given 
conceptions belong, and they are consequently, as far as re- 
gards their origin, to be treated as homogeneous ; while tran- 
scendental reflection (which applies to the objects themselves) 
contains the ground of the possibility of objective comparison 
of representations with each other, and is therefore very 
different from the former, because the faculties of cognition to 
which they belong are not even the same. Transcendenta. 
reflection is a duty which no one can neglect who wishes to 
establish an a priori judgment upon things. We shall now 
proceed to fulfil this duty, and thereby throw not a little light 
on the question as to the determination of the proper business 
of the understanding. 

1. Identity and Difference. — When an object is presented ^ 
us several times, but always with the same internal determin 
ations (qnalitas et quantitax), it, if an object of pure under- 
standing, is always tLu- M.n/» not several things, but only one 



192 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

thing (numerica identitas) ; but if a phenomenon, we do not 
concern ourselves with comparing the conception of the thing 
with the conception of some other, but, although they maybe 
in this respect perfectly the same, the difference of place at 
the same time is a sufficient ground for asserting the numerical 
difference of these objects (of sense). Thus, in the case of 
two drops of water, we may make complete abstraction of all 
internal difference (quality and quantity), and, the fact that 
they are intuited at the same time in different places, is suf- 
ficent to justify us in holding them to be numerically different. 
Leibnitz regarded phenomena as things in themselves, conse- 
quently as intelligibilia, that is, objects of pure understand- 
ing, (although, on account of the confused nature of their 
representations, he gave them the name of phenomena), and 
in this case his principle of the indiscernible (principium iden- 
tatis indiscernibilium) is not to be impugned. But, as pheno- 
mena are objects of sensibility, and, as the understanding, in re- 
spect of them, must be employed empirically and not purely or 
transcendentally, plurality and numerical difference are given 
by space itself as the condition of external phaenomena. For 
one part of space, although it may be perfectly similar and 
equal to another part, is still without it, and for this reason 
alone is different from the latter, which is added to it in order 
to make up a greater space. It follows that this must hold 
good of all things that are in the different parts of space 
at the same time, however similar and equal one may be to 
another. 

2. Agreement and Opposition. — When reality is represented 
by the pure understanding (realitas noumenon), opposition be- 
tween realities is incogitable — such a relation, that is, that 
when these realities are connected in one subject, they anni- 
hilate the effects of each other, and may be represented in the 
formula 3 — 3=0. On the other hand, the real in a pheno- 
menon (realitas phenomenon) may very well be in mutual oppo- 
sition, and, when united in the same subject, the one may 
completely or in part annihilate the effect or consequence oj 
the other ; as in the case of two moving forces in the same 
straight line drawing or impelling a point in opposite direc- 
tions, or in the case of a pleasure counterbalancing a certain 
amount of pain. 

3. The Internal and External. — In an object of the pure 



OF THE EQUITOCAL NATURE OF THE CONCEPTIONS. ] 93 

understanding only that is internal which has no relation (a/ 
regards its existence) to anything different from itself. On 
the other hand, the internal determinations of a substantia 
phenomenon in space are nothing but relations, and it is itself 
nothing more than a complex of mere relations. Substance 
in space we are cognisant of only through forces operative 
in it, either drawing others towards itself (attraction), or 
preventing others from forcing into itself (repulsion and impe- 
netrability) . We know no other properties that make up the 
conception of substance phsenomenal in space, and which we 
term matter. On the other hand, as an object of the pure 
understanding, every substance must have internal determina- 
tions and forces. But what other internal attributes of such 
an object can I think than those which my internal sense 
presents to me ? — That, to wit, which is either itself thought \ 
or something analogous to it. Hence Leibnitz, who looked 
upon things as noumena, after denying them everything like 
external relation, and therefore also composition or combina- 
tion, -declared that all substances, even the component parts 
of matter, were simple substances with powers of represen- 
tation, in one word, monads. 

4. Matter and Form. — These two conceptions lie at the 
foundation of all other reflection, so inseparably are they con- 
nected with every mode of exercising the understanding. The 
former denotes the determinable in general, the second its 
determination, both in a transcendental sense, abstraction 
being made of every difference in that which is given, and of 
the mode in which it is determined. Logicians formerly 
termed the universal, matter, the specific difference of this or 
that part of the universal, form. In a judgment one may 
call the given conceptions logical matter (for the judgment) 
the relation of these to each other (by means of the copula), 
the form of the judgment. In an object, the composite parts 
thereof (essentialia) are the matter ; the mode in which they 
are connected in the object, the form. In respect to things 
in general, unlimited reality was regarded as the matter of all 
possibility, the limitation thereof (negation) as the form, by 
which one thing is distinguished from another according to 
transcendental conceptions. The understanding demands that 
something be given (at least in die conception), in order to be 
able to determine it in a certain manner. Hence, in a con- 



194 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

ception of the pure understanding, the matter precedes the 
form, and for this reason Leibnitz first assumed the existence 
of things (monads) and of an internal power of representation 
in them, in order to found upon this their external relation 
and the community of their state (that is, of their representa- 
tions). Hence, with him, space and time were possible — the 
former through the relation of substances, the latter through 
the connection of their determinations with each other, as 
causes and effects. And so would it really be, if the pure un- 
derstanding were capable of an immediate application to ob- 
jects, and if space and time were determinations of things in 
themselves. But being merely sensuous intuitions, in which 
we determine all objects solely as phsenomena, the form of 
intuition (as a subjective property of sensibility) must ante- 
cede all matter (sensations), consequently space and time 
must antecede all phaenomena and all data of experience, and 
rather make experience itself possible. But the intellectual 
philosopher could not endure that the form should precede 
the things themselves, and determine their possibility ; an ob- 
jection perfectly correct, if we assume that we intuite things 
as they are, although with confused representation. But as 
sensuous intuition is a peculiar subjective condition, which is 
a priori at the foundation of all perception, and the form of 
which is primitive, the form must be given per se, and so far 
from matter (or the things themselves which appear) lying at 
the foundation of experience (as we must conclude, if we judge 
by mere conceptions), the very possibility of itself presupposes, 
on the contrary, a given formal intuition (space and time). 

remark on the amphiboly oe the conceptions oe 
Reelection. 

Let me be allowed to term the position which we assign to 
a conception either in the sensibility or in the pure under- 
standing, the transcendental place. In this manner, the ap- 
pointment of the position which must be taken by each concep- 
tion according to the difference in its use, and the directions for 
determining this place to all conceptions according to rules, 
would be a transcendental topic, a doctrine which would tho- 
roughly shield us from the surreptitious devices of the pure un- 
derstanding and the delusions which thence arise, as it would 
always distinguish to what faculty of cognition each concep- 



Or THE CONCEPTIONS OF BE FLECTION. 195 

tioii properly belonged. Every conception, every title, under 
which many cognitions rank together, may be called a logical 
place. Upon this is based the logical topic of Aristotle, of 
which teachers and rhetoricians could avail themselves, in 
order, under certain titles of thought, to observe what would 
best suit the matter they had to treat, and thus enable them- 
selves to quibble and talk with fluency and an appearance of 
profundity. 

Transcendental topic, on the contrary, contains nothing 
more than the above-mentioned four titles of all comparison 
and distinction, which differ from categories in this respect, 
that they do not represent the object according to that which 
constitutes its conception (quantity, reality), but set forth 
merely the comparison of representations, which precedes our 
conceptions of things. But this comparison requires a pre- 
vious reflection, that is, a determination of the place to which 
the representations of the things which are compared belong, 
whether, to wit, they are cogitated by the pure understanding, 
or given by sensibility. 

Conceptions may be logically compared without the trouble 
of inquiring to what faculty their objects belong, whether as 
noumena, to the understanding, or as phsenomena to sensi- 
bility. If, however, we wish to employ these conceptions in 
respect of objects, previous transcendental reflection is neces- 
sary. Without this reflection I should make a very unsafe 
use of these conceptions, and construct pretended synthetical 
propositions which critical reason cannot acknowledge, and 
which are based solely upon a transcendental amphiboly, that 
is, upon a substitution of an object of pure understanding for 
a phaenomenon. 

For want of this doctrine of transcendental topic, and con- 
sequently deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of 
reflection, the celebrated Leibnitz constructed an intellectual 
system of the world, or rather, believed himself competent to 
cognize the internal nature .of things, by comparing all objects 
merely with the understanding and the abstract formal con- 
ceptions of thought. Our table of the conceptions of reflec- 
tion gives us the unexpected advantage of being able to exhibit 
the distinctive peculiarities of his system in all its parts, and 
at the same time of exposing the fundamental principle of this 
peculiar mode of thought, which rested upon nought but a 



196 TBANSCENDENTAL DOCTEINE. 

misconception. He compared all things with each other 
merely by means of conceptions, and naturally found no other 
differences than those by which the understanding distin- 
guishes its pure conceptions one from another. The con- 
ditions of sensuous intuition, which contain in themselves 
their own means of distinction, he did not look upon as pri- 
mitive, because sensibility was to him but a confused mode of 
representation, and not any particular source of representa- 
tions. A phenomenon was for him the representation of the 
thing in itself, although distinguished from cognition by the 
understanding only in respect of the logical form — the former 
with its usual want of analysis containing, according to him, 
a certain mixture of collateral representations in its concep- 
tion of a thing, which it is the duty of the understanding to 
separate and distinguish. In one word, Leibnitz intellectua- 
lised phenomena, just as Locke, in his system of noogony (if I 
may be allowed to make use of such expressions), sensualised 
the conceptions of the understanding, that is to say, declared 
them to be nothing more than empirical or abstract concep- 
tions of reflection. Instead of seeking in the understanding 
and sensibility two different sources of representations, which, 
however, can present us with objective judgments of things 
only in conjunction, each of these great men recognised but one 
of these faculties, which, in their opinion, applied immediately 
to things in themselves, the other having no duty but that 
of confusing or arranging the representations of the former. 

Accordingly, the objects of sense were compared by Leib- 
nitz as things in general merely in the understanding. 

1st. He compares them in regard to their identity or dif- 
ference — as judged by the understanding. As, therefore, he 
considered merely the conceptions of objects, and not their 
position in intuition, in which alone objects can be given, 
and left quite out of sight the transcendental locale of these 
conceptions — whether, that is, their object ought to be classed 
among phenomena, or among things in themselves, it was to be 
expected that he should extend the application of the principle 
of indiscernibles, which is valid solely of conceptions of things 
in general, to objects of sense (mundus phenomenon), and 
that he should believe that he had thereby contributed in no 
small degree to extend our knowledge of nature. In truth, 
if I cognize in all its inner determinations a drop of water as 



OP THE CONCEPTIONS OF REELECTION. 197 

ft thing in itself, I cannot look upon one drop as different 
&om another, if the conception of the one is completely iden- 
tical with that of the other. But if it is a phenomenon in 
space, it has a place not merely in the understanding (among 
conceptions), but also in sensuous external intuition (in space), 
and in this case, the physical locale is a matter of indifference 
in regard to the internal determinations of things, and one 
place, B, may contain a thing which is perfectly similar and 
equal to another in a place, A, just as well as if the two things 
were in every respect different from each other. Difference 
of place without any other conditions, makes the plurality and 
distinction of objects as phsenomena, not only possible in itself, 
but even necessary. Consequently, the above so-called law is 
not a law of nature. It is merely an analytical rule for the 
comparison of things by means of mere conceptions. 

2nd. The principle, " Realities (as simple affirmations) never 
logically contradict each other," is a proposition perfectly 
true respecting the relation of conceptions, but, whether as 
regards nature, or things in themselves (of which we have 
not the slightest conception), is without any the least meaning. 
For real opposition, in which A — B is = 0, exists everywhere, 
an opposition, that is, in which one reality united with 
another in the same subject annihilates the effects of the other 
— a fact which is constantly brought before our eyes by the 
different antagonistic actions and operations in nature, which, 
nevertheless, as depending on real forces, must be called rea- 
litates phenomena. General mechanics can even present us with 
the empirical condition of this opposition in an a priori rule, 
as it directs its attention to the opposition in the direction of 
forces — a condition of which the transcendental conception of 
reality can tell us nothing. Although M. Leibnitz did not 
announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of a new 
principle, he yet employed it for the establishment of new 
propositions, and his followers introduced it into their Leib- 
nitzio-Wolfian system of philosophy. According to this prin- 
ciple, for example, all evils are but consequences of the limited 
nature of created beings, that is, negations, because these are 
the only opposite of reality. (In the mere conception of a 
thing in general this is really the case, but not in things as 
phsenomena). In like manner, the upholders of this system 
deem it not only possible, but natural also, to connect and 



198 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. 

unite all reality in one being, because they acknowledge no 
other sort of opposition than that of contradiction (by which 
the conception itself of a thing is annihilated), and find them- 
selves unable to conceive an opposition of reciprocal destruc- 
tion, so to speak, in which one real cause destroys the effect 
of another, and the conditions of whose representation we 
meet with only in sensibility. 

3rd. The Leibnitzian Monadology has really no better foun- 
dation than on this philosopher's mode of falsely representing 
the difference of the internal and external solely in relation to 
the understanding. Substances, in general, must have some- 
thing inward, which is therefore free from external relations, 
consequently from that of composition also. The simple — 
that which can be represented by a unit — is therefore the 
foundation of that which is internal in things in themselves. 
The internal state of substances cannot therefore consist in 
place, shape, contact, or motion, determinations which are all 
external relations, and we can ascribe to them no other 
than that whereby we internally determine our faculty of sense 
itself, that is to say, the state of representation. Thus, then, 
were constructed the monads, which were to form the elements 
of the universe, the active force of which consists in repre- 
sentation, the effects of this force being thus entirely confined 
to themselves. 

For the same reason, his view of the possible community of 
substances could not represent it but as a predetermined har- 
mony, and by no means as a physical influence. For inasmuch 
as everything is occupied only internally, that is, with its 
own representations, the state of the representations of one sub- 
stance could not stand in active and living connection with 
that of another, but some third cause operating on all without 
exception was necessary to make the different states corre- 
spond with one another. And this did not happen by means 
of assistance applied in each particular case (systema assis- 
tentice), but through the unity of the idea of a cause occupied 
and connected with all substances, in which they necessarily 
receive, according to the Leibnitzian school, their existence 
and permanence, consequently also reciprocal correspondence, 
according to universal laws. 

4th. This philosopher's celebrated doctrine of space and time, 
in which he intellectualized these forms of sensibility, ori- 



OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION. 199 

ginated in the same delusion of transcendental reflection. If 
I attempt to represent by the mere understanding, the external 
relations of things, I can do so only by employing the con- 
ception of their reciprocal action, and if I wish to connect one 
6tate of the same thing with another state, I must avail myself 
of the notion of the order of cause and effect. And thus Leib- 
nitz regarded space as a certain order in the community of 
substances, and time as the dynamical sequence of their states. 
That which space and time possess proper to themselves and 
independent of things, he ascribed to a necessary confusion in 
our conceptions of them, whereby that which is a mere form 
of dynamical relations is held to be a self- existent intuition, 
antecedent even to things themselves. Thus space and time 
were the intelligible form of the connection of things (sub- 
stances and their states) in themselves. But things were in- 
telligible substances (substantia noumena). At the same time, 
he made these conceptions valid of phaenomena, because he did 
not allow to sensibility a peculiar mode of intuition, but sought 
all, even the empirical representation of objects, in the under- 
standing, and left to sense nought but the despicable task of 
confusing and disarranging the representations of the former. 

But even if we could frame any synthetical proposition con- 
cerning things in themselves by means of the pure under- 
standing (which is impossible), it could not apply to phaeno- 
mena, which do not represent things in themselves. In such 
a case I should be obliged in transcendental reflection to 
compare my conceptions only under the conditions of sensi- 
bility, and so space and time would not be determinations of 
things in themselves, but of phaenomena. What things may be 
in themselves, I know not, and need not know, because a thing 
is never presented to me otherwise than as a phaenomenon. 

I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other 
conceptions of reflection. Matter is substantia phenomenon. 
That in it which is internal I seek to discover in all parts of 
space which it occupies, and in all the functions and opera- 
tions it performs, and which are indeed never anything but 
phaenomena of the external sense. I cannot therefore find any 
thing that is absolutely, but only what is comparatively in- 
ternal, and which itself consists of external relations. The 
absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be according to 
the pure understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter is not an 



200 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCJ.TtlNE. 

object for the pure understanding. But the transcendental 
object, which is the foundation of the phsenomenon which we 
call matter, is a mere nescio quid, the nature of which we could 
not understand, even though some one were found able to tell 
us. For we can understand nothing that does not bring with it 
something in intuition corresponding to the expressions em- 
ployed. If by the complaint of being unable to perceive the 
internal nature of things, it is meant that we do not comprehend 
by the pure understanding what the things which appear to 
us may be in themselves, it is a silly and unreasonable com- 
plaint ; for those who talk thus, really desire that we should 
be able to cognize, consequently to intuite things without 
senses, and therefore wish that we possessed a faculty of cog- 
nition perfectly different from the human faculty, not merely 
in degree, but even as regards intuition and the mode thereof, 
so that thus we should not be men, but belong to a class of 
beings, the possibility of whose existence, much less their 
nature and constitution, we have no means of cognizing. By 
observation and analysis of phenomena we penetrate into the 
interior of nature, and no one can say what progress this 
knowledge may make in time. But those transcendental 
questions which pass beyond the limits of nature, we could 
never answer, even although all nature were laid open to us, 
because we have not the power of observing our own mind 
with any other intuition than that of our internal sense. 
For herein lies the mystery of the origin and source of our 
faculty of sensibility. Its application to an object, and the 
transcendental ground of this unity of subjective and objec- 
tive, lie too deeply concealed for us, who cognize ourselves 
only through the internal sense, consequently as phaenomena, 
to be able to discover in our existence any thing but phaeno- 
mena, the non-sensuous cause of which we at the same time 
earnestly desire to penetrate to. 

The great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at 
by the processes of mere reflection, consists in its clear demon- 
stration of the nullity of all conclusions respecting objects 
which are compared with each other in the understanding 
alone, while it at the same time confirms what we particularly 
insisted on, namely, that,although phaenomena are not included 
as things in themselves among the objects of the pure under- 
standing, they are nevertheless the only things by which cut 



THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF EEFLECTIOK. 201 

cognition can possess objective reality, that is to say, which 
give us intuitions to correspond with our conceptions. 

When we reflect in a purely logical manner, we do nothing 
more than compare conceptions in our understanding, to dis- 
cover whether both have the same content, whether they are 
self-contradictory or not, whether anything is contained in 
either conception, which of the two is given, and which is 
merely a mode of thinking that given . But if I apply these con- 
ceptions to an object in general (in the transcendental sense), 
without first determining whether it is an object of sensuous 
or intellectual intuition, certain limitations present themselves, 
which forbid us to pass beyond the conceptions, and render 
all empirical use of them impossible. And thus these limit- 
ations prove, that the representation of an object as a thing 
in general is not only insufficient, but, without sensuous de- 
termination and independently of empirical conditions, self- 
contradictory ; that we must therefore make abstraction of 
all objects, as in logic, or, admitting them, must think them 
under conditions of sensuous intuition ; that, consequently, 
the intelligible requires an altogether peculiar intuition, which 
we do not possess, and in the absence of which it is for us 
nothing ; while, on the other hand, pheenomena cannot be ob- 
jects in themselves. For, when I merely think things in 
general, the difference in their external relations cannot con- 
stitute a difference in the things themselves ; on the contrary, 
the former presupposes the latter, and if the conception of one 
of two things is not internally different from that of the other, 
I am merely thinking the same thing in different relations. 
Further, by the addition of one affirmation (reality) to the 
other, the positive therein is really augmented, and nothing is 
abstracted or withdrawn from it ; hence the real in things 
cannot be in contradiction with or opposition to itself — and 
so on. 

The true use of the conceptions of reflection in the employ- 
ment of the understanding, has, as we have shown, been so mis- 
conceived by Leibnitz, one of the most acute philosophers of 
either ancient or modern times, that he has been misled into the 
construction of a baseless system of intellectual cognition, which 
professes to determine its objects without the intervention of 
the senses. For this reason, the exposition of the cause of the 



202 DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS. 

amphiboly of these conceptions, as the origin of these false 
principles, is of great utility in determining with certainty the 
proper limits of the understanding. 

It is right to say, whatever is affirmed or denied of the 
whole of a conception can be affirmed or denied of any part of 
it (dictum de omni et nullo) ; but it would be absurd so to alter 
this logical proposition, as to say, whatever is not contained 
in a general conception, is likewise not contained in the par- 
ticular conceptions which rank under it ; for the latter are 
particular conceptions, for the very reason that their content 
is greater than that which is cogitated in the general concep- 
tion. And yet the whole intellectual system of Leibnitz is 
based upon this false principle, and with it must necessarily 
fall to the ground, together with all the ambiguous principles 
in reference to the employment of the understanding which 
have thence originated. 

Leibnitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles or 
indistinguishables is really based on the presupposition, that, 
if in the conception of a thing a certain distinction is not to 
be found, it is also not to be met with in things themselves ; 
that, consequently, all things are completely identical {numero 
eadem) which are not distinguishable from each other (as to 
quality or quantity) in our conceptions of them. But, as in 
the mere conception of anything abstraction has been made of 
many necessary conditions of intuition, that of which abstrac- 
tion has been made is rashly held to be non-existent, and 
nothing is attributed to the thing but what is contained in its 
conception. 

The conception of a cubic foot of space, however I may 
think it, is in itself completely identical. But two cubic feet 
in space are nevertheless distinct from each other from the 
sole fact of their being in different places (they are numero 
diversa) ; and these places are conditions of intuition, wherein 
the object of this conception is given, and which do not belong 
to the conception, but to the faculty of sensibility. In like 
manner, there is in the conception of a thing no contradiction 
when a negative is not connected with an affirmative ; and 
merely affirmative conceptions cannot, in conjunction, produce 
any negation. But in sensuous intuition, wherein reality (take 
for example, motion) is given, we find conditions (opposite 
directions) — of which abstraction has been made in the con- 



THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF EEFXECTION. 205 

ception of motion in general — which render possible a contra- 
diction or opposition (not indeed of a logical kind) — and which 
from pure positives produce zero = 0. We are therefore not 
justified in saying, that all reality is in perfect agreement and 
harmony, because no contradiction is discoverable among its 
conceptions.* According to mere conceptions, that which is 
internal is the substratum of all relations or external deter- 
minations. When, therefore, I abstract all conditions of in- 
tuition, and confine myself solely to the conception of a thing 
in general, I can make abstraction of all external relations, and 
there must nevertheless remain a conception of that which in- 
dicates no relation, but merely internal determinations. Now 
it seems to follow, that in everything (substance) there is 
something which is absolutely internal, and which antecedes 
all external determinations, inasmuch as it renders them pos- 
sible ; and that therefore this substratum is something which 
does not contain any external relations, and is consequently 
simple (for corporeal things are never any thing but relations, 
at least of their parts external to each other) ; and inasmuch 
as we know of no other absolutely internal determinations 
than those of the internal sense, this substratum is not only 
simple, but also, analogously with our internal sense, deter- 
mined through representations , that is to say, all things are 
properly monads, or simple beings endowed with the power of 
representation. Now all this would be perfectly correct, if 
the conception of a thing were the only necessary condition 
of the presentation of objects of external intuition. It is, on 
the contrary, manifest that a permanent phaenomenon in 
space (impenetrable extension) can contain mere relations, and 
nothing that is absolutely internal, and yet be the primary 
substratum of all external perception. By mere concep- 
tions I cannot think any thing external, without, at the same 

* If any one wishes here to have recourse to the usual subterfuge, and 
to say, that at least realitates noumena cannot be in opposition to each 
other, it will be requisite for him to adduce an example of this pure and 
non-sensuous reality, that it may be understood whether the notion re- 
presents something or nothing. But an example cannot be found except 
in experience, which never presents to us anything more than phenomena ; 
and thus the proposition means nothing more than that the conception 
which contains only affirmatives, does not contain anything negative— 
a proposition nobody ever doubted. 



204 DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS. 

time, thinking something internal, for the reason that con- 
ceptions of relations presuppose given things, and without 
these are impossible. But, as in intuition there is something 
(that is, space, which, with all it contains, consists of purely 
formal, or, indeed, real relations) which is not found in the mere 
conception of a thing in general, and this presents to us the 
substratum which could not be cognized through conceptions 
alone, I cannot say : because a thing cannot be represented 
by mere conceptions without something absolutely internal, 
there is also, in the things themselves which are contained 
under these conceptions, and in their intuition nothing external 
to which something absolutely internal does not serve as the 
foundation. For, when we have made abstraction of all the 
conditions of intuition, there certainly remains in the mere 
conception nothing but the internal in general, through which 
alone the external is possible. Bat this necessity, which is 
grounded upon abstraction alone, does not obtain in the case 
of things themselves, in so far as they are given in intuition 
with such determinations as express mere relations, without 
having any thing internal as their foundation ; for they are 
not things in themselves, but only phsenomena. What we 
cognize in matter is nothing but relations (what we call its 
internal determinations are but comparatively internal). But 
there are some se]f-subsistent and permanent, through which 
a determined object is given. That I, when abstraction is 
made of these relations, have nothing more to think, does 
not destroy the conception of a thing as phsenomenon, nor 
the conception of an object in abstracto, but it does away with 
the possibility of an object that is determinable according to 
mere conceptions, that is, of a noumenon. It is certainly 
startling to hear that a thing consists solely of relations ; but 
this thing is simply a phaenomenon, and cannot be cogitated 
by means of the mere categories : it does itself consist in the 
mere relation of some thing in general to the senses. In the 
same way, we cannot cogitate relations of things in abstracto, 
if we commence with conceptions alone, in any other manner 
than that one is the cause of determinations in the other ; for 
that is itself the conception of the understanding or category 
of relation. But, as in this case we make abstraction of all 
intuition, we lose altogether the mode in which the manifold 
determines to each of its parts its place, that is, the form o 



THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OP PREELECTION. 205 

sensibility (space) ; and yet this mode antecedes all empirical 
causality. 

If by intelligible objects we understand things which can 
be thought by means of the pure categories, without the need 
of the schemata of sensibility, such objects are impossible. 
For the condition of the objective use of all our conceptions 
of understanding is the mode of our sensuous intuition, 
whereby objects are given ; and, if we make abstraction of the 
latter, the former can have no relation to an object. And 
even if we should suppose a different kind of intuition from 
our own, still our functions of thought would have no use or 
signification in respect thereof. But if we understand by the 
term, objects of a non-sensuous intuition, in respect of which 
our categories are not valid, and of which we can accordingly 
have no knowledge (neither intuition nor conception), in this 
merely negative sense noumena must be admitted. For this 
is no more than saying that our mode of intuition is not ap- 
plicable to all things, but only to objects of our senses, that 
consequently its objective validity is limited, and that room 
is therefore left for another kind of intuition, and thus also 
for things that may be objects of it. But in this sense the 
conception of a noumenon is problematical, that is to say, it is 
the notion of a thing of which we can neither say that it is 
possible, nor that it is impossible, inasmuch as we do not 
know of any mode of intuition besides the sensuous, or of any 
other sort of conceptions than the categories — a mode of in- 
tuition and a kind of conception neither of which is applicable 
to a non-sensuous object. We are on this account incom- 
petent to extend the sphere of our objects of thought beyond 
the conditions of our sensibility, and to assume the existence 
of objects of pure thought, that is, of noumena, inasmuch as 
these have no true positive signification. For it must be con- 
fessed of the categories, that they are not of themselves suffi- 
cient for the cognition of things in themselves, and without 
the data of sensibility are mere subjective forms of the unity 
of the understanding. Thought is certainly not a product of 
the senses, and in so far is not limited by them, but it does 
not therefore follow that it may be employed purely and with- 
out the intervention of sensibility, for it would then be with- 
out reference to an object. And we cannot call a noumenon 
an object of pure thought ; for the representation thereof is 



206 DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS. 

but the problematical conception of an object for a perfectly 
different intuition and a perfectly different understanding from 
ours, both of which are consequently themselves problematical. 
The conception of a noumenon is therefore not the conception 
of an object, but merely a problematical conception insepar- 
ably connected with the limitation of our sensibility. That is 
to say, this conception contains the answer to the question — 
Are there objects quite unconnected with, and independent of, 
our intuition ? — a question to which only an indeterminate 
answer can be given. That answer is : Inasmuch as sensuous 
intuition does not apply to all things without distinction, there 
remains room for other and different objects. The existence of 
these problematical objects is therefore not absolutely denied, 
in the absence of a determinate conception of them, but, as no 
category is valid in respect of them, neither must they be ad- 
mitted as objects for our understanding. 

Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the 
same time enlarging its own field. While, moreover, it for- 
bids sensibility to apply its forms and modes to things in 
themselves and restricts it to the sphere of phsenomena, it 
cogitates an object in itself, only, however, as a transcendental 
object, which is the cause of a phsenomenon (consequently 
not itself a phsenomenon), and which cannot be thought 
either as a quantity or as reality, or as substance (because 
these conceptions always require sensuous forms in which 
to determine an object) — an object, therefore, of which we 
are quite unable to say whether it can be met with in. ourselves 
or out of us, whether it would be annihilated together with 
sensibility, or, if this were taken away, would continue to 
exist. If we wish to call this object a noumenon, because the 
representation of it is non-sensuous, we are at liberty to do so. 
But as we can apply to it none of the conceptions of our under- 
standing, the representation is for us quite void, and is avail- 
able only for the indication of the limits of our sensuous intui- 
iton, thereby leaving at the same time an empty space, which 
we are competent to fill by the aid neither of possible experi- 
ence, nor of the pure understanding. 

The Critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does 
not permit us to create for ourselves a new field of objects be- 
yond those which are presented to us as phsenomena, and to 
stray into intelligible worlds ; nay, it does not even allow us to 



THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION. 207 

endeavour to form so much as a conception of them. The spe- 
cious error which leads to this — and which is a perfectly excusable 
one — lies in the fact that the employment of the understanding, 
contrary to its proper purpose and destination, is made tran- 
scendental, and objects, that is, possible intuitions, are made 
to regulate themselves according to conceptions, instead of 
the conceptions arranging themselves according to the intui- 
tions, on which alone their own objective validity rests. Now the 
reason of this again is, that apperception, and with it, thought, 
antecedes all possible determinate arrrangement of representa- 
tions. Accordingly we think something in general, and de- 
termine it on the one hand sensuously, but, on the other, 
distinguish the general and in abstracto represented object 
from this particular mode of intuiting it. In this case there 
remains a mode of determining the object by mere thought, 
which is really but a logical form without content, which, 
however, seems to us to be a mode of the existence of the ob- 
ject in itself (noumenon), without regard to intuition which is 
limited to our senses. 



Before ending this transcendental analytic, we must make 
an addition, which, although in itself of no particular import- 
ance, seems to be necessary to the completeness of the system. 
The highest conception, with which a transcendental philosophy 
commonly begins, is the division into possible and impossible. 
But as all division pre-supposes a divided conception, a still 
higher one must exist, and this is the conception of an object 
in general — problematically understood, and without its being 
decided, whether it is something or nothing. As the categories 
are the only conceptions, which apply to objects in general, 
the distinguishing of an object, whether it is something or 
nothing, must proceed according to the order and direction of 
the categories. 

1. To the categories of quantity, that is, the conceptions 
of all, many, and one, the conception which annihilates all, 
that is, the conception of none is opposed. And thus the 
object of a conception, to which no intuition can be found to 
correspond, is=nothing. That is, it is a conception without an 
object (ens rationis), like noumena, which cannot be considered 
possible in the sphere of reality, though they must not there- 
fore be held to be impossible, — or like certain new funda- 



208 DOCTBIKE OE ELEMENTS. 

mental forces in matter, the existence of which is cogitable 
without contradiction, though, as examples from experience are 
not forthcoming, they must not be regarded as possible. 

2. Reality is something ; negation is nothing, that is, a 
conception of the absence of an object, as cold, a shadow 
{nihil privativum). 

3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself 
no object, but the merely formal condition of an object (as 
phaenomenon), as pure space and pure time. These are cer- 
tainly something, as forms of intuition, but are not themselves 
objects which are intuited (ens imaginarium) . 

4. The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is 
nothing, because the conception is nothing — is impossible, as 
a figure composed of two straight lines (nihil negativum). 

The table of this division of the conception of nothing (the 
corresponding division of the conception of something does not 
require special description,) must therefore be arranged as 
follows : 

NOTHLNG. 

As 

1. 

Empty conception without object, 

ens rationis. 

2. 3. 

Empty object of a conception, Empty intuition without object, 

nihil privativum. ens imaginarium, 

4. 

Empty object without conception, 

nihil negativum. 

We see that the ens rationis is distinguished from the nihil 
negativum or pure nothing by the consideration, that the for- 
mer must not be reckoned among possibilities, because it is a 
mere fiction — though not self- contradictory, while the latter is 
completely opposed to all possibility, inasmuch as the concep- 
tion annihilates itself. Both, however, are empty conceptions. 
On the other hand, the nihil privativum and ens imaginarium 
are empty data for conceptions. If light be not given to the 
senses, we cannot represent to ourselves darkness, and if 
extended objects are not perceived, we cannot represent space. 
Neither the negation, nor the mere form of intuition can, with- 
out something real, be an object. 



XNTEODUCTIOX. 209 

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 
SECOND DIVISION. 

TRANSCENDE NTA L DIALECTIC. 
INTRODUCTION. 

I. 
Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance. 

We termed Dialectic in general a logic of appearance.* Tide 
does not signify a doctrine of probability ;f for probability 
is truth, only cognised upon insufficient grounds, and though 
the information it gives us is imperfect, it is not therefore 
deceitful. Hence it must not be separated from the analytical 
part of logic. Still less must phenomenon £ and appearance be 
held to be identical. For truth or illusory appearance does 
not reside in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the 
judgment upon the object, in so far as it is thought. It is there- 
fore quite correct to say that the senses do not err, not 
because they always judge correctly, but because they do not 
judge at all. Hence truth and error, consequently also, illu- 
sory appearance as the cause of error, are only to be found in 
a judgment, that is, in the relation of an object to our under- 
standing. In a cognition, which completely harmonises with 
the laws of the understanding, no error can exist. In a 
representation of the senses — as not containing any judgment 
— there is also no error. But no power of nature can of itself 
deviate from its own laws. Hence neither the understanding 
per se (without the influence of another cause), nor the senses 
per se, would fall into error ; the former could not, because, 
if it acts only according to its own laws, the effect (the judg- 
ment) must necessarily accord with these laws. But in accordance 
with the laws of the understanding consists the formal element 
in all truth. In the senses there is no judgment — neither a 
true nor a false one. But, as we have no source of cognition 
besides these two, it follows, that error is caused solely by the 
unobserved influence of the sensibility upon the understanding. 
And thus it happens that the subjective grounds of a judgment 
blend and are confounded with the objective, and cause their. 

* Schein. f WahrscheinlichKeit. J Erscheinung. 



211 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

to deviate from their proper determination,* just as a body in 
motion would always of itself proceed in a straight line, but if 
another impetus gives to it a different direction, it will then 
start off into a curvilinear line of motion. To distinguish the 
peculiar action of the understanding from the power which 
mingles with it, it is necessary to consider an erroneous judg- 
ment as the diagonal between two forces, that determine the 
judgment in two different directions, which, as it were, form 
an angle, and to resolve this composite operation into the 
simple ones of the understanding and the sensibility. In pure 
a priori judgments this must be done by means of transcen- 
dental reflection, whereby, as has been already shown, each 
representation has its place appointed in the corresponding 
faculty of cognition, and consequently the influence of the one 
faculty upon the other is made apparent. 

It is not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory 
appearance (for example, optical illusion), which occurs in 
the empirical application of otherwise correct rules of the 
understanding, and in which the judgment is misled by the 
influence of imagination. Our purpose is to speak of trans- 
cendental illusory appearance, which influences principles 
— that are not even applied to experience, for in this case 
we should possess a sure test of their correctness — but which 
leads us, in disregard of all the warnings of criticism, com- 
pletely beyond the empirical employment of the categories, and 
deludes us with the chimera of an extension of the sphere of 
the pure understanding . We shall term those principles, the 
application of which is confined entirely within the limits of 
possible experience, immanent; those, on the other hand, which 
transgress these limits, we shall call transcendent principles. 
But by these latter I do not -understand principles of the 
transcendental use or misuse of the categories, which is in 
reality a mere fault of the judgment when not under due 
restraint from criticism, and therefore not paying sufficient 
attention to the limits of the sphere in which the pure under- 
standing is allowed to exercise its functions ; but real principles 
which exhort us to break down all those barriers, and to lay 

* Sensibility, subjected to the understanding, as the object upon which 
the understanding employs its functions, is the source of real cognitions. 
But, in so far as it exercises an influence upon the action of the under- 
standing, and determines it to judgment, sensibility is itself the cause of 
error. 



INTEODUCTICXN". 211 

claim to a perfectly new field of cognition, which recognises 
no line of demarcation. Thus transcendental and transcendent 
are not identical terms. The principles of the pure under- 
standing, which we have already propounded, ought to be of 
empirical and not of transcendental use, that is, they are not 
applicable to any object beyond the sphere of experience. A 
principle which removes these limits, nay, which authorizes u»s 
to overstep them, is called transcendent. If our criticism can 
succeed in exposing the illusion in these pretended principles, 
those which are limited in their employment to the sphere of 
experience, may be called, in opposition to the others, immanent 
principles of the pure understanding. 

Logical illusion, which consists merely in the imitation of 
the form of reason (the illusion in sophistical syllogisms), arises 
entirely from a want of due attention to logical rules. So 
soon as the attention is awakened to the case before us, this 
illusion totally disappears. Transcendental illusion, on the 
contrary, does not cease to exist, even after it has been exposed, 
and its nothingness clearly perceived by means of transcendental 
criticism. — Take, for example, the illusion in the proposition, 
"The world must, have a beginning in time." — The cause of 
this is as follows. In our reason, subjectively considered as a 
faculty of human cognition, there exist fundamental rules and 
maxims of its exercise, which have completely the appearance 
of objective principles. Now from this cause it happens, that 
the subjective necessity of a certain connection of our concep- 
tions, is regarded as an objective necessity of the determination 
of things in themselves. This illusion it is impossible to avoid, 
just as we cannot avoid perceiving that the sea appears to be 
higher at a distance than it is near the shore, because we see 
the former by means of higher rays than the latter, or, which 
is a still stronger case, as even the astronomer cannot prevent 
himself from seeing the moon larger at its rising than some 
time afterwards, although he is not deceived by this illusion. 

Transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with 
exposing the illusory appearance in transcendental judgments, 
and guarding us against it ; but to make it, as in the case 
of logical illusion, entirely disappear and cease to be illu- 
sion, is utterly beyond its power. For we have here to do 
with a natural and unavoidable illusion, which rests upon 
subjective principles, and imposes these upon us as objective, 

p 2 



212 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

while logical dialectic, in the detection of sophisms, has to do 
merely with an error in the logical consequence of the pro- 
positions, or with an artificially constructed illusion, in imitation 
of the natural error. There is therefore a natural and unavoid- 
able dialectic of pure reason — not that in which the bungler, 
from want of the requisite knowledge, involves himself, nor 
that which the sophist devises for the purpose of misleading, 
but that which is an inseparable adjunct of human reason, and 
which, even after its illusions have been exposed, does not 
cease to deceive, and continually to lead, reason into momen- 
tary errors, which it becomes necessary continually to remove. 

II. 

Of Pure Reason as the Seat of the Transcendental Illusory 

Appearance. 

A. 

OF REASON IN GENERAL. 

All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to 
understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which nothing 
higher can be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the 
matter of intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of 
thought. At this stage of our inquiry it is my duty to give 
an explanation of this, the highest faculty of cognition, and I 
confess I find myself here in some difficulty. Of reason, as of 
the understanding, there is a merely formal, that is, logical 
use, in which it makes abstraction of all content of cognition ; 
but there is also a real use, inasmuch as it contains in itself 
the source of certain conceptions and principles, which it does 
not borrow either from the senses or the understanding. The 
former faculty has been long .defined by logicians as the 
faculty of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to immedi- 
ate conclusions (consequentice ifnmediatce) ; but the nature of 
the latter, which itself generates conceptions, is not to be 
understood from this definition. Now as a division of reason 
into a logical and a transcendental faculty presents itself here, 
it becomes necessary to seek for a higher conception of this 
source of cognition which shall comprehend both conceptions. 
In this we may expect, according to the analogy of the con- 
ceptions of the understanding, that the logical conception will 
give us the key to the transcendental, and that the table of 
the functions of the former will present us with the clue to the 
conceptions of reason. 



INTRODUCTION. — OF REASON IN GENERAL. 213 

In the former part of our transcendental logic, we defined 
the understanding to be the faculty of rules ; reason may be 
distinguished from understanding as the faculty of principles. 

The term principle is ambiguous, and commonly signifies 
merely a cognition that may be employed as a principle ; 
although it is not in itself, and as regards its proper origin, 
entitled to the distinction. Every general proposition, even 
if derived from experience by the process of induction, may 
serve as the major in a syllogism ; but it is not for that reason 
a principle. Mathematical axioms (for example, there can be 
only one straight line between two points,) are general & priori 
cognitions, and are therefore rightly denominated principles, 
relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. 
But I cannot for this reason say that I cognize this property 
of a straight line from principles — I cognize it only in pure 
intuition. 

Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition in which 
I cognize the particular in the general by means of concep- 
tions. Thus every syllogism is a form of the deduction of a 
cognition from a principle. For the major always gives a 
conception, through which everything that is subsumed under 
the condition thereof, is cognized according to a principle. 
Now as every general cognition may serve as the major in a 
syllogism, and the understanding presents us with such general 
d priori propositions, they may be termed principles, in re- 
upect of their possible use. 

But if we consider these principles of the pure understand- 
ing in relation to their origin, we shall find them to be any 
thing rather than cognitions from conceptions. For they 
would not even be possible a priori, if we could not rely on the 
assistance of pure intuition (in mathematics), or on that of the 
conditions of a possible experience. That every thing that 
happens has a cause, cannot be concluded from the general 
conception of that which happens ; on the contrary the prin- 
ciple of causality instructs us as to the mode of obtaining 
from that which happens a determinate empirical conception. 

Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding 
cannot supply, and they alone are entitled to be called prin- 
ciples. At the same time, all general propositions may be 
termed comparative principles. 

It has been a long-cherished wish — that, (who knows how 



214 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

late,) may one day be happily accomplished — that the princi- 
ples of the endless variety of civil laws should be investigated 
and exposed; for in this way alone can we find the secret of sim- 
plifying legislation. But in this case, laws are nothing more 
than limitations of our freedom upon conditions under which 
it subsists in perfect harmony with itself ; they consequently 
have for their object that which is completely our own work, 
and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means of these 
conceptions. But how objects as things in themselves — how 
the nature of things is subordinated to principles and is to be 
determined according to conceptions, is a question which it 
seems well nigh impossible to answer. Be this however as it 
may — for on this point our investigation is yet to be made — it 
is at least manifest from what we have said, that cognition 
from principles is something very different from cognition by 
means of the understanding, which may indeed precede other 
cognitions in the form of a principle, but in itself — in so far 
as it is synthetical — is neither based upon mere thought, nor 
contains a general proposition drawn from conceptions alone. 

The understanding may be a faculty for the production of 
unity of phsenomena by virtue of rules ; the reason is a faculty 
for the production of unity of rules (of the understanding) 
under principles. Reason, therefore, never applies directly to 
experience, or to any sensuous object ; its object is, on the 
contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of 
which it gives a unity a priori by means of conceptions — a 
unity which may be called rational unity, and which is of a 
nature very different from that of the unity produced by the 
understanding. 

The above is the general conception of the faculty of reason, 
in so far as it has been possible to make it comprehensible in 
the absence of examples. These will be given in the sequel, 

B. 

OF THE LOGICAL USE OF REASON. 

A distinction is commonly made between that which is 
immediately cognized and that which is inferred or concluded. 
That in a figure which is bounded by three straight lines, there 
*»jre three angles, is an immediate cognition ; but that these 
angles are together equal to two right angles, is an inference 



INTRODUCTION. — OF THE LOGICAL USE OF REASON. 215 

or conclusion. Now, as we are constantly employing this mode 
of thought, and have thus become quite accustomed to it, 
we no longer remark the above distinction, and, as in the case 
of the so-called deceptions of sense, consider as immediately 
perceived, what has really been inferred. In every reasoning 
or syllogism, there is a fundamental proposition, afterwards a 
second drawn from it, and finally the conclusion, which con- 
nects the truth in the first with the truth in the second — a*#* 
that infallibly. If the judgment concluded is so contained ift 
the first proposition, that it can be deduced from it without 
the mediation of a third notion, the conclusion is called imme- 
diate (consequentia immediate/,) :* I prefer the term conclusion 
of the understanding. But if, in addition to the fundamental 
cognition, a second judgment is necessary for the production 
of the conclusion, it is called a conclusion of the reason. In 
the proposition, All men are mortal, are contained the propo- 
sitions, Some men are mortal, Nothing that is not mortal is a 
man, and these are therefore immediate conclusions from the 
first. On the other hand, the proposition, All the learned are 
mortal, is not contained in the main proposition (for the con- 
ception of a learned man does not occur in it), and it can be 
deduced from the main proposition only by means of a me- 
diating judgment. 

In every syllogism I first cogitate a rule (the major) by 
means of the understanding. In the next place I subsume a 
cognition under the condition of the rule (and this is the minor') 
by means of the judgment. And finally I determine my cog- 
nition by means of the predicate of the rule (this is the 
conclusio), consequently, I determine it a priori by means of 
the reason. The relations, therefore, which the major propo- 
sition, as the rule, represents between a cognition and its 
condition, constitute the different kinds of syllogisms. These 
are just threefold — analogously with all judgments, in so far 
as they differ in the mode of expressing the relation of a cog- 
nition in the understanding — namely, categorical, hypothetical 
and disjunctive. 

* A consequentia immediata — if there really be such a thing, and if it 
be not a contradiction in terms — evidently does not belong to the sphere 
of logic proper, the object-matter of which is the syllogism, which always 
consists of three propositions, either in thought or expressed. This indeed 
is tantamount to declaring that there is no such mode of reasoning. — Tr. 



216 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

"When, as often happens, the conclusion is a judgment which 
may follow from other given judgments, through which a per- 
fectly different object is cogitated, I endeavour to discover in 
the understanding whether the assertion in this conclusion 
does not stand under certain conditions according to a general 
rule. If I find such a condition, and if the object mentioned 
in the conclusion can be subsumed under the given condition, 
then this conclusion follows from a rule which is also valid for 
other objects of cognition. From this we see that reason 
endeavours to subject the great variety of the cognitions of the 
understanding to the smallest possible number of principles 
(general conditions), and thus to produce in it the highest unity. 

C. 

OP THE PURE USE OF REASON. 

Can we isolate reason, and, if so, is it in this case a peculiar 
source of conceptions and judgments which spring from it 
alone, and through which it can be applied to objects; or is it 
merely a subordinate faculty, whose duty it is to give a certain 
form to given cognitions — a form which is called logical, and 
through which the cognitions of the understanding are subor- 
dinated to each other, and lower rules to higher (those, to wit, 
whose condition comprises in its sphere the condition of the 
others), in so far as this can be done by comparison 1 This is 
the question which we have at present to answer. Manifold 
variety of rules and unity of principles is a requirement of rea- 
son, for the purpose of bringing the understanding into 
complete accordance with itself, just as understanding subjects 
the manifold content of intuition to conceptions, and thereby 
introduces connection into it. But this principle prescribes no 
law to objects, and does not contain any ground of the possi- 
bility of cognizing, or of determining them as such, but is 
merely a subjective law for the proper arrangement of the 
content of the understanding. The purpose of this law is, by a 
comparison of the conceptions of the understanding, to reduce 
them to the smallest possible number, although, at the same 
time, it does not justify us in demanding from objects them- 
selves such an uniformity as might contribute to the convenience 
and the enlargement of the sphere of the understanding, or in 
expecting that it will itself thus receive from them objective 
validity. In one word, the question is, does reason in itself, 



INTRODUCTION. — 0"F THE PURE USE OF REASON. 217 

that is, does pure reason contain a priori synthetical principles 
and rules, and what are those principles ? 

The formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms 
gives us sufficient information in regard to the ground on 
which the transcendental principle of reason in its pure syn- 
thetical cognition will rest. 

1. Reason, as observed in the syllogistic process, is not appli- 
cable to intuitions, for the purpose of subjecting them to rules— 
for this is the province of the understanding with its categories — 
but to conceptions and judgments. If pure reason does apply 
to objects and the intuition of them, it does so not immediately, 
but mediately — through the understanding and its judgments, 
which have a direct relation to the senses and their intuition, for 
the purpose of determining their objects. The unity of reason 
is therefore not the unity of a possible experience, but is essenti- 
ally different from this unity, which is that of the understanding. 
That everything which happens has a cause, is not a principle 
cognized and prescribed by reason. This principle makes the 
unity of experience possible and borrows nothing from reason, 
which, without a reference to possible experience, could never 
have produced by means of mere conceptions any such synthe- 
tical unity. 

2. Reason, in its logical use, endeavours to discover the 
general condition of its judgment (the conclusion), and a 
syllogism is itself nothing but a judgment by means of the 
subsumption of its condition under a general rule (the major). 
Now as this rule may itself be subjected to the same process of 
reason, and thus the condition of the condition be sought (by 
means of a prosyllogism) as long as the process can be con- 
tinued, it is very manifest that the peculiar principle of reason 
in its logical use is — to find for the conditioned cognition of 
the understanding the unconditioned whereby the unity of 
the former is completed. 

But this logical maxim cannot be a principle of pure reason, 
unless we admit that, if the conditioned is given, the whole 
series of conditions subordinated to one another — a series 
which is consequently itself unconditioned — is also given, that 
is, contained in the object and its connection. 

But this principle of pure reason is evidently synthetical ; 
for analytically, the conditioned certainly relates to some con- 
dition, but not to the unconditioned. From this principle 



2*S teanscekdental dialectic. 

also there must originate different synthetical propositions, of 
which the pure understanding is perfectly ignorant, for it has 
to do only with objects of a possible experience, the cognition 
and synthesis of which is always conditioned. The uncondi- 
tioned, if it does really exist, must be especially considered in 
regard to the determinations which distinguish it from what- 
ever is conditioned, and will thus afford us material for many 
d priori synthetical propositions. 

The principles resulting from this highest principle of pure 
reason will, however, be transcendent in relation to phaenomena, 
that is to say, it will be impossible to make any adequate empi- 
rical use of this principle. It is therefore completely different 
from all principles of the understanding, the use made of 
which is entirely immanent, their object and purpose being 
merely the possibility of experience. Now our duty in the 
transcendental dialectic is as follows. To discover whether 
the principle, that the series of conditions (in the synthesis of 
phaenomena, or of thought in general) extends to the uncon- 
ditioned, is objectively true, or not ; what consequences re- 
sult therefrom affecting the empirical use of the understand- 
ing, or rather whether there exists any such objectively valid 
proposition of reason, and whether it is not, on the contrary, a 
merely logical precept which directs us to ascend perpetually 
to still higher conditions, to approach completeness in the 
series of them, and thus to introduce into our cognition the 
highest possible unity of reason. We must ascertain, I say, 
whether this requirement of reason has not been regarded, 
by a misunderstanding, as a transcendental principle of pure 
reason, which postulates a thorough completeness in the series 
of conditions in objects themselves. We must show, more- 
over, the misconceptions and illusions that intrude into syllo- 
gisms, the major proposition of which pure reason has sup- 
plied — a proposition which has perhaps more of the character 
of a petitio than ofa.postulatu?n — and that proceed from experi- 
ence upwards to its conditions. The solution of these pro- 
blems is our task in transcendental dialectic, which we are 
about to expose even at its source, that lies deep in human 
reason. We shall divide it into two parts, the first of which 
will treat of the transcendent conceptions of pure reason, the 
second of transcendent and dialectical syllogisms* 



219 



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC, 
BOOK I. 

Or THE CONCEPTIONS OE PTJEE SEASON. 

The conceptions of pure reason — we do not here speak of 
the possibility of them — are not obtained by reflection, but by 
inference or conclusion. The conceptions of understanding are 
also cogitated a priori antecedently to experience, and render it 
possible ; but they contain nothing but the unity of reflection 
upon phsenomena, in so far as these must necessarily belong 
to a possible empirical consciousness. Through them alone are 
cognition and the determination of an object possible. It is 
from them, accordingly, that we receive material for reasoning, 
and antecedently to them we possess no a priori conceptions of 
objects from which they might be deduced. On the other 
hand, the sole basis of their objective reality consists in the 
necessity imposed on them, as containing the intellectual form 
of all experience, of restricting their application and influence 
to the sphere of experience. 

But the term, conception of reason or rational conception, 
itself indicates that it does not confine itself within the limits 
of experience, because its object-matter is a cognition, of 
which every empirical cognition is but a part — nay, the whole 
of possible experience may be itself but a part of it, — a cogni- 
tion to which no actual experience ever fully attains, although 
it does always pertain to it. The aim of rational conceptions 
is the comprehension, as that of the conceptions of understand- 
ing is the understanding of perceptions. If they contain the 
unconditioned, they relate to that to which all experience is sub- 
ordinate, but which is never itself an object of experience, — 
that towards which reason tends in all its conclusions from ex- 
perience, and by the standard of which it estimates the degree 
of their empirical use, but which is never itself an element in 
an empirical synthesis. If, notwithstanding, such conceptions 
possess objective validity, they may be called conceptus ratio- 
cinati (conceptions legitimately concluded) ; in cases where 
they do not, they have been admitted on account of hav- 
ing the appearance of being correctly concluded, and may 
be called conceptus ratiocinantes (sophistical conceptions). 
But as this can only be sufficiently demonstrated in that part 



220 THANSCEKDEFTAL DIALECTIC. 

of our treatise which relates to the dialectical conclusions of 
reason, we shall omit any consideration of it in this place. 
As we called the pure conceptions of the understanding cate- 
gories, we shall also distinguish those of pure reason by a 
new name, and call them transcendental ideas. These terms, 
however, we must in the first place explain and justify. 

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

BOOK I. 

Sect. I. — Of Ideas in General. 

Spite of the great wealth of words which European Ian 
guages possess, the thinker finds himself often at a loss for an 
expression exactly suited to his conception, for want of which 
he is unable to make himself intelligible either to others or to 
nimself. To coin new words is a pretension to legislation in 
language which is seldom successful ; and, before recourse is 
taken to so desperate an expedient, it is advisable to examine 
the dead and learned languages, with the hope and the pro- 
bability that we may there meet with some adequate expression 
of the notion we have in our minds. In this case, even if the 
original meaning of the word has become somewhat uncertain, 
from carelessness or want of caution on the part of the authors 
of it, it is always better to adhere to and confirm its proper 
meaning — even although it may be doubtful whether it was 
formerly used in exactly this sense — than to make our labour 
vain by want of sufficient care to render ourselves intelligible. 

For this reason, when it happens that there exists only a 
single word to express a certain conception, and this word, in 
its usual acceptation, is thoroughly adequate to the conception, 
the accurate distinction of which from related conceptions is 
of great importance, we ought not to employ the expression 
improvidently, or, for the sake of variety and elegance of style, 
use it as a synonyme for other cognate words. It is our duty, 
on the contrary, carefully to preserve its peculiar signification, 
as otherwise it easily happens that when the attention of 
the reader is no longer particularly attracted to the expression, 
and it is lost amid the multitude of other words of very differ- 
ent import, the thought which it conveyed, and which it alone 
conveyed, is lost with it. 

Plato employed the expression Idea in a way that plainly 



OF IDEAS IN GEKEBAL. 221 

showed he meant by it something which is never derived from 
the senses, but which far transcends even the conceptions of 
the understanding, (with which Aristotle occupied himself,) in- 
asmuch as in experience nothing perfectly corresponding to 
them could be found. Ideas are, according to him, archetypes 
of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible experi- 
ences, like the categories. In his view they flow from the 
highest reason, by which they have been imparted to human 
reason, which, however, exists no longer in its original state, 
but is obliged with great labour to recal by reminiscence — 
which is called philosophy — the old but now sadly obscured 
ideas. I will not here enter upon any literary investigation 
of the sense which this sublime philosopher attached to this 
expression. I shall content myself with remarking that it is 
nothing unusual, in common conversation as well as in written 
works, by comparing the thoughts which an author has de- 
livered upon a subject, to understand him better than he un- 
derstood himself, — inasmuch as he may not have sufficiently 
determined his conception, and thus have sometimes spoken, 
nay even thought, in opposition to his own opinions. 

Plato perceived very clearly that our faculty of cognition 
has the feeling of a much higher vocation than that of merely 
spelling out phsenomena according to synthetical unity, for 
the purpose of being able to read them as experience, and that 
our reason naturally raises itself to cognitions far too elevated 
to admit of the possibility of an object given by experience 
corresponding to them — cognitions which are nevertheless real, 
and are not mere phantoms of the brain. 

This philosopher found his ideas especially in all that is 
practical,* that is, which rests upon freedom, which in its 
turn ranks under cognitions that are the peculiar product of 
reason. He who would derive from experience the con- 

* He certainly extended the application of his conception to speculative 
cognitions also, provided they were given pure and completely a priori, 
nay, even to mathematics, although this science cannot possess an object 
otherwhere than in possible experience. I cannot follow him in this, and 
as little can I follow him in his mystical deduction of these ideas, or in 
his hypostatization of them : although, in truth, the elevated and exag- 
gerated language which he employed in describing them is quite capable 
of an interpretation more subdued and more in accordance with fact and 
the nature of things. 



222 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

ceptioiis of virtue, who would make (as many have really 
done) that, which at best can but serve as an imperfectly 
illustrative example, a model for the formation of a perfectly 
adequate idea on the subject, would in fact transform virtue 
into a nonentity changeable according to time and circum- 
stance, and utterly incapable of being employed as a rule. On 
the contrary, every one is conscious that, when any one is 
held up to him as a model of virtue, he compares this so-called 
model with the true original which he possesses in his own 
mind, and values him according to this standard. But this 
standard is the idea of virtue, in relation to which all possible 
objects of experience are indeed serviceable as examples — 
proofs of the practicability in a certain degree of that which 
the conception of virtue demands — but certainly not as arche- 
types. That the actions of man will never be in perfect ac- 
cordance with all the requirements of the pure ideas of reason, 
does not prove the thought to be chimerical. For only through 
this idea are all judgments as to moral merit or demerit pos- 
sible ; it consequently lies at the foundation of every approach 
to moral perfection, however far removed from it the obstacles 
in human nature — indeterminable as to degree — may keep us. 
The Platonic Republic has become proverbial as an ex- 
ample — and a striking one — of imaginary perfection, such as 
can exist only in the brain of the idle thinker ; and Brucker 
ridicules the philosopher for maintaining that a prince can 
never govern well, unless he is participant in the ideas. But 
we should do better to follow up this thought, and, where 
this admirable thinker leaves us without assistance, employ new 
efforts to place it in clearer light, rather than carelessly fling 
it aside as useless, under the very miserable and pernicious 
pretext of impracticability. A constitution of the greatest 
possible human freedom according to laws, by which the liberty 
of every individual can consist with the liberty of every other, 
(not of the greatest possible happiness, for this follows neces- 
sarily from the former ;) is, to say the least, a necessary idea, 
which must be placed at the foundation not only of the first 
plan of the constitution of a state, but of all its laws. And in 
this, it is not necessary at the outset to take account of the 
obstacles which lie in our way — obstacles which perhaps do 
not necessarily arise from the character of human nature, but 
rather from the previous neglect of true ideas in legislation. 



OP IDEAS IN GENERAL. 223 

For there is nothing more pernicious and more unworthy of 
a philosopher, than the vulgar appeal to a so-called adverse 
experience, which indeed would not have existed, if those 
institutions had been established at the proper time and in 
accordance with ideas ; while instead of this, conceptions, 
crude for the very reason that they have been drawn from ex- 
perience, have marred and frustrated all our better views and in- 
tentions. The more legislation and government are in harmony 
with this idea, the more rare do punishments become, and 
thus it is quite reasonable to maintain, as Plato did, that in a 
perfect state no punishments at all would be necessary. Now 
although a perfect state may never exist, the idea is not on 
that account the less just, which holds up this Maximum as 
the archetype or standard of a constitution, in order to bring 
legislative government always nearer and nearer to the greatest 
possible perfection. For at what precise degree human nature 
must stop in its progress, and how wide must be the chasm 
which must necessarily exist between the idea and its realiza- 
tion, are problems which no one can or ought to determine, 
— and for this reason, that it is the destination of freedom to 
overstep all assigned limits between itself and the idea. 

But not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal 
agent and where ideas are operative causes (of actions and 
their objects), that is to say, in the region of ethics, but also 
in regard to nature herself, Plato saw clear proofs o£ an 
origin from ideas. A plant, an animal, the regular order of 
nature — probably also the disposition of the whole universe — 
give manifest evidence that they are possible only by means 
of and according to ideas ; that, indeed, no one creature, under 
the individual conditions of its existence, perfectly harmonizes 
with the idea of the most perfect of its kind — just as little as 
man with the idea of humanity, which nevertheless he bears 
in his soul as the archetypal standard of his actions ; that, 
notwithstanding, these ideas are in the highest sense individu- 
ally, unchangeably and completely determined, and are the 
original causes of things ; and that the totality of connected 
objects in the universe is alone fully adequate to that idea. 
Setting aside the exaggerations of expression in the writings of 
this philosopher, the mental power exhibited in this ascent 
from the ectypal mode of regarding the physical world to the 
architectonic connection thereof according to ends, that is, 



224 TKANSCEKDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

ideas, is an effort which deserves imitation and claims respect. 
Bat as regards the principles of ethics, of legislation and of 
religion, spheres in which ideas alone render experience pos- 
sible, although they never attain to full expression therein, 
he has vindicated for himself a position of peculiar merit, 
which is not appreciated only because it is judged by the very 
empirical rules, the validity of which as principles is destroyed 
by ideas. For as regards nature, experience presents us with 
rules and is the source of truth, but in relation to ethical laws 
experience is the parent of illusion, and it is in the highest 
degree reprehensible to limit or to deduce the laws which 
dictate what I ought to do, from what is done. 

We must, however, omit the consideration of these important 
subjects, the development of which is in reality the r ecu liar 
duty and dignity of philosophy, and confine ourselves for the 
present to the more humble but not less useful task of pre- 
paring a firm foundation for those majestic edifices of moral 
science. For this foundation has been hitherto insecure from 
the many subterranean passages which reason in its con- 
fident but vain search for treasures has made in all directions. 
Our present duty is to make ourselves perfectly acquainted 
with the transcendental use made of pure reason, its principles 
and ideas, that we may be able properly to determine and 
value its influence and real worth. But before bringing these 
introductory remarks to a close, I beg those who really have 
philosophy at heart — and their number is but small, — if they 
shall find themselves convinced by the considerations follow- 
ing as well as by those above, to exert themselves to preserve 
to the expression idea its original signification, and to take 
care that it be not lost among those other expressions by 
which all sorts of representations are loosely designated, — 
that the interests of science may not thereby suffer. We are 
in no want of words to denominate adequately every mode of 
representation, without the necessity of encroaching upon 
terms which are proper to others. The following is a gradu- 
ated list of them. The genus is representation in general 
Represent atio). Under it stands representation with consci- 
ousness (perceptio). A perception which relates solely to the 
subject as a modification of its state, is a sensation (sensatio), 
an objective perception is a cognition {cognitio). A cognition 
ia either an intuition or a conception (intuitus vel conceptus) 



OF IDEAS IN GENERAL. 225 

The former has an immediate relation to the object and is 
singular and individual ; the latter has but a mediate relation, 
by means of a characteristic mark which may be common to 
several things. A conception is either empirical ox: pure. A 
pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the understand- 
ing alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous 
image,* is called notio. A conception formed from notions, 
which transcends the possibility of experience, is an idea, or a 
conception of reason. To one who has accustomed himself 
to these distinctions, it must be quite intolerable to hear the 
representation of the colour red called an idea. It ought not 
even to be called a notion or conception of understanding. 

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

BOOK I. 

Sect. II. — Of Transcendental Ideas. 

Transcendental analytic showed us how the mere logical 
form of our cognition can contain the origin of pure con- 
ceptions a priori, conceptions which represent objects ante- 
cedently to all experience, or rather, indicate the synthetical 
unity which alone renders possible an empirical cognition of 
objects. The form of judgments — converted into a conception 
of the synthesis of intuitions — produced the categories, which 
direct the employment of the understanding in experience. 
This consideration warrants us to expect that the form of 
syllogisms, when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions, 
following the rule of the categories, will contain the origin of 
particular a priori conceptions, which we may call pure con- 
ceptions of reason or transcendental ideas, and which will 
determine the use of the understanding in the totality of ex- 
perience according to principles. 

The function of reason in arguments consists in the uni- 
versality of a cognition according to conceptions, and the 
syllogism itself is a judgment which is determined a priori in 
the whole extent of its condition. The proposition, "Caius is 
mortal," is one which may be obtained from experience bv 
the aid of the understanding alone ; but my wish is to find a 
conception, which contains the condition under which the 

* All mathematical figures., for example. — Tr. 



226 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

predicate of this judgment is given — in this case, the con- 
ception of man — and after subsuming under this condition, 
taken in its whole extent (all men are mortal), I determine 
according to it the cognition of the object thought, and say, 
" Caius is mortal." 

Hence, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a pre- 
dicate to a certain object, after having thought it in the major 
in its whole extent under a certain condition. This complete 
quantity of the extent in relation to such a condition is called 
universality (universalitas) . To this corresponds totality 
(universitas) of conditions in the synthesis of intuitions. The 
transcendental conception of reason is therefore nothing else 
than the conception of the totality of the conditions of a given 
conditioned. Now as the unconditioned alone renders possible 
totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of con- 
ditions is itself always unconditioned ; a pure rational conception 
in general can be defined and explained by means of the 
conception of the unconditioned, in so far as it contains a 
basis for the synthesis of the conditioned. 

To the number of modes of relation which the understanding 
cogitates by means of the categories, the number of pure 
rational conceptions will correspond. We must therefore seek 
for, first, an unconditioned of the categorical synthesis in a 
subject; secondly, of the hypothetical synthesis of the mem- 
bers of a series ; thirdly, of the disjunctive synthesis of parts 
in a system. 

There are exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms, 
each of which proceeds through prosyllogisms to the uncon- 
ditioned — one to the subject which cannot be employed as a 
predicate, another to the presupposition which supposes nothing 
higher than itself, and the third to an aggregate of the mem- 
bers of the complete division of a conception. Hence the 
pure rational conceptions of totality in the synthesis of con- 
ditions have a necessary foundation in the nature of human 
reason — at least as modes of elevating the unity of the under- 
standing to the unconditioned. They may have no valid 
application, corresponding to their transcendental employment, 
in concreto, and be thus of no greater utility than to direct* 
the understanding how, while extending them as widely as 
possible, to maintain its exercise and application in perfect 
consistence and harmony. 



OF TBAtfSCEKDENTAL IDEAS. 227 

But, while speaking here of the totality of conditions and 
of the unconditioned as the common title of all conceptions 
of reason, we again light upon an expression, which we find it 
impossible to dispense with, and which nevertheless, owing to 
the ambiguity attaching to it from long abuse, we cannot 
employ with safety. The word absolute is one of the few 
words which, in its original signification, was perfectly adequate 
to the conception it was intended to convey — a conception 
which no other word in the same language exactly suits, and 
the loss — or, which is the same thing, the incautious and loose 
employment — of which must be followed by the loss of the 
conception itself. And, as it is a conception which occupies 
much of the attention of reason, its loss would be greatly to 
the detriment of all transcendental philosophy. The word 
absolute is at present frequently used to denote that something 
can be predicated of a thing considered in itself and intrinsi- 
cally. In this sense absolutely possible would signify that 
which is possible in itself {interne) — which is, in fact, the least 
that one can predicate of an object. On the other hand, it 
is sometimes employed to indicate that a thing is valid in 
all respects — for example, absolute sovereignty. Absolutely 
possible would in this sense signify that which is possible in 
all relations and in every respect ; and this is the most that 
can be predicated of the possibility of a thing. Now these 
significations do in truth frequently coincide. Thus, for 
example, that which is intrinsically impossible, is also impossible 
in all relations, that is, absolutely impossible. But in most 
cases they differ from each other toto ccelo, and I can by no 
means conclude that, because a thing is in itself possible, it is 
also possible in all relations, and therefore absolutely. Nay, 
more, I shall in the sequel show, that absolute necessity does 
not by any means depend on internal necessity, and that 
therefore it must not be considered as synonymous with it. 
Of an opposite which is intrinsically impossible, we may 
affirm that it is in all respects impossible, and that con- 
sequently the thing itself, of which this is the opposite, is 
absolutely necessary ; but I cannot reason conversely and say, 
the opposite of that which is absolutely necessary is intrinsi- 
cally impossible, that is, that the absolute necessity of things 
is an internal necessity. For this internal necessity is in 
certain cases a mere empty word with which the least con- 

Q 2 



228 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

ception cannot be connected, while the conception of the 
necessity of a thing in all relations possesses very peculiar 
determinations. Now as the loss of a conception of great 
utility in speculative science cannot be a matter of indifference 
to the philosopher, I trust that the proper determination and 
careful preservation of the expression on which the conception 
depends will likewise be not indifferent to him. 

In this enlarged signification then shall I employ the word 
absolute, in opposition to that which is valid only in some par- 
ticular respect ; for the latter is restricted by conditions, the 
former is valid without any restriction whatever. 

Now the transcendental conception of reason has for its 
object nothing else than absolute totality in the synthesis of 
conditions, and does not rest satisfied till it has attained to 
the absolutely, that is, in all respects and relations, uncon- 
ditioned. For pure reason leaves to the understanding every 
thing that immediately relates to the object of intuition or 
rather to their synthesis in imagination. The former restricts 
itself to the absolute totality in the employment of the con- 
ceptions of the understanding, and aims at carrying out the 
synthetical unity which is cogitated in the category, even to 
the unconditioned. This unity may hence be called the 
rational unity* of phaenomena, as the other, which the category 
expresses, may be termed the unity of the understanding * 
Reason, therefore, has an immediate relation to the use of the 
understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter contains the 
ground of possible experience (for the conception of the ab- 
solute totality of conditions is not a conception that can 
be employed in experience, because no experience is uncon- 
ditioned), but solely for the purpose of directing it to a certain 
unity, of which the understanding; has no conception, and the 
aim of which is to collect into an absolute whole all acts of 
the understanding. Hence the objective employment of the 
pure conceptions of reason is always transcendent, while that 
of the pure conceptions of the understanding must, according 
to their nature, be always immanent, inasmuch as they are 
limited to possible experience. 

I understand by idea a necessary conception of reason, to 

which no corresponding object can be discovered in the world 

of sense. Accordingly, the pure conceptions of reason at 

present under consideration are transcendental ideas. They 

* Vernunfteinhcit, Verstandeseinbeit. 



OF TEAKSCENDE^TAL IDEAS. 229 

are conceptions of pure reason, for they regard all empirical 
cognition as determined by means of an absolute totality of 
conditions. They are not mere fictions, but natural and 
necessary products of reason, and have hence a necessary 
relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understand- 
ing. And finally, they are transcendent, and overstep the 
limits of all experience, in which, consequently, no object can 
ever be presented that would be perfectly adequate to a tran- 
scendental idea. When we use the word idea, we say, as 
regards its object (an object of the pure understanding), a 
great deal, but as regards its subject (that is, in respect 'of its 
reality under conditions of experience), exceedingly little, be- 
cause the idea, as the conception of a maximum, can never 
be completely and adequately presented in concreto. Now, 
as in the merely speculative employment of reason the latter 
is properly the sole aim, and as in this case the approxi- 
mation to a conception, which is never attained in practice, 
is the same thing as if the conception were non-existent, — 
it is commonly said of a conception of this kind, it is only 
an idea. So we might very well say, the absolute totality 
of all phsenomena is only an idea, for as we never can pre- 
sent an adequate representation of it, it remains for us a 
problem incapable of solution. On the other hand, as in the 
practical use of the understanding we have only to do with 
action and practice according to rules, an idea of pure reason 
can always be given really in concreto, although only partially, 
nay, it is the indispensable condition of all practical employ- 
ment of reason. The practice or execution of the idea is 
always limited and defective, but nevertheless within indeter- 
minable boundaries, consequently always under the influence 
of the conception of an absolute perfection. And thus the 
practical idea is always in the highest degree fruitful, and in 
relation to real actions indispensably necessary. In the idea, 
pure reason possesses even causality and the power of producing 
that which its conception contains. Hence we cannot say of 
wisdom, in a disparaging way, it is only an idea. For, for the 
very reason, that it is the idea of the necessary unity of all 
possible aims, it must be for all practical exertions and en- 
deavours the primitive condition and rule — a rule which, if 
not constitutive, is at least limitative. 

Now, although we must say of the transcendental concep- 



230 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

tions of reason, they are only ideas, we must not, ( n this 
account, look upon them as superfluous and nugatory. For, 
although no object can be determined by them, they can be of 
great utility, unobserved and at the basis of the edifice of the 
understanding, as the canon for its extended and self-consistent 
exercise — a canon which, indeed, does not enable it to cognize 
more in an object than it would cognize by the help of its 
own conceptions, but which guides it more securely in it§ 
cognition. Not to mention that they perhaps render possible 
a transition from our conceptions of nature and the non-ego 
to the practical conceptions, and thus produce for even ethical 
ideas keeping, so to speak, and connection with the speculative 
cognitions of reason. The explication of all this must be 
looked for in the sequel. 

But setting aside, in conformity with our original purpose, 
the consideration of the practical ideas, we proceed to con- 
template reason in its speculative use alone, nay, in a still 
more restricted sphere, to wit, in the transcendental use ; and 
here must strike into the same path which we followed in our 
deduction of the categories. That is to say, we shall consider 
the logical form of the cognition of reason, that we may see 
whether reason may not be thereby a source of conceptions 
which enable us to regard objects in themselves as determined 
synthetically a priori, in relation to one or other of the func- 
tions of reason 

Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form 
of cognition, is the faculty of conclusion, that is, of mediate 
judgment — by means of the subsumption of the condition of 
a possible judgment under the condition of a given judgment. 
The given judgment is the general rule (major). The sub- 
sumption of the condition of another possible judgment under 
the condition of the rule is the minor. The actual judgment, 
which enounces the assertion of the rule in the subsumed 
case, is the conclusion (conclusio). The rule predicates 
something generally under a certain condition. The con- 
dition of the rule is satisfied in some particular case. It 
follows, that what was valid in general under that condi- 
tion must also be considered as valid in the particular 
case which satisfies this condition. It is very plain that 
reason attains to a cognition, by means of acts of the un- 
derstanding which constitute a series of conditions. When 
I arrive at the proposition, "All bodies are changeable," by 



OF TEANSCEXDENTAL IDEAS. 231 

beginning with the more remote cognition, (in which the 
conception of body does not appear, but which nevertheless 
contains the condition of that conception), " All [that is] com- 
pound is changeable," by proceeding from this to a less 
remote cognition, which stands under the condition of the 
former, " Bodies are compound," and hence to a third, which 
at length connects for me the remote cognition (changeable) 
with the one before me, " Consequently, bodies are change- 
able," — I have arrived at a cognition (conclusion) through a 
series of conditions (premisses). Now every series, whose 
exponent (of the categorical or hypothetical judgment) is 
given, can be continued ; consequently the same procedure of 
reason conducts us to the ratiocinatio polysyllogistica, which 
is a series of syllogisms, that can be continued either on the 
side of the conditions {per prosyllogismos) or of the conditioned 
(per episyllogismos) to an indefinite extent. 

But we very soon perceive that the chain or series of pro- 
syllogisms, that is, of deduced cognitions on the side of the 
grounds or conditions of a given cognition, in other words, the 
ascending series of syllogisms must have a very different 
relation to the faculty of reason from that of the descending 
series, that is, the progressive procedure of reason on the side 
of the conditioned by means of episyllogisms. For, as in the 
former case the cognition (conclusio) is given only as con- 
ditioned, reason can attain to this cognition only under the 
pre-supposition that all the members of the series on the side 
of the conditions are given (totality in the series of premisses), 
because only under this supposition is the judgment we may 
be considering possible a priori ; while on the side of the 
conditioned or the inferences, only an incomplete and becoming, 
and not a pre-supposed or given series, consequently only a 
potential progression, is cogitated. Hence, when a cognition 
is contemplated as conditioned, reason is compelled to con- 
sider the series of conditions in an ascending line as completed 
and given in their totality. But if the very same cognition i& 
considered at the same time as the condition of other cognitions, 
which together constitute a series of inferences or consequences 
in a descending line, reason may preserve a perfect indifference, 
as to how far this progression may extend a parte posteriori, 
and whether the totality of this series is possible, because it 
stands in no need of such a series for the purpose of arriving 
at the conclusion before it, inasmuch as this conclusion is 



232 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

sufficiently guaranteed and determined on grounds a parte, 
priori. It may be the case, that upon the side of the con- 
ditions the series of premisses has & first or highest condition, 
or it may not possess this, and so be a parte priori unlimited ; 
but it must nevertheless contain totality of conditions, even 
admitting that we never could succeed in completely appre- 
hending it ; and the whole series must be unconditionally true, 
if the conditioned, which is considered as an inference resulting 
from it, is to be held as true. This is a requirement of reason, 
which announces its cognition as determined a priori and as 
necessary, either in itself — and in this case it needs no grounds 
to rest upon — or, if it is deduced, as a member of a series 
of grounds, which is itself unconditionally true. 

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

BOOK I. 

Sect. III. — System of Transcendental Ideas. 

We are not at present engaged with a logical dialectic which 
makes complete abstraction of the content of cognition, and 
aims only at unveiling the illusory appearance in the form of 
syllogisms. Our subject is transcendental dialectic, which must 
contain, completely a, priori, the origin of certain cognitions 
drawn from pure reason, and the origin of certain deduced con- 
ceptions, the object of which cannot be given empirically, and 
which therefore lie beyond the sphere of the faculty of under- 
standing. We have observed, from the natural relation which 
the transcendental use of our cognition, in syllogisms as well 
as in judgments, must have to the logical, that there are three 
kinds of dialectical arguments, corresponding to the three 
modes of conclusion, by which reason attains to cognitions 
on principles ; and that in all it is the business of reason, to 
ascend from the conditioned synthesis, beyond which the 
understanding never proceeds, to the unconditioned which the 
understanding never can reach. 

Now the most general relations which can exist in our 
representations are, 1st, the relation to the subject ; 2nd, the 
relation to objects, either as phoenomena, or as objects of 
thought in general. If we connect this subdivision with the 
main division, all the relations of our representations, of which 
we can form either a conception or an idea, are threefold : 



SYSTEM OF TKASTSCENDENTAL IDEAS. 2-33 

1. The relation to the subject; 2. The relation to the mani- 
fold of the object as a phsenomenon ; 3. The relation to ail 
things in general. 

Now all pure conceptions have to do in general with the 
synthetical unity of representations ; conceptions of pure reason, 
(transcendental ideas) on the other hand, with the uncondi- 
tional synthetical unity of all conditions. It follows that all 
transcendental ideas arrange themselves in three classes, the 
first of which contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of 
the thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of the series 
of the conditions of a phaenomenon, the third the absolute 
unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general. 

The thinking subject is the object-matter of Psychology; the 
sum total of all phaenomena (the world) is the object-matter of 
Cosmology ; and the thing which contains the highest condition 
of the possibility of all that is cogitable (the being of all beings) 
is the object-matter of all Theology. Thus pure reason presents 
us with the idea of a transcendental doctrine of the soul ( psy- 
chologia rationalis), of a transcendental science of the world 
(cosmologia rationalis), and finally of a transcendental doctrine 
of God (theologia transcendentalis) . Understanding cannot 
originate even the outline of any of these sciences, even when 
connected with the highest logical use of reason, that is, all 
cogitable syllogisms — for the purpose of proceeding from one 
object (phaenomenon) to all others, even to the utmost limits 
of the empirical synthesis. They are, on the contrary, pure 
and genuine products, or problems, of pure reason. 

What modi of the pure conceptions of reason these trans- 
cendental ideas are, will be fully exposed in the following 
chapter. They follow the guiding thread of the categories. 
For pure reason never relates immediately to objects, but to 
the conceptions of these contained in the understanding. In 
like manner, it will be made manifest in the detailed explana- 
tion of these ideas, — how reason, merely through the synthetical 
use of the same function which it employs in a categorical 
syllogism, necessarily attains to the conception of the absolute 
unity of the thinking subject, — how the logical procedure in 
hypothetical ideas necessarily produces the idea of the ab- 
solutely unconditioned in a series of given conditions, and 
finally, — how the mere form of the disjunctive syllogism in- 
volves the highest conception of a being of all beings : a thought 
which at first sight seems in the highest degree paradoxical. 



234 TKAFSCEKDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

An objective deduction, such as we were able to preseiu in 
the case of the categories, is impossible as regards these trans- 
cendental ideas. For they have, in truth, no relation to any 
object, in experience, for the very reason that they are only 
ideas. But a subjective deduction of them from the nature of 
our reason is possible, and has been given in the present 
chapter. 

It is easy to perceive that the sole aim of pure reason is, 
the absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the condi- 
tions, and that it does not concern itself with the absolute com- 
pleteness on the part of the conditioned. For of the former 
alone does she stand in need, in order to preposit the whole 
series of conditions, and thus present them to the understand- 
ing a priori. But if we once have a completely (and uncon- 
ditionally) given condition, there is no further necessity, in pro- 
ceeding with the series, for a conception of reason ; for the 
understanding takes of itself every step downward, from the 
condition to the conditioned. Thus the transcendental ideas 
are available only for ascending in the series of conditions, till 
we reach the unconditioned, that is, principles. As regards 
descending to the conditioned, on the other hand, we find that 
there is a widely extensive logical use which reason makes of 
the laws of the understanding, but that a transcendental use 
thereof is impossible ; and, that when we form an idea of the 
absolute totality of such a synthesis, for example, of the whole 
series of all future changes in the world, this idea is a mere 
ens rationis, an arbitrary fiction of thought, and not a neces- 
sary presupposition of reason. For the possibility of the con- 
ditioned presupposes the totality of its conditions, but not of 
its consequences. Consequently, this conception is not a trans- 
cendental idea — and it is with these alone that we are at 
present occupied. 

Finally, it is obvious, that there exists among the trans- 
cendental ideas a certain connection and unity, and that pure 
reason, by means of them, collects all its cognitions into one 
system. From the cognition of self to the cognition of the 
world, and through these to the supreme being, the progres- 
sion is so natural, that it seems to resemble the logical march 
of reason from the premisses to the conclusion.* Now whether 

* The science of Metaphysics has for the proper object of its inquiries 
only three grand ideas : God, Freedom, and Immortality, and it aims 



SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. 235 

there lies unobserved at the foundation of these ideas an analogy 
of tne same kind as exists between the logical ana transcen- 
dental procedure of reason, is another of those questions, the 
answer to which we must not expect till we arrive at a more 
advanced stage in our inquiries. In this cursory and prelimi- 
nary view, we have, meanwhile, reached our aim. For we 
have dispelled the ambiguity which attached to the transcen- 
dental conceptions of reason, from their being commonly mixed 
up with other conceptions in the systems of philosophers, and 
not properly distinguished from the conceptions of the under- 
standing ; we have exposed their origin, and thereby at the 
same time their determinate number, and presented them in a 
systematic connection, and have thus marked out and enclosed 
a definite sphere for pure reason. 

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 
BOOK II. 

OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OF PURE REASON. 

It may be said that the object of a merely transcendental 
idea is something of which we have no conception, although 
the idea may be a necessary product of reason according to its 
original laws. For, in fact, a conception of an object that is 
adequate to the idea given by reason, is impossible. For 
such an object must be capable of being presented and in- 
tuited in a possible experience. But we should express our 
meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood, if 
we said that, we can have no knowledge of an object, which 

at showing, that the second conception, conjoined with the first, must 
lead to the third, as a necessary conclusion. All the other subjects with 
which it occupies itself, are merely means, for the attainment and realiza- 
tion of these ideas. It does not require these ideas for the construction 
of a science of nature, but, on the contrary, for the purpose of passing 
beyond the sphere of nature. A complete insight into and comprehension 
of them would render Theology, Ethics, and, through the conjunction of 
both, Religion, solely dependent on the speculative faculty of reason. In 
a systematic representation of these ideas the above-mentioned arrange- 
ment — the synthetical one — would be the most suitable ; but in the in- 
vestigation which must necessarily precede it, the analytical which reverses 
this arrangement, would be better adapted to our purpose, as in it we 
should proceed from that which experience immediately presents to us— 
psychology, to cosmology, and thence to theology. 



236 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

perfectly corresponds to an idea, although we may possess a 
problematical conception thereof. 

Now the transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the 
pure conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are 
led to such ideas by a necessary procedure of reason. There 
must therefore be syllogisms which contain no empirical pre- 
misses, and by means of which we conclude from some- 
thing that we do know, to something of which we do not even 
possess a conception, to which we, nevertheless, by an un- 
avoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments 
are, as regards their result, rather to be termed sophisms than 
syllogisms, although indeed, as regards their origin, they are 
very well entitled to the latter name, inasmuch as they are 
not fictions or accidental products of reason, but are neces- 
sitated by its very nature. They are sophisms, not of men, 
but of pure reason herself, from which the wisest cannot free 
himself. After long labour he may be able to guard against 
the error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion 
which continually mocks and misleads him. 

Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds, corre- 
sponding to the number of the ideas, which their conclusions 
present. In the argument or syllogism of the first class, I 
conclude, from the transcendental conception of the subject 
which contains no manifold, the absolute unity of the subject 
itself, of which I can not in this manner attain to a concep- 
tion. This dialectical argument I shall call the Transcendental 
Paralogism. The second class of sophistical arguments is occu- 
pied with the transcendental conception of the absolute totality 
of the series of conditions for a given phaenomenon, and I 
conclude, from the fact that I have always a self-contradictory 
conception of the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series 
upon one side, the truth of the opposite unity, of which I have 
nevertheless no conception. The condition of reason in these 
dialectical arguments, I shall term the Antinomy of pure 
reason. Finally, according to the third kind of sophistical 
argument, I conclude, from the totality of the conditions of 
thinking objects in general, in so far as they can be given, the 
absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the possibility 
of things in general; that is, from things which I do not know 
in their mere transcendental conception, I conclude a being of 
all beings which I knsw still less by means of a transcenden* 



OF THE PAEALOGIS1IS OE PURE SEASON". 23/ 

tal conception, and of whose unconditioned necessity I can 
form no conception whatever. This dialectical argument I 
shall call the Ideal of pure reason. 

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

BOOK II. 

Chap. I. — Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. 

The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument 
in respect of its form, he the content what it may. But a 
transcendental paralogism has a transcendental foundation, 
and concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexcep- 
tionable. In this manner the paralogism has its foundation m 
the nature of human reason, and is the parent of an unavoid- 
able, though not insoluble, mental illusion. 

We now come to a conception, which was not inserted in 
the general list of transcendental conceptions, and yet must 
be reckoned with them, but at the same time without in the 
least altering, or indicating a deficiency in that table. This is 
the conception, or, if the term is preferred, the judgment, 1 
think. But it is readily perceived that this thought is as it 
were the vehicle of all conceptions in general, and consequently 
of transcendental conceptions also, and that it is therefore re- 
garded as a transcendental conception, although it can have 
no peculiar claim to be so ranked, inasmuch as its only use is 
to indicate that all thought is accompanied by consciousness. 
At the same time, pure as this conception is from all empiri- 
cal content (impressions of the senses), it enables us to distin- 
guish two different kinds of objects. I, as thinking, am an 
object of the internal sense, and am called soul. That which 
is an object of the external senses is called body. Thus the 
expression, I, as a thinking being, designates the object-matter 
of psychology, which may be called the rational doctrine of 
the soul, inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing 
of the soul but what, independently of all experience (which 
determines me in concreto), may be concluded from this con- 
ception I, in so far as it appears in all thought. 

Now, the rational doctrine of the soul is real y an under- 



238 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

taking of tLis kind. For if the smallest empirical element of 
thought, if any particular perception of my internal state, 
were to be introduced among the grounds of cognition of this 
science, it would not be a rational, but an empirical doctrine 
of the soul. We have thus before us a pretended science, 
raised upon the single proposition, I think, whose foundation 
or want of foundation we may very properly, and agreeably 
with the nature of a transcendental philosophy, here examine. 
It ought not to be. objected that in this proposition, which ex- 
presses the perception of one's self, an internal experience is 
asserted, and that consequently the rational doctrine of the 
soul which is founded upon it, is not pure, V.-ut partly founded 
upon an empirical principle. For this internal perception is 
nothing more than the mere apperception, / think, which in 
fact renders all transcendental conceptions possible, in which 
we say, I think substance, cause, &c. For internal experience 
in general and its possibility, or perception in general, and its 
relation to other perceptions, unless some particular distinction 
or determination thereof is empirically given, cannot be re- 
garded as empirical cognition, but as cognition of the empiri- 
cal, and belongs to the investigation of the possibility of every 
experience, which is certainly transcendental. The smallest 
object of experience (for example, only pleasure or pain), that 
should be included in the general representation of self-con- 
sciousness, would immediately change the rational into an 
empirical psychology. 

I think is therefore the only text of rational psychology, 
from which it must develope its whole system. It is manifest 
that this thought, when applied to an object (myself), can 
contain nothing but transcendental predicates thereof; be- 
cause the least empirical predicate would destroy the purity of 
the science and its independence of all experience. 

But we shall have to follow here the guidance of the cate- 
gories, — only, as in the present case a thing, I, as thinking 
being, is at first given, we shall — not indeed change the order 
of the categories as it stands in the table, — but begin at the 
category of substance, by which a thing in itself is represented, 
and proceed backwards through the series. The topic of the 
rational doctrine of the soul, from which every thing else it 
may contain must be deduced, is accordingly as follows : 



Or THE PARALOGISMS OF PUKE REASON. 239 

1. 

The soul is Substance. 
2. 3. 

As regards the different 
times in which it exists, 
As regards its quality, it is numerically iden- 

it is simple. tical, that is unity, not 

Plurality. 
4. 
It is in relation to possible objects in space.* 

From these elements originate all the conceptions of pure 
psychology, by combination alone, without the aid of any 
other principle. This substance, merely as an object of the 
internal sense, gives the conception of Immateriality ; as 
simple substance, that of Incorruptibility ; its identity, as in- 
tellectual substance, gives the conception of Personality ; all 
these three together, Spirituality. Its relation to objects in 
space gives us the conception of connection (commercium) 
with bodies. Thus it represents thinking substance as the 
principle of life in matter, that is, as a soul (anima), and as the 
ground of Animality ; and this, limited and determined by 
the conception of spirituality, gives us that of Immortality. 

Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a trans- 
cendental psychology, which is falsely held to be a science of 
pure reason, touching the nature of our thinking being. We 
can, however, lay at the foundation of this science nothing but 
the simple and in itself perfectly contentless representation I, 
which cannot even be called a conception, but merely a con- 
sciousness which accompanies all conceptions. By this I, or 
He, or It, who or which thinks, nothing more is represented 
than a transcendental subject of thought = x, which is cognized 
only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of 

* The reader, who may not so easily perceive the psychological sense of 
these expressions — taken here in their transcendental abstraction, and 
cannot guess why the latter attribute of the soul belongs to the category 
of existence, will find the expressions sufficiently explained and justified in 
the sequel. I have, moreover, to apologize for the Latin terms which 
have been employed, instead of their German synonymes, contrary to the 
rules of correct writing. But I judged it better to sacrifice elegance of 
language to perspicuity of exposition. 



240 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

which, apart from these, we cannot form the least conception. 
Hence we are obliged to go round this representation in a per- 
petual circle, inasmuch as we must always employ it, in order 
to frame any judgment respecting it. And this inconvenience 
we find it impossible to rid ourselves of, because consciousness 
in itself is not so much a representation distinguishing a par- 
ticular object, as a form of representation in general, in so far 
as it may be termed cognition ; for in and by cognition alone 
do I think anything. 

It must, however, appear extraordinary at first sight that the 
condition, under which I think, and which is consequently a 
property of my subject, should be held to be likewise valid for 
every existence which thinks, and that we can presume to base 
upon a seemingly empirical proposition a judgment which is 
apodeictic and universal, to wit, that every thing which thinks 
is constituted as the voice of my consciousness declares it to 
be, that is, as a selt-conscious being. The cause of this belief is 
to be found in the fact, that we necessarily attribute to things 
a priori all the properties which constitute conditions under 
which alone we can cogitate them. Now I cannot obtain the 
least representation of a thinking being by means of external 
experience, but solely through self-consciousness. Such ob- 
jects are consequently nothing more than the transference of 
this consciousness of mine to other things which can only thus 
be represented as thinking beings. The proposition, I think, 
is, in the present case, understood in a problematical sense, 
not in so far as it contains a perception of an existence (like 
the Cartesian Cogito, ergo sum), but in regard to its mere 
possibility — for the purpose of discovering, what properties 
may be inferred from so simple a proposition and predicated 
of the subject of it. 

If at the foundation of our pure rational cognition of think- 
ing beings there lay more than the mere Cogito, — if we could 
likewise call in aid observations on the play of our thoughts, 
and the thence derived natural laws of the thinking self, there 
would arise an empirical psychology which would be a kind of 
physiology of the internal sense, and might possibly be capable 
of explaining the phsenomena of that sense. But it could never 
be available for discovering those properties which do not be- 
long to possible experience (such as the quality of simplicity), 
nor could it make any apodeictic enunciation on the nature 



Or THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON. 241 

of thinking beings : — it would therefore not be a rational 
psychology. 

Now, as the proposition I think (in the problematical sense) 
contains the form of every judgment in general, and is the 
constant accompaniment of all the categories ; it is manifest, 
that conclusions are drawn from it only by a transcendental 
employment of the understanding. This use of the under- 
standing excludes all empirical elements ; and we cannot, as 
has been shown above, have any favourable conception before- 
hand of its procedure. We shall therefore follow with a critical 
eye this proposition through all the predicaments of pure 
psychology ; but we shall, for brevity's sake, allow this exami- 
nation to proceed in an uninterrupted connection. 

Before entering on this task, however, the following general 
remark may help to quicken our attention to this mode of 
argument. It is not merely through my thinking that I 
cognize an object, but only through my determining a given 
intuition in relation to the unity of consciousness in which all 
thinking consists. It follows that I cognize myself, not through 
my being conscious of myself as thinking, but only when I am 
conscious of the intuition of myself as determined in relation 
to the function of thought. All the modi of self-conscious- 
ness in thought are hence not conceptions of objects (concep- 
tions of the understanding — categories) ; they are mere logical 
functions, which do not present to thought an object to be 
cognized, and cannot therefore present my Self as an object. 
Not the consciousness of the determining, but only that of the 
determinable self, that is, of my internal intuition (in so far 
as the manifold contained in it can be connected conformably 
with the general condition of the unity of apperception in 
thought), is the object. 

1 . In all judgments I am the determining subject of that rela- 
tion which constitutes a judgment. But that the I which thinks, 
must be considered as in thought always a subject, and as a 
thing which cannot be a predicate to thought, is an apodeictic 
and identical proposition. But this proposition does not sig- 
nify that I, as an object, am, for myself, a self-sub sistent being 
or substance. This latter statement — an ambitious one — re- 
quires to be supported by data which are not to be discovered 
in thought ; and are perhaps (in so far as I consider the think- 
ing self merely as such) not to be discovered in the thinking 
self at all. jt 



242 TEAISSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

2. That the I or Ego of apperception, and consequently in 
all thought, is singular or simple, and cannot be resolved into 
a plurality of subjects, and therefore indicates a logically simple 
subject, — this is self- evident from the very conception of an Ego, 
and is consequently an analytical proposition. But this is not 
tantamount to declaring that the thinking Ego is a simple 
substance — for this would be a synthetical proposition. The 
conception of substance always relates to intuitions, which 
with me cannot be other than sensuous, and which conse- 
quently lie completely out of the sphere of the understanding 
and its thought : but to this sphere belongs the affirmation 
that the Ego is simple in thought. It would indeed be sur- 
prising, if the conception of substance, which in other cases 
requires so much labour to distinguish from the other elements 
presented by intuition — so much trouble too, to discover 
whether it can be simple (as in the case of the parts of 
matter), should be presented immediately to me, as if by reve- 
lation, in the poorest mental representation of all. 

3. The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the 
manifold representations of which I am conscious, is likewise a 
proposition lying in the conceptions themselves, and is conse- 
quently analytical. But this identity of the subject, of which 
I am conscious in all its representations, does not relate to or 
concern the intuition of the subject, by which it is given as an 
object. This proposition cannot therefore enounce the iden- 
tity of the person, by which is understood the consciousness 
of the identity of its own substance as a thinking being in all 
change and variation of circumstances. To prove this, we 
should require not a mere analysis of the proposition, but 
synthetical judgments based upon a given intuition. 

4. I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking 
being, from that of other things external to me — among which 
my body also is reckoned. This is also an analytical propo- 
sition, for other things are exactly those which I think as 
different or distinguished from myself. But whether this 
consciousness of myself is possible without things external to 
me ; and whether therefore I can exist merely as a thinking 
being (without being man), — cannot be known or inferred 
from this proposition. 

Thus we have gained nothing as regards the cognition of 
myself as object, by the analysis of the consciousness of 



OF THE PARALOGISMS OF PUEE REASON. 243 

my Self in thought. The logical exposition of thought in 
general is mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the 
object. 

Our Critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous, 
if there existed a possibility of proving a priori, that all 
thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, as 
such, therefore, possess the inseparable attribute of per- 
sonality, and are conscious of their existence apart from 
and unconnected with matter. For we should thus have 
taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have pene- 
trated into the sphere of noumena ; and in this case the 
right could not be denied us of extending our knowledge 
in this sphere, of establishing ourselves, and, under a favouring 
star, appropriating to ourselves possessions in it. For the 
proposition, " Every thinking being, as such, is simple sub- 
stance," is an a priori synthetical proposition ; because in the 
first place it goes beyond the conception which is the subject 
of it, and adds to the mere notion of a thinking being the 
mode of its existence, and in the second place annexes a 
predicate (that of simplicity) to the latter conception — a pre- 
dicate which it could not have discovered in the sphere of 
experience. It would follow that a priori synthetical propo- 
sitions are possible and legitimate, not only, as we have 
maintained, in relation to objects of possible experience, 
and as principles of the possibility of this experience itself, 
but are applicable to things as things in themselves — an 
inference which makes an end of the whole of this Critique, 
and obliges us to fall back on the old mode of metaphysical 
procedure. But indeed the danger is not so great, if we look 
a little closer into the question. 

There lurks in the procedure of rational psychology a para- 
logism, which is represented in the following syllogism : 

That which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject, 
does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore 
substance. 

A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be cogi- 
tated otherwise than as subject. 

Therefore it exists also as such, that is, as substance. 

In the major we speak of a being that can be cogitated gene- 
rally and in every relation, consequently as it may be given in 
intuition. But in the minor we speak of the same being only 
in so far as it regards itself a3 subject, relatively to thought 



244 TBANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

and the unity of consciousness, but not in relation to intui- 
tion, by which it is presented as an object to thought. 
Thus the conclusion is here arrived at by a Sophisma figures 
dictionis.* 

That this famous argument is a mere paralogism, will be 
plain to any one who will consider the general remark which 
precedes our exposition of the principles of the pure under- 
standing, and the section on noumena. For it was there proved 
that the conception of a thing, which can exist per se — only as 
a subject and never as a predicate, possesses no objective 
reality ; that is to say, we can never know, whether there exists 
any object to correspond to the conception ; consequently, the 
conception is nothing more than a conception, and from it we 
derive no proper knowledge. If this conception is to indicate 
by the term substance, an object that can be given, if it is to 
become a cognition ; we must have at the foundation of the 
cognition a permanent intuition, as the indispensable condition 
of its objective reality. For through intuition alone can an 
object be given. But in internal intuition there is nothing 
permanent, for the Ego is but the consciousness of my 
thought. If, then, we appeal merely to thought, we cannot 
discover the necessary condition of the application of the 
conception of substance — that is, of a subject existing per 
se — to the subject as a thinking being. And thus the con- 
ception of the simple nature of substance, which is connected 
with the objective reality of this conception, is shown to be 
also invalid, and to be, in fact, nothing more than the logical 
qualitative u, i y of self-consciousness in thought ; whilst we 
remain perfectly ignorant, whether the subject is composite or 
not. 

* Thought is taken in the two premisses in two totally different senses. 
In the major it is considered as relating and applying to objects in general, 
consequently to objects of intuition also. In the minor, we understand it 
as relating merely to self-consciousness. In this sense, we do not cogitate 
an object, but merely the relation to the self-consciousness of the subject, 
as the form of thought. In the former premiss we speak of things which 
cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subjects. In the second, we do not 
speak of things, but of thought, (all objects being abstracted), in which 
the Ego is always the subject of consciousness. Hence the conclusion 
cannot be, " I cannot exist otherwise than as subject ;" but only " I can, 
in cogitating my existence, employ my Ego only as the subject of the judg- 
ment." Hut this is an identical proposition, and throws no light on the 
mode of my existence. 



REFUTATION OF MENDELSSOHN' S ARGUMENT. 24 J 

Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Sub- 
'"• or Permanence* of the Soul. 



This acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of 
the common argument which attempts to prove that the soul — 
it being granted that it is a simple being — cannot perish by 
dissolution or decomposition ; he saw it is not impossible for it to 
cease to be by extinction, or disappearance^ He endea- 
voured to prove in his Phcedo, that the soul cannot be annihi- 
lated, by showing that a simple being cannot cease to exist. 
Inasmuch as, he said, a simple existence cannot diminish, nor 
gradually lose portions of its being, and thus be by degrees 
reduced to nothing (for it possesses no parts, and therefore no 
multiplicity), between the moment in which it is, and the mo- 
ment in which it is not, no time can be discovered — which is 
impossible. But this philosopher did not consider, that, grant- 
ing the soul to possess this simple nature, which contains no 
parts external to each other, and consequently no extensive 
quantity, we cannot refuse to it any less than to any other 
being, intensive quantity, that is, a degree of reality in regard 
to all its faculties, nay, to all that constitutes its existence. But 
this degree of reality can become less and less through an in- 
finite series of smaller degrees. It follows, therefore, that 
this supposed substance — this thing, the permanence of which 
is not assured in any other way, may, if not by decomposition, 
by gradual loss (remissio) of its powers (consequently by 
elanguescence, if I may employ this expression), be changed 
into nothing. For consciousness itself has always a degree, 
which may be lessened .J Consequently the faculty of being 

* There is no philosophical term in our language which can express, 
without saying too much or too little, the meaning of Beharrlichkeit , 
Permanence will be sufficient, if taken in an absolute, instead of the com- 
monly received relative sense.— Tr. 

f Verschwinden. 

% Clearness is not, as logicians maintain, the consciousness of a repre- 
sentation. For a certain degree of consciousness, which may not, how- 
ever, be sufficient for recollection, is to be met with in many dim re- 
presentations. For without any consciousness at all, we should not be 
able to recognize any difference in the obscure representations we connect ; 
as we really can do with many conceptions, such as those of right and 
justice, and those of the musician, who strikes at once several notes 
in improvising a piece of music. But a representation is clear, in which 
our consciousness is sufficient for the consciousness of the difference of this 
representation from others. If we are only conscious that there is a dif- 



246 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

conscious may be diminished ; and so with all other faculties. 
The permanence of the soul, therefore, as an object of the 
internal sense, remains undemonstrated, nay, even indemon- 
strable. Its permanence in life is evident, per se, inasmuch 
as the thinking being (as man) is to itself, at the same time, 
an object of the external senses. But this does not authorize 
the rational psychologist to affirm, from mere conceptions, its 
permanence beyond life.* 

ference, but are not conscious of the difference — that is, what the difference 
is — the representation must be termed obscure. There is, consequently, an 
infinite series of degrees of consciousness down to its entire disappearance. 
* There are some who think they have done enough to establish a new 
possibility in the mode of the existence of souls, when they have shown 
that there is no contradiction in their hypotheses on this subject. Such 
are those who affirm the possibility of thought — of which they have no 
other knowledge than what they derive from its use in connecting 
empirical intuitions presented in this our human life — after this life has 
ceased. But it is very easy to embarrass them by the introduction of 
counter-possibilities, which rest upon quite as good a foundation. Such, 
for example, is the possibility of the division of a simple substance into 
several substances ; and conversely, of the coalition of several into one 
simple substance. For, although divisibility presupposes composition, it 
does not necessarily require a composition of substances, but only of the 
degree? (of the several faculties) of one and the same substance. Now 
we can cogitate all the powers and faculties of the soul — even that of con- 
sciousness — as diminished by one half, the substance still remaining. In 
the same way we can represent to ourselves without contradiction, this 
obliterated half as preserved, not in the soul, but without it ; and we can 
believe that, as in this case everything that is real in the soul, and has a 
degree — consequently its entire existence — has been halved, a particular 
substance would arise out of the soul. For the multiplicity, which has 
been divided, formerly existed, but not as a multiplicity of substances, 
but of every reality as the quantum of existence in it ; and the unity of 
substance was merely a mode of existence, which by this division alone 
has been transformed into a plurality of subsistence. In the same manner 
several simple substances might coalesce into one, without anything being 
lost except the plurality of subsistence, inasmuch as the one substance 
would contain the degree of reality of all the former substances. Perhaps, 
indeed, the simple substances, which appear under the form of matter 
might, (not indeed by a mechanical or chemical influence upon each 
other, but by an unknown influence, of which the former would be but the 
phaenomenal appearance), by means of such a dynamical division of the 
parent-souls, as intensive quantities, produce other souls, while the former 
repaired the loss thus sustained with new matter of the same sort. I 
am far from allowing any value to such chimeras ; and the principles 
of our analytic have clearly proved that no other than an empirical use 
of the categories — that of substance, for example — is possible. But if 
the rationalist is bold enough to construct, on the mere authority of the 



OF THE PAEALOGISMS OF PTTEE SEASON. 247 

If, now, we take the above propositions — as they must be ac- 
cepted as valid for all thinking beings in the system of rational 
psychology — in synthetical connection, and proceed, from the 
category of relation, with the proposition, " All thinking beings 
are, as such, substances," backwards through the series, till the 
circle is completed ; we come at last to their existence, of which, 
in this system of rational psychology, substances are held 
to be conscious, independently of external things ; nay, it is 
asserted that, in relation to the permanence which is a necessary 
characteristic of substance, they can of themselves determine 
external things. It follows that Idealism — at least problematical 
Idealism, is perfectly unavoidable in this rationalistic system. 
And, if the existence of outward things is not held to be re- 
quisite to the determination of the existence of a substance in 
time ; the existence of these outward things at all, is a gratuitous 
assumption which remains without the possibility of a proof. 

But if we proceed analytically — the " I think " as a propo- 
sition containing in itself an existence as given, consequently 
modality being the principle — and dissect this proposition, in 
order to ascertain its content, and discover whether and how 
this Ego determines its existence in time and space without the 
aid of any thing external ; the propositions of rationalistic 
psychology would not begin with the conception of a thinking 
being, but with a reality, and the properties of a thinking 
being in general would be deduced from the mode in which 
this reality is cogitated, after everything empirical had been 
abstracted ; as is shown in the following table : 

1. 

J think, 

2. 3. 

as Subject, as simple Subject, 

4. 

as identical Subject, 

in every state of my thought. 

faculty of thought — without any intuition, whereby an object is given 
— a self-subsistent being, merely because the unity of apperception in 
thought cannot allow him to believe it a composite being, instead of de- 
claring, as he ought to do, that he is unable to explain the possibility of a 
thinking nature ; what ought to hinder the materialist, with as complete 
an independence of experience, to employ the principle of the rationalist 
in a directly opposite manner — still preserving the formal unity required 
by his opponent ? 



248 TBANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

Now, inasmuch as it is not determined in this second pro- 
position, whether I can exist and be cogitated only as subject, 
and not also as a predicate of another being, the conception 
of a subject is here taken in a merely logical sense ; and it 
remains undetermined, whether substance is to be cogitated 
under the conception or not. But in the third proposition, 
the absolute unity of apperception — the simple Ego in the re- 
presentation to which all connection and separation, which 
constitute thought, relate, is of itself important ; even although 
it presents us with no information about the constitution or 
subsistence of the subject. Apperception is something real, 
and the simplicity of its nature is given in the very fact of its 
possibility. Now in space there is nothing real that is at the 
same time simple ; for points, which are the only simple things 
in space, are merely limits, but not constituent parts of space. 
From this follows the impossibility of a definition on the basis 
of materialism of the constitution of my Ego as a merely think- 
ing subject. But, because my existence is considered in the 
first proposition as given, for it does not mean, " Every think- 
ing being exists" (for this would be predicating of them abso- 
lute necessity,) but only, " / exist thinking ;" the proposition 
is quite empirical, and contains the determinability of my ex- 
istence merely in relation to my representations in time. But 
as I require for this purpose something that is permanent, such 
as is not given in internal intuition ; the mode of my existence, 
whether as substance or as accident, cannot be determined by 
means of this simple self-consciousness. Thus, if materialism 
is inadequate to explain the mode in which I exist, spiritualism 
is likewise as insufficient ; and the conclusion is, that we are 
ntterly unable to attain to any knowledge of the constitution of 
the soul, in so far as relates to the possibility of its existence 
apart from external objects. 

And, indeed, how should it be possible, merely by the aid 
of the unity of consciousness — which we cognize only for the 
reason that it is indispensable to the possibility of expe- 
rience — to pass the bounds of experience (our existence in this 
life) ; and to extend our cognition to the nature of all thinking 
beings by means of the empirical — but in relation to every sort 
of intuition, perfectly undetermined — proposition, " I think V , 

There does not then exist any rational psychology as a doc- 
trine furnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves. 
It is nothing more than a discipline, which sets impassable 



OF THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON. 249 

limits to speculative reason in this region of thought, to pre- 
vent it, on the one hand, from throwing itself into, the arms of 
a soulless materialism, and, on the other, from losing itself 
in the mazes of a baseless spiritualism. It teaches us 
to consider this refusal of our reason to give any satisfactory 
answer to questions which reach beyond the limits of this 
our human life, as a hint to abandon fruitless speculation ; 
and to direct, to a practical use, our knowledge of ourselves 
•—which, although applicable only to objects of experience, 
receives its principles from a higher source, and regulates its 
procedure as if our destiny reached far beyond the boun- 
daries of experience and life. 

From all this it is evident that rational psychology has its 
origin in a mere misunderstanding. The unity of conscious- 
ness, which lies at the basis of the categories, is considered 
to be an intuition of the subject as an object ; and the category 
of substance is applied to the intuition. Eut this unity is 
nothing more than the unity in thought, by which no object 
is given ; to which therefore the category of substance — 
which always presupposes a given intuition — cannot be ap- 
plied. Consequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The 
subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very rea- 
son that it cogitates these, frame any conception of itself 
as an object of the categories ; for, to cogitate these, it must 
lay at the foundation its own pure self-consciousness — the very 
thing that it wishes to explain and describe. In like manner, 
the subject, in which the representation of time has its basis, can- 
not determine, for this very reason, its own existence in time. 
Now, if the latter is impossible, the former, as an attempt 
to determine itself by means of the categories as a thinking 
being in general, is no less so.* 



* The " I think" is, as has been already stated, an empirical proposi- 
tion, and contains the proposition, " I exist." But I cannot say " Every- 
thing, which thinks, exists ;" for in this case the property of thought would 
constitute all beings possessing it, necessary beings. Hence ray existence 
cannot be considered as an inference from the proposition, " I think," as 
Des Cartes maintained — because in this case the major premiss, " Every- 
thing, which thinks, exists," must precede — but the two m ^positions are 
identical. The proposition " I think," expresses an undetermined em- 
pirical intuition, that is, perception,* (proving consequently that sensation, 
which must belong to sensibility, lies at the foundation of this proposi- 

* Seep. 224.— Tr. 



250 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

Thus, then, appears the vanity of the hope of establishing a 
cognition which is to extend its rule beyond the limits of ex- 
perience — a cognition which is one of the highest interests of 
humanity; and thus is proved the futility of the attempt of spe- 
culative philosophy in this region of thought. But, in this interest 
of thought, the severity of criticism has rendered to reason a not 
unimportant service, by the demonstration of the impossibility 
of making any dogmatical affirmation concerning an object of 
experience beyond the boundaries of experience. She has thus 
fortified reason against all affirmations of the contrary. Now, 
this can be accomplished in only two ways. Either our pro- 
position must be proved apodeictically ; or, if this is unsuc- 
cessful, the sources of this inability must be sought for, and 
if these are discovered to exist in the natural and necessary 
limitation of our reason, our opponents must submit to the 
same law of renunciation, and refrain from advancing claims 
to dogmatic assertion. 

But the right, say rather the necessity to admit a future 
life, upon principles of the practical conjoined with the specu- 
lative use of reason, has lost nothing by this renunciation ; for 
the merely speculative proof has never had any influence upon 
the common reason of men. It stands upon the point of a 
hair, so that even the schools have been able to preserve it 
from falling only by incessantly discussing it and spinning it 
like a top ; and even in their eyes it has never been able to pre- 
sent any safe foundation for the erection of a theory. The 

tion) ; but it precedes experience, whose province it is to determine an 
object of perception by means of the categories in relation to time ; and 
existence in this proposition is not a category, as it does not apply to an 
undetermined given object, but only to one of which we have a conception, 
and about which we wish to know whether it does or does not exist, out 
of, and apart from this conception. An undetermined perception signifies 
here merely something real that has been given, only, however, to thought 
in general — but not as a phenomenon, nor as a thing in itself (noumenon) 
but only as something that really exists, and is designated as such in the 
proposition, " I think." For it must be remarked that, when I call the 
proposition, " I think," an empirical proposition, I do not thereby mean 
that the Ego in the proposition is an empirical representation; on the 
contrary, it is purely intellectual, because it belongs to thought in general. 
But without some empirical representation, which presents to the mind 
material for thought, the mental act, " I think," would not take place ; 
and the empirical is only the condition of the application or employment 
of the pure intellectual faculty. 



OF THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASOH. 251 

proofs which have been current among men, preserve their value 
undiminished; nay, rather gain in clearness and unsophisti- 
cated power, by the rejection of the dogmatical assumptions 
of speculative reason. For reason is thus confined within her 
own peculiar province — the arrangement of ends or aims, 
which is at the same time the arrangement of nature ; and, as a 
practical faculty, without limiting itself to the latter, it is 
justified in extending the former, and with it our own exist- 
ence, beyond the boundaries of experience and life. If we 
turn our attention to the analogy of the nature of living beings 
in this world, in the consideration of which reason is obliged 
to accept as a principle, that no organ, no faculty, no appetite 
is useless, and that nothing is superfluous, nothing dispropor- 
tionate to its use, nothing unsuited to its end ; but that, on the 
contrary, everything is perfectly conformed to its destination 
in life,— we shall find that man, who alone is the final end and 
aim of this order, is still the only animal that seems to be ex- 
cepted from it. For his natural gifts, not merely as regards 
the talents and motives that may incite him to employ them — 
but especially the moral law in him, stretch so far beyond all 
mere earthly utility and advantage, that he feels himself bound 
to prize the mere consciousness of probity, apart from all ad- 
vantageous consequences — even the shadowy gift of posthu- 
mous fame — above everything ; and he is conscious of an in- 
ward call to constitute himself, by his conduct in this world 
— without regard to mere sublunary interests — the citizen of 
a better. This mighty, irresistible proof — accompanied by 
an ever-increasing knowledge of the conformability to a pur- 
pose in everything we see around us, by the conviction of 
the boundless immensity of creation, by the consciousness of 
a certain illimitableness in the possible extension of our know- 
ledge, and by a desire commensurate therewith — remains to 
humanity, even after the theoretical cognition of ourselves has 
failed to establish the necessity of an existence after death. 

Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralogism. 
The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from 
our confounding an idea of reason (of a pure intelligence) with 
the conception — in every respect undetermined — of a think- 
ing being in general. I cogitate myself in behalf of a pos- 
sible experience, at the same time making abstraction of ail 
actual experience ; and infer therefrom that I can be conscious 



252 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

of myself apart from experience and its empirical conditions. 
I consequently confound the possible abstraction of my em- 
pirically determined existence with the supposed conscious- 
ness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self ; and 
I believe that I cognize what is substantial in myself as a 
transcendental subject, when I have nothing more in thought 
than the unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of all 
determination of cognition. 

The task of explaining the community of the soul with the 
body does not properly belong to the psychology of vliich we 
are here speaking ; because it proposes to prove the personality 
of the soul apart from this communion (after death), and is 
therefore transcendent in the proper sense of the word, al- 
though occupying itself with an object of experience, — only in 
so far, however, as it ceases to be an object of experience. But 
a sufficient answer may be found to the question in our 
system. The difficulty which lies in the execution of this 
task consists, as is well known, in the presupposed heteroge- 
neity of the object of the internal sense (the soul) and the ob- 
jects of the external senses ; inasmuch as the formal condition 
of the intuition of the one is time, and of that of the other space 
also. But if we consider that both kinds of objects do not 
differ internally, but only in so far as the one appears exter- 
nally to the other — consequently, that what lies at the basis 
of phsenomena, as a thing in itself, may not be heterogene- 
ous ; this difficulty disappears. There then remains no other 
difficulty than is to be found in the question — how a com- 
munity of substances is possible ; a question which lies out 
of the region of psychology, and which the reader, after 
what in our Analytic has been said of primitive forces and fa- 
culties, will easily judge to be also beyond the region of human 
cognition. 

General Remake. 

On the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology. 

The proposition " I think," or, " I exist thinking," is an 
empirical proposition. But such a propositi, n must be based 
on empirical intuition, and the object cogitated as a phaeno- 
menon ; and thus our theory appears to maintain that the soul, 
even in thought, is merely a phenomenon ; and in this way 
our consciousness itself, in fact, abuts upon nothing. 



TRANSITION TO COSMOLOGY. 253 

Thought, per se, is merely the purely spontaneous logical 
function which operates to connect the manifold of a possible 
intuition ; and it does not represent the subject of con- 
sciousness as a phsenomenon — for this reason alone, that it pays 
no attention to the question whether the mode of intuiting it 
is sensuous or intellectual. I therefore do not represent myself 
in thought either as I am, or as I appear to myself; I merely 
cogitate myself as an object in general, of the mode of in- 
tuiting which I make abstraction. When I represent myself 
as the subject of thought, or as the ground of thought, these 
modes of representation are not related to the categories of 
substance or of cause ; for these are functions of thought ap- 
plicable only to our sensuous intuition. The application of 
these categories to the Ego would, however, be necessary, if I 
wished to make myself an object of knowledge. But I wish 
to be conscious of myself only as thinking ; in what mode my 
Self is given in intuition, I do not consider, and it may be that 
I, who think, am a phsenomenon — although not in so far as I 
am a thinking being ; but in the consciousness of myself in 
mere thought I am a being, though this consciousness does not 
present to me any property of this being as material for thought. 

But the proposition " I think," in so far as it declares, " / 
exist thinking," is not the mere representation of a logical 
function. It determines the subject (which is in this case an 
object also,) in relation to existence ; and it cannot be given 
without the aid of the internal sense, whose intuition presents 
to us an object, not as a thing in itself, but always as a phse- 
nomenon. In this proposition there is therefore something 
more to be found than the mere spontaneity of thought ; 
there is also the receptivity of intuition, that is, my thought 
of myself applied to the empirical intuition of myself. Now, 
in this intuition the thinking self must seek the conditions 
of the employment of its logical functions as categories of 
substance, cause, and so forth ; not merely for the purpose 
of distinguishing itself as an object in itself by means of 
the representation 7, but also for the purpose of determining 
the mode of its existence, that is, of cognizing itself as nou- 
menon. But this is impossible, for the internal empirical in- 
tuition is sensuous, and presents us with nothing but pheno- 
menal data, which do not assist the object of pure conscious- 
ness in its attempt to cognize itself as a separate existence, 
but are useful only as contributions to experience. 



254 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

But, let it be granted that we could discover, not in experi- 
ence, but in certain firmly-established a priori laws of the use 
of pure reason — laws relating to our existence, authority to 
consider ourselves as legislating di priori in relation to our own 
existence and as determining this existence ; we should, on 
this supposition, find ourselves possessed of a spontaneity, by 
which our actual existence would be determinable, without the 
aid of the conditions of empirical intuition. We should also 
become aware, that in the consciousness of our existence there 
was an a priori content, which would serve to determine our 
own existence — an existence only sensuously determinable— 
relatively, however, to a certain internal faculty in relation to 
an intelligible world. 

But this would not give the least help to the attempts of 
rational psychology. For this wonderful faculty, which the 
consciousness of the moral law in me reveals, would present 
me with a principle of the determination of my own existence 
which is purely intellectual, — but by what predicates ? By none 
other than those which are given in sensuous intuition. Thus 
I should find myself in the same position in rational psycho- 
logy which I formerly occupied, that is to say, I should find 
myself still in need of sensuous intuitions, in order to give 
significance to my conceptions of substance and cause, by 
means of which alone I can possess a knowledge of myself : 
but these intuitions can never raise me above the sphere of ex- 
perience. I should be justified, however, in applying these 
conceptions, in regard to their practical use, which is always 
directed to objects of experience — in conformity with their 
analogical significance when employed theoretically — to freedom 
and its subject.* At the same time, I should understand by 
them merely the logical functions of subject and predicate, of 
principle and consequence, in conformity with which all actions 
are so determined, that they are capable of being explained 
along with the laws of nature, conformably to the categories of 
substance and cause, although they originate from a very dif- 
ferent principle. We have made these observations for the 
purpose of guarding against misunderstanding, to which the 
doctrine of our intuition of self as a phenomenon is exposed. 
We shall have occasion to perceive their utility in the sequel. 
* The Ego.— Tr. 



THE ANTINOMY OP PURE REASON. 255 

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

BOOK II. 
Chap. II. — The Antinomy of Pure Reason. 

We showed in the introduction to this part of our work, 
that all transcendental illusion of pure reason arose from 
dialectical arguments, the schema of which logic gives us in 
its three formal species of syllogisms — just as the categories 
find their logical schema in the four functions of all judg- 
ments. The first kind of these sophistical arguments related 
to the unconditioned unity of the subjective conditions of all 
representations in general (of the subject or soul), in corre- 
spondence with the categorical syllogisms, the major of which, 
as the principle, enounces the relation of a predicate to a sub- 
ject. The second kind of dialectical argument will therefore 
be concerned, following the analogy with hypothetical syllo- 
gisms, with the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions 
in the phenomenon ; and, in this way, the theme of the third 
kind to be treated of in the following chapter, will be the un- 
conditioned unity of the objective conditions of the possibility 
of objects in general. 

But it is worthy of remark, that the transcendental paralo- 
gism produced in the mind only a one-sided illusion, in re- 
gard to the idea of the subject of our thought ; and the 
conceptions of reason gave no ground to maintain the contrary 
proposition. The advantage is completely on the side of Pneu- 
matism ; although this theory itself passes into nought, in the 
crucible of pure reason. 

Very different is the case, when we apply reason to the ob- 
jective synthesis of phsenomena. Here, certainly, reason es- 
tablishes, with much plausibility, its principle of unconditioned 
unity ; but it very soon falls into such contradictions, that it is 
compelledj in relation to cosmology, to renounce its pretensions. 

For here a new phsenomenon of human reason meets us, — 
a perfectly natural antithetic, which does not require to be 
sought for by subtle sophistry, but into which reason of it- 
self unavoidably falls. It is thereby preserved, to be sure, 
from the slumber of a fancied conviction — which a merely 
one-sided illusion produces ; but it is at the same time com- 
pelled, either, on the one hand, to abandon itself to a despair- 



256 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

ing scepticism, or, on the other, to assume a dogmatical confi- 
dence and obstinate persistence in certain assertions, without 
granting a fair hearing to the other side of the question. 
Either is the death of a sound philosophy, although the former 
might perhaps deserve the title of the Euthanasia of pure 
reason. 

Before entering this region of discord and confusion, which 
the conflict of the laws of pure reason (antinomy) produces, 
we shall present the reader with some considerations, in ex- 
planation and justification of the method we intend to follow 
in our treatment of this subject. I term all transcendental 
ideas, in so far as they relate to the absolute totality in the 
synthesis of phaenomena, cosmical conceptions ; partly on ac- 
count of this unconditioned totality, on which the conception 
of the world-whole is based — a conception which is itself an 
idea, — partly because they relate solely to the synthesis of 
phaenomena — the empirical synthesis; while, on the other hand, 
the absolute totality in the synthesis of the conditions of all 
possible things gives rise to an ideal of pure reason, which is 
quite distinct from the cosmical conception, although it stands 
in relation with it. Hence, as the paralogisms of pure reason 
laid the foundation for a dialectical psychology, the antinomy 
of pure reason will present us with the transcendental princi- 
ples of a pretended pure (rational) cosmology, — not, how- 
ever, to declare it valid and to appropriate it, but — as the 
very term of a conflict of reason sufficiently indicates, to pre- 
sent it as an idea which cannot be reconciled with phaenomena 
and experience. 

The Antinomy of pure reason. 

SECTION FlftST. 

System of CosmoJogical Ideas. 

That we may be able to enumerate with systematic preci- 
sion these ideas according to a principle, we must remark, in 
the first place, that it is from the understanding alone that 
pure and transcendental conceptions take their origin ; that 
the reason does not properly give birth to any conception, but 
only frees the conception of the understanding from the un- 
avoidable limitation of a possible experience, and thus endea- 



SYSTEM QF COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS. 257 

vours to raise it above the empirical, though it must still be 
in connection with it. This happens from the fact, that for a 
given conditioned, reason demands absolute totality on the side 
of the conditions (to which the understanding submits all 
pheenomena), and thus makes of the category a transcendental 
idea. This it does that it may be able to give absolute complete- 
ness to the empirical synthesis, by continuing it to the uncon- 
ditioned (which is not to be found inexperience, but only in the 
idea). Reason requires this according to the principle, If the 
conditioned is given, the whole of the conditions, and consequent- 
ly the absolutely unconditioned, is also given, whereby alone the 
former was possible. Fiist, then, the transcendental ideas are 
properly nothing but categories elevated to the unconditioned ; 
and they may be arranged in a table according to the titles of 
the latter. But, secondly, all the categories are not available 
for this purpose, but only those in which the synthesis con- 
stitutes a series — of conditions subordinated to, not co-ordi- 
nated with, each other. Absolute totality is required of 
reason only in so far as concerns the ascending series of 
the conditions of a conditioned ; not, consequently, when 
the question relates to the descending series of consequences, 
or to the aggregate of the co-ordinated conditions of these 
consequences. For, in relation to a given conditioned, con- 
ditions are pre-supposed and considered to be given along with 
it. On the other hand, as the consequences do not render 
possible their conditions, but rather pre-suppose them, — in 
the consideration of the procession of consequences (or in the 
descent from the given condition to the conditioned), we may 
be quite unconcerned whether the series ceases or not ; and 
their totality is not a necessary demand of reason. 

Thus we cogitate — and necessarily — a given time completely 
elapsed up to a given moment, although that time is not 
determinable by us. But as regards time future, which is 
not the condition of arriving at the present, in order to con- 
ceive it ; it is quite indifferent whether we consider future 
time as ceasing at some point, or as prolonging itself to 
infinity. Take, for example, the series m, n, o, in which n is 
given as conditioned in relation to m, but at the same time as 
the condition of o, and let the series proceed upwards from 
the conditioned n to m (I, k, i, &c), and also downwards from 
the condition n to the conditioned o (jj, q, r, Sec), — I must 



258 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC!. 

pre-suppose the former series, to be able to consider n as 
given, and n is according to reason (the totality of conditions) 
possible only by means of that series. But its possibility does 
not rest on the following series o,p, q, r, which for this reason 
cannot be regarded as given, but only as capable of being 
given (dabilis). 

I shall term the synthesis of the series on the side of the 
conditions — from that nearest to the given phenomenon up 
to the more remote — regressive ; that which proceeds on the 
side of the conditioned, from the immediate consequence to 
the more remote, I shall call the progressive synthesis. The 
former proceeds in antecedentia, the latter in consequentia. 
The cosmological ideas are therefore occupied with the totality 
of the regressive synthesis, and proceed in antecedentia, not 
in consequentia. When the latter takes place, it is an arbi- 
trary and not a necessary problem of pure reason ; for we re- 
quire, for the complete understanding of what is given in a 
phsenomenon, not the consequences which succeed, but the 
grounds or principles which precede. 

In order to construct the table of ideas in correspondence 
with the table of categories, we take first the two primitive 
quanta of all our intuition, time and space. Time is in itself 
a series (and the formal condition of all series), and hence, in 
relation to a given present, we must distinguish a priori in it the 
antecedentia as conditions (time past) from the consequentia 
(time future). Consequently, the transcendental idea of the 
absolute totality of the series of the conditions of a given 
conditioned> relates merely to all past time. According to the 
idea of reason, the whole past time, as the condition of the 
given moment, is necessarily cogitated as given. But as regards 
space, there exists in it no distinction between progressus and 
regressus ; for it is an aggregate and not a series — its parts ex- 
isting together at the same time. I can consider a given point 
of time in relation to past time only as conditioned, because 
this given moment comes into existence only through the past 
time — or rather through the passing of the preceding time. 
But as the parts of space are not subordinated, but co-ordi- 
nated to each other, one part cannot be the condition of the 
possibility of the other ; and space is not in itself, like time, & 
series. But the synthesis of the manifold parts of space — (the 
syntheses whereby we apprehend space) — is nevertheless succes- 



SYSTEM OF COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS. 259 

fiive ; it takes place, therefore, in time,and contains a series. And 
as in this series of aggregated spaces (for example, the feet in a 
rood), beginning with a given portion of space, those which con- 
tinue to be annexed form the condition of the limits of the for- 
mer, — the measurement of a space must also be regarded as a 
synthesis of the series of the conditions of a given conditioned. 
It differs, however, in this respect from that of time, that the 
side of the conditioned is not in itself distinguishable from 
the side of the condition ; and, consequently, regressus and 
progressus in space seem to be identical. But, inasmuch as 
one part of space is not given, but only limited, by and 
through another, we must also consider every limited space as 
conditioned, in so far as it pre-supposes some other space as 
the condition of its limitation, and so on. As regards limita- 
tion, therefore, our procedure in space is also a regressus, and 
the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the syn- 
thesis in a series of conditions applies to space also ; and I am 
entitled to demand the absolute totality of the phsenomenal 
synthesis in space as well as in time. Whether my demand can 
be satisfied, is a question to be answered in the sequel. 

Secondly, the real in space — that is, matter, is conditioned. 
Its internal conditions are its parts, and the parts of parts its 
remote conditions ; so that in this case we find a regressive 
synthesis, the absolute totality of which is a demand of reason. 
But this cannot be obtained otherwise than by a complete 
division of parts, whereby the real in matter becomes either 
nothing or that which is not matter, that is to say, the simple.* 
Consequently we find here also a series of conditions and a 
progress to the unconditioned. 

Thirdly, as regards the categories of a real relation between 
phsenomena, the category of substance and its accidents is not 
suitable for the formation of a transcendental idea ; that is 
to say, reason has no ground, in regard to it, to proceed re- 
gressively with conditions. For accidents (in so far as they 
inhere in a substance) are co-ordinated with each other, and 
do not constitute a series. And, in relation to substance, 
they are not properly subordinated to it, but are the mode of 
existence of the substance itself. The conception of the sub- 
stantial might nevertheless seem to be an idea of the trans- 
cendental reason. But, as this signifies nothing more than the 
conception of an object in general, which subsists in so far as 
* Das Einfache. 

S 2 



260 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

we cogitate in it merely a transcendental subject without any 
predicates ; and as the question here is of an unconditioned in 
the series of phsenomena, — it is clear that the substantial can 
form no member thereof. The same holds good of sub- 
stances in community, which are mere aggregates, and do 
not form a series. For they are not subordinated to each 
other as conditions of the possibility of each other ; which, 
however, may be affirmed of spaces, the limits of which are 
never determined in themselves, but always by some other 
space. It is, therefore, only in the category of causality, 
that we can find a series of causes to a given effect, and 
in which we ascend from the latter, as the conditioned, to 
the former as the conditions, and thus answer the question of 
reason. 

Fourthly, the conceptions of the possible, the actual, and 
the necessary do not conduct us to any series, — excepting only 
in so far as the contingent in existence must always be re- 
garded as conditioned, and as indicating, according to a law of 
the understanding, a condition, under which it is necessary to 
rise to a higher, till in the totality of the series, reason arrives 
at unconditioned necessity. 

There are, accordingly, only four cosmological ideas, cor- 
responding with the four titles of the categories. For we 
can select only such as necessarily furnish us with a series in 
the synthesis of the manifold. 

1. 

The absolute Completeness 

of the 

Composition 

of the given totality of all phcenomena. 

2. 3. 

The absolute Completeness The absolute Completeness 
of the of the 

Division Origination 

of a given totality of a phcenomenon. 

in a phcenomenon. 

4. 

The absolute Completeness 

of the Dependence of the Existence 

of what is changeable in a phcenomenon. 

We must here remark, in the first place, that the idea of 



261 

SYSTEM OF COSMOLOGTOAL IDEAS. 

absolute totality relates to nothing but the exposition of phe- 
nomena, and therefore not to the pure conception of a totality 
of things. Phsenomena are here, therefore, regarded as given, 
and reason requires the absolute completeness of the condi- 
tions of their possibility, in so far as these conditions constitute 
a series, — consequently an absolutely (that is, in every respect) 
complete synthesis, whereby a phsenomenon can be explained 
according to the laws of the understanding. 

Secondly, it is properly the unconditioned alone, that 
reason seeks in this serially and regressively conducted syn- 
thesis of conditions. It wishes, to speak in another way, to 
attain to completeness in the series of premisses, so as to 
render it unnecessary to presuppose others. This uncondi- 
tioned is always contained in the absolute totality of the series, 
when we endeavour to form a representation of it in thought. 
But this absolutely complete synthesis is itself but an idea ; 
for it is impossible, at least beforehand, to know whether any 
such synthesis is possible in the case of phsenomena. "When 
we represent all existence in thought by means of pure concep- 
tions of the understanding, without any conditions of sensuous 
intuition, we may say with justice that for a given conditioned 
the whole series of conditions subordinated to each other is 
also given ; for the former is only given through the latter. 
But we find in the case of phsenomena a particular limitation 
of the mode in which conditions are given, that is, through 
the successive synthesis of the manifold of intuition, which 
must be complete in the regress. Now whether this com- 
pleteness is sensuously possible, is a problem. But the idea 
of it lies in the reason — be it possible or impossible to con- 
nect with the idea adequate empirical conceptions. There- 
fore, as in the absolute totality of the regressive synthesis 
of the manifold in a phsenomenon (following the guidance of 
the categories, which represent it as a series of conditions to 
a given conditioned) the unconditioned is necessarily contained 
— it being still left unascertained whether and how this totality 
exists ; reason sets out from the idea of totality, although its 
proper and final aim is the unconditioned — of the whole series, 
or of a part thereof. 

This unconditioned may be cogitated— either as existing 
only in the entire series, all the members of which therefore 
would >e without exception conditioned and only the totality 



262 

TKANSCEtfDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

absolutely unconditioned, — and in this case the regressus is 
called infinite ; or the absolutely unconditioned is only a part 
of the series, to which the other members are subordinated, 
but which is not itself submitted to any other condition.* In 
the former case the series is a parte priori unlimited (without 
beginning), that is, infinite, and nevertheless completely given. 
But the regress in it is never completed, and can only be 
called potentially infinite. In the second case there exists a 
first in the series. This first is called, in relation to past time, 
the beginning of the world ; in relation to space, the limit of 
the world ; in relation to the parts of a given limited whole, 
the simple ; in relation to causes, absolute spontaneity (liberty) ; 
and in relation to the existence of changeable things, absolute 
physical necessity. 

We possess two expressions, world and nature, which are 
generally interchanged. The first denotes the mathematical 
total of all phsenomena and the totality of their synthesis — 
in its progress by means of composition, as well as by division. 
And the world is termed nature, f when it is regarded as 
a dynamical whole — when our attention is not directed to the 
aggregation in space and time, for the purpose of cogitating it 
as a quantity, but to the unity in the existence of phaenomena. 
In this case the condition of that which happens is called a 
cause ; the unconditioned causality of the cause in a phseno- 
menon is termed liberty ; the conditioned cause is called in a 
more limited sense a natural cause. The conditioned in ex- 
istence is termed contingent, and the unconditioned necessary. 

* The absolute totality of the series of conditions to a given condi- 
tioned is always unconditioned : because beyond it there exist no other 
conditions, on which it might depend. But the absolute totality of such 
a series is only an idea, or rather a problematical conception, the possibi- 
lity of which must be investigated — particularly in relation to the mode 
in which the unconditioned, as the transcendental idea which is the real 
subject of inquiry, may be contained therein. 

\ Nature, understood adjective (formatiter), signifies the complex of 
the determinations of a thing, connected according to an internal princi- 
ple of causality. On the other hand, we understand by nature, substantive 
(materialiter), the sum-total of phaenomena, in so far as they, by virtue 
of an internal principle of causality, are connected with each other 
throughout. In the former sense we speak of the nature of liquid matter, 
of fire, &c, and employ the word only adjective ; while, if speaking of 
the objects of nature, we have in our minds the idea of a subsisti:sjf 
whole. 



ANTITHETIC 0E PURE REASON. 263 

The unconditioned necessity of phenomena may be called 
natural necessity. 

The ideas which we are at present engaged in discussing 
I have called cosmological ideas ; partly because by the term 
world is understood the entire content of all phaenomena, and 
our ideas are directed solely to the unconditioned among 
phaenomena ; partly also, because world, in the transcendental 
sense, signifies the absolute totality of the content of existing 
things, and we are directing our attention only to the com- 
pleteness of the synthesis — although, properly, only in re- 
gression. In regard to the fact that these ideas are all tran- 
scendent, and, although they do not transcend phaenomena as 
regards their mode, but are concerned solely with the world of 
sense (and not with noumena), nevertheless carry their syn- 
thesis to a degree far above all possible experience, — it still 
seems to me that we can, with perfect propriety, desig- 
nate them cosmical conceptions. As regards the distinction 
between the mathematically and the dynamically unconditioned 
which is the aim of the regression of the synthesis, I should 
call the two former, in a more* limited signification, cosmical 
conceptions, the remaining twd transcendent physical concep- 
tions. This distinction does not at present seem to be of par- 
ticular importance, but we shall afterwards find it to be of 
some value. 

ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. 

Section Second. 

Antithetic of Pure Reason. 

Thetic is the term applied to every collection of dogmatical 
propositions. By antithetic I do not understand dogmatical 
assertions of the opposite, but the self-contradiction of seem- 
ingly dogmatical cognitions {thesis cum antithesi), in none of 
which we can discover any decided superiority. Antithetic 
is not therefore occupied with one-sided statements, but is 
engaged in considering the contradictory nature of the general 
cognitions of reason, and its causes. Transcendental antithetic 
is an investigation into the antinomy of pure reason, its causes 
and result. If we employ our reason not merely in the appli- 
cation of the principles of the understanding to objects of ex- 



2"4 TEANSCEKDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

^rience, but venture with it beyond these boundaries, there 
arise certain sophistical propositions or theorems. These 
assertions have the following peculiarities : They can find 
neither confirmation nor confutation in experience ; and each 
is in itself not only self- consistent, but possesses conditions 
of its necessity in the very nature of reason — only that, un- 
luckily, there exist just as valid and necessary grounds for 
maintaining the contrary proposition. 

The questions which naturally arise in the consideration of 
this dialectic of pure reason, are therefore : 1st. In what pro- 
positions is pure reason unavoidably subject to an antinomy ? 
2nd. What are the causes of this antinomy? 3rd. Whether 
and in what way can reason free itself from this self-contra- 
diction ? 

A dialectical proposition or theorem of pure reason, must, 
according to what has been said, be distinguishable from all 
sophistical propositions, by the fact that it is not an answer to 
an arbitrary question, which may be raised at the mere pleasure 
of any person, but to one which human reason must neces- 
sarily encounter in its progress. In the second place, a dia- 
lectical proposition, with its opposite, does not carry the ap- 
pearance of a merely artificial illusion, which disappears as 
soon as it is investigated, but a natural and unavoidable illusion, 
which, even when we are no longer deceived by it, continues 
to mock us, and, although rendered harmless, can never be 
completely removed. 

This dialectical doctrine will not relate to the unity of under- 
standing in empirical conceptions, but to the unity of reason 
in pure ideas. The conditions of this doctrine are — inasmuch 
as it must, as a synthesis according to rules, be conformable 
to the understanding, and at the same time as the absolute 
unity of the synthesis, to the reason — that, if it is adequate 
to the unity of reason, it is too great for the understanding, if 
according with the understanding, it is too small for the reason. 
Hence arises a mutual opposition, which cannot be avoided, 
do what we will. 

These sophistical assertions of dialectic open, as it were, a 
battle-field, where that side obtains the victory which has been 
permitted to make tl e attack, and he is compelled to yield 
who has been unfortunately obliged to stand on the defensive. 
And hence, champions of ability, whether on the right or on 



ANTITHETIC OF PURE BEA80N. 26S 

the wrong side, are certain to carry away the crown of victory, 
if they only take care to have the right to make the last 
attack, and are not obliged to sustain another onset from 
their opponent. We can easily believe that this arena has 
;een often trampled by the feet of combatants, that many 
victories have been obtained on both sides, but that the last 
victory, decisive of the affair between the contending parties, 
was won by him who fought for the right, only if his adver- 
sary was forbidden to continue the tourney. As impartial 
umpires, we must lay aside entirely the consideration whether 
the combatants are fighting for the right or for the wrong side, 
for the true or for the false, and allow the combat to be first 
decided. Perhaps, after they have wearied more than injured 
each other, they will discover the nothingness of their cause of 
quarrel, and part good friends. 

This method of watching, or rather of originating, a con- 
flict of assertions, not for the purpose of finally deciding in 
favour of either side, but to discover whether the object of 
the struggle is not a mere illusion, which each strives in vain 
to reach, but which would be no gain even when reached, — 
this procedure, I say, may be termed the sceptical method. 
It is thoroughly distinct from scepticism — the principle of a 
technical and scientific ignorance, which undermines the foun- 
dations of all knowledge, in order, if possible, to destroy our 
belief and confidence therein. For the sceptical method aims 
at certainty, by endeavouring to discover in a conflict of this 
kind, conducted honestly and intelligently on both sides, 
the point of misunderstanding ; just as wise legislators derive, 
from the embarrassment of judges in lawsuits, information in 
regard to the defective and ill-defined parts of their statutes. 
The antinomy which reveals itself in the application of laws, 
is for our limited wisdom the best criterion of legislation. For 
the attention of reason, which in abstract speculation does not 
easily become conscious of its errors, is thus roused to the 
momenta in the determination of its principles. 

But this sceptical method is essentially peculiar to trans- 
cendental philosophy, and can perhaps be dispensed with 
in every other held of investigation. In mathematics its 
use would be absurd ; because m it no false assertions can 
long remain hidden, inasmuch as its demonstrations .must 
always proceed under the c-uidance of pure intuition, and 



266 



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 



by means of an always evident synthesis. In experimental 
philosophy doubt and delay may be very useful ; but no 
misunderstanding is possible, which cannot be easily re- 
moved ; and in experience means of solving the difficulty 
and putting an end to the dissension must at last be found, 
whether sooner or later. Moral philosophy can always exhibit 
its principles, with their practical consequences, in concreto— 
at least in possible experiences, and thus escape the mistakes 
and ambiguities of abstraction. But transcendental pro- 
positions, which lay claim to insight beyond the region of 
possible experience, cannot, on the one hand, exhibit their 
abstract synthesis in any a priori intuition, nor, on the other, 
expose a lurking error by the help of experience. Transcen- 
dental reason, therefore, presents us with no other criterion, 
than that of an attempt to reconcile such assertions, and for 
this purpose to permit a free and unrestrained conflict be- 
tween them. And this we now proceed to arrange.* 

THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. 



FIRST CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. 



Thesis. 
The world has a beginning 
in time, and is also limited in 
regard to space. 

Proof. 
Granted, that the world has 
no beginning in time ; up to 
every given moment of time, 
an eternity must have elapsed, 
and therewith passed away an 
infinite series of successive 
conditions or states of things 
in the world. Now the infi- 
nity of a series consists in the 
fact, that it never can be com- 
pleted by means of a succes- 



* The antinomies stand in the order 
above detailed. 



Antithesis. 

The world has no beginning, 
and no limits in space, but is, 
in relation both to time and 
space, infinite. 

Proof. 

For let it be granted, that 
it has a beginning. A begin- 
ning is an existence which is 
preceded by a time in which 
the thing does not exist. On 
the above supposition, it follows 
that there must have been a 
time in which the world did 
not exist, that is, a void time. 
Rut in a void time the origina- 
tion of a thing is impossible ; 

of the four transcendental ideas 



PIEST ANTINOMY. 



267 



Thesis. 
give synthesis. It follows 
that an infinite series already 
elapsed is impossible, and 
that consequently a begin- 
ning of the world is a ne- 
cessary condition of its exist- 
ence. And this was the first 
thing to be proved. 

As regards the second, let us 
take the opposite for granted. 
In this case, the world must 
be an infinite given total of 
coexistent things. Now we 
cannot cogitate the dimensions 
of a quantity, which is not 
given within certain limits of 
an intuition,* in any other way 
than by means of the synthesisf 
of its parts, and the total of 
such a quantity only by means 
of a completed synthesis, or 
the repeated addition of unity 
to itself. Accordingly, to 
cogitate the world, which fills 

* We may consider an undeter- 
mined quantity as a whole, when it 
is enclosed within limits, although 
we cannot construct or ascertain its 
totality by measurement, that is, by 
the successive synthesis of its parts. 
For its limits of themselves deter- 
mine its completeness as a whole. 

t What is meant by successive 
synthesis must be tolerably plain. If 
I am required to form some notion 
of a piece of land, I may assume 
an arbitrary standard, — a mile, or 
an acre, — and by the successive ad- 
dition of mile to mile or acre to acre 
till the proper number is reached, 
consti-uct for myself a notion of the 
size of the land. — Tr. 



Antithesis. 
because no part of any such 
time contains a distinctive con- 
dition of being, in preference 
to that of non-being (whether 
the supposed thing originate of 
itself, or by means of some 
other cause). Consequently, 
many series of things may have 
a beginning in the world, but 
the world itself cannot have a 
beginning, and is, therefore, in 
relation to past time, infinite. 

As regards the second state- 
ment, let us first take the op- 
posite for granted — that the 
world is finite and limited in 
space ; it follows that it must 
exist in a void space, which is 
not limited. We should there- 
fore meet not only with a re- 
lation of things in space, but 
also a relation of things to 
space. Now, as the world is 
an absolute whole, out of and 
beyond which no object of in- 
tuition, and consequently no 
correlate to which can be 
discovered, this relation of the 
world to a void space is merely 
a relation to no object. But 
such a relation, and conse- 
quently the limitation of the 
world by void space, is nothing. 
Consequently, the world, as 
regards space, is not limited, 
that is, it is infinite in regard 
to extension.* 

* Space is merely the form of ex- 
ternal intuition (formal intuition), 
and not a real object which oan be 



268 



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 



Thesis. 
all spaces, as a whole, the suc- 
cessive synthesis of the parts 
of an infinite world must be 
looked upon as completed, that 
is to say, an infinite time must 
be regarded as having elapsed 
in the enumeration of all co- 
existing things ; which is im- 
possible. For this reason an 
infinite aggregate of actual 
things cannot be considered as 
a given whole, consequently, 
not as a contemporaneously 
given whole. The world is con- 
sequently, as regards extension 
in space, not infinite, but en- 
closed in limits. And this was 
the second thing to be proved. 



Antithesis. 
externally perceived. Space, prioi 
to all things which determine it (fill or 
limit it), or, rather, which present an 
empirical intuition conformable to it, 
is, under the title of absolute space, 
nothing but the mere possibility of 
external phaenomena, in so far as 
they either exist in themselves, or 
can annex themselves to given in- 
tuitions, Empirical intuition is 
therefore not a composition of phae - 
nomena and space (of perception and 
empty intuition). The one is not 
the correlate of the other in a synthe- 
sis, but they are vitally connected in 
the same empirical intuition, as mat- 
ter and form. If we wish to set one 
of these two apart from the other — 
space from phaenomena — there arise 
all sorts of empty determinations of 
external intuition, which are very far 
from being possible perceptions. 
For example, motion or rest of the 
world in an infinite empty space, or a 
determination of the mutual relation 
of both, cannot possibly be perceived, 
and is therefore merely the predicate 
of a notional entitv. 



Observations on the First Antinomy. 



On the Thesis. 
In bringing forward these 
conflicting arguments, I have 
not been on the search for so- 
phisms, far the purpose of 
availing myself of special plead- 
ing, which takes advantage of 
the carelessness of the opposite 
party, appeals to a misunder- 
stood statute, and erects its 
unrighteous claims upon an 
unfair interpretation. Both 
proofs originate fairly from the 



On the Antithesis. 
The proof in favour of the 
infinity of the cosmical suc- 
cession and the cosmical con- 
tent is based upon the con- 
sideration, that, in the opposite 
case, a void time and a void 
space must constitute the limits 
of the world. Now I am not 
unaware, that there are some 
| ways of escaping this conclu- 
| sion. It may, for example, 
) be alleged, that a limit to the 



SIEST ANTINOMY". 



269 



Thesis. 
nature of the case, and the ad- 
vantage presented by the mis- 
takes of the dogmatists of both 
parties has been completely- 
set aside. 

The thesis might also have 
been unfairly demonstrated, 
by the introduction of an erro- 
neous conception of the infi- 
nity of a given quantity. A 
quantity is infinite, if a greater 
than itself cannotpossibly exist. 
The quantity is measured by 
the number of given units — 
which are taken as a standard 
— contained in it. Now no 
number can be the greatest, 
because one or more units can 
always be added. It follows 
that an infinite given quantity, 
consequently an infinite world 
(both as regards time and 
extension) is impossible. It 
is, therefore, limited in both 
respects. In this manner I 
might have conducted my 
proof ; but the conception 
given in it does not agree 
with the true conception of 
an infinite whole. In this 
there is no representation of 
its quantity, it is not said how 
large it is ; consequently its 
conception is not the concep- 
tion of a maximum. We cogi- 
tate in it merely its relation 
to an arbitrarily assumed unit, 
in relation to which it is greater 
than any number. Now, just 
as the unit which is taken is 



Antithesis. 
world, as regards both space 
and time, is quite possible, 
without at the same time hold- 
ing the existence of an abso- 
lute time before the begin- 
ning of the world, or an abso- 
lute space extending beyond 
the actual world — which is 
impossible. I am quite well 
satisfied with the latter part 
of this opinion of the phi- 
losophers of the Leibnitzian 
school. Space is merely the 
form of external intuition, but 
not a real object which can it- 
self be externally intuited ; it 
is not a correlate of pheeno- 
mena, it is the form of pheno- 
mena itself. Space, therefore, 
cannot be regarded as abso- 
lutely and in itself something 
determinative of the existence 
of things, because it is not it- 
self an object, but only the 
form of possible objects. Con- 
sequently, things, as phseno- 
mena, determine space ; that 
is to say, they render it possi- 
ble that, of all the possible 
predicates of space (size and 
relation), certain may belong to 
reality. But we cannot affirm 
the converse, that space, as 
something self-subsistent, can 

determine real things in regard 

. . . . 
to size or shape, for it is in it- 
self not a real thing. Space 
(filled or void)* may there- 

* It is evident that what is meant 
here is, that empty space, in so fai 



270 



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 



Thesis, 
greater or smaller, the infinite 
will be greater or smaller ; but 
the infinity, which consists 
merely in the relation to this 
given unit, must remain always 
the same, although the abso- 
lute quantity of the whole is 
not thereby cognized. 

The true (transcendental) 
conception of infinity is : that 
the successsive synthesis of 
unity in the measurement of a 
given quantum can never be 
completed.* Hence it follows, 
without possibility of mistake, 
that an eternity of actual suc- 
cessive states up to a given 
(the present) moment cannot 
have elapsed, and that the 
world must therefore have a 
beginning. 

In regard to the second part 
of the thesis, the difficulty 
as to an infinite and yet elapsed 
series disappears ; for the mani- 
fold of a world infinite in ex- 
tension is contemporaneously 
given. But, in order to cogi- 
tate the total of this mani- 
fold, as we cannot have the aid 
of limits constituting by them- 
selves this total in intuition, 
we are obliged to give some 
account of our conception, 
which in this case cannot pro- 

* The quantum in this sense con- 
tains a congeries of given units, 
which is greater than any number 
— and this is the mathematical con- 
ception of the infinite. 



Antithesis. 
fore be limited by phaenoniena, 
but phaenomena cannot be 
limited by an empty space 
without them. This is true of 
time also. All this being 
granted, it is nevertheless in- 
disputable, that we must as- 
sume these two nonentities, 
void space without and void 
time before the world, if we 
assume the existence of cos- 
mical limits, relatively to space 
or time. 

For, as regards the subter- 
fuge adopted by those who 
endeavour to evade the conse- 
quence — that, if the world is 
limited as to space and time, 
the infinite void must deter- 
mine the existence of actual 
things in regard to their di- 
mensions — it arises solely from 
the fact that, instead of a sen- 
suous world, an intelligible 
world — of which nothing is 
known — is cogitated; instead of 
a real beginning (an existence, 
which is preceded by a period 
in which nothing exists) an ex- 
istence which presupposes no 
other condition than that of 
time ; and, instead of limits 
of extension, boundaries of 

as it is limited by phaenomena — 
space, that is, within the world — 
does not at least contradict trans- 
cendental principles, and may there- 
fore, as regards them, be admitted, 
although its possibility cannot on 
that account be affirmed. 



/ 



SECOND ANTINOMY. 



271 



Thesis. 
coed from the whole to the 
determined quantity of the 
parts, but must demonstrate 
the possibility of a whole by 
means of a successive synthesis 
of the parts. But as this syn- 
thesis must constitute a series 
that cannot be completed, it is 
impossible for us to cogitate 
prior to it, and consequently 
not by means of it, a totality. 
For the conception of totality 
itself is in the present case the 
representation of a completed 
synthesis of the parts ; and this 
completion, and consequently 
its conception, is impossible. 



Antithesis. 
the universe. But the ques- 
tion relates to the mundus phe- 
nomenon, and its quantity ; and 
in this case we cannot make 
abstraction of the conditions 
of sensibility, without doing 
away with the essential reality 
of this world itself. The world 
of sense, if it is limited, must 
necessarily lie in the infinite 
void. If this, and with it 
space as the a priori condition 
of the possibility of pheeno- 
mena, is left out of view, the 
whole world of sense disap- 
pears. In our problem is this 
alone considered as given. The 
mundus intelligibilis is nothing 
but the general conception of 
a world, in which abstraction 
has been made of all condi- 
tions of intuition, and in rela- 
tion to which no synthetical 
proposition — either affirma- 
tive or negative — is possible. 



ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. 



SECOND CONFLICT OE THE TEANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. 



Thesis. 

Every composite substance 
in the world consists of simple 
parts ; and there exists nothing 
that is not either itself simple, 
or composed of simple parts. 

Peooe. 
For, grant that composite 
substances do not consist of 



Antithesis. 

No composite thing in the 
world consists of simple parts ; 
and there does not exist in the 
world any simple substance. 

Peooe. 
Let it be supposed that a 
composite thing (as substance) 
consists of simple parts. In- 



272 



TRANSCENDENTAL DrALLX'TTC. 



Thesis. 
simple parts ; in this case, if ' 
all combination or composition 
were annihilated in thought, ' 
no composite part, and (as, by 
the supposition, there do not 
exist simple parts) no simple 
part would exist. Consequent- 
ly, no substance ; consequent- 
ly, nothing would exist. Ei- 
ther, then, it is impossible 
to annihilate composition in 
thought ; or, after such anni- 
hilation, there must remain 
something that subsists without 
composition, that is, something 
that is simple. But in the 
former case , the composite 
could not itself consist of sub- 
stances, because with sub- 
stances composition is merely 
a contingent relation, apart 
from which they must still ex- 
ist as self-subsistent beings. 
Now, as this case contradicts 
the supposition, the second 
must contain the truth' — that 
the substantial composite in the 
world consists of simple parts. 
It follows as an immediate 
inference, that the things in the 
world are all, without exception, 
simple beings, — that composi- 
tion is merely an external con- 
dition pertaining to them, — and 
that, although we never can 
separate and isolate the ele- 
mentary substances from the 
state of composition, reason 
must cogitate these as the pri- 
mary subjects of all composi- 



Anti thesis. 
asmuch as all external relation, 
consequently all composition 
of substances, is possible only 
in space ; the space, occupied 
by that which is composite, 
must consist of the same num- 
ber of parts as is contained 
in the composite. But space 
does not consist of simple 
parts, but of spaces. There- 
fore, every part of the compo- 
site must occupy a space. But 
the absolutely primary parts of 
what is composite are simple. 
It follows that what is simple 
occupies a space. Now, as 
everything real that occupies a 
space, contains a manifold the 
parts of which are external to 
each other, and is consequently 
composite — and a real compo- 
site, not of accidents (for these 
cannot exist external to each 
other apart from substance), 
but of substances, — it follows 
that the simple must be a sub- 
stantial composite, which is 
self-contradictory. 

The second proposition of 
the antithesis — that there ex- 
ists in the world nothing that 
is simple — is here equivalent to 
the following : The existence 
of the absolutely simple can- 
not be demonstrated from any 
experience or perception either 
external or internal ; and the 
absolutely simple is a mere 
idea, the objective reality of 
which cannot be demonstrated 



SECOND ANTINOMY. 



2/3 



Thesis. ! Antithesis. 

tion, and consequently, as prior j in any possible experience; it 
thereto, — and as simple suo- is consequently, in the exposi- 
stances, tion of phsenomena, without 

application and object. For, 
let us take for granted that an 
object may be found in ex- 
perience for this transcenden- 
tal idea ; the empirical intui- 
tion of such an object must 
then be recognized to contain 
absolutely no manifold with its 
parts external to each other, 
and connected into unity. 
Now, as we cannot reason from 
the non-consciousness of such 
a manifold to the impossibility 
of its existence in the intuition 
i 01 an object, and as the proof of 
i this impossibility is necessary 
i ior the establishment and proof 
» of absolute simplicity ; it fol- 
lows, that this simplicity cannot 
be inferred from any percep- 
tion whatever. As, therefore, an 
absolutely simple object cannot 
be given in any experience, 
and the world of sense must 
be considered as the sum-total 
ef all possible experiences ; 
nothing simple exists in the 
world. 

This second proposition in 
the antithesis has a more ex- 
tended aim than the first. The 
nrst merely banishes the sim- 
ple from the intuition of the 
I composite ; while the second 
I drives it entirely out of na- 
I ture. Hence we were unable 
I to demonstrate it from the 



274 



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 



Thesis. i Antithesis. 

conception of a given object of 
external intuition (of the com- 
posite), but we were obliged 
to prove it from the relation 
of a given object to a possible 
experience in general. 

Observations on the Second Antinomy. 



I. 

On the Thesis. 

When I speak of a whole, 
which necessarily consists of 
simple parts, I understand 
thereby only a substantial 
whole, as the true composite ; 
that is to say, I understand 
that contingent unity of the 
manifold which is given as per- 
fectly isolated (at least in 
thought), placed in reciprocal 
connection, and thus consti- 
tuted a unity. Space ought 
not to be called a compositum 
but a totum, for its parts are 
possible in the whole, and not 
the whole by means of the 
parts. It might perhaps be 
called a compositum ideate, but 
not a compositum reale. But 
this is of no importance. As 
space is not a composite of 
substances (and not even of 
real accidents), if I abstract 
all composition therein, — no- 
thing, not even a point, re- 
mains ; for a point is possible 
only as the limit of a space, — 
consequently of a composite. 
Space and time, therefore, do 



II. 

On the Antithesis. 

Against the assertion of the 
infinite subdivisibility of mat- 
ter, whose ground of proof is 
purely mathematical, objec- 
tions have been alleged by the 
Monadists. These objections 
lay themselves open, at first 
sight, to suspicion, from the 
fact that they do not recog- 
nize the clearest mathematical 
proofs as propositions relating 
to the constitution of space, in 
so far as it is really the formal 
condition of the possibility of 
all matter, but regard them 
merely as inferences from ab- 
stract but arbitrary concep- 
tions, which cannot have any 
application to real things. 
Just as if it were possible to 
imagine another mode of in- 
tuition than that given in the 
primitive intuition of space ; 
and just as if its a priori de- 
terminations did not apply to 
everything, the existence of 
which is possible, from the fact 
alone of its filling space. If we 
listen to them, we shall find 



OBSERVATIONS OX THE SECOND ANTINOMY. 



Thesis. 
not consist of simple parts. 
That which belongs only to 
the condition or state of a 
substance, even although it 
possesses a quantity (motion 
or change, for example), like- 
wise does not consist of simple 
parts. That is to say, a cer- 
tain degree of change does not 
originate from the addition of 
many simple changes. Our 
inference of the simple from 
the composite is valid only of 
self-subsisting things. But 
the accidents of a state are not 
self-subsistent. The proof, 
then, for the necessity of the 
simple, as the component part 
of all that is substantial and 
composite, may prove a failure, 
and the whole case of this the- 
sis be lost, if we carry the pro- 
position too far, and wish to 
make it valid of everything 
that is composite without dis- 
tinction — as indeed has really 
now and then happened. Be- 
sides, I am here speaking only 
of the simple, in so far as it 
is necessarily given in the com- 
posite — the latter being capa- 
ble of solution into the former 
as its component parts. The 
proper signification of the 
word monas (as employed by 
Leibnitz) ought to relate to 
the simple, given immediately 
as simple substance (for ex- 
ample, in consciousness), and 
not as an element of the 



Antithesis. 
ourselves required to cogitate, 
in addition to the mathemati- 
cal point, which is simple — 
not, however, a part, but a 
mere limit of space — physical 
points, which are indeed like- 
wise simple, but possess the 
peculiar property, as parts of 
space, of filling it merely by 
their aggregation. I shall not 
repeat here the common and 
clear refutations of this ab- 
surdity, which are to be found 
everywhere in numbers : every 
one knows that it is impossi- 
ble to undermine the evidence 
of mathematics by mere dis- 
cursive conceptions ; I shall 
only remark, that, if in this 
case philosophy endeavours to 
gain an advantage over mathe- 
matics by sophistical artifices, 
it is because it forgets that the 
discussion relates solely to •phe- 
nomena and their conditions. 
It is not sufficient to find the 
conception of the simple for 
the pure conception of the com- 
posite, but we must discover 
for the intuition of the compo- 
site (matter), the intuition of 
the simple. Now this, ac- 
cording to the laws of sensi- 
bility, and consequently in the 
case of objects of sense, is ut- 
terly impossible. In the case 
of a whole composed of sub- 
stances, which is cogitated 
solely by the pure understand- 
ing, it may be necessary to be 
T 2" 



276 



TBANSCEKDENTAL DIALECTIC. 



Thesis. 
composite. As an element, 
the term atomus* would be 
more appropriate. And as I 
wish to prove the existence of 
simple substances, only in re- 
lation to, and as the elements 
of, the composite, I might 
term the antithesis of the se- 
cond Antinomy, transcenden- 
tal Atomistic. But as this 
word has long been employed 
to designate a particular theory 
of corporeal phsenomena (?no- 
leculce), and thus presupposes 
a basis of empirical concep- 
tions, I prefer calling it the 
dialectical principle of Mona- 
dology. 

* A masculine formed by Kant, 
instead of the common neuter ato- 
mon, which is generally translated 
in the scholastic philosophy by the 
terms i/iseparabile, indiscernibiie, 
simplex. Kant wished to have a 
term opposed to monas, and so hit 
upon this airaZ XeySfievov. With 
Democritus tiro/iog, and with Cicero 
atomus is feminine. — Note by Ro~ 
uenkranz. 



Antithesis. 
in possession of the simple be- 
fore composition is possible. 
But this does not hold good 
of the Toturn substantiate phe- 
nomenon, which, as an empi- 
rical intuition in space, pos- 
sesses the necessary property 
of containing no simple part, 
for the very reason, that no 
part of space is simple. Mean- 
while, the Monadists have been 
subtle enough to escape from 
this difficulty, by presupposing 
intuition and the dynamical 
relation of substances as the 
condition of the possibility of 
space, instead of regarding 
space as the condition of the 
possibility of the objects of 
external intuition, that is, of 
bodies. Now we have a con- 
ception of bodies only as phe- 
nomena, and, as such, they 
necessarily presuppose space 
as the condition of all external 
phenomena. The evasion is 
therefore in vain ; as, indeed, 
we have sufficiently shown in 
our iEsthetic. If bodies were 
things in themselves, the proof 
of the Monadists would be un- 
exceptionable. 

The second dialectical as- 
sertion possesses the peculi- 
arity of having opposed to it a 
dogmatical proposition, which, 
among all such sophistical 
statements, is the only one 
that undertakes to prove in the 
case of an object of experience, 



OBSERVATIONS ON THE SECOND ANTINOMY. 



277 



Thesis. 



Antithesis. 
that which is properly a trans- 
cendental idea — the absolute 
simplicity of substance. The 
proposition is, that the object 
of the internal sense, the think- 
ing Ego, is an absolute simple 
substance. Without at present 
entering upon this subject — 
as it has been considered at 
length in a former chapter — I 
shall merely remark, that, if 
something is cogitated merely 
as an object, without the addi- 
tion of any synthetical determi- 
nation of its intuition — as hap- 
pens in the case of the bare 
representation, I — it is certain 
that no manifold and no com- 
position can be perceived in 
such a representation. As, 
moreover, the predicates where- 
by I cogitate this object are 
merely intuitions of the in- 
ternal sense, there cannot be 
discovered in them anything 
to prove the existence of a 
manifold whose parts are ex- 
ternal to each other, and con- 
sequently, nothing to prove 
the existence of real compo- 
sition. Consciousness, there- 
fore, is so constituted, that, 
inasmuch as the thinking sub- 
ject is at the same time its 
own object, it cannot divide 
itself — although it can divide 
its inhering determinations. 
For every object in relation to 
itself is absolute unity. Never- 
theless, if the subject is re- 



27S 



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 



Antithesis. 
\ garded externally, as an object 
J of intuition, it must, in its 
j character of phsenomenon, 
j possess the property of com- 
position. And it must always 
be regarded in this manner, if 
we wish to know, whether 
there is or is not contained 
in it a manifold whose parts 
are external to each other. 



ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. 



THIED CONFLICT OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. 

Thesis. 
Causality according to the 
laws of nature, is not the only 
causality operating to originate 
the phsenomena of the world. 
A causality of freedom is also 
necessary to account fully for 
these phsenomena. 



Proof. 
Let it be supposed, that there 
is no other kind of causality 
than that according to the laws 
of nature. Consequently, every- 
thing that happens presuppo- 
ses a previous condition, which 
it follows with absolute certain- 
ty, in conformity with a rule. 
But this previous condition 
must itself be something that 
has happened (that has arisen 
in time, as it did not exist be- 
fore), for, if it has always been 
in existence, its consequence 
or effect would not thus origi- 
nate for the first time, but 



Antithesis. 
There is no such thing as 
freedom, but everything in the 
world happens solely accord- 
ing to the laws of nature. 



Proof. 
Granted, that there does ex- 
ist freedom in the transcenden- 
tal sense, as a peculiar kind of 
causality, operating to produce 
events in the world — a faculty, 
that is to say, of originating a 
state, and consequently a series 
of consequences from that state. 
In this case, not only the series 
originated by this spontaneity, 
but the determination of this 
spontaneity itself to the pro- 
duction of the series, that is 
to say, the causality itself must 
have an absolute commence- 
ment, such, that nothing can 
precede to determine this action 
according to unvarying laws. 
But every beginning of action 



THIRD ANTINOMY. 



279 



Thesis. 
would likewise have always ex- 
isted. The causality, there- 
fore, of a cause, whereby some- 
thing happens, is itself a thing 
that has happened. Now this 
again presupposes, in confor- 
mity with the law of nature, a 
previous condition and its caus- 
ality, and this another anterior 
to the former, and so on. If, 
then, every thinghappens solely 
in accordance with the laws of 
nature, there cannot be any 
real first beginning of things, 
but only a subaltern or com- 
parative beginning. There 
cannot, therefore, be a com- 
pleteness of series on the side 
of the causes which originate 
the one from the other. But 
the law of nature is, that no- 
thing can happen without a 
sufficient a priori determined 
cause. The proposition, there- 
fore — if all causality is possible 
only in accordance with the 
laws of nature — is, when stated 
in this unlimited and general 
manner, self-contradictory. It 
follows that this cannot be the 
only kind of causality. 

From what has been said, it 
follows that a causality must 
be admitted, bymeans of which 
something happens, without 
its cause being determined ac- 
cording to necessary laws by 
some other cause preceding. 
That is to say, there must ex- 
ist an absolute spontaneity of 



Antithesis. 
presupposes in the acting cause 
a state of inaction ; and a dy- 
namically primal beginning of 
action presupposes a state, 
which has no connection — as 
regards causality — with tile 
preceding state of the cause, 
— which does not, that is, in 
any wise result from it. Tran- 
scendental freedom is therefore 
opposed to the natural law of 
cause and effect, and such a 
conjunction of successive states 
in effective causes is destructive 
of the possibility of unity in 
experience, and for that reason 
not to be found in experience 
— is consequently a mere fiction 
of thought. 

We have, therefore, nothing 
but nature, to which we must 
look for connection and order 
in cosmical events. Freedom — 
independence of the laws ot 
nature — is certainly a deliver- 
ance from • restraint, but it is 
also a relinquishing of the gui- 
dance of law and rule. For 
it cannot be alleged, that, in- 
stead of the laws of nature, 
laws of freedom may be intro- 
duced into the causality of the 
course of nature. For, if free- 
dom were determined accord- 
ing to laws, it would be no 
longer freedom, but merely 
nature. Nature, therefore, and 
transcendental freedom are dis- 
tinguishable as conformity to 
law and lawlessness. The for- 



280 



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 



Thesis. 
cause, which of itself origi- 
nates a series of phsenomena 
which proceeds according to 
natural laws, — consequently 
transcendental freedom, with- 
out which even in the course of 
nature the succession of phse- 
nomena on the side of causes 
is never complete. 



Antithesis. 
mer imposes upon understand- 
ing the difficulty of seeking 
the origin of events ever higher 
and higher in the series of 
causes, inasmuch as causality 
is always conditioned thereby ; 
while it compensates this labour 
by the guarantee of a unity 
complete and in conformity 
with law. The latter ; on the 
contrary, holds out to the un- 
derstanding the promise of a 
point of rest in the chain of 
causes, by conducting it to an 
unconditioned causality, which 
professes to have the power of 
spontaneous origination, but 
which, in its own utter blind- 
ness, deprives it of the guidance 
of rules, by which alone a 
completely connected experi- 
ence is possible. 

Observations on the Third Antinomy. 

II. 

On the Antithesis 
The assertor of the all-suf- 
ficiency of nature in regard tc 
causality (transcendental Phy- 
siocracy), in opposition to the 
doctrine of freedom, would de- 
fend his view of the question 
somewhat in the following 
manner. He would say, in an- 
swer to the sophistical argu- 
ments of the opposite party : 
If you do not accept a mathe- 
matical first, in relation to 
time, you have no need to seek 
a dynamical first, in regard to 



On the Thesis. 
The transcendental idea of 
freedom is far from constitut- 
ing the entire content of the 
psychological conception so 
termed, which is for the most 
part empirical. It merely pre- 
sents us with the conception of 
spontaneity of action, as the 
proper ground for imputing 
freedom to the cause of a 
certain class of objects. It is, 
however, the true stumbling- 
stone to philosophy, which 
meets with unconquerable dif- 



OBSERVATIONS ON THE THIRD ANTINOMY. 



281 



transcendental 
the question, 
must be held 



Thesis. 
Acuities in the way of its ad- i 
mining this kind of uncondi- 
tioned causality. That ele- 
ment in the question of the 
freedom of the will, which 
has for so long a time placed 
speculative reason in such 
perplexity, is properly only 
and concerns 
whether there 
to exist a fa- 
culty of spontaneous origi- 
nation of a series of successive i 
things or states. How such a I 
faculty is possible, is not a I 
necessary inquiry ; for in the 
case of natural causality it- 
self, we are obliged to content 
ourselves with the a priori 
knowledge that such a causa- 
lity must be presupposed, al- 
though we are quite incapable 
of comprehending how the 
being of one thing is possible 
through the being of another, 
but must for this information 
look entirely to experience. 
Now we have demonstrated 
this necessity of a free first 
beginning of a series of phse- 
nomena, only in so far as it 
is required for the compre- 
hension of an origin of the 
world, all following states 
being regarded as a succession 
according to laws of nature 
alone. But, as there has thus 
been proved the existence of 
a faculty which can of itself 
originate a series in time — al- 



Antithesis. 
causality. Who compelled you 
to imagine an absolutely pri- 
mal condition of the world, 
and therewith an absolute be- 
ginning of the gradually pro- 
gressing successions of phseno- 
mena — and, as some founda- 
tion for this fancy of yours, 
to set bounds to unlimited 
nature 1 Inasmuch as the 
substances in the world have 
always existed — at least the 
unity of experience renders 
such a supposition quite neces- 
sary — there is no difficulty in 
believing also, that the changes 
in the conditions of these sub- 
stances have always existed ; 
and, consequently, that a first 
beginning, mathematical or 
dynamical, is by no means re- 
quired. The possibility of 
such an infinite derivation, 
without any initial member 
from which all the others 
result, is certainly quite in- 
comprehensible. But if you 
are rash enough to deny the 
enigmatical secrets of nature 
for this reason, you will 
find yourselves obliged to 
deny also the existence of 
many fundamental properties 
of natural objects (such as 
fundamental forces), which 
you can just as little compre- 
hend ; and even the possi- 
bility of so simple a concep- 
tion as that of change must 
present to you insuperable dif- 



282 



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 



Thesis. 
though we are unable to ex- 
plain how it can exist — we 
feel ourselves authorised to ad- 
mit, even in the midst of the 
natural course of events, a be- 
ginning, as regards causality, 
of different successions of phse- 
nomena, and at the same time 
to attribute to all substances 
a faculty of free action. But 
we ought in this case not to 
allow ourselves to fall into 
a common misunderstanding, 
and to suppose that, because 
a successive series in the 
world can only have a compara- 
tively first beginning — another 
state or condition of things 
always preceding — an abso- 
lutely first beginning of a series 
in the course of nature is im- 
possible. For we are not 
speaking here of an absolutely 
first beginning in relation to 
time, but as regards causality 
alone. When, for example, I, 
completely of my own free 
will, and independently of the 
necessarily determinative in- 
fluence of natural causes, rise 
from my chair, there com- 
mences with this event, includ- 
ing its material consequences 
in infinitum, an absolutely new 
series ; although, in relation to 
time, this event is merely the 
continuation of a preceding- 
series. For this resolution 
and act of mine do not form 
part of the succession of effects 



Antithesis. 
Acuities. For if experience 
did not teach you that it was 
real, you never could conceive 
a priori the possibility of this 
ceaseless sequence of being and 
non-being. 

But if the existence of a 
transcendental faculty of free- 
dom is granted — a faculty of 
originating changes in the 
world — this faculty must at 
least exist out of and apart 
from the world ; although it 
is certainly a bold assump- 
tion, that, over and above the 
complete content' of all pos- 
sible intuitions, there still 
exists an object whieh cannot 
be presented in any possible 
perception. But, to attribute 
to substances in the world it- 
self such a faculty, is quite 
inadmissible ; for, in this case, 
the connection of phsenomena 
reciprocally determining and 
determined according to gene- 
ral laws, which is termed na- 
ture, and along with it the 
criteria of empirical truth, 
which enable us to distinguish 
experience from mere visionary 
dreaming, would almost en- 
tirely disappear. In proxi- 
mity with such a lawless fa- 
culty of freedom, a system of 
nature is hardly cogitable ; 
for the laws of the latter would 
be continually subject to the 
intrusive influences of the 
former, and the course of 



OBSEEVATIONS ON THE THIED ANTINOMY. 283 



Thesis. . Antithes 



is. 



in nature, and are not mere 
continuations of it ; on the 
contrary, the determining 
causes of nature cease to ope- 
rate in reference to this event, 
which certainly succeeds the 
acts of nature, but does not 
proceed from them. For these J 
reasons, the action of a free 
agent must be termed, in re- j 
gard to causality, if not in re- • 
lation to time, an absolutely j 
primal beginning of a series j 
of phsenomena. ) 

The justification of this need i 
of reason to rest upon a free | 
act as the first beginning of) 
the series of natural causes, is ; 
evident from the fact, that! 
all philosophers of antiquity j 
(with the exception of the Epi- J 
curean school) felt themselves j 
obliged, when constructing z j 
theory of the motions of the j 
universe, to accept a prime j 
mower, that is, a freely acting j 
cause, which spontaneously j 
and prior to all other causes j 
evolved this series of states, j 
They always felt the need of 
going beyond mere nature, I 
for the purpose of making n • 
first beginning comprehend- j 
ble. I 



pb8enomena,whichwould other- 
wise proceed regularlyand uni- 
formly, would become there- 
by confused and disconnected. 



2S4 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC, 



ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. 

FOURTH CONFLICT OE THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEaS. 

Thesis. \ Antithesis. 

There exists either in, or in j An absolutely necessary being 
connection with the world — jdoes not exist, either in the 
either as a part of it, or as the i world, or out of it — as its cause, 
cause of it — an absolutely ne- j 
cessary being. j Prooe. 

I Grant that either the world 

Prooe. j itself is necessary, or that there 

The world of sense, as the I is contained in it a necessary 
sum-total of all phsenornena, I existence. Two cases are pos- 
contains a series of changes. I sible. First, there must either 
For, without such a series, the i be in the series of cosmical 
mental representation of the i changes a beginning, which is 
series of time itself, as the con- j unconditionally necessary, and 
dition of the possibility of the l therefore uncaused — which is 
sensuous world, could not be i at variance with the dynamical 
presented to us.* But every I law of the determination of all 
change stands under its con- ipheenomena in time; or -se- 
dition, which precedes it in I condly, the series itself is with- 
time and renders it neces- j out beginning, and, although 
sary. Now the existence of a [contingent and conditioned in 
given conditions presuppose a I all its parts, is nevertheless 
complete series of conditions I absolutely necessary and un- 
up to the absolutely uncon- 1 conditioned as a whole — which 
ditioned, which alone is ab- i is self-contradictory. For the 



solutely necessary. It fol 
lows that something that is 
absolutely necessary must exist, 
if change exists as its conse- 
quence. But this necessary 

* Objectively, time, as the formal 
condition of the possibility of change, 
precedes all changes ; but subjectively, 
and in consciousness, the representa- 
tion of time, like every other, is given 
solely by occasion of perception. 



existence of an aggregate can- 
not be necessary, if no single 
part of it possesses necessary 
existence. 

Grant on the other hand, 
that an absolutely necessary 
cause exists out of and apart 
from the world. This cause, 
as the highest member in the 
series of the causes of cosmical 
changes, must originate or be- 



FOUETH ANTINOMY. 



285 



thing 



Thesis. 
itself belongs to the 
sensuous world. For suppose 
it to exist out of and apart 
from it, the series of cosmical 
changes would receive from it 
a beginning, and yet this ne- 
cessary cause would not itself 
belong to the world of sense. 
But this is impossible. For, as 
the beginning of a series in 
time is determined only by that 
which precedes it in time, the 
supreme condition of the be- 
ginning of a series of changes 
must exist in the time in which 
this series itself did not exist ; 
for a beginning supposes a time 
preceding, in which the thing 
that begins to be was not in 
existence. The causality of 
the necessary cause of changes, 
and consequently the cause it- 
self, must for these reasons be- 
long to time — and to pheno- 
mena, time being possible only 
as the form of phenomena. 
Consequently, it cannot be 
cogitated as separated from 
the world of sense, — the sum- 
total of all phenomena. There 
is, therefore, contained in the 
world, something that is abso- 
lutely necessary — whether it be 
the whole cosmical series itself, 
or only a part of it. 



Antithesis. 
gin * the existence of the latter 
and their series. In this case 
it must also begin to act, and 
its causality would therefore 
belong to time, and conse- 
quently to the sum-total of 
phenomena, that is, to the 
world. It follows that the 
cause cannot be out of the 
world ; which is contradictory 
to the hypothesis. Therefore, 
neither in the world, nor out 
of it (but in causal connec- 
tion with it), does there ex- 
ist any absolutely necessary 
being. 

* The word begin is taken in two 
senses. The first is active — the cause 
being regarded as beginning a series 
of conditions as its effect {infit). f 
The second is passive — the causality 
in the cause itself beginning to ope- 
rate {fit). I reason here from the 
first to the second. 

t It may be doubted whether 
there is any passage to be found in 
the Latin Classics where infit is em- 
ployed in any other than a neuter 
sense, as in Plautus, " Infit me per • 
contarier." The second significa- 
tion of begin (anfangen) we should 
rather term neuter. — Tr. 



28b' 



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 



Observations on the Fourth Antinomy. 



I. 

On the Thesis. 

To demonstrate the exist- 
ence of a necessary being, I 
cannot be permitted in this 
place to employ any other 
than the cosmological argu- 
ment, which ascends from the 
conditioned in pheenomena to 
the unconditioned in concep- 
tion — the unconditioned being 
considered the necessary con- 
dition of the absolute totality 
of the series. The proof, 
from the mere idea of a su- 
preme being, belongs to ano- 
ther principle of reason, and 
requires separate discussion. 

The pure cosmological proof 
demonstrates the existence of 
a necessary being, but at the 
same time leaves it quite un- 
settled, whether this being is 
the world itself, or quite dis- 
tinct from it. To establish 
the truth of the latter view, 
principles are requisite, which 
are not cosmological, and do 
not proceed in the series of 
phsenomena. We should re- 
quire to introduce into our 
proof conceptions of contin- 
gent beings — regarded merely 
as objects of the understand- 
ing, and also a principle which 
enables us to connect these, 
by means of mere conceptions, 
with a necessary being. But 



II. 

On the Antithesis. 
The difficulties which meet 
us, inourattemptto rise through 
the series of phaenomena to the 
existence of an absolutely ne- 
cessary supreme cause, must 
not originate from our inabi- 
lity to establish the truth of 
our mere conceptions of the 
necessary existence of a thing. 
That is to say, our objec- 
tions must not be ontological, 
but must be directed against 
the causal connection with a 
series of phaenomena of a con- 
dition which is itself uncon- 
ditioned. In one word, they 
must be cosmological, and re- 
late to empirical laws. We 
must show that the regress in 
the series of causes (in the 
world of sense) cannot con- 
clude with an empirically un- 
conditioned condition, and that 
the cosmological argument 
from the contingency of the 
cosmical state — a contingency 
alleged to arise from change 
— does not justify us in ac- 
cepting a first cause, that is, 
a prime originator of the cos- 
mical series. 

The reader will observe in this 
antinomy a very remarkable 
contrast. The very samegrounds 
of proof which established in 
the thesis the existence of a su- 



OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOUETH. ANTINOMF. 



287 



Thesis. 
the proper place for all such 
arguments is a transcendent 
philosophy, which has unhap- 
pily not yet heen established. 

But, if we begin our proof 
cosmologically, by laying at 
the foundation of it the series 
of phsenomena, and the regress 
in it according to empirical 
laws of causality, we are not at 
liberty to break oif from this 
mode of demonstration and to 
pass over to something which 
is not itself a member of the 
series. The condition must 
be taken in exactly the same 
signification as the relation of 
the conditioned to its condi- 
tion in the series has been 
taken, for the series must con- 
duct us in an unbroken re- 
gress to this supreme condi- 
tion. But if this relation is 
sensuous, and belongs to the 
possible empirical employment 
of the understanding, the su- 
preme condition or cause must 
close the regressive series ac- 
cording to the laws of sensi- 
bility, and consequently must 
belong to the series of time. 
It follows that this necessary; 
existence must be regarded as 
the highest member of the 
cosmical series. 

Certain philosophers have, , 
nevertheless, allowed them- 
selves the liberty of making 
such a saltus (lAtrafiatSig ug 



ciXXo 



vog). From the changes 



7* 



Antithesis. 
preme being, demonstrated in 
the antithesis — and with equal 
strictness — the non-existence 
of such a being. We found, 
first, that a necessary being 
exists, because the whole time 
past contains the series of all 
conditions, and with it, there- 
fore, the unconditioned (the 
necessary) ; secondly, that 
there does not exist any neces- 
sary being, for the same reason, 
that the whole time past con- 
tains the series of all condi- 
tions — which are themselves 
therefore, in the aggregate, 
conditioned. The cause of 
this seeming incongruity is as 
follows. We attend, in the 
first argument, solely to the 
absolute totality of the series 
of conditions, the one of which 
determines the other in time, 
and thus arrive at a necessary 
unconditioned. In the second, 
we consider, on the contrary, 
the contingency of everything 
that is determined in the series 
of time — for every event is 
preceded by a time, in which 
the condition itself must be 
determined as conditioned — 
and thus everything that is 
unconditioned or absolutely 
necessary disappears. In both, 
the mode of proof is quite in 
accordance with the common 
procedure of human reason, 
which often falls into discord 
with itself, from considering 



288 



TEANSCEKDENTAL DIALECTIC. 



Thesis. 
in the world they have con- 
cluded their empirical contin- 
gency, that is, their depend- 
ence on empirically-determined 
causes, and they thus admitted 
an ascending series of empi- 
rical conditions : and in this 
they are quite right. But as 
they could not find in this 
series any primal beginning 
or any highest member, they 
passed suddenly from the em- 
pirical conception of contin- 
gency to the pure category, 
which presents us with a 
series — not sensuous, but intel- 
lectual — whose completeness 
does certainly rest upon the 
existence of an absolutely ne- 
cessary cause. Nay, more, this 
intellectual series is not tied to 
any sensuous conditions ; and 
is therefore free from the con- 
dition of time, which requires 
it spontaneously to begin its 
causality in time. — But such a 
procedure is perfectly inad- 
missible, as will be made plain 
from what follows. 

In the pure sense of the 
categories, that is contingent,, 
the contradictory opposite of 
which is possible. Now we 
cannot reason from empirical 
contingency to intellectual. 
The opposite of that which is 
cnanged — the opposite of its 
state — is actual at anotner 
time, and is therefore possible. 
Consequently, ii is not the 



Antithesis. 

an object from two different 
points of view. Herr von 
Mairan regarded the contro- 
versy between two celebrated 
astronomers, which arose from 
a similar difficulty as to the 
choice of a proper stand-point, 
as a phsenomenon of sufficient 
importance to warrant a sepa- 
rate treatise on the subject. 
The one concluded : the moon 
devolves on its own axis, be- 
cause it constantly presents 
the same side to the earth ; 
tne other declared that the 
moon does not revolve on its 
own axis, for the same reason. 
Both conclusions were per- 
iectiy correct, according to the 
point of view from which the 
motions of the moon were con- 
si J ereu. 



OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOURTH ANTINOMY. 



?29 



Thesis. 
contradictory opposite of the 
former state. To be that, it 
is necessary that in the same 
time in which the preceding 
state existed, its opposite could 
have existed in its place ; but 
such a cognition is not given 
us in the mere phaenomenon 
of change. A body that was in 
motion=^, comes into a state 
of rest=?ion-A. Now it can- 
not be concluded from the 
fact that a state opposite to 
the state A follows it, that the 
contradictory opposite of A is 
possible ; and that A is there- 
fore contingent. To prove 
this, we should require to know 
that the state of rest could 
have existed in the very same 
time in which the motion took 
place. Now we know nothing 
more than that the state of rest 
was actual in the time that fol- 
lowed the state of motion ; con- 
sequently, that it was also pos- 
sible. But motion at one time, 
and rest at another time, are 
not contradictorily opposed to 
each other. It follows from 
what has been said, that the suc- 
cession of opposite determina- 
tions, that is, change, does not 
demonstrate the fact of con- 
tingency as represented in the 
conceptions of the pure under- 
standing ; and that it cannot, 
therefore, conduct us to the 
fact of the existence of a ne- 
cessary being. Change proves 



Antithesis. 



290 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

Thesis. Antithesis, 

merely empirical contingency, 
that is to say, that the new 
state could not have existed 
without a cause, which belongs 
to the preceding time. This 
cause — even although it is re- 
garded as absolutely necessary 
— must be presented to us in 
time, and must belong to the 
series of phsenomena. 

ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. 

Section Third. 

Of the Interest of Reason in these Self-contradictions. 

We have thus completely before us the dialectical procedure 
of the cosmological ideas. No possible experience can present 
us with an object adequate to them in extent. Nay, more, 
reason itself cannot cogitate them as according with the general 
laws of experience. And yet they are not arbitrary fictions of 
thought. On the contrary, reason, in its uninterrupted pro- 
gress in the empirical synthesis, is necessarily conductea to 
them, when it endeavours to free from all conditions and to 
comprehend in its unconditioned totality, that which can only 
be determined conditionally in accordance with the laws of ex- 
perience. These dialectical propositions are so many attempts 
to solve four natural and unavoidable problems of reason. 
— There are neither more, nor can there be less, than this 
number, because there are no other series of synthetical hy- 
potheses, limiting a priori the empirical synthesis. 

The brilliant claims of reason striving to extend its do- 
minion beyond the limits of experience, have been represented 
above only in dry formulae, which contain merely the grounds 
of its pretensions. They have, besides, in conformity with 
the character of a transcendental philosophy, been freed from 
every empirical element ; although the full splendour of the 
promises they hold out, and the anticipations they excite, mani- 
fests itself only when in connection with empirical cognitions. 
In the application of them, however, and in the advancing en- 



OF THE INTEREST OF REASON IN THE ANTINOMIES. 291 

largement of the employment of reason, while struggling to 
rise from the region of experience and to soar to those sub- 
lime ideas, philosophy discovers a value and a dignity, which, if 
it could but make good its assertions, would raise it far above 
all other departments of human knowledge — professing, as 
it does, to present a sure foundation for our highest hopes 
and the ultimate aims of all the exertions of reason. The 
questions : whether the world has a beginning and a limit to 
its extension in space ; whether there exists anywhere, or per- 
haps, in my own thinking Self an indivisible and indestructible 
unity — or whether nothing but what is divisible and transitory 
exists ; whether I am a free agent, or, like other beings, am 
bound in the chains of nature and fate ; whether, finally, there 
is a supreme cause of the world, or all oiir thought and spe- 
culation must end with nature and the order of external things 
— are questions, for the solution of which the mathematician 
would willingly exchange his whole science ; for in it there is 
no satisfaction for the highest aspirations and most ardent 
desires of humanity. Nay, it may even be said that the true 
value of mathematics — that pride of human reason — con- 
sists in this : that she guides reason to the knowledge of 
nature — in her greater, as well as in her less manifestations — 
in her beautiful order and regularity, — guides her, moreover, 
to an insight into the wonderful unity of the moving forces 
in the operations of nature, far beyond the expectations of a 
philosophy building only on experience ; and that she thus 
encourages philosophy to extend the province of reason beyond 
all experience, and at the same time provides it with the most 
excellent materials for supporting its investigations, in so far 
as their nature admits, by adequate and accordant intui- 
tions. 

Unfortunately for speculation — but perhaps fortunately for 
the practical interests of humanity — reas m, in the midst of 
her highest anticipations, finds herself hemmed in by a press 
of opposite and contradictory conclusions, from which neither 
her honour nor her safety will permit her to draw back. Nor 
can she regard these conflicting trains of reasoning with in- 
difference as mere passages at arms, still less can she command 
peace ; for in the subject of the conflict she has a deep inte- 
rest. There is no other course left open to her, than to reflect 
with herself upon the origin of this disunion in reason — 

V2 



292 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

whether it may not arise from a mere misunderstanding. After 
such an inquiry, arrogant claims would have to be given up on 
both sides ; but the sovereignty of reason over understanding 
and sense would be based upon a sure foundation. 

We shall at present defer this radical inquiry, and in the 
meantime consider for a little — what side in the controversy 
we should most willingly take, if we were obliged to become 
partisans at all. As, in this case, we leave oat of sight alto- 
gether the logical criterion of truth, and merely consult our 
own interest in reference to the question, these considerations, 
although inadequate to settle the question of right in either 
party, will enable us to comprehend, how those who have taken 
part in the struggle, adopt the one view rather than the other 
— no special insight into the subject, however, having influenced 
their choice. They will, at the same time, explain to us many 
other things by the way — for example, the fiery zeal on the 
one side and the cold maintenance of their cause on the other ; 
why the one party has met with the warmest approbations, and 
the other has always been repulsed by irreconcileable preju- 
dices. 

There is one thing, however, that determines the proper 
point of view, from which alone this preliminary inquiry can 
be instituted and carried on with the proper completeness, — 
=md that is the comparison of the principles, from which both 
sides — thesis and antithesis, proceed. My readers would re- 
mark in the propositions of the antithesis a complete uniformity 
in the mode of thought and a perfect unity of principle. Its 
principle was that of pure empiricism, not only in the explica- 
tion of the phsenomena in the world, but also in the solution 
of the transcendental ideas, even of that of the universe itself. 
The affirmations of the thesis on the contrary, were based, in 
addition to the empirical mode of explanation employed in the 
series of phenomena, on intellectual propositions ; and its 
principles were in so far not simple. I shall term the thesis, 
in view of its essential characteristic, the dogmatism of pure 
reason. 

On the side of dogmatism, or of the thesis, therefore, in the 
determination of the cosmological ideas, we find : 

I . A practical interest, which must be very dear to every 
right-thinking man. That the world has a beginning, — that 
the nature of my thinking self is simple, and therefore in- 



OP THE INTEREST OF REASON IN THE ANTINOMIES. 293 

destructible, — that I am a free agent, and raised above the 
compulsion of nature and her laws, — and, finally, that the 
entire order of things, which form the world, is dependent 
upon a Supreme Being, from whom the whole receives unity 
and connection, — these are so many foundation-stones of mo- 
rality and religion. The antithesis deprives us of all these 
supports, — or, at least, seems so to deprive us. 

2. A speculative interest of reason manifests itself on this 
side. For, if we take the transcendental ideas and employ 
them in the manner which the thesis directs, we can exhibit 
completely a priori the entire chain of conditions, and under- 
stand the derivation of the conditioned — beginning from the 
unconditioned. This the antithesis does not do ; and for this 
reason does not meet with so welcome a reception. For it 
can give no answer to our questions respecting the conditions 
of its synthesis — except such as must be supplemented by 
another question, and so on to infinity. According to it, we 
must rise from a given beginning to one still higher ; every 
part conducts us to a still smaller one ; every event is pre- 
ceded by another event which is its cause ; and the conditions 
of existence rest always upon other and still higher conditions, 
and find neither end nor basis in some self- subsis tent thing as 
the primal being. 

3. This side has also the advantage of popularity ; and 
this constitutes no small part of its claim to favour. The 
common understanding does not find the least difficulty in 
the idea of the unconditioned beginning of all synthesis — ac- 
customed, as it is, rather to follow out consequences, than to 
seek for a proper basis for cognition. In the conception of 
an absolute first, moreover — the possibility of which it does 
not inquire into — it is highly gratified to find a firmly-esta- 
blished point of departure for its attempts at theory ; Avhile in 
the restless and continuous aseent from the conditioned to the 
condition, always with one foot in the air, it can find no 
satisfaction. 

On the side of the Antithesis, or Empiricism in the deter- 
mination of the cosmological ideas : 

1. We cannot discover any such practical interest arising from 
pure principles of reason, as morality and religion present. On 
the contrary, pure empiricism seems to empty them of all their 
power and influence. If there does not exist a Supreme Being 



•-'**4 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC 

distinct from the world, — if the world is without beginning 
consequently without a Creator, — if our wills are not free, 
and the soul is divisible and subject to corruption just like 
matter, — the ideas and principles of morality lose all validity; 
and fall with the transcendental ideas which constituted their 
theoretical support. 

2. But empiricism, in compensation, holds out to reason, in 
its speculative interests, certain important advantages, far ex- 
ceeding any that the dogmatist can promise us. For, when 
employed by the empiricist, understanding is always upon its 
proper ground of investigation — the field of possible experi- 
ence, the laws of which it can explore, and thus extend its 
cognition securely and with clear intelligence without being 
stopped by limits in any direction. Here can it and ought 
it to find and present to intuition its proper object — not only 
in itself, but in all its relations ; or, if it employ conceptions, 
upon this ground it can always present the corresponding 
images in clear and unmistakable intuitions. It is quite un- 
necessary for it to renounce the guidance of nature, to attach 
itself to ideas, the objects of which it cannot know ; because, 
as mere intellectual entities, they cannot be presented in any 
intuition. On the contrary, it is not even permitted to aban- 
don its proper occupation, under the pretence that it has been 
brought to a conclusion, (for it never can be,) and to pass into 
the region of idealizing reason and transcendent conceptions, 
where it is not required to observe and explore the laws of 
nature, but merely to think and to imagine — secure from 
being contradicted by facts, because they have not been called 
as witnesses, but passed by, or perhaps subordinated to the 
so-called higher interests and considerations of pure reason. 

Hence the empiricist will never allow himself to accept any 
epoch of nature for the first — the absolutely primal state ; he 
will not believe that there can be limits to his out-look into 
her wide domains, nor pass from the objects of nature, which 
he can satisfactorily explain by means of observation and 
mathematical thought — which he can determine synthetically 
in intuition, to those which neither sense nor imagination can 
ever present in concreto ; he will not concede the existence of 
a faculty in nature, operating independently of the laws of 
nature — a concession which would introduce uncertainty into 
the procedure of the understanding, which is guided by neces- 



OF THE INTEREST OF REASON IN THE ANTINOMIES. 293 

wry laws to the observation of phenomena ; nor, finally, will 
he permit himself to seek a cause beyond nature, inasmuch as 
we know nothing but it, and from it alone receive an objective 
basis for all our conceptions and instruction in the unvarying 
laws of things. 

In truth, if the empirical philosopher had no other purpose 
in the establishment of his antithesis, than to check the pre- 
sumption of a reason which mistakes its true destination, which 
coasts of its insight and its knowledge, just where all insight 
and knowledge cease to exist, and regards that which is valid 
only in relation to a practical interest, as an advancement of 
the speculative interests of the mind (in order, when it is con- 
venient for itself, to break the thread of our physical investi- 
gations, and, under pretence of extending our cognition, con- 
nect them with transcendental ideas, by means of which we 
really know only that we know nothing,) — if, I say, the em- 
piricist rested satisfied with this benefit, the principle ad- 
vanced by him would be a maxim recommending moderation in 
the pretensions of reason and modesty in its affirmations, and 
at the same time would direct us to the right mode of extend- 
ing the province of the understanding, by the help of the only 
true teacher, experience. In obedience to this advice, intel- 
lectual hypotheses and faith would not be called in aid of 
our practical interests ; nor should we introduce them under 
the pompous titles of science and insight. For specula- 
tive cognition cannot find an objective basis any other where 
than in experience ; and, when we overstep its limits, our 
synthesis, which requires ever new cognitions independent 
of experience, has no substratum of intuition upon which to 
build. 

But if — as often happens — empiricism, in relation to ideas, 
becomes itself dogmatic, and boldly denies that which is above 
the sphere of its phaenomenal cognition, it falls itself into the 
error of intemperance — an error which is here all the more 
reprehensible, as thereby the practical interest of reason re- 
ceives an irreparable injury. 

And this constitutes the opposition between Epicureanism* 
and Platonism. 

* It is, however, still a matter of doubt whether Epicurus ever pro- 
pounded these principles as directions for the objective employment of 
the understanding. If, indeed, they were nothing more than maxims for 



296 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

Both Epicurus and Plato assert more in their systems than 
they know. The former encourages and advances science — 
although to the prejudice of the practical ; the latter presents 
us with excellent principles for the investigation of the prac- 
tical, but, in relation to everything regarding which we can 
attain to speculative cognition, permits reason to append 
idealistic explanations of natural phsenomena, to the great 
injury of physical investigation. 

3. In regard to the third motive for the preliminary choice 
of a party in this war of assertions, it seems very extraordi- 
nary that empiricism should be utterly unpopular. We should 
be inclined to believe, that the common understanding would 
receive it with pleasure — promising as it does, to satisfy it 
without passing the bounds of experience and its connected 
order ; while transcendental dogmatism obliges it to rise to 
conceptions, which far surpass the intelligence and ability of 
the most practised thinkers. But in this, in truth, is to 
be found its real motive. For the common understanding 
thus finds itself in a situation, where not even the most 
learned can have the advantage of it. If it understands little 
or nothing about these transcendental conceptions, no one 
can boast of understanding any more ; and although it may 
not express itself in so scholastically correct a manner as 
others, it can busy itself with reasoning and arguments with- 
out end, wandering among mere ideas, about which one can 
always be very eloquent, because we know nothing about 
them ; while, in the observation and investigation of nature, it 
would be forced to remain dumb and to confess its utter igno- 

the speculative exercise of reason, he gives evidence therein of a more 
genuine philosophic spirit than any of the philosophers of antiquity. That, 
in the explanation of phaenomena, we must proceed as if the field of in- 
quiry had neither limits in space nor commencement in time ; that we 
must be satisfied with the teaching of experience in reference to the mate- 
rial of which the world is composed ; that we must not look for any other 
mode of the origination of events than that which is determined by the 
unalterable laws of nature ; and finally, that we must not employ the 
hypothesis of a cause distinct from the world to account for a phsenome- 
non or for the world itself— are principles for the extension of specula- 
tive philosophy, and the discovery of the true sources of the principles of 
morals, which, however little conformed to in the present day, are un- 
doubtedly correct. At the same time, any one desirous of ignoring, m 
mere speculation, these dogmatical propositions, need not for that reason 
be accused of denying them. 



OE THE INTEREST OF REASON. 297 

ranee. Thus indolence and vanity form of themselves strong 
recommendations of these principles. Besides, although it is 
a hard thing for a philosopher to assume a principle, of which 
he can give to himself no reasonable account, and still more 
to employ conceptions, the objective reality of which cannot 
be established, nothing is more usual with the common under- 
standing. It wants something, which will allow it to go to 
work with confidence. The difficulty of even comprehending 
a supposition, does not disquiet it, because — not knowing 
what comprehending means — it never even thinks of the suppo- 
sition it may be adopting as a principle ; and regards as known, 
that with which it has become familiar from constant use. 
And, at last, all speculative interests disappear before the prac- 
tical interests which it holds dear ; and it fancies that it un- 
derstands and knows what its necessities and hopes incite 
it to assume or to believe. Thus the empiricism of transcen- 
dentally idealizing reason is robbed of all popularity ; and, 
however prejudicial it may be to the highest, practical prin- 
ciples, there is no fear that it will ever pass the limits of the 
schools, or acquire any favour or influence in society or with 
the multitude. 

Human reason is by nature architectonic. That is to say, 
it regards all cognitions as parts of a possible system, and 
hence accepts only such principles, as at least do not incapaci- 
tate a cognition to which we may have attained from being 
placed along with others in a general system. But the pro- 
positions of the antithesis are of a character which renders the 
completion of an edifice of cognitions impossible. Accord- 
ing to these, beyond one state or epoch of the world there is 
always to be found one more ancient ; in every part always 
other parts themselves divisible ; preceding every event ano- 
ther, the origin of which must itself be sought still higher ; and 
everything in existence is conditioned, and still not dependent 
on an unconditioned and primal existence. As, therefore, 
the antithesis will not concede the existence of a first begin- 
ning which might be available as a foundation, a complete 
edifice of cognition, in the presence of such hypotheses, is 
utterly impossible. Thus the architectonic interest of reason, 
which requires a unity — not empirical, but a priori and ra- 
tional, forms a natural recommendation for the assertions of 
the thesis in our antinomy. 



298 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

But if any one could free himself entirely from all con* 
eiderations of interest, and weigh without partiality the asser- 
tions of reason, attending only to their content, irrespective 
of the consequences which follow from them ; such a person, 
on the supposition that he knew no other way out of the 
confusion than to settle the truth of one or other of the 
conflicting doctrines, would live in a state of continual hesi- 
tation. To-day, he would feel convinced that the human 
will is free ; to-morrow, considering the indissoluble chain 
of nature, he would look on freedom as a mere illusion, and 
declare nature to be all-in-all. But, if he were called to 
action, the play of the merely speculative reason would dis- 
appear like the shapes of a dream, and practical interest 
would dictate his choice of principles. But, as it well befits 
a reflective and inquiring being to devote certain periods of 
time to the examination of its own reason — to divest itself 
of all partiality, and frankly to communicate its observations 
for the judgment and opinion of others; so no one can be 
blamed for, much less prevented from placing both parties on 
their trial, with permission to defend themselves, free from 
intimidation, before a sworn jury of equal condition with 
themselves — the condition of weak and fallible men. 

ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. 

Section Fourth. 

Of the necessity imposed upon Pure Reason of presenting a 
Solution of its Transcendental Problems. 

To avow an ability to solve all problems and to answer all 
questions, would be a profession certain to convict any phi- 
losopher of extravagant boasting and self-conceit, and at once 
to destroy the confidence that might otherwise have been 
reposed in him. There are, however, sciences so constituted, 
that every question arising within their sphere, must neces- 
sarily be capable of receiving an answer from the knowledge 
already possessed, for the answer must be received from the 
same sources whence the question arose. In such sciences 
it is not allowable to excuse ourselves on the plea of necessary 
and unavoidable ignorance ; a solution is absolutely requisite. 
The rule of right and wrong must help us to the knowledge 



OF TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEMS. 299 

of what is right or wrong in all possible cases ; otherwise, 
the idea of obligation or duty would be utterly null, for we 
cannot have any obligation to that, which we cannot know. 
On the other hand, in our investigations of the phsenomena 
of nature, much must remain uncertain, and many questions 
continue insoluble ; because what we know of nature is 
far from being sufficient to explain all the phaenomena that 
are presented to our observation. Now the question is : 
Whether there is in transcendental philosophy any question, 
relating to an object presented to pure reason, which is un- 
answerable by this reason ; and whether we must regard the 
subject of the question as quite uncertain — so far as our 
knowledge extends, and must give it a place among those 
subjects, of which we have just so much conception as is 
sufficient to enable us to raise a question — faculty or materials 
failing us, however, when we attempt an answer. 

Now I maintain, that among all speculative cognition, the 
peculiarity of transcendental philosophy is, that there is 
no question, relating to an object presented to pure reason, 
which is insoluble by this reason ; and that the profession 
of unavoidable ignorance — the problem being alleged to be 
beyond the reach of our faculties — cannot free us from the 
obligation to present a complete and satisfactory answer. For 
the very conception, which enables us to raise the question, 
must give us the power of answering it ; inasmuch as the 
object, as in the case of right and wrong, is not to be dis- 
covered out of the conception. 

But, in transcendental philosophy, it is only the cosmo- 
logical questions, to which we can demand a satisfactory 
answer in relation to the constitution of their object ; and the 
philosopher is not permitted to avail himself of the pretext 
of necessary ignorance and impenetrable obscurity. These 
questions relate solely to the cosmological ideas. For the 
object must be given in experience, and the question relates 
to the adequateness of the object to an idea. If the object 
is transcendental, and therefore itself unknown ; if the 
question, for example, is whether the object — the something, 
the phsenomenon of which (internal — in ourselves' is thought 
— that is to say, the soul, is in itself a simple being ; or 
whether there is a cause of all things, which is absolutely ne- 
cessary, — in such cases we are seeking for our idea an object. 



300 TEANSCEKDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

of which we may confess, that it is unknown to us, though 
we must not on that account assert that it is impossible.* 
The cosmological ideas alone possess the peculiarity, that we 
can presuppose the object of them and the empirical synthesis 
requisite for the conception of that object to be given ; and 
the question, which arises from these ideas, relates merely to 
the progress of this synthesis, in so far as it must contain 
absolute totality, — which, however, is not empirical, as it 
cannot be given in any experience. Now, as the question 
here is solely in regard to a thing as the object of a possible 
experience, and not as a thing in itself, the answer to the 
transcendental cosmological question need not be sought out 
of the idea, for the question does not regard an object in 
itself. The question in relation to a possible experience, is 
not, what can be given in an experience in concreto, — but, 
what is contained in the idea, to which the empirical syn- 
thesis must approximate. The question must therefore be 
capable of solution from the idea alone. For the idea is a 
creation of reason itself, which therefore cannot disclaim the 
obligation to answer or refer us to the unknown object. 

It is not so extraordinary as it at first sight appears, that 
a science should demand and expect satisfactory answers to 
all the questions that may arise within its own sphere 
(questio?ies domesticce) , although, up to a certain time, these 
answers may not have been discovered. There are, in ad- 
dition to transcendental philosophy, only two pure sciences 
of reason ; the one with a speculative, the other with a prac- 
tical content — pure mathematics and pure ethics. Has any 

* The question, what is the constitution of a transcendental object, is 
unanswerable — we are unable to say what it is ; but we can perceive that 
the question itself is nothing ; because it does not relate to any object 
that can be presented to us. For this reason, we must consider all the 
questions raised in transcendental psychology as answerable, and as really 
answered ; for they relate to the transcendental subject of all internal 
phaenomena, which is not itself phenomenon, and consequently not given 
as an object, in which, moreover, none of the categories — and it is to 
them that the question is properly directed — find any conditions of its 
application. Here, therefore, is a case where no answer is the only 
proper answer. For a question regarding the constitution of a something, 
which cannot be cogitated by any determined predicate — being com- 
pletely beyond the sphere of objects and experience, is perfectly null 
and void. 



Or TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEMS. 3C1 

one ever beard it alleged that, from our complete and ne- 
cessary ignorance of the conditions, it is uncertain what 
exact relation the diameter of a circle bears to the circle in 
rational or irrational numbers ? By the former the sum 
cannot be given exactly, by the latter only approximately ; 
and therefore we decide, that the impossibility of a solution 
of the question is evident. Lambert presented us with a 
demonstration of this. In the general principles of morals 
there can be nothing uncertain, for the propositions are 
either utterly without meaning, or must originate solely in 
our rational conceptions. On the other hand, there must be 
in physical science an infinite number of conjectures, which 
can never become certainties ; because the pheenomena of 
nature are not given as objects dependent on our conceptions. 
The key to the solution of such questions cannot therefore be 
found in our conceptions or in pure thought, but must lie 
without us, and for that reason is in many cases not to be 
discovered ; and consequently a satisfactory explanation can- 
not be expected. The questions of transcendental analytic, 
which relate to the deduction of our pure cognition, are not 
to be regarded as of the same kind as those mentioned above ; 
for we are not at present treating of the certainty of judg- 
ments in relation to the origin of our conceptions, but only 
of that certainty in relation to objects. 

We cannot, therefore, escape the responsibility of at least a 
critical solution of the questions of reason, by complaints 
of the limited nature of our faculties, and the seemingly hum- 
ble confession that it is beyond the power of our reason to 
decide, whether the world has existed from all eternity or had 
a beginning, — whether it is infinitely extended, or enclosed 
within certain limits, — whether anything in the world is simple, 
or whether everything must be capable of infinite divisibility, 
— whether freedom can originate phsenomena, or whether 
everything is absolutely dependent on the laws and order of 
nature — and, finally, whether there exists a being that is com- 
pletely unconditioned and necessary, or whether the existence 
of everything is conditioned and consequently dependent on 
something external to itself, and therefore in its own nature 
contingent. For all these questions relate to an object, which 
can be given no where else than in thought. This object is 
the absjlutely unconditioned totality of the synthesis of phse* 



302 TKA^SCEKDEJTTAL DIALECTIC. 

nomena. If the conceptions in our minds do not assist us to 
some certain result in regard to these problems, we must not 
defend ourselves on the plea that the object itself remains 
hidden from and unknown to us. For no such thing or object 
can be given — it is not to be found out of the idea in our minds. 
We must seek the cause of our failure in our idea itself, 
which is an insoluble problem, and in regard to which we 
obstinately assume that there exists a real object corre- 
sponding and adequate to it. A clear explanation of the 
dialectic which lies in our conception, will very soon enable 
us to come to a satisfactory decision in regard to such a 
question. 

The pretext, that we are unable to arrive at certainty in 
regard to these problems, may be met with this question, 
which requires at least a plain answer : From what source do 
the ideas originate, the solution of which involves you in such 
difficulties? Are you seeking for an explanation of certain 
phsenomena ; and do you expect these ideas to give you the 
principles or the rules of this explanation ? Let it be granted, 
that all nature was laid open before you ; that nothing was 
hid from your senses and your consciousness. Still, you 
could not cognize in concreto the object of your ideas in any 
experience. For what is demanded, is, not only this full and 
complete intuition, but also a complete synthesis and the 
consciousness of its absolute totality; and this is not possible by 
means of any empirical cognition. It follows that your question 
— your idea is by no means necessary for the explanation of any 
phsenomenon; and the idea cannot have been in anysense given 
by the object itself. For such an object can never be pre- 
sented to us, because it cannot be given by any possible expe- 
rience. Whatever perceptions you may attain to, you are still 
surrounded by conditions — in space, or in time, and you can- 
not discover anything unconditioned ; nor can you decide 
whether this unconditioned is to be placed in an absolute 



;inning of the synthesis, or in an absolute totality of the 
series without beginning. A whole, in the empirical signifi- 
cation of the term, is always merely comparative. The absolute 
whole of quantity (the universe), of division, of derivation, 
of the condition of existence, with the question — whether it 
is to be produced by a finite or infinite synthesis, no possible 
experience can instruct us concerning. You will not, foi 



OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PEOBLEMS. 303 

example, be able to explain the phenomena of a body in the 
least degree better, whether you believe it to consist of simple, 
or of composite parts ; for a simple phsenomenon— -and just as 
little an infinite series of composition — can never be presented 
to your perception. Phsenoraena require and admit of ex- 
planation, only in so far as the conditions of that explanation 
are given in perception ; but the sum-total of that which is 
given in phenomena, considered as an absolute whole, is 
itself a perception — and we cannot therefore seek for expla- 
nations of this whole beyond itself, in other perceptions. The 
explanation of this whole is the proper object of the trans- 
cendental problems of pure reason. 

Although, therefore, the solution of these problems is un- 
attainable through experience, we must not permit ourselves 
to say, that it is uncertain how the object of our inquiries is 
constituted. For the object is in our own mind, and cannot 
be discovered in experience ; and we have only to take care 
that our thoughts are consistent with each other, and to avoid 
falling into the amphiboly of regarding our idea as a repre- 
sentation of an object empirically given, and therefore to be 
cognized according to the laws of experience. A dogmatical 
solution is therefore not only unsatisfactory, but impossible. 
The critical solution, which may be a perfectly certain one, 
does not consider the question objectively, but proceeds by 
inquiring into the basis of the cognition upon which the 
question rests. 

ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. 

Section Fifth. 

Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems presented 
in the four Transcendental Ideas. 

We should be quite willing to desist from the demand of a dog- 
matical answer to our questions, if we understood beforehand 
'hat, be the answer what it may, it would only serve to increase 
our ignorance, to throw us from one incomprehensibility into 
another, from one obscurity into another still greater, and 
perhaps lead us into irreconcilable contradictions. If a dog- 
matical affirmative or negative answer is demanded, is it at all 
prudent, to set aside the probable grounds of a solution which 



304 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

lie before us, and to take into consideration, what advantage 
we shall gain, if the answer is to favour the one side or the 
other ? If it happens that in both cases the answer is mere 
nonsense, we have in this an irresistible summons, to institute 
a critical investigation of the question, for the purpose of 
discovering whether it is based on a groundless presup- 
position, and relates to an idea, the falsity of which would be 
more easily exposed in its application and consequences, 
than in the mere representation of its content. This is the 
great utility of the sceptical mode of treating the questions 
addressed by pure reason to itself. By this method we easily 
rid ourselves of the confusions of dogmatism, and establish in 
its place a temperate criticism, which, as a genuine cathartic, 
will successfully remove the presumptuous notions of philo- 
sophy and their consequence — the vain pretension to universal 
science. 

If, then, I could understand the nature of a cosmological 
idea, and perceive, before I entered on the discussion of the 
subject at all, that, whatever side of the question regarding 
the unconditioned of the regressive synthesis of phaenomena 
it favoured, it must either be too great or too small for every 
conception of the understanding ; — I would be able to compre- 
hend how the idea, which relates to an object of experience — an 
experience which must be adequate to and in accordance with a 
possible conception of the understanding — must be completely 
void and without significance, inasmuch as its object is inade- 
quate, consider it as we may. And this is actually the case 
with all cosmological conceptions, which, for the reason above- 
mentioned, involve reason, so long as it remains attached to 
them, in an unavoidable antinomy. For suppose : 

First, that the world has no beginning, — in this case it is too 
large for our conception ; for this conception, which consists 
in a successive regress, cannot overtake the whole eternity 
that has elapsed. Grant that it has a beginning, it is then too 
small for the conception of the understanding. For, as a be- 
ginning presupposes a time preceding, it cannot be uncondi- 
tioned ; and the law of the empirical employment of the un- 
derstanding imposes the necessity of looking for a higher con- 
dition of time ; and the world is, therefore, evidently too small 
for this law. 

The same is the case with the double answer to the ques- 



OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PBOBLEAIS. 305 

tion regarding the extent, in space, of the world. For, if it 
is infinite and unlimited, it must be too large for every possi- 
ble empirical conception. If it is finite and limited, we have 
a right to ask — what determines these limits ? Void space is 
not a self-subsistent correlate of things, and cannot be a final 
condition — and still less an empirical condition, forming a 
part of a possible experience. For how can we have any ex- 
perience or perception of an absolute void ? But the absolute 
totality of the empirical synthesis requires that the uncondi- 
tioned be an empirical conception. Consequently, a finite 
world is too small for our conception. 

Secondly, if every phaenomenon (matter) in space consists 
of an infinite number of parts, the regress of the division is 
always too great for our conception ; and if the division of 
space must cease with some member of the division (the sim- 
ple), it is too small for the idea of the unconditioned. For 
the member at which we have discontinued our division 
still admits a regress to many more parts contained in the 
object. 

Thirdly, suppose that every event in the world happens in 
accordance with the laws of nature ; the causality of a cause 
must itself be an event, and necessitates a regress to a still 
higher cause, and consequently the unceasing prolongation 
of the series of conditions a parte priori. Operative nature is 
therefore too large for every conception we can form in the 
synthesis of cosmical events. 

If we admit the existence of spontaneously produced events, 
that is, oifree agency, we are driven, in our search for sufficient 
reasons, on an unavoidable law of nature, and are compelled 
to appeal to the empirical law of causality, and we find that 
any such totality of connection in our synthesis is too small 
for our necessary empirical conception. 

Fourthly, if we assume the existence of an absolutely neces- 
sary being — whether it be the world or something in the 
world, or the cause of the world ; we must place it in a time at 
an infinite distance from any given moment ; for, otherwise, it 
must be dependent on some other and higher existence. Such 
an existence is, in this case, too large for our empirical concep- 
tion, and unattainable by the continued regress of any synthesis. 

But if we believe that everything in the world — be it con- 
dition or conditioned — is contingent ; every given existence is 

x 



305 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

too small for our conception. For in this case we are com- 
pelled to seek for some other existence upon which the former 
depends. 

We have said that in all these cases the cosmological idea 
is either too great or too small for the empirical regress in a 
synthesis, and consequently for every possible conception of 
the understanding. Why did we not express ourselves in a 
manner exactly the reverse of this, and, instead of accusing 
the cosmological idea of overstepping or of falling short of its 
true aim — possible experience, say that, in the first case, the 
empirical conception is always too small for the idea, and in 
the second too great, and thus attach the blame of these con- 
tradictions to the empirical regress? The reason is this. 
Possible experience can alone give reality to our conceptions ; 
without it a conception is merely an idea, without truth or 
relation to an object. Hence a possible empirical conception 
must be the standard by which we are to judge whether an idea 
is anything more than an idea and fiction of thought, orwhether 
it relates to an object in the world. If we say of a thing that 
in relation to some other thing it is too large or too small, the 
former is considered as existing for the sake of the latter, and 
requiring to be adapted to it. Among the trivial subjects of 
discussion in the old schools of dialectics was this question : 
If a ball cannot pass through a hole, shall we say that the ball 
is too large or the hole too small? In this case it is indifferent 
what expression we employ ; for we do not know which exists 
for the sake of the other. On the other hand, we cannot say — 
the man is too long for his coat, but — the coat is too short for 
the man. 

We are thus led to the well-founded suspicion, that the cos- 
mological ideas, and all the conflicting sophistical assertions 
connected with them, are based upon a false and fictitious 
conception of the mode in which the object of these ideas is 
presented to us ; and this suspicion will probably direct m 
how to expose the illusion that has so long led us astray from 
the truth. 



OF PURE COSMOLOGICAL DIALECTIC. 30-" 

ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. 

Section Sixth. 

Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution of Pure 
Cosmological Dialectic. 

In the transcendental aesthetic, we proved, that everything 
intuited in space and time — all objects of a possible experience, 
are nothing but phsenomena, that is, mere representations ; 
and that these, as presented to us — as extended bodies, or as 
series of changes — have no self-subsistent existence apart from 
human thought. This doctrine I call Transcendental Ideal- 
ism* The realist in the transcendental sense regards these 
modifications of our sensibility — these mere representations, 
as things subsisting in themselves. 

It would be unjust to accuse us of holding the long-decried 
theory of empirical idealism, which, while admitting the reality 
of space, denies, or at least doubts, the existence of bodies 
extended in it, and thus leaves us without a sufficient criterion 
of reality and illusion. The supporters of this theory find no 
difficulty in admitting the reality of the phsenomena of the 
internal sense in time ; nay, they go the length of maintain- 
ing that this internal experience is of itself a sufficient proof 
of the real existence of its object as a thing in itself. 

Transcendental idealism allows that the objects of external 
intuition — as intuited in space, and all changes in time — as 
represented by the internal sense, are real. For, as space is 
the form of that intuition which we call external, and without 
objects in space, no empirical representation could be given 
us ; we can and ought to regard extended bodies in it as real. 
The case is the same with representations in time. But time 
and space, with all phsenomena therein, are not in themselves 
things. They are nothing but representations, and cannot 
exist out of and apart from the mind. Nay, the sensuous in- 
ternal intuition of the mind (as the object of consciousness), 
the determination of which is represented by the succession 

* I have elsewhere termed this theory formal idealism, to distinguish it 
from material idealism, which douhts or denies the existence of externa, 
things. To avoid ambiguity, it seems advisable in many cases to employ 
this term instead of that mentioned in the text. 

x2 



*08 TiiATSTSOEKDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

of different states in time, is not the real, proper self, as it 
exists in itself — not the transcendental subject, but only a 
phsenomenon, which is presented to the sensibility of this, to 
us, unknown being. This internal phsenomenon cannot be 
admitted to be a self-subsisting thing ; for its condition is 
time, and time cannot be the condition of a thing in itself. 
But the empirical truth of phenomena in space and time is 
guaranteed beyond the possibility of doubt, and sufficiently 
distinguished from the illusion of dreams or fancy — although 
both have a proper and thorough connection in an experience 
according to empirical laws. The objects of experience then 
are not things in themselves,* but are given only in experi- 
ence, and have no existence apart from and independently 
of experience. That there may be inhabitants in the moon, 
although no one has ever observed them, must certainly be 
admitted ; but this assertion means only, that we may in the 
possible progress of experience discover them at some future 
time. For that, which stands in connection with a perception 
according to the laws of the progress of experience, is real. 
They are therefore really existent, if they stand in empirical 
connection with my actual or real consciousness, although 
they are not in themselves real, that is, apart from the pro- 
gress of experience. 

There is nothing actually given — we can be conscious of 
nothing as real, except a perception and the empirical pro- 
gression from it to other possible perceptions. For phseno- 
mena, as mere representations, are real only in perception ; 
ind perception is, in fact, nothing but the reality of an em- 
pirical representation, that is, a phsenomenon. To call a 
phsenomenon a real thing prior to perception, means either, 
that we must meet with this phsenomenon in the progress of 
experience, or it means nothing at all. For I can say only of 
a thing in itself that it exists without relation to the senses 
and experience- But we are speaking here merely of phseno- 
mena in space and time, both of which are determinations of 
sensibility, and not of things in themselves. It follows that 
phsenomena are not things in themselves, but are mere repre- 
sentations, which, if not given in us — in perception, are non- 
existent. 

The faculty of sensuous intuition is properly a receptivity — 
* Dinge an sich, Sachen an sich. 

I 



or pure cosmic-logical dialectic. 30S 

a capacity of being affected in a certain manner by representa- 
tions, the relation of which to each other is a pure intuition of 
space and time — the pure forms of sensibility. These repre- 
sentations, in so far as they are connected and determinable in 
this relation (in space and time) according to laws of the 
unity of experience, are called objects. The non-sensuous 
cause of these representations is completely unknown to us, 
and hence cannot be intuited as an object. For such an ob- 
ject could not be represented either in space or in time ; and 
without these conditions intuition or representation is impos- 
sible. We may, at the same time, term the non-sensuous 
cause of phaenomena the transcendental object — but merely 
as a mental correlate to sensibility, considered as a receptivity. 
To this transcendental object we may attribute the whole con- 
nection and extent of our possible perceptions, and say that 
it is given and exists in itself prior to all experience. But 
the phaenomena, corresponding to it, are not given as things 
in themselves, but in experience alone. For they are mere 
representations, receiving from perceptions alone significance 
and relation to a real object, under the condition that this or 
that perception — indicating an object — is in complete connec- 
tion with all others in accordance with the rules of the unity of 
experience. Thus we can say : the things that really existed 
in past time, are given in the transcendental object of experi- 
ence. But these are to me real objects, only in so far as I 
can represent to my own mind, that a regressive series of pos- 
sible perceptions — following the indications of history, or the 
footsteps of cause and effect — in accordance with empirical 
laws, — that, in one word, the course of the world conducts us to 
an elapsed series of time as the condition of the present time. 
This series in past time is represented as real, not in itself, 
but only in connection with a possible experience. Thus, 
when I say that certain events occurred in past time, I merely 
assert the possibility of prolonging the chain of experience, 
from the present perception, upwards to the conditions that 
determine it according to time. 

If I represent to myself all objects existing in all space and 
time, I do not thereby place these in space and time prior to 
all experience ; on the contrary, such a representation is 
nothing more than the notion of a possible experience, in its 
absolute completeness. In experience alone are thos-e objects. 



310 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

which are nothing but representations, given. But, when 
I say, they existed prior to my experience ; this means only 
that I must begin with the perception present to me, and fol- 
low the track indicated, until I discover them in some part or 
region of experience. The cause of the empirical condition of 
this progression — and consequently at what member therein 
I must stop, and at what point in the regress I am to find 
this member — is transcendental, and hence necessarily incog- 
nizable. But with this we have not to do ; our concern is only 
with the law of progression in experience, in which objects, 
that is, phenomena, are given. It is a matter of indifference, 
whether I say — I may in the progress of experience discover 
stars, at a hundred times greater distance than the most distant 
of those now visible, or — stars at this distance may be met 
m space, although no one has, or ever will discover them. 
For, if they are given as things in themselves, without any 
relation to possible experience ; they are for me non-existent, 
consequently, are not objects, for they are not contained in 
the regressive series of experience. But, if these phsenomena 
must be employed in the construction or support of the cos- 
mological idea of an absolute whole, — and, when we are dis- 
cussing a question that over-steps the limits of possible ex- 
perience ; the proper distinction of the different theories of 
the reality of sensuous objects is of great importance, in order 
to avoid the illusion which must necessarily arise from the 
misinterpretation of our empirical conceptions. 

THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. 

Section Seventh. 

Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problem. 

The antinomy of pure reason is based upon the following dia- 
lectical argument : If that which is conditioned is given, the 
whole series of its conditions is also given ; but sensuous ob- 
jects are given as conditioned ; consequently. . . . This syllo- 
gism, the major of which seems so natural and evident, intro- 
duces as many cosmological ideas as there are different kinds 
of conditions in the synthesis of phenomena, in so far as these 
conditions constitute a series. These ideas require absolute 
totality in the series, and thus place reason in inextricable em- 



SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOOTCAL PROBLEM. 311 

barrassment. Before proceeding to expose the fallacy in 
this dialectical argument, it will be necessary to have a correct 
understanding of certain conceptions that appear in it. 

In the first place, the following proposition is evident, and 
indubitably certain : If the conditioned is given, a regress in 
the series of all its conditions is thereby imperatively required. s* 
For the very conception of a conditioned, is a conception of 
something related to a condition, and, if this condition is 
itself conditioned, to another condition — and so on through 
all the members of the series. This proposition is, therefore, 
analytical, and has nothing to fear from transcendental criti- 
cism. It is a logical postulate of reason : to pursue, as far 
as possible, the connection of a conception with its conditions. 

If, in the second place, both the conditioned and the con- 
dition are things in themselves, and if the former is given, 
not only is the regress to the latter requisite, but the latter is 
really given with the former. Now, as this is true of all the 
members of the series, the entire series of conditions, and 
with them the unconditioned is at the same time given in the 
very fact of the conditioned, the existence of which is possible 
only in and through that series, being given. In this case, 
the synthesis of the conditioned with its condition, is a syn- 
thesis of the understanding merely, which represents things as 
they are, without regarding whether and how we can cognize 
them. But if I have to do with phsenomena, which, in their 
character of mere representations, are not given, if I do not 
attain to a cognition of them (in other words, to themselves, 
for they are nothing more than empirical cognitions), I am 
not entitled to say : If the conditioned is given, all its condi- 
tions (as phsenomena) are also given. I cannot, therefore, 
from the fact of a conditioned being given, infer the absolute 
totality of the series of its conditions. For phsenomena are 
nothing but an empirical synthesis in apprehension or percep- 
tion, and are therefore given only in it. Now, in speaking 
of phsenomena, it does not follow, that, if the conditioned is 
given, the synthesis which constitutes its empirical condition 
is also thereby given and presupposed ; such a synthesis can 
be established only by an actual regress in the series of con- 
ditions. But we are entitled to say in this case : that a regress 
tc. the conditions of a conditioned, in other words, that a 
continuous empirical synthesis is enjoined ; that, if the condi- 



312 



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 



tions are not given, they are at least required ; and that we 
are certain to discover the conditions in this regress. 

We can now see that the major in the above cosmological 
syllogism, takes the conditioned in the transcendental signifi- 
cation which it has in the pure category, while the minor 
speaks of it in the empirical signification which it has in the 
category as applied to phsenomena. There is, therefore, a dia- 
lectical fallacy in the syllogism — a sophisma figures dictionis. 
But this fallacy is not a consciously devised one, but a per- 
fectly natural illusion of the common reason of man. For, 
when a thing is given as conditioned, we presuppose in the 
major its conditions and their series, unperceived, as it were, 
and unseen ; because this is nothing more than the logical 
requirement of complete and satisfactory premisses for a given 
conclusion. In this case, time is altogether left out in the 
connection of the conditioned with the condition ; they are 
supposed to be given in themselves, and contemporaneously . 
It is, moreover, just as natural to regard phsenomena (in the 
minor) as things in themselves and as objects presented to the 
pure understanding, as in the major, in which complete ab- 
straction was made of all conditions of intuition. But it is 
under these conditions alone that objects are given. Now we 
overlooked a remarkable distinction between the conceptions. 
The synthesis of the conditioned with its condition, and the 
complete series of the latter (in the major) are not limited by 
time, and do not contain the conception* of succession. On 
the contrary, the empirical synthesis, and the series of con^ 
ditions in the phsenomenal world — subsumed in the minor — 
are necessarily successive, and given in time alone. It follows 
that I cannot presuppose in the minor, as I did in the major, 
the absolute totality of the synthesis and of the series therein 
represented ; for in the major all the members of the series 
are given as things in themselves — without any limitations or 
conditions of time, while in the minor they are possible only 
in and through a successive regress, which cannot exist, ex- 
cept it be actually carried into execution in the world of 
phaenomena. 

After this proof of the viciousness of the argument com- 
monly employed in maintaining cosmological assertions, both 
parties may now be justly dismissed, as advancing claims 
without grounds or title. But the process has not been 



SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROELEM. 31? 

ended, by convincing them that one or both were in the 
wrong, and had maintained an assertion which was without 
valid grounds of proof. Nothing seems to be clearer than 
that, if one maintains : the world has a beginning, and ano- 
ther : the world has no beginning, one of the two must be 
right. But it is likewise clear, that, if the evidence on both 
sides is equal, it is impossible to discover on what side the 
truth lies ; and the controversy continues, although the par- 
ties have been recommended to peace before the tribunal of 
reason. There remains, then, no other means of settliug the 
question than to convince the parties, who refute each other 
with snch conclusiveness and ability, that they are disputing 
about nothing, and that a transcendental illusion has been 
mocking them with visions of reality where there is none. 
This mode of adjusting a dispute which cannot be decided 
upon its own merits, we shall now proceed to lay before our 
readers. 



Zeno of Elea, a subtle dialectician, was severely reprimanded 
by Plato as a sophist, who, merely from the base motive of 
exhibiting his skill in discussion, maintained and subverted 
the same proposition by arguments as powerful and convinc- 
ing on the one side as on the other. He maintained, for ex- 
ample, that God (who was probably nothing more, in his view, 
than the world,) is neither finite nor infinite, neither in mo- 
tion nor in rest, neither similar nor dissimilar to any other 
thing. It seemed to those philosophers who criticised his 
mode of discussion, that his purpose was to deny completely 
both of two self-contradictory propositions — which is absurd. 
But I cannot believe that there is any justice in this accusa- 
tion. The first of these propositions I shall presently con- 
sider in a more detailed manner. With regard to the others, 
if by the word God he understood merely the Universe, his 
meaning must have been, that it cannot be permanently pre- 
sent in one place — that is, at rest, nor be capable of changing 
its place — that is, of moving, because all places are in the 
universe, and the universe itself is, therefore, in no place. 
Again, if the universe contains in itself everything that exists, 
it, cannot be similar or dissimilar to any other thing, because 
'here is. in fact, no other thing with which it can be compared. 



314 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

If two opposite judgments presuppose a contingent impos- 
sible, or arbitrary condition, both — in spite of their opposition 
(which is, however, not properly or really a contradiction) — 
fall away ; because the condition, which insured the validity 
of both, has itself disappeared. 

If we say : every body has either a good or a bad smell, we 
have omitted a third possible judgment — it has no smell at 
all ; and thus both conflicting statements may be false. If 
we say : it is either good-smelling or not good-smelling {vel 
suateolens vel non-suaveolens), both judgments are contra- 
dictorily opposed ; and the contradictory opposite of the 
former judgment — some bodies are not good-smelling — em- 
braces also those bodies which have no smell at all, In the 
preceding pair of opposed judgments {per disparata), the 
contingent condition of the conception of body (smell) at- 
tached to both conflicting statements, instead of having been 
omitted in the latter, which is consequently not the contra- 
dictory opposite of the former. 

If, accordingly, we say : the world is either infinite in ex- 
tension, or it is not infinite (non est bifinitus) ; and if the 
former proposition is false, its contradictory opposite — the 
world is not infinite, must be true. And thus I should deny 
the existence of an infinite, without, however, affirming the 
existence of a finite world. But if we construct our propo- 
sition thus — the world is either infinite or finite (noninfinite), 
both statements may be false. For, in this case, we consider 
the world as per se determined in regard to quantity, and 
while, in the one judgment, we deny its infinite and conse- 
quently, perhaps, its independent existence ; in the other, we 
append to the world, regarded as a thing in itself, a certain 
determination — that of finitude ; and the latter may be false 
as well as the former, if the world is not given as a thing in 
itself, and thus neither as finite nor as infinite in quantity. 
This kind of opposition I may be allowed to term dialectical ; 
that of contradictories may be called analytical opposition. 
Thus then, of two dialectically opposed judgments both may 
be false, from the fact, that the one is not a mere contradic- 
tory of the other, but actually enounces more than is requisite 
for a full and complete contradiction. 

When we regard the two propositions — the world is infinite 
in quantity, and, the world is finite in quantity, as contra- 



SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PEOBLEM. 315 

dictory opposites, we are assuming that the world — the com- 
plete series of phsenomena — is a thing in itself. For it re- 
mains as a permanent quantity, whether I deny the infinite 
or the finite regress in the series of its phsenomena. But if 
we dismiss this assumption — this transcendental illusion, and 
deny that it is a thing in itself, the contradictory opposition 
is metamorphosed into a merely dialectical one ; and the 
world, as not existing in itself — independently of the regressive 
series of my representations, exists in like manner neither as 
a whole which is infinite nor as a whole which is finite in 
itself. The universe exists for me only in the empirical re- 
gress of the series of phsenomena, and not^er se. If, then, 
it is always conditioned, it is never given completely or as a 
whole ; and it is, therefore, not an unconditioned whole, and 
does not exist as such, either with an infinite, or with a finite 
quantity. 

"What we have here said of the first cosmological idea — that 
of the absolute totality of quantity in phsenomena, applies 
also to the others. The series of conditions is discoverable 
only in the regressive synthesis itself, and not in the phse- 
nomenon considered as a thing in itself — given prior to all re- 
gress. Hence I am compelled to say : the aggregate of parts 
in a given phsenomenon is in itself neither finite nor infinite; 
and these parts are given only in the regressive synthesis of 
decomposition — a synthesis which is never given in absolute 
completeness, either as finite, or as infinite. The same is the 
case with the series of subordinated causes, or of the con- 
ditioned up to the unconditioned and necessary existence, 
which can never be regarded as in itself, and in its totality, 
either as finite or as infinite ; because, as a series of subor- 
dinate representations, it subsists only in the dynamical re- 
gress, and cannot be regarded as existing previously to this 
regress, or as a self-subsistent series of things. 

Thus the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas 
disappears. For the above demonstration has established the 
fact that it is merely the product of a dialectical and illusory 
opposition, which arises from the application of the idea of 
absolute totality — admissible only as a condition of things 
in themselves, to phsenomena, which exist only in our repre- 
sentations, and — when constituting a series — in a succes- 
sive regress. This antinomy of reason may, however, be 
'ealiy profitable to our speculative interests, not in the way of 



316 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

contributing any dogmatical addition, but as presenting to ua 
another material support in our critical investigations. For 
it furnishes us with an indirect proof of the transcendental 
ideality of phaenomena, if our minds were not completely 
satisfied with the direct proof set forth in the Transcendental 
.ZEsthetic. The proof would proceed in the following di- 
lemma. If the world is a whole existing in itself, it must be 
either finite or infinite. But it is neither finite nor infinite — 
as has been shown, on the one side, by the thesis, on the 
other, by the antithesis. Therefore the world — the content 
of all phaenomena — is not a whole existing in itself. It fol- 
lows that phaenomena are nothing, apart from our representa- 
tions. And this is what we mean by transcendental ideality. 
This remark is of some importance. It enables us to see 
that the proofs of the fourfold antinomy are not mere sophis- 
tries — are not fallacious, but grounded on the nature of rea- 
son, and valid — under the supposition that phaenomena are 
things in themselves. The opposition of the judgments which 
follow make it evident that a fallacy lay in the initial suppo- 
sition, and thus helps us to discover the true constitution of 
objects of sense. This transcendental dialectic does not fa- 
vour scepticism, although it presents us with a triumphant 
demonstration of the advantages of the sceptical method, the 
great utility of which is apparent in the antinomy, where the 
arguments of reason were allowed to confront each other in 
undiminished force. And although the result of these con- 
flicts of reason is not what we expected — although we have ob- 
tained no positive dogmatical addition to metaphysical science, 
we have still reaped a great advantage in the correction of our 
judgments on these subjects of thought. 

ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. 

Section Eighth. 

Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation to the Cos- 
moloc/ical Ideas. 

The cosmological principle of totality could not give us any 
certain knowledge in regard to the maximum in the series oi 
conditions in the world of sense, considered as a thing in 
itself. The actual regress in the series is the only means of 



BEGULATIYE PRINCIPLE OP PURE REASON. 317 

approaching this maximum. This principle of pure reason, 
therefore, may still be considered as valid — not as an axiom 
enabling us to cogitate totality in the object as actual, but as 
a problem for the understanding, which requires it to institute 
and to continue, in conformity with the idea of totality in the 
mind, the regress in the series of the conditions of a given 
conditioned. For in the world of sense, that is, in space and 
time, every condition which we discover in our investigation 
of phsenomena is itself conditioned ; because sensuous objects 
are not things in themselves (in which case an absolutely un- 
conditioned might be reached in the progress of cognition), 
but are merely empirical representations, the conditions of 
which must always be found in intuition. The principle of 
reason is therefore properly a mere rule — prescribing a re- 
gress in the series of conditions for given phsenomena, and 
prohibiting any pause or rest on an absolutely unconditioned. 
It is, therefore, not a principle of the possibility of experience 
or of the empirical cognition of sensuous objects — consequently 
not a principle of the understanding ; for every experience is 
confined within certain proper limits determined by the given 
intuition. Still less is it a constitutive principle of reason 
authorising us to extend our conception of the sensuous 
world beyond all possible experience. It is merely a prin- 
ciple for the enlargement and extension of experience as far as 
is possible for human faculties. It forbids us to consider 
any empirical limits as absolute. It is, hence, a principle of 
reason, which, as a rule, dictates how we ought to proceed in 
our empirical regress, but is unable to anticipate or indicate 
prior to the empirical regress what is given in the object it- 
self. I have termed it for this reason a regulative principle 
of reason ; while the principle of the absolute totality of the 
series of conditions, as existing in itself and given in the ob- 
ject, is a constitutive cosmological principle. This distinction 
will at once demonstrate the falsehood of the constitutive 
principle, and prevent us from attributing (by a transcen- 
dental subreptio) objective reality to an idea, which is valid 
only as a rule. 

In order to understand the proper meaning of this rule of 
pure reason, we must notice first, that it cannot tell us what 
the object is, but only how the empirical regress is to be pro- 
ceeded with in order to attain to the complete conception of 



318 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

the object. If it gave us any information in respect to the 
former statement, it would be a constitutive principle — a prin- 
ciple impossible from the nature of pure reason. It will not 
therefore enable us to establish any such conclusions as — the 
series of conditions for a given conditioned is in itself finite, 
or, it is infinite. For, in this case, we should be cogitating 
in the mere idea of absolute totality, an object which is not 
and cannot be given in experience ; inasmuch as we should 
be attributing a reality objective and independent of the em- 
pirical synthesis, to a series of phsenomena. This idea of 
reason cannot then be regarded as valid — except as a rule for 
the regressive synthesis in the series of conditions, according 
to which we must proceed from the conditioned, through all 
intermediate and subordinate conditions, up to the uncondi- 
tioned ; although this goal is unattained and unattainabi , 
For the absolutely unconditioned cannot be discovered in th. 
sphere of experience. 

We now proceed to determine clearly our notion of a 
synthesis which can never be complete. There are two 
terms commonly employed for this purpose. These terms 
are regarded as expressions of different and distinguish- 
able notions, although the ground of the distinction has 
never been clearly exposed. The term employed by the 
mathematicians, is proyressus in infinitum. The philosophers 
prefer the expression proyressus in indefinitum. Without 
detaining the reader with an examination of the reasons for 
such a distinction, or with remarks on the right or wrong use 
of the terms, I shall endeavour clearly to determine these 
conceptions, so far as is necessary for the purpose of this 
Critique. 

We may, with propriety, say of a straight line, that it may be 
produced to infinity. In this case the distinction between ^pro- 
yressus in infinitum and a proyressus in indefinitum is a, mere 
piece of subtlety. For, although when we say, produce a straight 
line — it is more correct to say in indefinitum than in infinitum ; 
because the former means, produce it as far as you please, the 
second, you must not cease to produce it ; the expression in infi- 
nitum is, when we are speaking of the power to do imperfectly 
correct, for we can always make it longer if we please — on to 
infinity. And this remark holds good in all cases, when we 
■peak of a proyressus, that is, an advancement from the con- 



REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE OE PURE REASON. 319 

dition to the conditioned ; this possible advancement always 
proceeds to infinity. We may proceed from a given pair in 
the descending line of generation from father to son, and 
cogitate a never-ending line of descendants from it. For in 
such a case reason does not demand absolute totality in the 
series, because it does not presuppose it as a condition and as 
given (datum), but merely as conditioned, and as capable of 
being given (dubile). 

Very different is the case with the problem — how far the 
regress, which ascends from the given conditioned to the 
conditions, must extend ; whether I can say — it is a regress 
in infinitum, or only in indefinitum ; andw T hether, for example, 
setting out from the human beings at present alive in the 
world, I may ascend in the series of their ancestors, in infinitum. 
— or whether all that can be said is, that so far as I have pro- 
ceeded, I have discovered no empirical ground for considering 
the series limited, so that I am justified, and indeed, compelled 
to search for ancestors still further back, although I am not 
obliged by the idea of reason to presuppose them. 

My answer to this question is : If the series is given in 
empirical intuition as a whole, the regress in the series of its 
internal conditions proceeds in infinitum; but, if only one 
member of the series is given, from which the regress is to 
proceed to absolute totality, the regress is possible only in 
indefinitum. For example, the division of a portion of matter 
given within certain limits — of a body, that is — proceeds in 
infinitum. For, as the condition of this whole is its part, and 
the condition of the part a part of the part, and so on, and 
as in this regress of decomposition an unconditioned indivi- 
sible member of the series of conditions is not to be found ; 
there are no reasons or grounds in experience for stopping in 
the division, but, on the contrary, the more remote members 
of the division are actually and empirically given prior to this 
division. That is to say, the division proceeds to infinity. 
On the other hand, the series of ancestors of any given human 
being is not given, in its absolute totality, in any experience ; 
and yet the regress proceeds from every genealogical member 
of this series to one still higher, and does not meet with any 
empirical limit presenting an absolutely unconditioned member 
of the series. But as the members of such a series are not 
contained in the empirical intuition of the whole, prior to the 



320 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

regress, this regress does not proceed to infinity, but only 
in indefinitum, that is, we are called upon to discover 
other and higher members, which are themselves always 
conditioned. 

In neither case — the regressus in infinitum, nor the regres- 
sus in inrlefinitum, is the series of conditions to be considered 
as actually infinite in the object itself. This might be true of 
things in themselves, but it cannot be asserted of phaenomena, 
which, as conditions of each other, are only given in the em- 
pirical regress itself. Hence, the question itj longer is, 
What is the quantity of this series of conditions in itself — is 
it finite or infinite? for it is nothing in itself; but, How is 
the empirical regress to be commenced, and how far ought we 
to proceed with it 1 And here a signal distinction in the ap- 
plication of this rule becomes apparent. If the whole is 
given empirically, it is possible to recede in the series of its 
internal conditions to infinity. But if the whole is not given, 
and can only be given by and through the empirical regress, 
I can only say — it is possible to infinity * to proceed to still 
higher conditions in the series. In the first case I am justi- 
fied in asserting that more members are empirically given in 
the object than I attain to in the regress (of decomposition). 
In the second case, I am justified only in saying, that I can 
always proceed further in the regress, because no member of 
the series is given as absolutely conditioned, and thus a higher 
member is possible, and an inquiry with regard to it is neces- 
sary. In the one case it is necessary to find other members 
of the series, in the other it is necessary to inquire for others, 
inasmuch as experience presents no absolute limitation of the 
regress. For, either you do not possess a perception which 
absolutely limits your empirical regress, and in this case the 
regress cannot be regarded as complete ; or, you do possess 
such a limitative perception, in which case it is not a part of 
your series (for that which limits must be distinct from that 
which is limited by it), and it is incumbent on you to continue 
your regress up to this condition, and so on. 

These remarks will be placed in their proper light by their 
application in the following section. 

* Kant's meaning is ; Infinity, in the first case, is a quality, or may 
be predicated, of the regress ; while in the second case, it is only tt be 
predicated of the possibility of the regress. — Tr. 



BEGTJLATIYE PEINCIPLE OF REASON. 321 

ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. 

Section Ninth. 

Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason 
with regard to the Cosmological Ideas. 

We have shown that no transcendental use can be made either 
of the conceptions of reason or of understanding. We have 
shown, likewise, that the demand of absolute totality in the 
series of conditions in the world of sense arises from a 
transcendental employment of reason, resting on the opinion 
that phaenomena are to be regarded as things in themselves. 
It follows that we are not required to answer the question re- 
specting the absolute quantity of a series — whether it is in 
itself limited or unlimited. We are only called upon to de 
termine how far we must proceed in the empirical regress 
from condition to condition, in order to discover, in confor- 
mity with the rule of reason, a full and correct answer to the 
questions proposed by reason itself. 

This principle of reason is hence valid only as a rule for the 
extension of a possible experience — its invalidity as a principle 
constitutive of phsenomena in themselves having been suffi- 
ciently demonstrated. And thus, too, the antinomial conflict 
of reason with itself is completely put an end to ; inasmuch 
as we have not only presented a critical solution of the fallacy 
lurking in the opposite statements of reason, but have shown 
the true meaning of the ideas which gave rise to these state- 
ments. The dialectical principle of reason has, therefore, 
been changed into a doctrinal principle. But in fact, if this 
principle, in the subjective signification which we have shown 
to be its only true sense, may be guaranteed as a principle 
of the unceasing extension of the employment of our un- 
derstanding, its influence and value are just as great as if 
it were an axiom for the a priori determination of objects. 
For such an axiom could not exert a stronger influence on 
the extension and rectification of our knowledge, otherwise 
than by procuring for the principles of the understanding the 
most widely expanded employment in the field of experience.. 



322 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

I. 

Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of thi 
Composition of Ph&nomena in the Universe. 

Here, as well as in the case of the other cosmological 
problems, the ground of the regulative principle of reason is 
the proposition, that in our empirical regress no experience 
of an absolute limit, and consequently no experience of a con- 
dition, which is itself absolutely unconditioned, is discover- 
able. And the truth of this proposition itself rests upon the 
consideration, that such an experience must represent to us 
phaenomena as limited by nothing or the mere void, on which 
our continued regress by means of perception must abut — 
which is impossible. 

Now this proposition, which declares that every condition 
attained in the empirical regress must itself be considered em- 
pirically conditioned, contains the rule in terminis, which re- 
quires me, to whatever extent I may have proceeded in the 
ascending series, always to look for some higher member in 
the series — whether this member is to become known to me 
through experience, or not. 

Nothing further is necessary, then, for the solution of the 
first cosmological problem, than to decide, whether, in the re- 
gress to the unconditioned quantity of the universe (as re- 
gards space and time), this never limited ascent ought to be 
called a regressus in infantum or in indefinitum. 

The general representation which we form in our minds of 
the series of all past states or conditions of the world, or of 
all the things which at present exist in it, is itself nothing 
more than a possible empirical regress, which is cogitated — 
although in an undetermined manner — in the mind, and whieih 
gives rise to the conception of a series of conditions for a 
given object.* Now I have a conception of the universe, but 
not an intuition — that is, not an intuition of it as a whole. 
Thus I cannot infer the magnitude of the regress from the 

* The cosmical series can neither be greater nor smaller than the pos- 
sible empirical regress, upon which its conception is based. And as this 
regress cannot be a determinate infinite regress, still less a determinate 
finite (absolutely limited), it is evident, that we cannot regard the world 
as either finite or infinite, because the regress, which gives us the repre- 
sentation of the world, is neither finite nor infinite. 



IDEA OF TOTAilTr OT COMPOSITION. o2J 

quantity or magnitude of the world, and determine the 
former by means of the latter; on the contrary, I must first 
of all form a conception of the quantity or magnitude of the 
world from the magnitude of the empirical regress. But of 
this regress I know nothing more, than that I ought to pro- 
ceed from every given member of the series of conditions to 
one still higher. But the quantity of the universe is not 
thereby determined, and we cannot affirm that this regress 
proceeds in infinitum. Such an affirmation would anticipate 
the members of the series which have not yet been reached, 
and represent the number of them as beyond the grasp of any 
empirical synthesis ; it would consequently determine the 
cosmical quantity prior to the regress (although only in a 
negative manner) — which is impossible. For the world is not 
given in its totality in any intuition; consequently, its quan- 
tity cannot be given prior to the regress. It follows that we 
are unable to make any declaration respecting the cosmical 
quantity in itself — not even that the regress in it is a regress 
in infinitum ; we must only endeavour to attain to a conception 
of the quantity of the universe, in conformity with the rule 
which determines the empirical regress in it. But this rule 
merely requires us never to admit an absolute limit to our series 
— how far soever we may have proceeded in it, but always, 
on the contrary, to subordinate every phenomenon to some 
other as its condition, and consequently to proceed to this higher 
phenomenon. Such a regress is, therefore, the regressus 
in indefimtum, which, as not determining a quantity in the 
object, is clearly distinguishable from the regressus in infinitum. 
It follows from what we have said that we are not justified 
in declaring the world to be infinite in space, or as regards 
past time. For this conception of an infinite given quantity 
is empirical ; but we cannot apply the conception of an infinite 
quantity to the world as an object of the senses. I cannot 
say, the regress from a given perception to every thing limited 
either in space or time, proceeds in infinitum — for this 
presupposes an infinite cosmical quantity ; neither can I 
say, it is finite — for an absolute limit is likewise impossible in 
experience. It follows that I am not entitled to make any 
assertion at all respecting the whole object of experience — the 
world of sense ; I must limit my declarations to the rule, accord- 
ing to which experience or empirical knowledge is to be attained. 

t 2 



324 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

To the question, therefore, respecting; the cosmical quan- 
tity, the first and negative answer is : The world has no be- 
ginning in time, and no absolute limit in space. 

For, in the contrary case, it would be limited by a void 
time on the one hand, and by a void space on the other. 
Now, since the world, as a phenomenon, cannot be thus 
limited in itself — for a phaenomenon is not a thing in itself; 
it must be possible for us to have a perception of this limita- 
tion by a void time and a void space. But such a perception 
— such an experience is impossible ; because it has no content. 
Consequently, an absolute cosmical limit is empirically, and 
therefore absolutely, impossible.* 

From this follows the affirmative answer : The regress in 
the series of phaenomena — as a determination of the cosmical 
quantity, proceeds in indefinitum. This is equivalent to say- 
ing — the world of sense has no absolute quantity, but the 
empirical regress (through which alone the world of sense is 
presented to us on the side of its conditions) rests upon a 
rule, which requires it to proceed from every member of the 
series — as conditioned, to one still more remote (whether 
through personal experience, or by means of history, or the 
chain of cause and effect), and not to cease at any point in 
this extension of the possible empirical employment of the 
understanding. And this is the proper and only use which 
reason can make of its principles. 

The above rule does not prescribe an unceasing regress in 
one kind of phaenomena. It does not, for example, forbid us, 
in our ascent from an individual human being through the 
line of his ancestors, to expect that we shall discover at some 
point of the regress a primeval pair, or to admit, in the series 
of heavenly bodies, a sun at the farthest possible distance 
from some centre. All that it demands is a perpetual pro- 
gress from phaenomena to phaenomena, even although an 

* The reader will remark that the proof presented ahove is very dif- 
ferent from the dogmatical demonstration given in the antithesis of the 
first antinomy. In that demonstration, it was taken for granted that the 
world is a thing in itself— given in its totality prior to all regress, and a 
determined position in space and time was denied to it — if it was not 
considered as occupying all time and all space. Hence our conclusion 
differed from that given ahove ; lor we inferred in the antithesis the ac- 
tual infinity of the world. 



IDEA OF TOTALITY OF DIYISIOT*. 325 

actual perception is not presented by them (as in the case of 
our perceptions being so weak, as that we are unable to be- 
come conscious of them), since they, nevertheless, belong to 
possible experience. 

Every beginning is in time, and all limits to extension are in 
space. But space and time are in the world of sense. Con- 
sequently pheenomena in the world are conditionally limited, 
but the world itself is not limited, either conditionally or un- 
conditionally. 

For this reason, and because neither the world nor the 
cosmical series of conditions to a given conditioned can be 
completely given, our conception of the cosmical quantity 
is given only in and through the regress and not prior to it — 
in a collective intuition. But the regress itself is really nothing 
more than the determining of the cosmical quantity, and can- 
not therefore give us any determined conception of it — still 
less a conception of a quantity which is, in relation to a certain 
standard, infinite. The regress does not, therefore, proceed 
to infinity (an infinity given), but only to an indefinite extent, 
for the purpose of presenting to us a quantity — realized only 
in and through the regress itself. 

II. 

Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the 
Division of a Whole given in Intuition. 

When I divide a whole which is given in intuition, I pro- 
ceed from a conditioned to its conditions. The division of the 
parts of the whole (subdivisio or deco?npositio) is a regress in 
the series of these conditions. The absolute totality of this 
series would be actually attained and given to the mind, if the 
regress could arrive at simple parts. But if all the parts in a 
continuous decomposition are themselves divisible, the division, 
that is to say, the regress, proceeds from the conditioned to 
its conditions in infinitum; because the conditions (the parts) 
are themselves contained in the conditioned, and, as the latter 
is given in a limited intuition, the former are all given alon°; 
with it. This regress cannot, therefore, be called a regressvs 
in indefinitum, as happened in the case of the preceding cos- 
mological idea, the regress in which proceeded from the con- 



326 TEANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

ditioned to the conditions not given contemporaneously and 
along with it, but discoverable only through the empirical 
regress. We are not, however, entitled to affirm of a whole of 
this kind, which is divisible in infinitum, that it consists of 
an infinite number of parts. For, although all the parts are 
contained in the intuition of the whole, the whole division is 
not contained therein. The division is contained only in the 
progressing decomposition — in the regress itself, which is the 
condition of the possibility and actuality of the series. Now, 
as this regress is infinite, all the members (parts) to which it 
attains must be contained in the given whole as an aggregate. 
But the complete series of division is not contained therein. 
For this series, being infinite in succession and always incom- 
plete, cannot represent an infinite number of members, and 
still less a composition of these members into a whole. 

To apply this remark to space. Every limited part of space 
presented to intuition is a whole, the parts of which are always 
spaces — to whatever extent subdivided. Every limited space 
is hence divisible to infinity. 

Let us again apply the remark to an external phsenomenon 
enclosed in limits, that is, a body. The divisibility of a body 
rests upon the divisibility of space, which is the condition of 
the possibility of the body as an extended whole. A body is 
consequently divisible to infinity, though it does not, for that 
reason, consist of an infinite number of parts. 

It certainly seems that, as a body must be cogitated as 
substance in space, the law of divisibility would not be appli- 
cable to it as substance. For we may and ought to grant, in 
the case of space, that division or decomposition, to any 
extent, never can utterly annihilate composition (that is to 
say, the smallest part of space must still consist of spaces) ; 
otherwise space would entirely cease to exist — which is im- 
possible. But, the assertion on the other hand, that when all 
composition in matter is annihilated in thought, nothing re- 
mains, does not seem to harmonise with the conception of 
substance, which must be properly the subject of all compo- 
sition and must remain, even after the conjunction of its attri- 
butes in space — which constituted a body — is annihilated in 
thought. But this is not the case with substance in the 
phaenomenal world, which is not a thing in itself cogitated by 
the pure category. Pheenomenal substance is not an absolute 



IDEA OF TOTALITY OF DIVISION. 327 

subject ; it is merely a permanent sensuous image, and nothing 
more than an intuition, in which the unconditioned is not to 
be found. 

But, although this rule of progress to infinity is legitimate 
and applicable to the subdivision of a phaenomenon, as a mere 
occupation or filling of space, it is not applicable to a whole con- 
sisting of a number of distinct parts and constituting a quantum 
discretum — that is to say, an organised body. It cannot be 
admitted that every part in an organised whole is itself organ- 
ised, and that, in analysing it to infinity, we must always 
meet with organised parts ; although we may allow that the 
parts of the matter which we decompose in infinitum, may be 
organised. For the infinity of the division of a phaenomenon in 
space rests altogether on the fact that the divisibility of a phae- 
nomenon is given only in and through this infinity, that is an 
undetermined number of parts is given, while the parts them- 
selves are given and determined only in and through the sub- 
division ; in a word, the infinity of the division necessarily pre- 
supposes that the whole is not already divided in se. Hence our 
division determines a number of parts in the whole — a number 
which extends just as far as the actual regress in the division; 
while, on the other hand, the very notion of a body organised 
to infinity represents the whole as already and in itself divided. 
We expect, therefore, to find in it a determinate, but, at the 
same time, infinite, number of parts — which is self-contradic- 
tory. For we should thus have a whole containing a series of 
members which could not be completed in any regress — which 
is infinite, and at the same time complete in an organised 
composite. Infinite divisibility is applicable only to a 
quantum continuum, and is based entirely on the infinite 
divisibility of space. But in a quantum discretum the multi- 
tude of parts or units is always determined, and hence always 
equal to some number. To what extent a body may be or- 
ganized, experience alone can inform us ; and although, so 
far as our experience of this or that body has extended, we 
may not have discovered any inorganic part, such parts must 
exist in possible experience. But how far the transcendental 
division of a phaenomenon must extend, we cannot know from 
experience — it is a question which experience cannot answer ; 
it is answered only by the principle of reason which forbids 



328 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

us to consider the empirical regress, in the analysis of extended 
body, as ever absolutely complete. 



Concluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcendental 
Mathematical Ideas — and. Introductory to the Solution of 
the Dynamical Ideas. 

We presented the antinomy of pure reason in a tabular form, 
and we endeavoured to show the ground of this self-contra- 
diction on the part of reason, and the only means of bringing 
it to a conclusion — namely, by declaring both contradictory 
statements to be false. We represented in these antinomies 
the conditions of phsenomena as belonging to the conditioned 
according to relations of space and time — which is the usual 
supposition of the common understanding. In this respect, 
all dialectical representations of totality, in the series of con- 
ditions to a given conditioned, were perfectly homogeneous. 
The condition was always a member of the series along with 
the conditioned, and thus the homogeneity of the whole series 
was assured. In this case the regress could never be cogitated 
as complete ; or, if this was the case, a member really con- 
ditioned was falsely regarded as a primal member, conse- 
quently as unconditioned. In such an antinomy, therefore, 
we did not consider the object, that is, the conditioned, but 
the series of conditions belonging to the object, and the magni- 
tude of that series. And thus arose the difficulty — a difficulty 
not to be settled by any decision regarding the claims of the 
two parties, but simply by cutting the knot — by declaring the 
series proposed by reason to be either too long or too short for 
the understanding, which could in neither case make its con- 
ceptions adequate with the ideas. 

But we have overlooked, up to this point, an essential dif- 
ference existing between the conceptions of the understanding 
which reason endeavours to raise to the rank of ideas — two of 
these indicating a mathematical, and two a dynamical synthesis 
of phsenomena. Hitherto, it was not necessary to signalize 
this distinction ; for, just as in our general representation of 
all transcendental ideas, we considered them under phoenomenal 
conditions, so, in the two mathematical ideas, our discussion 



MATHEMATICAL A1ST> DYNAMICAL IDEAS. 329 

is concerned solely with an object in the world of ph-cencmena. 
But as we are now about to proceed to the consideration of 
the dynamical conceptions of the understanding, and their 
adequateness with ideas, we must not lose sight of this dis- 
tinction. We shall find that it opens up to us an entirely 
new view of the conflict in which reason is involved. For, 
while in the first two antinomies, both parties were dismissed, 
on the ground of having advanced statements based upon false 
hypotheses ; in the present case the hope appears of discover- 
ing a hypothesis which may be consistent with the demands 
of reason, and, the judge completing the statement of the 
grounds of claim, which both parties had left in an unsatis- 
factory state, the question may be settled on its own merits, 
n-ot by dismissing the claimants, but by a comparison of the 
arguments on both sides. — If we consider merely their exten- 
sion, and whether they are adequate with ideas, the series of 
conditions may be regarded as all homogeneous. But the 
conception of the understanding which lies at the basis of these 
ideas, contains either a synthesis of the homogeneous, (presup- 
posed in every quantity — in its composition as well as in its 
division) or of the heteroyeneous, which is the case in the 
dynamical synthesis of cause and effect, as well as of the 
necessary and the contingent. 

Thus it happens, that in the mathematical series of pheeno- 
mena no other than a sensuous condition is admissible — a 
condition which is itself a member of the series ; while the 
dynamical series of sensuous conditions admits a heterogeneous 
condition, which is not a member of the series, but, as purely 
intelligible, lies out of and beyond it. And thus reason is 
satisfied, and an unconditioned placed at the head of the series 
of phaenomena, without introducing confusion into or discon- 
tinuing it, contrary to the principles of the understanding. 

Now, from the fact that the dynamical ideas admit a con- 
dition of phaenomena which does not form a part of the series 
of phaenomena, arises a result which we should not have ex- 
pected from an antinomy. In former cases, the result was 
that both contradictory dialectical statements were declared to 
be false. In the present case, we find the conditioned in the 
dynamical series connected with an empirically unconditioned, 
but non-sensuous condition ; and thus satisfaction is done to 
the understanding on the one hand and to the reason on the 



330 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC 

other.* While, moreover, the dialectical arguments for un- 
conditioned totality in mere phenomena fall to the ground, 
both propositions of reason may be shown to be true in their 
proper signification. This could not happen in the case of 
the cosmological ideas which demanded a mathematically un- 
conditioned unity ; for no condition could be placed at the 
head of the series of phaenomena, except one which was itself 
a phsenomenon, and consequently a member of the series. 

III. 

Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the De- 
duction of Cosmical Events from their Causes. 

There are only two modes of causality cogitable — the caus- 
ality of nature, or of freedom. The first is the conjunction of 
a particular state with another preceding it in the world of 
sense, the former following the latter by virtue of a law. Now, 
as the causality of phaenomena is subject to conditions of time, 
and the preceding state, if it had always existed, could not 
have produced an effect which would make its first appearance 
at a particular time, the causality of a cause must itself be an 
effect — must itself have begun to be, and therefore, according 
to the principle of the understanding, itself requires a cause. 

We must understand, on the contrary, by the term freedom, 
in the cosmological sense, a faculty of the spontaneous origin- 
ation of a state ; the causality of which, therefore, is not sub- 
ordinated to another cause determining it in time. Freedom 
is in this sense a p'ure transcendental idea, which, in the first 
place, contains no empirical element ; the object of which, in 
the second place, cannot be given or determined in any expe- 
rience, because it is a universal law of the very possibility of 
experience, that everything which happens must have a eause, 
that consequently the causality of a cause, being itself some- 
thing that has happened, must also have a cause. In this view 

* For the understanding cannot admit among phenomena a condition 
which is itself empirically unconditioned. But if it is possible to cogitate 
an intelligible condition — one which is not a member of the series of phae- 
nomena — for a conditioned phenomenon, without breaking the series of 
empirical conditions, such a condition may be admissible as empirically 
unconditioned, and the empirical regress continue regular, unceasing, and 
intact. 



IDEA OF TOTALITY OF DEDUCTION. 331 

of the case, the whole field of experience, how far soever it 
may extend, contains nothing that is not subject to the laws 
of nature. But, as we cannot by this means attain to an ab- 
solute totality of conditions in reference to the series of causes 
and effects, reason creates the idea of a spontaneity, which 
can begin to act of itself, and without any external cause 
determining it to action, according to the natural law of 
causality. 

It is especially remarkable that the practical conception of 
freedom is based upon the transcendental idea, and that the 
question of the possibility of the former is difficult only as it 
involves the consideration of the truth of the latter. Free- 
dom, in the practical sense, is the independence of the will of 
coercion by sensuous impulses. A will is sensuous, in so far 
as it is pathologically affected (by sensuous impulses) ; it is 
termed animal (arbitrium orutum), when it is 'pathologically 
necessitated. The human will is certainly an arbitrium sensi- 
tivum, not brutum, but liberum ; because sensuousness does 
not necessitate its action, a faculty existing in man of self- 
determination, independently of all sensuous coercion. 

It is plain, that, if all causality in the world of sense were 
natural — and natural only, every event would be determined 
by another according to necessary laws, and that consequently, 
phaenomena, in so far as they determine the will, must neces- 
sitate every action as a natural effect from themselves ; and 
thus all practical freedom would fall to the ground with the 
transcendental idea. For the latter presupposes that, although 
a certain thing has not happened, it ought to have happened, 
and that, consequently, its phsenomenal cause was not so 
powerful and determinative as to exclude the causality of our 
will — a causality capable of producing effects independently 
of and even in opposition to the power of natural causes, and 
capable, consequently, of spontaneously originating a series of 
events. 

Here, too, we find it to be the case, as we generally found 
in the self-contradictions and perplexities of a reason which 
strives to pass the bounds of possible experience, that the pro- 
blem is properly not physiological ',* but transcendental. The 
question of the possibility of freedom does indeed concern 
psychology ; but, as it rests upon dialectical arguments of 

* Probably an error of tbe press, and tbat we sbould read psychi- 
logical— Tr. 



332 TEAFSCEKDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

pure reason, its solution must engage the attention of trans- 
cendental philosophy. Before attempting this solution, a task 
which transcendental philosophy cannot decline, it will be ad- 
visable to make a remark with regard to its procedure in the 
settlement of the question. 

If phsenomena were things in themselves, and time and 
space forms of the existence of things, condition and con- 
ditioned would always be members of the same series ; and 
thus would arise in the present case the antinomy common to 
all transcendental ideas — that their series is either too great 
or too small for the understanding. The dynamical ideas, 
which we are about to discuss in this and the following sec- 
tion, possess the peculiarity of relating to an object, not con- 
sidered as a quantity, but as an existence ; and thus, in the 
discussion of the present question, we may make abstraction 
of the quantity of the series of conditions, and consider merely 
the dynamical relation of the condition to the conditioned. 
The question, then, suggests itself, whether freedom is pos- 
sible ; and, if it is, whether it can consist with the universality 
of the natural law of causality ; and, consequently, whether 
we enounce a proper disjunctive proposition when we say — 
every effect must have its origin either in nature or in free- 
dom, or whether both cannot exist together in the same event 
in different relations. The principle of an unbroken connec- 
tion between all events in the phsenomenal world, in accord- 
ance with the unchangeable laws of nature, is a well-established 
principle of transcendental analytic which admits of no excep- 
tion. The question, therefore, is : Whether an effect, deter- 
mined according to the laws of nature, can at the same time 
be produced by a free agent, or whether freedom and nature 
mutually exclude each other ? And here, the common, but 
fallacious hypothesis of the absolute reality of phsenomena 
manifests its injurious influence in embarrassing the procedure 
of reason. For if phoenomena are things in themselves, free- 
dom is impossible. In this case, nature is the complete and 
all-sufficient cause of every event ; and condition and con- 
ditioned, cause and effect, are contained in the same series, 
and necessitated by the same law. If, on the contrary, phae- 
nomena are held to be, as they are in fact, nothing more than 
mere representations, connected with each other in accordance 
with empirical laws, they must have a ground which is not 



FKEEDOM AND NECESSITY. 333 

phsenomenal. But the causality of such an intelligible cause 
is not determined or determinable by phsenomena ; although 
its effects, as phsenomena, must be determined by other phse- 
nomenal existences. This cause and its causality exist there- 
fore out of and apart from the series of phsenomena ; while 
its effects do exist and are discoverable in the series of em- 
pirical conditions. Such an effect may therefore be considered 
to be free in relation to its intelligible cause, and necessary in 
relation to the phsenomena from which it is a necessary con- 
sequence — a distinction which, stated in this perfectly general 
and abstract manner, must appear in the highest degree subtle 
and obscure. The sequel will explain. It is sufficient, at 
present, to remark that, as the complete and unbroken con- 
nection of phsenomena is an unalterable law of nature, freedom 
is impossible — on the supposition that phsenomena are abso- 
lutely real. Hence those philosophers who adhere to the 
common opinion on this subject can never succeed in recon- 
ciling the ideas of nature and freedom. 

Possibility of Freedom in harmony with the Universal Law of 
Natural Necessity. 

That element in a sensuous object which is not itself sen- 
suous, I may be allowed to term intelligible. If, accordingly, 
an object which must be regarded as a sensuous phsenomenon 
possesses a faculty which is not an object of sensuous intuition, 
but by means of which it is capable of being the cause of 
phsenomena, the causality of an object or existence of this 
kind may be regarded from two different points of view. It 
may be considered to be intelligible, as regards its action — the 
action of a thing which is a thing in itself, and sensuous, as 
regards its effects — the effects of a phsenomenon belonging to 
the sensuous world. We should, accordingly, have to form 
both an empirical and an intellectual conception of the causality 
of such a faculty or power — both, however, having reference 
tc> the same effect. This two-fold manner of cogitating a 
power residing in a sensuous object does not run counter to 
any of the conceptions, which we ought to form of the world 
of phsenomena or of a possible experience. Phsenomena — not 
being things in themselves — must have a transcendental object 
as a foundation, which determines them as mere representa- 



334 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

tions ; and there seems to be no reason why we should not 
ascribe to this transcendental object, in addition to the pro- 
perty of self-phaenomenization, a causality whose effects are to 
be met with in the world of phaenomena, although it is not 
itself a phaenomenon. But every effective cause must possess 
a character, that is to say, a law of its causality, without which 
it would cease to be a cause. In the above case, then, every 
sensuous object would possess an empirical character, which 
guaranteed that its actions, as phaenomena, stand in com- 
plete and harmonious connection, conformably to unvarying 
natural laws, with all other phsenomena, and can be deduced 
from these, as conditions, and that they do thus, in connection 
with these, constitute a series in the order of nature. This 
sensuous object must, in the second place, possess an intelli- 
gible character, which guarantees it to be the cause of those 
actions, as phaenomena, although it is not itself a phaenomenon 
nor subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense. The 
former may be termed the character of the thing as a phae- 
nomenon, the latter the character of the thing as a thing in 
itself. 

Now this active subject would, in its character of intelligible 
subject, be subordinate to no conditions of time, for time is 
only a condition of phaenomena, and not of things in them- 
selves. No action would begin or cease to be in this subject ; 
it would consequently be free from the law of all determination 
of time — the law of change, namely, that everything which 
happens must have a cause in the phaenomena of a preceding 
state. In one word, the causality of the subject, in so far as 
it is intelligible, would not form part of the series of empirical 
conditions which determine and necessitate an event in the 
world of sense. Again, this intelligible character of a thing 
cannot be immediately cognized, because we can perceive 
nothing but phaenomena, but it must be capable of being 
cogitated in harmony with the empirical character ; for we 
always find ourselves compelled to place, in thought, a trans- 
cendental object at the basis of phaenomena, although we can 
never know what this object is in itself. 

In virtue of its empirical character, this subject would at the 
same time be subordinate to all the empirical laws of causality, 
and, as a phaenomenon and member of the sensuous world, ic« 
effects would have to be accounted for by a reference to prs- 



rllEESJOM AND NECESSITY. 335 

ceding phenomena. External phaenomena must be capable 
of influencing it ; and its actions, in accordance with natural 
laws, must explain to us how its empirical character, that is, 
the law of its causality, is to be cognized in and by means of 
experience. In a word, all requisites for a complete and ne- 
cessary determination of these actions must be presented to 
us by experience. 

In virtue of its intelligible character,, on the other hand, 
(although we possess only a general conception of this charac- 
ter), the subject must be regarded as free from all sensuous 
influences, and from all phsenomenal determination. More- 
over, as nothing happens in this subject — for it is a noumenon, 
and there does not consequently exist in it any change, de- 
manding the dynamical determination of time, and for the 
same reason no connection with phaenomena as causes — -this 
active existence must in its actions be free from and indepen- 
dent of natural necessity, for this necessity exists only in the 
world of phaenomena. It would be quite correct to say, that 
it originates or begins its effects in the world of sense from 
itself \ although the action productive of these effects does not 
begin in itself. We should not be in this case affirming that 
these sensuous effects began to exist of themselves, because 
they are always determined by prior empirical conditions — 
by virtue of the empirical character, which is the pheno- 
menon of the intelligible character — and are possible only as 
constituting a continuation of the series of natural causes. 
And thus nature and freedom, each in the complete and ab- 
solute signification of these terms, can exist, without contra- 
diction or disagreement, in the same action. 

Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in harmony 
with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity. 

I have thought it advisable to lay before the reader at first 
merely a sketch of the solution of this transcendental problem, 
in order to enable him to form with greater ease a clear con- 
ception of the course which reason must adopt in the solution. 
I shall now proceed to exhibit the several momenta of this so- 
lution, and to consider them in their order. 

The natural law, that everything which happens must have 
a cause, that the causality of this cause, that is, the action of 



336 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

the cause, (which cannot always have existed, but must be 
itself an event, for it precedes in time some effect which it has 
originated), must have itself a phsenomenal cause, by which 
it is determined, and, consequently, that all events are empiri- 
cally determined in an order of nature — this law, I say, which 
lies at the foundation of the possibility of experience, and of 
a connected system of phaenornena or nature, is a law of the 
understanding, from which no departure, and to which no 
exception, can be admitted. For to except even a single phee- 
nomenon from its operation, is to exclude it from the sphere 
of possible experience, and thus to admit it to be a mere fiction 
of thought or phantom of the brain. 

Thus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain 
of causes, in Avhich, however, absolute totality cannot be 
found. But we need not detain ourselves with this question, 
for it has already been sufficiently answered in our discussion 
of the antinomies into which reason falls, when it attempts to 
reach the unconditioned in the series of phsenomena. If we 
permit ourselves to be deceived by the illusion of transcen- 
dental idealism, we shall find that neither nature nor freedom 
exists. Now the question is : Whether, admitting the exist- 
ence of natural necessity in the world of phsenomena, it is 
possible to consider an effect as at the same time an effect of 
nature and an effect of freedom — or, whether these two modes 
of causality are contradictory and incompatible ? 

No pheenomenal cause can absolutely and of itself begin a 
series. Every action, in so far as it is productive of an event, 
is itself an event or occurrence, and presupposes another pre- 
ceding state, in which its cause existed. Thus everything that 
happens is but a continuation of a series, and an absolute be- 
ginning is impossible in the sensuous world. The actions of 
natural causes are, accordingly, themselves effects, and pre- 
suppose causes preceding them in time. A primal action — 
an action which forms an absolute beginning, is beyond the 
causal power of pheenomena. 

Now, is it absolutely necessary that, granting that all effects 
are phaenomena, the causality of the cause of these effects 
must also be a phenomenon, and belong to the empirical 
world ? Is it not rather possible that, although every effect 
in the phsenomenal world must be connected with an empirical 
cause, according to the universal law of nature, this empirical 



OF THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEA OF FBEEDOM. 337 

causality may be itself the effect of a non- empirical and intel- 
ligible causality — its connection with natural causes remaining 
nevertheless intact 1 Such a causality would be considered, 
in reference to phenomena, as the primal action of a cause, 
which is in so far, therefore, not phenomenal, but, by reason 
of this faculty or power, intelligible ; although it must, at the 
same time, as a link in the chain of nature, be regarded as 
belonging to the sensuous world. 

A belief in the reciprocal causality of phsenomena is neces- 
sary, if we are required to look for and to present the natural 
conditions of natural events, that is to say, their causes. This 
being admitted as unexceptionably valid, the requirements of 
the understanding, which recognises nothing but nature in 
the region of phsenomena, are satisfied, and our physical ex- 
planations of physical phsenomena may proceed in their regular 
course, without hindrance and without opposition. But it is no 
stumbling-block in the way, even assuming the idea to be a 
pure fiction, to admit that there are some natural causes in 
the possession of a faculty which is not empirical, but intelli- 
gible, inasmuch as it is not determined to action by empirical 
conditions, but purely and solely upon grounds brought for- 
ward by the understanding — this action being still, when 
the cause is phsenomenized, in perfect accordance with the 
laws of empirical causality. Thus the acting subject, as a 
causal phenomenon, would continue to preserve a complete con- 
nection with nature and natural conditions ; and the phe- 
nomenon only of the subject (with all its phsenomenal causality) 
would contain certain conditions, which, if we ascend from the 
empirical to the transcendental object, must necessarily be re- 
garded as intelligible. For, if we attend, in our inquiries with 
regard to causes in the world of phsenomena, to the directions 
of nature alone, we need not trouble ourselves about the rela- 
tion in which the transcendental subject, which is completely 
unknown to us, stands to these phsenomena and their connec- 
tion in nature. The intelligible ground of phsenomena in this 
subject does not concern empirical questions. It has to do 
only with pure thought ; and, although the effects of this 
thought and action of the pure understanding are discoverable 
in phsenomena, these phsenomena must nevertheless be capable 
of a full and complete explanation, upon purely physical 
grounds, and in accordance with natural laws. And in thij 

z 



333 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

case we attend solely to tlieir empirical, and omit all consider- 
ation of their intelligible character, (which is the transcendental 
cause of the former,) as completely unknown, except in so far 
as it is exhibited by the latter as its empirical symbol. Now 
let us apply this to experience. Man is a phsenomenon of the 
sensuous world, and at the same time, therefore, a natural 
cause, the causality of which must be regulated by empirical 
laws. As such, he must possess an empirical character, like all 
other natural phsenomena. We remark this empirical character 
in his actions, which reveal the presence of certain powers and 
faculties. If we consider inanimate, or merely animal nature, 
we can discover no reason for ascribing to ourselves any other 
than a faculty which is determined in a purely sensuous man- 
ner. But man, to whom nature reveals herself only through 
sense, cognizes himself not only by his senses, but also through 
pure apperception ; and this in actions and internal determi- 
nations, which he cannot regard as sensuous impressions. 
He is thus to himself, on the one hand, a phsenomenon, but 
on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties, a purely in- 
telligible object — intelligible, because its action cannot be as- 
cribed to sensuous receptivity. These faculties are under- 
standing and reason. The latter, especially, is in a peculiar 
manner distinct from all empirically-conditioned faculties, for 
it employs ideas alone in the consideration of its objects, and 
by means of these determines the understanding, which then 
proceeds to make an empirical use of its own conceptions, 
which, like the ideas of reason, are pure and non-empirical. 

That reason possesses the faculty of causality, or that at 
least we are compelled so to represent it, is evident from the 
imperatives, which in the sphere of the practical we impose 
on many of our executive powers. The words I ought express 
a species of necessity, and imply a connection with grounds 
which nature does not and cannot present to the mind of man. 
Understanding knows nothing in nature but that which is, 
or has been, or will be. It would be absurd to say that any- 
thing in nature ought to be other than it is in the relations of 
time in which it stands ; indeed, the ought, when we consider 
merely the course of nature, has neither application nor mean- 
ing. The question, what ought to happen in the sphere of 
nature, is just as absurd as the question, what ought to be the 
properties of a circle ? All that we are entitled to ask is, what 



Of 1 THE C0SM0:LOtfiCAL IDEA OE EREEDOM. 339 

takes place in nature, or, in the latter case, what are the pro- 
perties of a circle ? 

But the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible 
action, the ground of which is a pure conception ; while the 
ground of a merely natural action is, on the contrary, always 
a phaenomenon. This action must certainly be possible under 
physical conditions, if it is prescribed by the moral imperative 
ought ; but these physical or natural conditions do not con- 
cern the determination of the will itself, they relate to its effect 
alone, and the consequences of the effect in the world of phe- 
nomena. Whatever number of motives nature may present 
to my will, whatever sensuous impulses — the moral ought it is 
beyond their power to produce. They may produce a volition, 
which, so far from being necessary, is always conditioned — a 
volition to which the ought enunciated by reason, sets an aim 
and a standard, gives permission or prohibition. Be the ob- 
ject what it may, purely sensuous — as pleasure, or presented 
by pure reason — as good, reason will not yield to grounds 
which have an empirical origin. Reason will not follow the 
order of things presented by experience, but, with perfect 
spontaneity, rearranges them according to ideas, with which 
it compels empirical conditions to agree. It declares, in the 
name of these ideas, certain actions to be necessary which 
nevertheless have not taken place, and which perhaps never 
will take place ; and yet presupposes that it possesses the 
faculty of causality in relation to these actions. For, in the 
absence of this supposition, it could not expect its ideas to 
produce certain effects in the world of experience. 

Now, let us stop here, and admit it to be at least possible, 
that reason does stand in a really causal relation to phse- 
nomena. In this case it must — pure reason as it is — exhibit 
an empirical character. For every cause supposes a rule, ac- 
cording to which certain phsenomena follow as effects from 
the cause, and every rule requires uniformity in these effects ; 
and this is the proper ground of the conception of a cause — 
as a faculty or power. Now this conception (of a cause) may 
be termed the empirical character of reason ; and this charac- 
ter is a permanent one, while the effects produced appear, in 
conformity with the various conditions which accompany and 
partly limit them, in various forms. 

Thus the volition of every man has an empirical character, 

z ° 



340 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

which is nothing more than the causality of his reason, in go 
far as its effects in the phaenomenal world manifest the pre- 
sence of a rule, according to which we are enabled to examine, 
in their several kinds and degrees, the actions of this causality 
and the rational grounds for these actions, and in this way to 
decide upon the subjective principles of the volition. Now 
we learn what this empirical character is only from phse- 
nomenal effects, and from the rule of these which is presented 
by experience ; and for this reason all the actions of man in 
the world of phaenomena are determined by his empirical cha- 
racter, and the co-operative causes of nature. If, then, we 
could investigate all the phaenomena of human volition to 
their lowest foundation in the mind, there would be no action 
which we could not anticipate with certainty, and recognise to 
be absolutely necessary from its preceding conditions. So far 
as relates to this empirical character, therefore, there can be no 
freedom ; and it is only in the light of this character that we 
can consider the human will, when we confine ourselves to 
simple observation, and, as is the case in anthropology, insti- 
tute a physiological investigation of the motive causes of human 
actions. 

But when we consider the same actions in relation to reason 
— not for the purpose of explaining their origin, that is, in re- 
lation to speculative reason — but to practical reason, as the 
producing cause of these actions, we shall discover a rule and 
an order very different from those of nature and experience. 
For the declaration of this mental faculty may be, that what 
has and could not but take place in the course of nature, ought 
not to have taken place. Sometimes, too, we discover, or be- 
lieve that we discover, that the ideas of reason did actually 
stand in a causal relation to certain actions of man ; and that 
these actions have taken place because they were determined, 
not by empirical causes, but by the act of the will upon 
grounds of reason. 

Now, granting that reason stands in a causal relation to 
phaenomena ; can an action of reason be called free, when 
we know that, sensuously — in its empirical character, it is 
completely determined and absolutely necessary ? But tins 
empirical character is itself determined by the intelligible cha- 
racter. The latter we cannot cognize ; we can only indicate 
it by means of phaenomena, which enable us to have an imme- 



OP THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEA OF FBEEDOM. 341 

diate cognition only of the empirical character.* An action, 
then, in so far as it is to be ascribed to an intelligible cause, 
does not result from it ih accordance with empirical laws. 
That is to say, not the conditions of pure reason, but only their 
effects in the internal sense, precede the act. Pure reason, as 
a purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the conditions 
of time. The causality of reason in its intelligible character 
does not begin to be ; it does not make its appearance at a 
certain time, for the purpose of producing an effect. If this 
were not the case, the causality of reason would be subservient 
to the natural law of phsenomena, which determines them ac- 
cording to time, and as a series of causes and effects in time ; 
it would consequently cease to be freedom, and become a part 
of nature. We are therefore justified in saying — If reason 
stands in a causal relation to phsenomena, it is a faculty which 
originates the sensuous condition of an empirical series of 
effects. For the condition, which resides in the reason, is 
non-sensuous, and therefore cannot be originated, or begin to 
be. And thus we find — what we could not discover in any 
empirical series — a condition of a successive series of events 
itself empirically unconditioned. For, in the present case, 
the condition stands out of and beyond the series of phseno- 
mena — it is intelligible, and it consequently cannot be subject 
to any sensuous condition, or to any time-determination by a 
preceding cause. 

But, in another respect, the same cause belongs also to the 
series of phsenomena. Man is himself a phenomenon. His 
will has an empirical character, which is the empirical cause 
of all his actions. There is no condition — determining man 
and his volition in conformity with this character — which does 
not itself form part of the series of effects in nature, and is 
subject to their law — the law according to which an empirically 
undetermined cause of an event in time cannot exist. For 
this reason no given action can have an absolute and spon- 
taneous origination, all actions being phsenomena, and belong- 

* The real morality of actions— their merit or demerit, and even that 
of our own conduct, is completely unknown to us. Our estimates can 
relate only to their empirical character. How much is the result of the 
action of free-will, how much is to be ascribed to nature and to blameless 
error, or to a happy constitution of temperament (meri to fortunes), no oirts 
can discover, nor, for this reason, determine with perfect justice. 



342 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

ing to the world of experience. But it cannot be said of rea- 
son, that the state in which it determines the will is always 
preceded by some other state determining it. For reason is 
not a phenomenon, and therefore not subject to sensuous 
•onditions ; and, consequently, even in relation to its causality, 
the sequence or conditions of time do not influence reason, 
nor can the dynamical law of nature, which determines the 
sequence of time according to certain rules, be applied to it. 

Reason is consequently the permanent condition of all ac- 
tions of the human will. Each of these is determined in the 
empirical character of the man, even before it has taken place. 
Hie intelligible character, of which the former is but the sen- 
suous schema, knows no before or after ; and every action, 
irrespective of the time-relation in which it stands with other 
phsenomena, is the immediate effect of the intelligible charac- 
ter of pure reason, which, consequently, enjoys freedom of 
action, and is not dynamically determined either by internal 
or external preceding conditions. This freedom must not be 
described, in a merely negative manner, as independence of 
empirical conditions, for in this case the faculty of reason 
woujd cease to be a cause of phsenomena ; but it must be re- 
garded, positively, as a faculty which can spontaneously ori- 
ginate a series of events. At the same time, it must not be 
supposed that any beginning can take place in reason ; on the 
contrary, reason, as the unconditioned condition of all action 
of the will, admits of no time- conditions, although its effect 
does really begin in a series of phaenomena — a beginning 
which is not, however, absolutely primal. 

I shall illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an 
example, from its employment in the world of experience ; 
proved it cannot be by any amount of experience, or by any 
number of facts, for such arguments cannot establish the truth 
of transcendental propositions. Let us take a voluntary action 
— for example, a falsehood — by means of which a man has in- 
troduced a certain degree of confusion into the social life of hu- 
manity, which is judged according to the motives from Which 
it originated, and the blame of which and of the evil conse- 
quences arising from it, is imputed to the offender. We at 
first proceed to examine the empirical character of the offence, 
and for this purpose we endeavour to penetrate to the sources 
of that character, such as a defective education, bad company. 



OF THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEA OF FREEDOM. 345 

a shameless and wicked disposition, frivolity, and want 
of reflection — not forgetting also the occasioning causes 
which prevailed at the moment of the transgression. In 
this the procedure is exactly the same as that pursiied in 
the investigation of the series of causes which determine a 
given physical effect. Now, although we believe the action 
to have been determined by all these circumstances, we do 
not the less blame the offender. We do not blame him for 
his unhappy disposition, nor for the circumstances which in- 
fluenced him, nay, not even for his former course of life ; for 
we presuppose that all these considerations may be set aside, 
that the series of preceding conditions may be regarded as 
having never existed, and that the action may be considered 
as completely unconditioned in relation to any state preced- 
ing, just as if the agent commenced with it an entirely new 
series of effects. Our blame of the offender is grounded upon 
a law of reason, which requires us to regard this faculty as a 
cause, which could have and ought to have otherwise deter- 
mined the behaviour of the culprit, independently of all em- 
pirical conditions. This causality of reason we do not regard 
as a co-operating agency, but as complete in itself. It mat- 
ters not whether the sensuous impulses favoured or opposed 
the action of this causality, the offence is estimated according 
to its intelligible character — the offender is decidedly worthy 
of blame, the moment he utters a falsehood. It follows that 
we regard reason, in spite of the empirical conditions of the 
act, as completely free, and therefore, as in the present case, 
culpable. 

The above judgment is complete evidence that we are ac- 
customed to think that reason is not affected by sensuous 
conditions, that in it no change takes place — although its 
phaenomena, in other words, the mode in which it appears in 
its effects, are subject to change — that in it no preceding 
state determines the following, and, consequently, that it does 
not form a member of the series of sensuous conditions which 
necessitate phaenomena according to natural laws. Reason 
is present and the same in all human actions, and at all 
times ; but it does not itself exist in time, and therefore does 
not enter upon any state in which it did not formerly exist. 
It is, relatively to new states or conditions, determining, but 
not determinable. Hence we cannot ask : Why did not 



34 4 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

reason determine itself in a different manner? The question 
ought to be thus stated : Why did not reason employ its 
power of causality to determine certain phenomena in a dif- 
ferent manner ? But this is a question which admits of no 
answer. For a different intelligible character would have ex- 
hibited a different empirical character ; and, when we say 
that, in spite of the course which his whole former life has 
taken, the offender could have refrained from uttering the 
falsehood, this means merely that the act was subject to the 
power and authority — permissive or prohibitive — of reason. 
Now, reason is not subject in its causality to any conditions 
of phsenomena or of time; and a difference in time may 
produce a difference in the relation of phaenomena to each 
other — for these are not things, and therefore not causes in 
themselves, — but it cannot produce any difference in the re- 
lation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason. 

Thus, then, in our investigation into free actions and the 
causal power which produced them, we arrive at an intelligible 
cause, beyond which, however, we cannot go ; although we can 
recognize that it is free, that is, independent of all sensuous 
conditions, and that, in this way, it may be the sensuously 
unconditioned condition of phsenomena. But for what reason 
the intelligible character generates such and such phseno- 
mena, and exhibits such and such an empirical character 
under certain circumstances, it is beyond the power of our 
reason to decide. The question is as much above the power 
and the sphere of reason as the following would be : Why 
does the transcendental object of our external sensuous in- 
tuition allow of no other form than that of intuition in 
space ? But the problem, which we were called upon to 
solve, does not require us to entertain any such questions. 
The problem was merely this — whether freedom and natural 
necessity can exist without opposition in the same action. 
To this question we have given a sufficient answer ; for we 
have shown that, as the former stands in a relation to a dif- 
ferent kind of conditions from those of the latter, the law of 
the one does not affect the law of the other, and that, conse- 
quently, both can exist together in independence of and with- 
out interference with each other. 



OF THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEA 01 DEPENDENCE. 345 

The reader must be careful to remark that my intention in 
the above remarks has not been to prove the actual existence 
of freedom, as a faculty in which resides the cause of certain 
sensuous phsenomena. For, not to mention that such an 
argument would not have a transcendental character, nor have 
been limited to the discussion of pure conceptions, — all at- 
tempts at inferring from experience what cannot be cogitated 
in accordance with its laws, must ever be unsuccessful. Nay, 
more, I have not even aimed at demonstrating the possibility 
of freedom ; for this too would have been a vain endeavour, 
inasmuch as it is beyond the power of the mind to cognize 
the possibility of a reality or of a causal power, by the aid of 
mere a priori conceptions. Freedom has been considered in 
the foregoing remarks only as a transcendental idea, by means 
of which reason aims at originating a series of conditions in 
the world of phsenomena with the help of that which is sen- 
suously unconditioned, involving itself, however, in an anti- 
nomy with the laws which itself prescribes for the conduct of 
the understanding. That this antinomy is based upon a mere 
illusion, and that nature and freedom are at least not opposed 
— this was the only thing in our power to prove, and the 
question which it was our task to solve. 

IV. 

Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the 
Dependence of Phenomenal Existences. 

In the preceding remarks, we considered the changes in 
the world of sense as constituting a dynamical scries, in which 
each member is subordinated to another — as its cause. Our 
present purpose is to avail ourselves of this series of states or 
conditions as a guide to an existence which may be the high- 
est condition of all changeable phsenomena, that is, to a ne- 
cessary being. Our endeavour is to reach, not the uncondi- 
tioned causality, but the unconditioned existence, of substance. 
The series before us is therefore a series of conceptions, and 
not ot intuitions, (in which the one intuition is the condition 
of the other). 

But it is evident that, as all phsenomena are subject to 
change, and conditioned in their existence, the series of de- 



346 TBANSCEKDENTAL DIALECTIC 

pendent existences cannot embrace an unconditioned member, 
the existence of which would be absolutely necessary. It 
follows that, if phsenomena were things in themselves, and — 
as an immediate consequence from this supposition — condi- 
tion and conditioned belonged to the same series of phsenomena, 
the existence of a necessary being, as the condition of the 
existence of sensuous phsenomena, would be perfectly im- 
possible. 

An important distinction, however, exists between the dy- 
namical and the mathematical regress. The latter is engaged 
solely with the combination of parts into a whole, or with the 
division of a whole into its parts ; and therefore are the con- 
ditions of its series parts of the series, and to be consequently 
regarded as homogeneous, and for this reason, as consisting, 
without exception, of phsenomena. In the former regress, 
on the contrary, the aim of which is not to establish the pos- 
sibility of an unconditioned whole consisting of given parts, 
or of an unconditioned part of a given whole, but to demon- 
strate the possibility of the deduction of a certain state from 
its cause, or of the contingent existence of substance from 
that which exists necessarily, it is not requisite that the con- 
dition should form part of an empirical series along with the 
conditioned. 

In the case of the apparent antinomy with which we are 
at present dealing, there exists a way of escape from the diffi- 
culty ; for it is not impossible that both of the contradictory 
statements may be true in different relations. All sensuous 
phsenomena may be contingent, and consequently possess only 
an empirically conditioned existence, and yet there may also 
exist a non-empirical condition of the whole series, or, in 
other words, a necessary being. For this necessary being, as 
an intelligible condition, would not form a member — not even 
the highest member — of the series ; the whole world of sense 
would be left in its empirically determined existence uninter- 
fered with and uninfluenced. This would also form a ground 
of distinction between the modes of solution employed for 
the third and fourth antinomies. For, while in the consider- 
ation of freedom in the former antinomy, the thing itself — 
the cause {substantia phenomenon) was regarded as belonging 
to the series of conditions, and only its causality to the in- 
telligible world, — we are obliged in the present case to cogi- 



OF THE COSHOLOCxICAL IDEA OF DEPENDENCE. 347 

tate this necessary being as purely intelligible and as existing 
entirely apart from the world of sense (as an ens extramun- 
danurri) ; for otherwise it would be subject to the phsenomenal 
law of contingency and dependence. 

In relation to the present problem, therefore, the regulative 
principle of reason is that everything in the sensuous world 
possesses an empirically conditioned existence, — that no pro- 
perty of the sensuous world possesses unconditioned necessity, 
— that we are bound to expect, and, so far as is possible, to 
seek for the empirical condition of every member in the series 
of conditions, — and that there is no sufficient reason to justify 
us in deducing any existence from a condition which lies out 
of and beyond the empirical series, or in regarding any ex- 
istence as independent and self-subsistent ; although this 
should not prevent us from recognising the possibility of the 
whole series being based upon a being which is intelligible, 
and for this reason free from all empirical conditions. 

But it has been far from my intention, in these remarks, to 
prove the existence of this unconditioned and necessary 
being, or even to evidence the possibility of a purely intelli- 
gible condition of the existence of all sensuous phsenomena. 
As bounds were set to reason, to prevent it from leaving the 
guiding thread of empirical conditions, and losing itself in 
transcendent theories which are incapable of concrete pre- 
sentation ; so, it was my purpose, on the other hand, to set 
bounds to the law of the purely empirical understanding, 
and to protest against any attempts on its part at deciding on 
the possibility of things, or declaring the existence of the in- 
telligible to be impossible, merely on the ground that it is not 
available for the explanation and exposition of phsenomena. 
It has been shown, at the same time, that the contingency of 
all the phsenomena of nature and their empirical conditions 
is quite consistent with the arbitrary hypothesis of a neces- 
sary, although purely intelligible condition, that no real con- 
tradiction exists between them, and that, consequently, both 
may be true. The existence of such an absolutely necessary 
being may be impossible ; but this can never be demon- 
strated from the universal contingency and dependence of sen- 
suous phsenomena, nor from the principle which forbids us 
to discontinue the series at some member of it, or to seek 
for its cause in some sphere of existence beyond the world of 



348 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

nature. Reason goes its way in the empirical world, and 
follows, too, its peculiar path in the sphere of the transcend- 
ental. 

The sensuous world contains nothing but phsenomena, 
which are mere representations, and always sensuously con- 
ditioned ; things in themselves are not, and cannot be, ob- 
jects to us. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that we 
are not justified in leaping from some member of an empirical 
series beyond the world of sense, as if empirical representa- 
tions were things in themselves, existing apart from their 
transcendental ground in the human mind, and the cause of 
whose existence may be sought out of the empirical series. 
This would certainly be the case with contingent things ; but 
it cannot be with mere representations of things, the contin- 
gency of which is itself merely a phsenomenon, and can relate 
to no other regress than that which determines phenomena, 
that is, the empirical. But to cogitate an intelligible ground 
of phsenomena, as free, moreover, from the contingency of 
the latter, conflicts neither with the unlimited nature of the 
empirical regress, nor with the complete contingency of phe- 
nomena. And the demonstration of this was the only thing 
necessary for the solution of this apparent antinomy. For if 
the condition of every conditioned — as regards its existence — 
is sensuous, and for this reason a part of the same series, it 
must be itself conditioned, as was shewn in the Antithesis of 
the fourth Antinomy. The embarrassments into which a 
reason, which postulates the unconditioned, necessarily falls, 
must, therefore, continue to exist ; or the unconditioned must 
be placed in the sphere of the intelligible. In this way, its 
necessity does not require, nor does it even permit, the pre- 
sence of an empirical condition : and it is, consequently, un- 
conditionally necessary. 

The empirical employment of reason is not affected by the 
assumption of a purely intelligible being ; it continues its 
operations on the principle of the contingency of all phse- 
nomena, proceeding from empirical conditions to still higher 
and higher conditions, themselves empirical. Just as little 
does this regulative principle exclude the assumption of an 
intelligible cause, when the question regards merely the pure 
employment of reason — in relation to ends or aims. For, in 
this case, an intelligible cause signifies merely the transcen- 



CONCLUDING EEMAEKS ON THE ANTINOMIES, 349 

dental and to us unknown ground of the possibility of sensu- 
ous phenomena, and its existence necessary and independent 
of ail sensuous conditions, is not inconsistent with the con- 
tingency of phsenomena, or with the unlimited possibility of 
regress which exists in the series of empirical conditions. 

Concluding Remarks on the Antinomy of Pure Reason. 
So long as the object of our rational conceptions is the to- 
tality of conditions in the world of phsenomena, and the satis- 
faction, from this source, of the requirements of reason, so 
long are our ideas transcendental and cosmological. But 
when we set the unconditioned — which is the aim of all our 
inquiries — in a sphere which lies out of the world of sense 
and possible experience, our ideas become transcendent. They 
are then not merely serviceable towards the completion of the 
exercise of reason (which remains an idea, never executed, but 
always to be pursued) ; they detach themselves completely 
from experience, and construct for themselves objects, the 
material of which has not been presented by experience, and 
the objective reality of which is not based upon the comple- 
tion of the empirical series, but upon pure a priori conceptions. 
The intelligible object of these transcendent ideas may be 
conceded, as a transcendental object. But we cannot cogitate 
it as a thing determinable by certain distinct predicates re- 
lating to its internal nature, for it has no connection with em- 
pirical conceptions ; nor are we justified in affirming the 
existence of any such object. It is, consequently, a mere 
product of the mind alone. Of all the cosmological ideas, 
however, it is that occasioning the fourth antinomy which 
compels us to venture upon this step. For the existence of 
phsenomena, always conditioned and never self-subsistent, 
requires us to look for an object different from phsenomena 
— an intelligible object, with which all contingency must 
cease. But, as we have allowed ourselves to assume the ex- 
istence of a self-subsistent reality out of the field of experience, 
and are therefore obliged to regard phsenomena as merely a 
contingent mode of representing intelligible objects employed 
by beings which are themselves intelligences, — no other 
course remains for us than to follow analogy, and employ 
the same mode in forming some conception of intelligible 
things, of which we have not the least knowledge, which 



350 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

nature taught us to use in the formation of empirical con- 
ceptions. Experience made us acquainted with the contingent. 
But we are at present engaged in the discussion of things 
which are not objects of experience ; and must, therefore, 
deduce our knowledge of them from that which is necessary 
absolutely and in itself, that is from pure conceptions. Hence 
the first step which we take out of the world of sense obliges 
us to begin our system of new cognition with the investigation 
of a necessary being, and to deduce from our conceptions of 
it, all our conceptions of intelligible things. This we pro- 
pose to attempt in the following chapter. 

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

BOOK II. 

Chap. III. — The Ideal of Pure Reason. 

Section First. 

Of the Ideal in General. 

We have seen that pure conceptions do not present objects 
to the mind, except under sensuous conditions ; because 
the conditions of objective reality do not exist in these 
conceptions, which contain, in fact, nothing but the mere 
form of thought. They may, however, when applied to 
phsenomena, be presented in concreto ; for it is phenomena 
that present to them the materials for the formation of 
empirical conceptions, which are nothing more than cowcrete 
forms of the conceptions of the understanding. But ideas are 
still farther removed from objective reality than categories; 
for no phenomenon can ever present them to the human 
mind in concreto. They contain a certain perfection, attain- 
able by no possible empirical cognition ; and they give to 
reason a systematic unity, to which the unity of experience 
attempts to approximate, but can never completely attain. 

But still further removed than the idea from objective 
reality is the Ideal, by which term I understand the idea, not 
in concreto, but in individuo — as an individual thing, deter- 
minable or determined by the idea alone. The idea of 
humanity in its complete perfection supposes not only the 



OE THE ILEjlL in geneeal. 351 

advancement of all the powers and faculties, which constitute 
our conception of human nature, to a complete attainment of 
their final aims, but also every thing which is requisite for the 
complete determination of the idea ; for of all contradictory 
predicates, only one can conform with the idea of the perfect 
man. What I have termed an ideal, was in Plato's philosophy 
an idea of the divine mind — an individual object present to its 
pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible 
beings, and the archetype of all phaenomenal existences. 

Without rising to these speculative heights, we are bound 
to confess that human reason contains not only ideas, but 
ideals, which possess, not, like those of Plato, creative, but 
certainly 'practical power — as regulative principles, and form 
the basis of the perfectibility of certain actions. Moral con- 
ceptions are not perfectly pure conceptions of reason, because 
an empirical element — of pleasure or pain — lies at the foun- 
dation of them. In relation, however, to the principle, 
whereby reason sets bounds to a freedom which is in itself 
without law, and consequently when we attend merely to 
their form, they may be considered as pure conceptions 
of reason. Virtue and wisdom in their perfect purity, are 
ideas. But the wise man of the Stoics is an ideal, that is 
to say, a human being existing only in thought, and in com- 
plete conformity with the idea of wisdom. As the idea pro- 
vides a rule, so the ideal serves as an archetype for the perfect 
and complete determination of the copy. Thus the conduct 
of this wise and divine man serves us as a standard of action, 
with which we may compare and judge ourselves, which may 
help us to reform ourselves, although the perfection it de- 
mands can never be attained by us. Although we cannot 
concede objective reality to these ideals, they are not to be 
considered as chimaeras ; on the contrary, they provide reason 
with a standard, which enables it to estimate, by comparison, 
the degree of incompleteness in the objects presented to it. 
But to aim at realising the ideal in an example in the world 
of experience — to describe, for instance, the character of the 
perfectly wise man in a romance is impracticable. Nay more, 
there is something absurd in the attempt ; and the result 
must be little edifying, as the natural limitations which are 
continually breaking in upon the perfection and completeness 
of the idea, destroy the illusion in the story, and throw an air 



352 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTS. 

of suspicion even on what is good in the i/lea, which hence 
appears fictitious and unreal. 

Such is the constitution of the ideal of reason, which is 
always based upon determinate conceptions, and serves as a rule 
and a model for imitation or for criticism. Very different 
is the nature of the ideals of the imagination. Of these it is 
impossible to present an intelligible conception; they are a 
kind of monogram, drawn according to no determinate rule, 
and forming rather a vague picture — the production of many 
diverse experiences — than a determinate image. Such are 
the ideals which painters and physiognomists profess to have 
in their minds, and which can serve neither as a model for 
production nor as a standard for appreciation. They may be 
termed, though improperly, sensuous ideals, as they are de- 
clared to be models of certain possible empirical intuitions. 
They cannot, however, furnish rules or standards for expla- 
nation or examination. 

In its ideals, reason aims at complete and perfect determi- 
nation according to a priori rules ; and hence it cogitates an 
object, which must be completely determinable in conformity 
with principles, although all empirical conditions are absent, 
and the conception of the object is on this account trans- 
cendent. 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

Section Second. 
Of the Transcendental Ideal. 
(Prototypon Transcendentale. ) 
Every conception is, in relation to that which is not contained 
in it, undetermined and subject to the principle of determin- 
ability. This principle is, that of every two contradictorily op- 
posed predicates, only one can belong to a conception. It is 
a purely logical principle, itself based upon the principle of 
contradiction ; inasmuch as it makes complete abstraction of 
the content, and attends merely to the logical form of the 
cognition. 

But again, everything, as regards its possibility, is also sub- 
ject to the principle* of complete determination, according to 
which one of all the possible contradictory predicates of 
things must belong to it. This principle is not based merely 
* Principium deter minalionis omnimodce.—'Hx, 



Or THE TBAXSCENDEXTAL IDEAL. 3~j3 

upon that of contradiction ; for, in addition to the relation 
between two contradictory predicates, it regards everything as 
standing in a relation to the sum of possibilities, as the sum- 
total of all predicates of things, and, while presupposing 
this sum as an a priori condition, presents to the mind every- 
thing as receiving the possibility of its individual existence 
from the relation it bears to, and the share it possesses 
in the aforesaid sum of possibilities.* The principle of com- 
plete determination relates therefore to the content and not 
to the logical form. It is the principle of the synthesis of all 
the predicates which are required to constitute the complete 
conception of a thing, and not a mere principle of analytical 
representation, which anounces that one of two contradictory 
predicates must belong to a conception. It contains, more- 
over, a transcendental presupposition — that, namely, of the 
material for all possibility, which must contain a priori the 
data for this or that particular possibility . 

The proposition, everything which exists is completely deter- 
mined, means not qnly that one of every pair of given contradic- 
tory attributes, but that one of all possible attributes, is always 
predicable of the thing ; in it the predicates are not merely 
compared logically with each other, but the thing itself is tran- 
scendentally compared with the sum-total of all possible pre- 
dicates. The proposition is equivalent to saying : — to attain to 
a complete knowledge of a thing, it is necessary to possess a 
knowledge of everything that is possible, and to determine it 
thereby, in a positive or negative manner. The conception 
of complete determination is consequently a conception which 
cannot be presented in its totality in concreto, and is therefore 
based upon an idea, which has its seat in the reason — the 
faculty which prescribes to the understanding the laws of its 
harmonious and perfect exercise. 

Now, although this idea of the sum-total of all possibility, 
in so far as it forms the condition of the complete determina- 

* Thus this principle declares everything to possess a relation to a 
common correlate— the sum-total of possibility, which, if discovered to 
exist in the idea of one individual thing, would establish the affinity of 
all possible things, from the identity of the ground of their complete 
determination. The determinability of every conception is subordinate to 
the universality (Allgemeinheit universalitas) of the. principle of excluded 
middle; the determination of a thing to the totality (Allheit. universitgs) 
of all possible predicates. 

A A 



354 TEANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

tion of every thing, is itself undetermined in relation to the 
predicates which may constitute this sum-total, and we cogi- 
tate in it merely the sum-total of all possible predicates — we 
nevertheless find, upon closer examination, that this idea, as a 
primitive conception of the mind, excludes a large number 
of predicates — those deduced and those irreconcilable with 
others, and that it is evolved as a conception completely de- 
termined a priori. Thus it becomes the conception of an 
individual object, which is completely determined by and 
through the mere idea, and must consequently be termed an 
ideal of pure reason. 

When we consider all possible predicates, not merely logi- 
cally, but transcendentally, that is to say, with reference to 
the content which may be cogitated as existing in them a 
priori, we shall find that some indicate a being, others merely 
a non-being. The logical negation expressed in the word not, 
does not properly belong to a conception, but only to the re- 
lation of one conception to another in a judgment, and is 
consequently quite insufficient to present to, the mind the con- 
tent of a conception. The expression not mortal, does not in- 
dicate that a non-being is cogitated in the object ; it does not 
concern the content at all. A transcendental negation, on the 
contrary, indicates non-being in itself, and is opposed to 
transcendental affirmation, the conception of which of itself 
expresses a being. Hence this affirmation indicates a reality, 
because in and through it objects are considered to be some- 
thing — to be things ; while the opposite negation, on the 
other hand, indicates a mere want, or privation, or absence, 
and, where such negations alone are attached to a representa- 
tion, the non-existence of anything corresponding to the repre- 
sentation. 

Now a negation cannot be cogitated as determined, without 
cogitating at the same time the opposite affirmation. The 
man born blind has not the least notion of darkness, because 
he has none of light ; the vagabond knows nothing of po- 
verty, because he has never known what it is to be in com- 
fort j* the ignorant man has no conception of his ignorance, 

* The investigations and calculations of astronomers have taught ns 
much that is wonderful ; hut the most important lesson we have received 
from them is the discovery of the ahyss of our ignorance in relation to 
the universe — an ignorance, the magnitude of which reason, without the 



OE THE TBANSCEKDENTAL IDEAL. 355 

because he has no conception of knowledge. All conceptions 
of negatives are accordingly derived or deduced conceptions ; 
and realities contain the data, and, so to speak, the material 
or transcendental content of the possibility and complete de- 
termination of all things. 

If, therefore, a transcendental substratum lies at the foun- 
dation of the complete determination of things — a sub- 
stratum which is to form the fund from which all possible 
predicates of things are to be supplied, this substratum can- 
not be anything else than the idea of a sum-total of reality 
(omnitudo realitatis). In this view, negations are nothing 
but limitations — a term which could not, with propriety, be 
applied to them, if the unlimited (the all) did not form the 
true basis of our conception. 

This conception of a sum-total of reality is the conception 
of a thing in itself, regarded as completely determined ; and 
the conception of an ens realissimum is the conception of an 
individual being, inasmuch as it is determined by that predi- 
cate of all possible contradictory predicates, which indicates 
and belongs to being. It is therefore a transcendental ideat 
which forms the basis of the complete determination of every- 
thing that exists, and is the highest material condition of its 
possibility — a condition on which must rest the cogitation 
of all objects with respect to their content. Nay, more, this 
ideal is the only proper ideal of which the human mind is 
capable ; because in this case alone a general conception of a 
thing is completely determined by and through itself, and 
cognized as the representation of an individuum. 

The logical determination of a conception is based upon a 
disjunctive syllogism, the major of which contains the logical 
division of the extent of a general conception, the minor 
limits this extent to a certain part, while the conclusion de- 
termines the conception by this part. The general conception 
of a reality cannot be divided a, priori, because, without the 
aid of experience, we cannot know any determinate kinds of 
reality, standing under the former as the genus. The tran- 
scendental principle of the complete determination of all 
things is therefore merely the representation of the sum-total 

information thus derived, could never have conceived. This discovery 
of our deficiencies must produce a great change in the determination of 
the aims of human reason. 

2 A 2 



356 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

of all reality ; it is not a conception which is the genus of all 
predicates under itself, but one which comprehends them all 
within itself. The complete determination of a thing is con- 
sequently based upon the limitation of this total of reality, 
so much being predicated of the thing, while all that remains 
over is excluded — a procedure which is in exact agreement 
with that of the disjunctive syllogism and the determination 
of the object in the conclusion by one of the members of the 
division. It follows that reason, in laying the transcendental 
ideal at the foundation of its determination of all possible 
things, takes a course in exact analogy with that which it pur- 
sues in disjunctive syllogisms — a proposition which formed 
the basis of the systematic division of all transcendental ideas, 
according to which they are produced in complete parallelism 
with the three modes of syllogistic reasoning employed by the 
human mind.* 

It is self-evident that reason, in cogitating the necessary 
complete determination of things, does not presuppose the 
existence of a being corresponding to its ideal, but merely the 
idea of the ideal — for the purpose of deducing from the un- 
conditioned totality of complete determination, the condi- 
tioned, that is, the totality of limited things. The ideal is 
therefore the prototype of all things, which, as defective 
copies {ectypa), receive from it the material of their possibility, 
and approximate to it more or less, though it is impossible 
that they can ever attain, to its perfection. 

The possibility of things must therefore be regarded as de- 
rived — except that of the thing which contains in itself all 
reality, which must be considered to be primitive and original. 
For all negations — and they are the only predicates by means 
of which all other things can be distinguished from the ens 
realissimum — are mere limitations of a greater and a higher- 
nay, the highest reality ; and they consequently presuppose 
this reality, and are, as regards their content, derived from 
it. The manifold nature of things is only an infinitely various 
mode of limiting the conception of the highest reality, which 
is their common substratum ; just as all figures are possible 
only as different modes of limiting infinite space. The ob- 
ject of the ideal of reason — an object existing only in reason 
itself — is also termed the primal being (ens oriy'uiariuin) ; as 
* See pages 225 and 236. 



OF THE TRAXSCEFE-ESTAL IDEAL. 357 

having no existence superior to him, the supreme being (ens 
summuni) ; and as being the condition of all other beings, 
which rank under it, the being of all beings (ens entium). But 
none of these terms indicate the objective relation of an actually 
existing object to other things, but merely that of an idea to 
conceptions; and all our investigations into this subject 
still leave us in perfect uncertainty with regard to the ex- 
istence of this being. 

A primal being cannot be said to consist of many other 
beings with an existence which is derivative, for the latter 
presuppose the former, and therefore cannot be constitutive 
parts of it. It follows that the ideal of the primal being 
must be cogitated as simple. 

The deduction of the possibility of all other things from 
this primal being cannot, strictly speaking, be considered as 
a limitation, or as a kind of division of its reality ; for this 
would be regarding the primal being as a mere aggregate — 
which has been shown to be impossible, although it was so 
represented in our first rough sketch. The highest reality 
must be regarded rather as the ground than as the sum-total 
of the possibility of all things, and the manifold nature of 
things be based, not upon the limitation of the primal being 
itself, but upon the complete series of effects which flow from 
it. And thus all our powers of sense, as well as all phseno- 
menal reality, may be with propriety regarded as belonging to 
this series of effects, while they could not have formed parts 
of the idea, considered as an aggregate. Pursuing this track, 
and hypostatising this idea, we shall find ourselves authorised 
to determine our notion of the Supreme Being by means of 
the mere conception of a highest reality, as one, simple, all- 
sufficient, eternal, and so on — in one word, to determine it in 
its unconditioned completeness by the aid of every possible 
predicate. The conception of such a being is the conception 
of God in its transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure 
reason is the object-matter of a transcendental Theology. 

But, by such an employment of the transcendental idea, 
we should be overstepping the limits of its validity and pur- 
pose. For reason placed it, as the conception of all reality, 
at the basis of the complete determination of things, without 
requiring that this conception be regarded as the conception 
of an objective existence. Such an existence would be purely 



358 TBATTSCEKDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

fictitious, and the hypostatising of the content of the idea 
mto an ideal, as an individual being, is a step perfectly un- 
authorised. Nay, more, we are not even called upon to as- 
sume the possibility of such an hypothesis, as none of the de- 
ductions drawn from such an ideal would affect the complete 
determination of things in general — for the sake of which 
alone is the idea necessary. 

It is not sufficient to circumscribe the procedure and the 
dialectic of reason ; we must also endeavour to discover the 
sources of this dialectic, that we may have it in our power to 
give a rational explanation of this illusion, as a phsenomenon 
of the human mind. For the ideal, of which we are at pre- 
sent speaking, is based, not upon an arbitrary, but upon a 
natural, idea. The question hence arises : how happens it 
that reason regards the possibility of all things as deduced 
from a single possibility, that, to wit, of the highest reality, 
and presupposes this as existing in an individual and primal 
being ? 

The answer is ready ; it is at once presented by the pro- 
cedure of transcendental analytic. The possibility of sen- 
suous objects is a relation of these objects to thought, in 
which something (the empirical form) may be cogitated 
a priori; while that which constitutes the matter — the reality 
of the phsenomenon (that element which corresponds to sen- 
sation) — must be given from without, as otherwise it could not 
even be cogitated by, nor could its possibility be presentable 
to the mind. Now, a sensuous object is completely deter- 
mined, when it has been compared with all phaenomenal pre- 
dicates, and represented by means of these either positively 
or negatively. But, as that which constitutes the thing itself 
— the real in a phaenomenon, must be given, and that, in 
which the real of all phenomena is given, is experience, one, 
eole, and all-embracing, — the material of the possibility of all 
sensuous objects must be presupposed as given in a whole, 
and it is upon the limitation of this whole that the possibility 
of all empirical objects, their distinction from each other and 
their complete determination, are based. Now, no other ob- 
jects are presented to us besides sensuous objects, and these 
can be given only in connection with a possible experience j 
it follows that a thing is not an object to us, unless it pre- 
supposes the whole or sum-total of empirical reality as the 



OF THE EXISTENCE OE A SEPBEME BEING. 35 9 

condition of its possibility. Now, a natural illusion leads us 
to consider this principle, which is valid only of sensuous ob- 
jects, as valid with regard to things in general. And thus 
we are induced to hold the empirical principle of our con 
ceptions of the possibility of things, as phsenomena, by leav- 
ing out this limitative condition, to be a transcendental prin- 
ciple of the possibility of things in general. 

We proceed afterwards to hypostatise this idea of the sum- 
total of all reality, by changing the distributive nnity of the 
empirical exercise of the understanding into the collective unity 
of an empirical whole — a dialectical illusion, and by cogitating 
this whole or sum of experience as an individual thing, con- 
taining in itself all empirical reality. This individual thing or 
being is then, by means of the above-mentioned transcendental 
subreption, substituted for our notion of a thing which stands 
at the head of the possibility of all things, the real conditions 
of whose complete determination it presents.* 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

Section Thibd. 

Of the Arguments employed ly Speculative Reason in proof of 
the Existence of a Supreme Being. 

Notwithstanding the pressing necessity which reason feels, 
to form some presupposition that shall serve the understanding 
as a proper basis for the complete determination of its con- 
ceptions, the idealistic and factitious nature of such a presup- 
position is too evident to allow reason for a moment to per- 
suade itself into a belief of the objective existence of a mere 
creation of its own thought. But there are other considera- 
tions which compel reason to seek out some resting-place in 
the regress from the conditioned to the unconditioned, which 

* This ideal of the ens realissimum — although merely a mental repre- 
sentation — is first objectivised, that is, has an objective existence attributed 
to it, then hypostatised, and finally, by the natural progress of reason to 
the completion of unity, personified, as we shall show presently. For the 
regulative unity of experience is not based upon phenomena "themselves, 
but upon the connection of the variety of phenomena by the under- 
standing in a consciousness, and thus the unity of the supreme reality and 
the complete determinability of all things, seem to reside in a supreme 
understanding, and consequently, in a conscious intelligence. 



350 teAjStscekde^tal dialectic. 

is not given as an actual existence from the mere conception 
of it, although it alone can give completeness to the series of 
conditions. And this is the natural course of every human 
reason, even of the most uneducated, although the path at first 
entered it does 'not always continue to follow. It does not 
begin from conceptions, but from common experience, and 
requires a basis in actual existence. But this basis is inse- 
cure, unless it rests upon the immovable rock of the absolutely 
necessary. And this foundation is itself unworthy of trust, if 
it leave under and above it empty space, if it do not fill all, 
and leave no room for a why or a wherefore, if it be not, in 
one word, infinite in its reality. 

If we admit the existence of some one thing, whatever it 
may be, we must also admit that there is something which 
exists necessarily. For what is contingent exists only under 
the condition of some other thing, which is its cause ; and 
from this we must go on to conclude the existence of a cause, 
which is not contingent, and which consequently exists neces- 
sarily and unconditionally. Such is the argument by which 
reason justifies its advances towards a primal being. 

Now reason looks round for the conception of a being 
that may be admitted, without inconsistency, to be worthy of 
the attribute of absolute necessity, not for the purpose of in- 
ferring d priori, from the conception of such a being, its ob- 
jective existence, (for if reason allowed itself to take this 
course, it would not require a basis in given and actual exist- 
ence, but merely the support of pure conceptions), but for 
the purpose of discovering, among all our conceptions of pos- 
sible things, that conception which possesses no element in- 
consistent with the idea of absolute necessity. For that there 
must be some absolutely necessary existence, it regards as a 
truth already established. Now, if it can remove every exist- 
ence incapable of supporting the attribute of absolute neces- 
sity, excepting one, — this must be the absolutely necessary 
being, whether its necessity is comprehensible by us, that is, 
deducible from the conception of it alone, or not. 

Now that, the conception of which contains a therefore to 
every ivherefore, which is not defective in any respect what- 
ever, which is all-sufficient as a condition, seems to be the 
being of which we can justly predicate absolute necessity — for 
this reason, that, possessing the conditions of all that is pos- 



01' THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEL2TG. 36 1 

Bible, it does not and cannot itself require any condition. And 
thus it satisfies, in one respect at least, the requirements of 
the conception of absolute necessity. In this view, it is su- 
perior to all other conceptions, which, as deficient and incom- 
plete, do not possess the characteristic of independence of all 
higher conditions. It is true that we cannot infer from this 
that what does not contain in itself the supreme and complete 
condition — the condition of all other things, must possess only 
a conditioned existence ; but as little can we assert the con- 
trary, for this supposed being does not possess the only cha- 
racteristic which can enable reason to cognize by means of an 
a priori conception the unconditioned and necessary nature of 
its existence. 

The conception of an ens realissimam is that which best 
agrees with the conception of an unconditioned and necessary 
being. The former conception does not satisfy all the require- 
ments of the latter ; but we have no choice, we are obliged 
to adhere to it, for we find that we cannot do without the 
existence of a necessary being ; and even although we admit 
it, we find it out of our power to discover in the whole sphere 
of possibility any being that can advance well-grounded claims 
to such a distinction. 

The following is, therefore, the natural course of human 
reason. It begins by persuading itself of the existence of 
some necessary being. In this being it recognises the charac- 
teristics of unconditioned existence. It then seeks the con- 
ception of that which is independent of all conditions, and 
finds it in that which is itself the sufficient condition of all 
other things — in other words, in that which contains all reality. 
But the unlimited all is an absolute unity, and is conceived by 
the mind as a being one and supreme ; and thus reason con- 
cludes that the supreme being, as the primal basis of all 
things, possesses an existence which is absolutely necessary. 

This conception must be regarded as in some degree satis- 
factory, if we admit the existence of a necessary being, and 
consider that there exists a necessity for a definite and final 
answer to these questions. In such a case, we cannot make 
a better choice, or rather we have no choice at all, but feel 
ourselves obliged to declare in favour of the absolute unity of 
complete reality, as the highest source of the possibility of 
things. But if there exists no motive for coming to a definite 



362 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

conclusion, and we may leave the question unanswered till we 
have fully weighed both sides — in other words, when we are 
merely called upon to decide how much we happen to know 
about the question, and how much we merely flatter ourselves 
that we know — the above conclusion does not appear to so 
great advantage, but, on the contrary, seems defective in the 
grounds upon which it is supported. 

For, admitting the truth of all that has been said, that, 
namely, the inference from a given existence (my own, for ex- 
ample,) to the existence of an unconditioned and necessary being 
is valid and unassailable ; that, in the second place, we must 
consider a being which contains all reality, and consequently 
all the conditions of other things, to be absolutely uncon- 
ditioned ; and admitting too, that we have thus discovered the 
conception of a thing to which may be attributed, without in- 
consistency, absolute necessity — it does not follow from all 
this that the conception of a limited being, in which the su- 
preme reality does not reside, is therefore incompatible with 
the idea of absolute necessity. For, although I do not dis- 
cover the element of the unconditioned in the conception of 
such a being — an element which is manifestly existent in the 
sum-total of all conditions, I am not entitled to conclude that 
its existence is therefore conditioned ; just as I am not entitled 
to affirm, in a hypothetical syllogism, that where a certain 
condition does not exist, (in the present, completeness, as far 
as pure conceptions are concerned), the conditioned does not 
exist either. On the contrary, we are free to consider all 
limited beings as likewise unconditionally necessary, although 
we are unable to infer this from the general conception which 
we have of them. Thus conducted, this argument is incapable 
of giving us the least notion of the properties of a necessary 
being, and must be in every respect without result. 

This argument continues, however, to possess a weight and 
an authority, which, in spite of its objective insufficiency, it 
has never been divested of. For, granting that certain re- 
sponsibilities lie upon us, which, as based on the ideas of 
reason, deserve to be respected and submitted to, although 
they are incapable of a real or practical application to our 
nature, or, in other words, would be responsibilities with- 
out motives, except upon the supposition of a Supreme 
Being to give effect and influence to the practical laws : in 



Or THE EXISTENCE OE A STJPEEME BEING. 353 

ruch a case we should be bound to obey our conceptions, 
which, although objectively insufficient, do, according to the 
standard of reason, preponderate over and are superior to any 
claims that may be advanced from any other quarter. The 
equilibrium of doubt would in this case be destroyed by a 
practical addition ; indeed, Reason would be compelled to con- 
demn herself, if she refused to comply with the demands of 
the judgment, no superior to which we know — however de- 
fective her understanding of the grounds of these demands 
might be. 

This argument, although in fact transcendental, inasmuch 
as it rests upon the intrinsic insufficiency of the contingent, 
is so simple and natural, that the commonest understanding 
can appreciate its value. We see things around us change, 
arise, and pass away ; they, or their condition, must therefore 
have a cause. The same demand must again be made of the 
cause itself — as a datum of experience. Now it is natural that 
we should place the highest causality just where we place 
supreme causality, in that being, which contains the conditions 
of all possible effects, and the conception of which is so simple 
as that of an all-embracing reality. This highest cause, then, 
we regard as absolutely necessary, because we find it absolutely 
necessary to rise to it, and do not discover any reason for 
proceeding beyond it. Thus, among all nations, through the 
darkest polytheism glimmer some faint sparks of monotheism, 
to which these idolaters have been led, not from reflection and 
profound thought, but by the study and natural progress of 
the common understanding. 

There are only three modes of proving the existence of a 
Deity, on the grounds of speculative reason. 

All the paths conducting to this end, begin either from 
determinate experience and the peculiar constitution of the 
world of sense, and rise, according to the laws of causality, 
from it to the highest cause existing apart from the world, — or 
from a purely indeterminate experience, that is, some empirical 
existence, — or abstraction is made of all experience, and tha 
existence of a supreme cause is concluded from d priori con- 
ceptions alone. The first is the physico- theological argument, 
the second the cosmological, the third the oncological. More 
there are not, and more there cannot be. 

I shall show it is as unsuccessful on the one path — the 



364 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

empirical, as on the other — the transcendental, and that it 
stretches its wings in vain, to soar beyond the world of sense 
by the mere might of speculative thought. As regards the 
order in which we must discuss those arguments, it will be 
exactly the reverse of that in which reason, *n the progress 
of its development, attains to them — the order in which they 
are placed above. For it will be made manifest *.o the reader, 
that, although experience presents the occasion and the start- 
ing-point, it is the transcendental idea of reason which guides 
it in its pilgrimage, and is the goal of all its struggles. I shall 
therefore begin with an examination of the transcendental 
argument, and afterwards inquire, what additional strength 
has accrued to this mode of proof from the addition of the 
empirical element. 

CHAPTER III. 

Section Fourth. 

Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence 
of God. 

It is evident from what has been said, that the conception of 
an absolutely necessary being is a mere idea, the objective re- 
ality of which is far from being established by the mere fact that 
it is a need of reason. On the contrary, this idea serves merely 
to indicate a certain unattainable perfection, and rather limits 
the operations than, by the presentation of new objects, ex- 
tends the sphere of the understanding. But a strange anomaly 
meets us at the very threshold ; for the inference from a given 
existence in general to an giWutely necessary existence, seems 
to be correct and unavoidable, while the conditions of the 
understanding refuse to aid us in forming any conception of 
such a being. 

Philosophers have always talked of an absolutely necessary 
being, and have nevertheless declined to take the trouble of 
conceiving, whether — and how — a being of this nature is even 
cogitable, not to mention that its existence is actually demon- 
strable. A verbal definition of the conception is certainly easy 
enough : it is something, the non-existence of which is im- 
possible. But does this definition throw any light upon the con- 
ditions which render it impossible to cogitate the non-existence 



OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. 365 

of a thing — conditions which we wish to ascertain, that we 
may discover whether we think anything in the conception of 
such a being or not? For the annihilation in thought of all 
the conditions imposed by the understanding, and the cogita- 
tion of some thing as unconditioned, and therefore necessary, 
is far from being sufficient to determine whether I think 
anything real in this conception of an unconditioned and 
necessary being. 

Nay, more, this chance-conception, now become so current, 
many have endeavoured to explain by examples, which seemed 
to render any inquiries regarding its intelligibility quite need- 
less. Every geometrical proposition — a triangle has three 
angles — it was said, is absolutely necessary ; and thus people 
talked of an object which lay out of the sphere of our under- 
standing as if it were perfectly plain what the conception of 
such a being meant. 

All the examples adduced have been drawn, without ex- 
ception, from judgments, and not from things. But the 
unconditioned necessity of a judgment does not form the 
absolute necessity of a thing. On the contrary, the absolute 
necessity of a judgment is only a conditioned necessity of a 
thing, or of the predicate in a judgment. The proposition 
above-mentioned, does not enounce that three angles necessarily 
exist, but, upon condition that a triangle exists, three angles 
must necessarily exist — in it. And thus this logical necessity 
has been the source of the greatest delusions. Having formed 
an a priori conception of a thing, the content of which was 
made to embrace existence, we believed ourselves safe in con- 
cluding that, because existence belongs necessarily to the 
object of the conception, (that is, under the condition of my 
positing this thing as given,) the existence of the thing is also 
posited necessarily, and that it is therefore absolutely necessary 
— merely because its existence has been cogitated in the con- 
ception. 

If, in an identical judgment, I annihilate the predicate in 
thought, and retain the subject, a contradiction is the result ; 
and hence I say, the former belongs necessarily to the latter. 
But if I suppress both subject and predicate in thought, no 
contradiction arises ; for there is nothing at all, and therefore 
no means of forming a contradiction. To suppose the ex- 
istence of a triangle and not that of its three angles, is self. 



366 TBAFSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

contradictory ; but to suppose the non-existence of both 
triangle and angles is perfectly admissible. And so is it with 
the conception of an absolutely necessary being. Annihilate 
its existence in thought, and you annihilate the thing itself 
with all its predicates ; how then can there be any room for 
contradiction ? Externally,* there is nothing to give rise to 
a contradiction, for a thing cannot be necessary externally ; 
nor internally, for, by the annihilation or suppression of the 
thing itself, its internal properties are also annihilated. God 
is omnipotent — that is a necessary judgment. His omnipo- 
tence cannot be denied, if the existence of a Deity is posited — 
the existence, that is, of an infinite being, the two conceptions 
being identical. But when you say, God does not exist, neither 
omnipotence nor any other predicate is affirmed ; they must 
all disappear with the subject, and in this judgment there 
cannot exist the least self-contradiction. 

You have thus seen, that when the predicate of a judgment 
is annihilated in thought along with the subject, no internal 
contradiction ean arise, be the predicate what it may. There 
is no possibility of evading the conclusion — you find yourselves 
compelled to declare : There are certain subjects which cannot 
be annihilated in thought. But this is nothing more than say- 
ing : There exist subjects which are absolutely necessary — the 
very hypothesis which you are called upon to establish. For I 
find myself unable to form the slightest conception of a thing 
which, when annihilated in thought with all its predicates, 
leaves behind a contradiction ; and contradiction is the only 
criterion of impossibility, in the sphere of pure a priori con- 
ceptions. 

Against these general considerations, the justice of which no 
one can dispute, one argument is adduced, which is regarded 
as furnishing a satisfactory demonstration from the fact. It 
is affirmed, that there is one and only one conception, in which 
the non-being or annihilation of the object is self-contradictory, 
and this is the conception of an ens realissimum. It possesses, 
you say, all reality, and you feel yourselves justified in ad- 
mitting the possibility of such a being. (This I am willing to 
grant for the present, although the existence of a conception 
which is not self-contradictory, is far from being sufficient to 

* In relation to other things. — Tr. 



OF THE (mTOLOGICAL AEGUMENT. 367 

prove the possibility of an object.*) Now the notion of all 
reality embraces in it that of existence ; the notion of existence 
lies, therefore, in the conception of this possible thing. If 
this thing is annihilated in thought, the internal possibility of 
the thing is also annihilated, which is self-contradictory. 

I answer : It is absurd to introduce — under whatever term 
disguised — into the conception of a thing, which is to be cogi- 
tated solely in reference to its possibility, the conception of its 
existence. If this is admitted, you will have apparently gained 
the day, but in reality have enounced nothing but a mere tau- 
tology. I ask, is the proposition, this or that thing (which I am 
admitting to be possible) exists, an analytical or a synthetical 
proposition ? If the former, there is no addition made to the 
subject of your thought by the affirmation of its existence ; 
but either the conception in your minds is identical with the 
thing itself, or you have supposed the existence of a thing to 
be possible, and then inferred its existence from its internal 
possibility — which is but a miserable tautology. The word 
reality in the conception of the thing, and the word existence 
in the conception of the predicate, will not help you out of 
the difficulty. For, supposing you were to term all positing 
of a thing, reality, you have thereby posited the thing with all 
its predicates in the conception of the subject and assumed its 
actual existence, and this you merely repeat in the predicate. 
But if you confess, as every reasonable person must, that every 
existential proposition is synthetical, how can it be maintained 
that the predicate of existence cannot be denied without 
contradiction — a property which is the characteristic of ana- 
lytical propositions, alone. 

I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever 
to this sophistical mode of argumentation, by a strict definition 
of the conception of existence, did not my own experience 
teach me that the illusion aris ; ng from our confounding a 

* A conception is always possible, if it is not self-contradictory. This 
is the logical criterion of possibility, distinguishing the object of such a 
conception from the nihil negativum. But it may be, notwithstanding, an 
empty conception, unless the objective reality of this synthesis, by which 
it is generated, is demonstrated ; and a proof of this kind must be based 
upon principles of possible experience, and not upon the principle of ana- 
lysis or contradiction. This remark may be serviceable as a warning 
against concluding, from the possibility of a conception — which is logical, 
the possibility of a thing — which is real. 



368 TEANSCESfEENXAL DIALECTIC. 

logical with a real predicate (a predicate which aids in the de- 
termination of a thing) resists almost all the endeavours of 
explanation and illustration. A logical predicate may be what 
you please, even the subject may be predicated of itself; for 
logic pays no regard to the content of a judgment. But the 
determination of a conception is a predicate, which adds to 
and enlarges the conception. It must not, therefore, be con- 
tained in the conception. 

Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception 
of something which is added to the conception of some other 
thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain de- 
terminations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a 
judgment. The proposition, God is omnipotent, contains two 
conceptions, which have a certain object or content ; the word 
is, is no additional predicate — it merely indicates the relation 
of the predicate to the subject. Now, if I take the subject 
(God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one), and 
say,' God is, or, There is a God, I add no new predicate to the 
conception of God, I merely posit or affirm the existence of 
the subject with all its predicates — I posit the object in relation 
to my conception. The content of both is the same ; and 
there is no addition made to the conception, which expresses 
merely the possibility of the object, by my cogitating the 
object — in the expression, it is — as absolutely given or exist- 
ing. Thus the real contains no more than the possible. A 
hundred real dollars contain no more than a hundred possible 
dollars. For, as the latter indicate the conception, and the 
former the object, on the supposition that the content of the 
former was greater than that of the latter, my conception 
would not be an expression of the whole object, and would 
consequently be an inadequate conception of it. In another 
sense, however, it may be said that there is more in a hundred 
real dollars, than in a hundred possible dollars — that is, in the 
mere conception of them. For the real object — the dollars — is 
not analytically contained in my conception, but forms a syn- 
thetical addition to my conception (which is merely a determina* 
tion of my mental state), although this objective reality — this 
existence — apart from my conception, does not in the least 
degree increase the aforesaid hundred dollars. 

By whatever and by whatever number of predicates — even 
to the complete determination of it — I may cogitate a thing 



■ OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. 369 

I do not in the least augment the object of my conception by 
the addition of the statement, this thing exists. Otherwise, 
not exactly the same, but something more than what was cogi- 
tated in my conception, would exist, and I could not affirm 
that the exact object of my conception l>ad real existence. If 
I cogitate a thing as containing all modes of reality except 
one, the mode of reality which is absent is not added to the 
conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing 
exists ; on the contrary, the thing exists — if it exist at all — 
with the same defect as that cogitated in its conception ; other- 
wise not that which was cogitated, but something different, 
exists. Now, if I cogitate a being as the highest reality, 
without defect or imperfection, the question still remains— 
whether this being exists or not ? For although no element 
is wanting in the possible real content of my conception, there 
is a defect in its relation to my mental state, that is, I am 
ignorant whether the cognition of the object indicated by the 
conception is possible a posteriori. And here the cause of 
the present difficulty becomes apparent. If the question re- 
garded an object of sense merely, it would be impossible for 
me to confound the conception with the existence of a thing. 
For the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as 
according with the general conditions of experience ; while 
the existence of the object permits me to cogitate it as con- 
tained in the sphere of actual experience. At the same time, 
this connection with the world of experience does not in the 
least augment the conception, although a possible perception 
has been added to the experience of the mind. But if we 
cogitate existence by the pure category alone, it is not to be 
wondered at, that we should find ourselves unable to present 
any criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility. 
Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it 
is necessary to go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence 
of the object. In the case of sensuous objects, this is attained by 
their connection according to empirical laws with some one of my 
perceptions ; but there is no means of cognizing the existence 
of objects of pure thought, because it must be cognized com- 
pletely a priori. But all our knowledge of existence (be it imme- 
diately by perception, or by inferences connecting some object 
with a perception) belongs entirely to the sphere of experience 

B E 



370 TBANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

— which is in perfect unity with itself ; and although an exist- 
ence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely declared to be 
impossible, it is a hypothesis the truth of which we have no 
means of ascertaining. 

The notion of a supreme being is in many respects a highly 
useful idea ; but for the very reason that it is an idea, it is 
incapable of enlarging our cognition with regard to the exist- 
ence of things. It is not even sufficient to instruct us as to 
the possibility of a being which we do not know to exist. 
The analytical criterion of possibility, which consists in the 
absence of contradiction in propositions, cannot be denied it. 
But the connection of real properties in a thing is a synthesis 
of the possibility of which an a priori judgment cannot be 
formed, because these realities are not presented to us spe- 
cifically ; and even if this were to happen, a judgment would 
still be impossible, because the criterion of the possibility of 
synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the world of ex- 
perience, to Avhich the object of an idea cannot belong. And 
thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in his attempt 
to establish upon a priori grounds the possibility of this 
sublime ideal being. 

The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the 
existence of a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient ; and 
we may as well hope to increase our stock of knowledge by 
the aid of mere ideas, as the merchant to augment his wealth 
by the addition of noughts to his cash-account. 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

Section Fifth. 

Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Exist" 
exce of God. 

It was by no means a natural course of proceeding, but, on 
the contrary, an invention entirely due to the subtlety of the 
schools, to attempt to draw from a mere idea a proof of the 
existence of an object corresponding to it. Such a course 
would never have been pursued, were it not for that need of 
reason which requires it to suppose the existence of a neces- 



OF THE COSMOLOGICAL AHGUMEST. 371 

sary being as a basis for the empirical regress, and that, as 
this necessity must be unconditioned and a priori, reason is 
bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy, if possible, 
this requirement, and enable us to attain to the a priori cog- 
nition of such a being. This conception was thought to be 
found in the idea of an ens realissimum, and thus this idea 
was employed for the attainment of a better defined know- 
ledge of a necessary being, of the existence of which we were 
convinced, or persuaded, on other grounds. Thus reason was 
seduced from her natural course ; and, instead of concluding 
with the conception of an ens realissimum, an attempt was 
made to begin with it, for the purpose of inferring from it 
that idea of a necessary existence, which it was in fact called 
in to complete. Thus arose that unfortunate ontological 
argument, which neither satisfies the healthy common sense 
of humanity, nor sustains the scientific examination of the 
philosopher. 

The cosmological proof, which we are about to examine, 
retains the connection between absolute necessity, and the 
highest reality; but, instead of reasoning from this highest 
reality to a necessary existence, like the preceding argument, 
it concludes from the given unconditioned necessity of some 
being its unlimited reality. The track it pursues, whether 
rational or sophistical, is at least natural, and not only goes 
far to persuade the common understanding, but shows itself 
deserving of respect from the speculative intellect; while it 
contains, at the same time, the outlines of all the argu- 
ments employed in natural theology — arguments which 
always have been, and still will be, in use and authority. 
These, however adorned, and hid under whatever embellish- 
ments of rhetoric and sentiment, are at bottom identical with 
the arguments we are at present to discuss. This proof, 
termed by Leibnitz the argumentum a contiagentid mundi, I 
shall now lay before the reader, and subject to a strict exa- 
mination. 

It is framed in the following manner : — If something 
exists, an absolutely necessary being must likewise exist. Now 
i, at least, exist. Consequently, there exists an absolutely 
necessary being. The minor contains an experience, the 
major reasons from a general experience to the existence of a 

B B 2 



372 TKA.NSCEXDE1STAL DIALECTIC. 

necessary being.* Thus this argument really begins at ex< 
perience, and is not completely a priori, or ontological. The 
object of all possible experience being the world, it is called 
the cosmological proof. It contains no reference to any 
peculiar property of sensuous objects, by which this world of 
sense might be distinguished from other possible worlds ; and 
in this respect it differs from the physico-theological proof, 
which is based upon the consideration of the peculiar consti- 
tution of our sensuous world. 

The proof proceeds thus : — A necessary being can be de- 
termined only in one way, that is, it can be determined by 
only one of all possible opposed predicates ; consequently, it 
must be completely determined in and by its conception. But 
there is only a single conception of a thing possible, which 
completely determines the thing a priori : that is, the con- 
ception of the ens realissimum. It follows that the conception 
of the ens realissimum is the only conception, by and in 
which we can cogitate a necessary being. Consequently, a 
supreme being necessarily exists. 

In this cosmological argument are assembled so many so- 
phistical propositions, that speculative reason seems to have 
exerted in it all her dialectical skill to produce a transcendental 
illusion of the most extreme character. We shall postpone 
an investigation of this argument for the present, and confine 
ourselves to exposing the stratagem by which it imposes upon 
us an old argument in a new dress, and appeals to the agree- 
ment of two witnesses, the one with the credentials of pure 
reason, and the other with those of empiricism ; while, in fact, 
it is only the former who has changed his dress and voice, for 
the purpose of passing himself off for an additional witness. 
That it may possess a secure foundation, it bases its conclu- 
sions upon experience, and thus appears to be completely 
distinct, from the ontological argument, which places its con- 

* This inference is too well known to require more detailed discus- 
sion. It is based upon the spurious transcendental law of causality,f 
that everything which is contingent has a cause, which, if itself contin- 
gent, must also have a cause ; and so on, till the series of subordinated 
eauses must end with an absolutely necessary cause, without which it 
would not possess completeness. 

\ See note on page 175. — 7V. 



OP THE COSMOLOGICAL ABGTJMENT. 373 

fidence entirely in pure a priori conceptions. But this expe- 
rience merely aids reason in making one step — to the exist- 
ence of a necessary being. What the properties of this being 
are, cannot be learned from experience ; and therefore reason 
abandons it altogether, and pursues its inquiries in the sphere 
of pure conceptions, for the purpose of discovering what the 
properties of an absolutely necessary being ought to be, that 
is, what among all possible things contain the conditions 
(requisita) of absolute necessity. Reason believes that it has 
discovered these requisites in the conception of an ens realis- 
simum — and in it alone, and hence concludes : The ens realis- 
simum is an absolutely necessary being. But it is evident 
that reason has here presupposed that the conception of an 
ens realissimum is perfectly adequate to the conception of a 
being of absolute necessity, that is, that we may infer the ex- 
istence of the latter from that of the former — a proposition, 
which formed the basis of the ontological argument, and 
which is now employed in the support of the cosmological 
argument, contrary to the wish and professions of its in- 
ventors. For the existence of an absolutely necessary being 
is given in conceptions alone. But if I say — the conception 
of the ens realissimum is a conception of this kind, and in 
fact the only conception which is adequate to our idea of a 
necessary being, I am obliged to admit, that the latter may be 
inferred from the former. Thus it is properly the ontological 
argument which figures in the cosmological, and constitutes 
the whole strength of the latter ; while the spurious basis of 
experience has been of no further use than to conduct us to 
the conception of absolute necessity, being utterly insufficient 
to demonstrate the presence of this attribute in any deter- 
minate existence or thing. For when we propose to ourselves 
an aim of this character, we must abandon the sphere of ex- 
perience, and rise to that of pure conceptions, which we exa- 
mine with the purpose of discovering whether any one con- 
tains the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely neces- 
sary being. But if the possibility of such a being is thus 
demonstrated, its existence is also proved ; for we may then 
assert that, of all possible beings there is one which possesses 
the attribute of necessity — in other words, this being possesses 
an absolutely necessary existence. 

All illusions in an argument are more easily detected, when 



374 TBANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

they are presented in the formal manner employed by the 
schools, which we now proceed to do. 

If the proposition, Every absolutely necessary being is like- 
wise an ens realissimum, is correct (and it is this which con- 
stitutes the nervus probandi of the cosmological argument), 
it must, like all affirmative judgments, be capable of conver- 
sion — the conversio per accidens, at least. It follows, then, 
that some entia realissima are absolutely necessary beings. 
But no ens realissimum is in any respect different from another, 
and what is valid of some, is valid of all. In this present 
case, therefore, I may employ simple conversion,* and say, 
Every ens realissimum is a necessary being. But as this pro- 
position is determined a priori by the conceptions contained 
in it, the mere conception of an ens realissimum must possess 
the additional attribute of absolute necessity. But this is 
exactly what was maintained in the ontological argument, and 
not recognised by the cosmological, although it formed the 
real ground of its disguised and illusory reasoning. 

Thus the second mode employed by speculative reason of 
demonstrating the existence of a Supreme Being, is not only, 
like the first, illusory and inadequate, but possesses the addi- 
tional blemish of an ignoratio elenchi — professing to conduct us 
by a new road to the desired goal, but bringing us back, after a 
short circuit, to the old path which we had deserted at its call. 

I mentioned above, that this cosmological argument contains 
a perfect nest of dialectical assumptions, which transcendental 
criticism does not find it difficult to expose and to dissipate. 
I shall merely enumerate these, leaving it to the reader, who 
must by this time be well practised in such matters, to inves- 
tigate the fallacies residing therein. 

The following fallacies, for example, are discoverable in this 
mode of proof: 1. The transcendental principle, Every thing 
that is contingent must have a cause — a principle without sig- 
nificance, except in the sensuous world. For the purely in- 
tellectual conception of the contingent cannot produce any 
synthetical proposition, like that of causality, which is itself 
without significance or distinguishing characteristic except in 
the phenomenal world. But in the present case it is employed 
to help us beyond the limits of its sphere. 2. From the im- 
possibility of an infinite ascending series of causes in the 
* Conversio pura seu simplex. — Tr. 



OE THE COSMOLOGICAL AEGTTMEjS'T. O/O 

world of sense a first cause is inferred; — a conclusion which 
the principles of the employment of reason do not justify even 
in the sphere of experience, and still less when an attempt is 
made to pass the limits of this sphere. 3. Reason allows 
itself to be satisfied upon insufficient grounds, with regard to 
the completion of this series. It removes all conditions (with- 
out which it is impossible to establish the conception of neces- 
sity) ; and, as after this it is beyond our power to form any 
other conception, it accepts this as a completion of the con- 
ception it wishes to form of the series. 4. The logical possi- 
bility of a conception of the total of reality (the criterion of 
this possibility being the absence of contradiction) is con- 
founded with the transcendental, which requires a principle of 
the practicability of such a synthesis — a principle which again 
refers us to the world of experience. And so on. 

The aim of the cosmological argument is to avoid the ne- 
cessity of proving the existence of a necessary being d, priori 
from mere conceptions — a proof which must be ontological, 
and of which we feel ourselves quite incapable. With this 
purpose, we reason from an actual existence — an experience 
in general, to an absolutely necessary condition of that ex- 
istence. It is in this case unnecessary to demonstrate its 
possibility. For after having proved that it exists, the ques- 
tion regarding its possibility is superfluous. Now, when we 
wish to define more strictly the nature of this necessary being, 
we do not look out for some being the conception which 
would enable us to comprehend the necessity of its being — 
for if we could do this, an empirical presupposition would be 
unnecessary ; no, we try to discover merely the negative con- 
dition (conditio sine qua non), without which a being would 
not be absolutely necessary. Now this would be perfectly 
admissible in every sort of reasoning, from a consequence to 
its principle ; but in the present case it unfortunately happens 
that the condition of absolute necessity can be discovered in 
but a single being, the conception of which must consequently 
contain all that is requisite for demonstrating the presence 
of absolute necessity, and thus entitle me to infer this ab- 
solute necessity a priori. That is, it must be possible to 
reason conversely, and say — the thing, to which the concep- 
tion of the highest reality belongs, is absolutely necessary. 
But if I cannot reason thus — and I cannot, unless I believe in 



J7G 



TEANSCENDEWTAL DIALECTIC. 



the sufficiency of the ontological argument — I fijd insur- 
mountable obstacles in my new path, and am really no further 
than the point from which I set out. The conception of a 
Supreme Being satisfies all questions a priori regarding the 
internal determinations of a thing, and is for this reason an 
ideal without equal or parallel, the general conception of it 
indicating it as at the same time an ens individuum among all 
possible things. But the conception does not satisfy the 
question regarding its existence — which was the purpose of 
all our enquiries ; and, although the existence of a necessary 
being were admitted, we should find it impossible to answer 
the question — What of all things in the world must be regarded 
as such? • 

It is certainly allowable to admit the existence of an all- 
sufficient being — a cause of all possible effects, for the purpose 
of enabling reason to introduce unity into its mode and grounds 
of explanation with regard to phenomena. But to assert that 
such a being necessarily exists, is no longer the modest enun- 
ciation of an admissible hypothesis, but the boldest declaration 
of an apodeictic certainty ; for the cognition of that which is 
absolutely necessary, must itself possess that character. 

The aim of the transcendental ideal formed by the mind is, 
either to discover a conception which shall harmonise with 
the idea of absolute necessity, or a conception which shall 
contain that idea. If the one is possible, so is the other ; for 
reason recognises that alone as absolutely necessary, which is 
necessary from its conception.* But both attempts are equally 
beyond our power — we find it impossible to satisfy the under- 
standing upon this point, and as impossible to induce it to 
remain at rest in relation to this incapacity. 

Unconditioned necessity, which, as the ultimate support 
and stay of all existing things, is an indispensable require- 
ment of the mind, is an abyss on the verge of which human 
reason trembles in dismay. Even the idea of eternity, ter- 
rible and sublime as it is, as depicted by Haller, does not pro- 
duce upon the mental vision such a feeling of awe and terror ; 
for, although it measures the duration of things, it does not 
support them. We cannot bear, nor can we rid ourselves of 
the thought, that a being, which we regard as the greatest of 
all possible existences, should say to himself: I am from 

* That is, which cannot be cogitated as other than necessary. — Tr, 



Or THE ILLUSION IS THE EOEEGOllN'G AEGUMENTS. 377 

eternity to eternity ; beside me there is nothing, except that 
which exists by my will ; but whence then am I? Here all 
sinks away from under us ; and the greatest, as the smallest, 
perfection, hovers without stay or footing in presence of the 
speculative reason, which finds it as easy to part with the one 
as with the other. 

Many physical powers, which evidence their existence by 
their effects, are perfectly inscrutable in their nature ; they 
elude all our powers of observation. The transcendental ob- 
ject which forms the basis of phsenomena, and, in connection 
with it, the reason why our sensibility possesses this rather 
than that particular kind of conditions, are and must ever 
remain hidden from our mental vision ; the fact is there, the 
reason of the fact we cannot see. But an ideal of pure reason 
cannot be termed mysterious or inscrutable, because the only 
credential of its reality is the need of it felt by reason, for the 
purpose of giving completeness to the world of synthetical 
unity. An ideal is not even given as a cogitable object, and 
• therefore cannot be inscrutable ; on the contrary, it must, as a 
mere idea, be based on the constitution of reason itself, and 
on this account must be capable of explanation and solution. 
For the very essence of reason consists in its ability to give an 
account of all our conceptions, opinions, and assertions — upon 
objective, or, when they happen to be illusory and fallacious, 
upon subjective grounds. 

Detection and Explanation of the Dialectical Illusion in all 
Transcendental Arguments for the Existence of a Necessary 
Being. 

Both of the above arguments are transcendental ; in other 
words, they do not proceed upon empirical principles. For, 
although the cosmological argument professed to lay a basis 
of experience for its edifice of reasoning, it did not ground its 
procedure upon the peculiar constitution of experience, but 
upon pure principles of reason — in relation to an existence 
given by empirical consciousness ; utterly abandoning its 
guidance, however, for the purpose of supporting its assertions 
entirely upon pure conceptions. Now what is the cause, in 
these transcendental arguments, of the dialectical, but natural, 
illusion, which connects the conceptions of necessity and 
supreme reality, and hypostatizes that which cannot be any 



378 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

thing but an idea ? What is the cause of this unavoidable 
step on the part of reason, of admitting that some one among 
all existing things must be necessary, while it falls back from 
the assertion of the existence of such a being as from an 
abyss ? And how does reason proceed to explain this anomaly 
to itself, and from the wavering condition of a timid and re- 
luctant approbation — always again withdrawn, arrive at a calm 
and settled insight into its cause ? 

It is something very remarkable that, on the supposition 
that something exists, I cannot avoid the inference, that some- 
thing exists necessarily. Upon this perfectly natural — but not 
on that account reliable — inference does the cosmological 
argument rest. But, let me form any conception whatever of 
a thing, I find that I cannot cogitate the existence of the thing 
as absolutely necessary, and that nothing prevents me — be the 
thing or being what it may — from cogitating its non-existence. 
I may thus be obliged to admit that all existing things have a 
necessary basis, while I cannot cogitate any single or indivi- 
dual thing as necessary. In other words, I can never com-* 
plete the regress through the conditions of existence, without 
admitting the existence of a necessary being ; but, on the 
other hand, I cannot make a commencement from this be- 

If I must cogitate something as existing necessarily as the 
Dasis of existing things, and yet am not permitted to cogitate 
any individual thing as in itself necessary, the inevitable in- 
ference is, that necessity and contingency are not properties 
of things themselves — otherwise an internal contradiction 
would result ; that consequently neither of these principles 
are objective, but merely subjective principles of reason — the 
one requiring us to seek for a necessary ground for every 
thing that exists, that is, to be satisfied with no other expla- 
nation than that which is complete a priori, the other forbid- 
ding us ever to hope for the attainment of this completeness, 
that is, to regard no member of the empirical world as un- 
conditioned. In this mode of viewing them, both principles, 
in their purely heuristic and regulative character, and as con- 
cerning merely the formal interest of reason, are quite con- 
sistent with each other. The one says — you must philoso- " 
phise upon nature, as if there existed a necessary primal basis 
of all existing things, solely for the purpose of introducing 



OF THE ILLUSION IN THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS. 379 

systematic unity into your knowledge, by pursuing an idea of 
this character — a foundation which is arbitrarily admitted to 
be ultimate ; while the other warns you to consider no indi- 
vidual determination, concerning the existence of things, as 
such an ultimate foundation, that is, as absolutely necessary, 
but to keep the way always open for further progress in the 
deduction, and to treat every determination as determined by 
some other. But if all that we perceive must be regarded as 
conditionally necessary, it is impossible that anything which 
is empirically given should be absolutely necessary. 

It follows from this, that you must accept the absolutely 
necessary as out of and beyond the world, inasmuch as it is 
useful only as a principle of the highest possible unity in ex- 
perience, ancLyou cannot discover any such necessary existence 
in the world, the seco'nd rule requiring you to regard all em- 
pirical causes of unity as themselves deduced. 

The philosophers of antiquity regarded all the forms of 
nature as contingent ; while matter was considered by them, 
in accordance with the judgment of the common reason of 
mankind, as primal and necessary. But if they had regarded 
matter, not relatively — as the substratum of phsenomena, 
but absolutely and in itself — as an independent existence, this 
idea of absolute necessity would have immediately disappeared. 
For there is nothing absolutely connecting reason with such 
an existence ; on the contrary, it can annihilate it in thought, 
always and without self-contradiction. But in thought alone 
lay the idea of absolute necessity. A regulative principle 
must, therefore, have been at the foundation of this opinion. 
In fact, extension and impenetrability — which together con- 
stitute our conception of matter — form the supreme empirical 
principle of the unity of phsenomena, and this principle, in so 
far as it is empirically unconditioned, possesses the property 
of a regulative principle. But, as every determination of 
matter which constitutes what is real in it — and consequently 
impenetrability — is an effect, which must have a cause, and is 
for this reason always derived, the notion of matter cannot 
harmonise with the idea of a necessary being, in its character 
of the principle of all derived unity. For every one of its 
real properties, being derived, must be only conditionally ne- 
cessary, and can therefore be annihilated in thought ; and 
thus the whole existence of matter can be so annihilated or 



380 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

suppressed. If this were not the case, we should have found 
in the world of phaenomena the highest ground or condition 
of unity — which is impossible, according to the second regu- 
lative principle. It follows, that matter, and, in general, all 
that forms part of the world of sense, cannot be a necessary 
primal being, nor even a principle of empirical unity, but that 
this being or principle must have its place assigned without 
the world. And, in this way, we can proceed in perfect con- 
fidence to deduce the phaenomena of the world and their ex- 
istence from other phaenomena, just as if there existed no ne- 
cessary being ; and we can at the same time, strive without 
ceasing towards the attainment of completeness for our de- 
duction, just as if such a being — the supreme condition of all 
existences — were presupposed by the mind. 

These remarks will have made it evident to the reader that 
the ideal of the Supreme Being, far from being an enounce- 
ment of the existence of a being in itself necessary, is nothing 
more than a regulative principle of reason, requiring us to 
regard all connection existing between phaenomena as if it 
had its origin from an all-sufficient necessary cause, and basing 
upon this the rule of a systematic and necessary unity in the 
explanation of phaenomena. We cannot, at the same time, 
avoid regarding, by a transcendental subreptio, this formal 
principle as constitutive, and hypostatising this unity. Pre- 
cisely similar is the case with our notion of space. Space is 
the primal condition of all forms, which are properly just so 
many different limitations of it ; and thus, although it is 
merely a principle of sensibility, we cannot help regarding it 
as an absolutely necessary and self-subsistent thing — as an 
object given a priori in itself. In the same way, it is quite 
natural that, as the systematic unity of nature cannot be esta- 
blished as a principle for the empirical employment of reason, 
unless it is based upon the idea of an ens realissimum, as the 
supreme cause, we should regard this idea as a real object, 
and this object, in its character of supreme condition, as ab- 
solutely necessary, and that in this way a regulative should be 
transformed into a constitutive principle. This interchange 
becomes evident when I regard this supreme being, which, 
relatively to the world, was absolutely (unconditionally) ne- 
cessary, as a thing jter se. In this case, I find it impossible 
to represent this necessity in or by any conception, and it 



Or THE PHYSICO-THEOLOGICA.L ARGUMENT. 381 

exists merely in my own mind, as the formal condition of 
thought, but not as a material and hypostatic condition of 
existence. 

CHAPTER THIRD. 
Section Sixth. 

Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof 

If, then, neither a pure conception nor the general experi- 
ence of an existing being can provide a sufficient basis for the 
proof of the existence of the Deity, we can make the attempt 
by the only other mode — that of grounding our argument 
upon a determinate experience of the phsenomena of the pre- 
sent world, their constitution and disposition, and discover 
whether we can thus attain to a sound conviction of the ex- 
istence of a Supreme Being. This argument we shall term 
the physico-theological argument. If it is shown to be insuf- 
ficient, speculative reason cannot present us with any satis- 
factory proof of the existence of a being corresponding to our 
transcendental idea. 

It is evident from the remarks that have been made in the 
preceding sections, that an answer to this question will be far 
from being difficult or unconvincing. For how can any ex- 
perience be adequate with an idea ? The very essence of an 
idea consists in the fact that no experience can ever be dis- 
covered congruent or adequate with it. The transcendental 
idea of a necessary and all-sufficient being is so immeasurably 
great, so high above all that is empirical, which is always con- 
ditioned, that we hope in vain to find materials in the sphere 
of experience sufficiently ample for our conception, and in 
vain seek the unconditioned among things that are condi- 
tioned, while examples, nay, even guidance, is denied us by 
the laws of empirical synthesis. 

If the Supreme Being forms a link in the chain of empirical 
conditions, it must be a member of the empirical series, and, 
like the lower members which it precedes, have its origin in 
some higher member of the series. If, on the other hand, we 
disengage it from the chain, and cogitate it as an intelligible 
being, apart from the series of natural causes — how shall reason 
bridge the abyss that separates the latter from the former ? 
All laws respecting the regress from effects to causes, all syn- 



382 TKANSCEXDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

thetical additions to our knowledge relate solely to possible 
experience and the objects of the sensuous world, and, apart 
from them, are without significance. 

The world around us opens before our view so magnificent 
a spectacle of order, variety, beauty, and conformity to ends, 
that whether we pursue our observations into the infinity of 
space in the one direction, or into its illimitable divisions on 
the other, whether we regard the world in its greatest or its 
least manifestations, — even after we have attained to the highest 
summit of knowledge which our weak minds can reach, we 
find that language in the presence of wonders so inconceivable 
has lost its force, and number its power to reckon, nay, even 
thought fails to conceive adequately, and our conception of 
the whole dissolves into an astonishment without the power of 
expression — all the more eloquent that it is dumb. Every- 
where around us we observe a chain of causes and effects, of 
means and ends, of death and birth ; and, as nothing has 
entered of itself into the condition in which we find it, we 
are constantly referred to some other thing, which itself 
suggests the same inquiry regarding its cause, and thus the 
universe must sink into the abyss of nothingness, unless we 
admit that, besides this infinite chain of contingencies, there 
exists something that is primal and self-subsistent — something 
which, as the cause of this phsenomenal world, secures its 
continuance and preservation. 

This highest cause — what magnitude shall we attribute to 
it ? Of the content of the world we are ignorant ; still less 
can we estimate its magnitude by comparison with the sphere 
of the possible. But this supreme cause being a necessity 
of the human mind, what is there to prevent us from attri- 
buting to it such a degree of perfection as to place it above 
the sphere of all that is possible ? This we can easily do, 
although only by the aid of the faint outline of an abstract 
conception, by representing this being to ourselves as contain- 
ing in itself, as an individual substance, all possible perfec- 
tion — a conception which satisfies that requirement of reason 
which demands parsimony in principles,* which is free from 
self-contradiction, which even contributes to the extension of 

* A reference to the metaphysical dogma : Entia practer necessitate™ 
non sunt multiplicanda, which may also be applied to logic, by the sub- 
stitution of priucipia for entia. — Tr. 



OF THE PHY31CO-THEOLOGICAL AEGTTMENT. 333 

the employment of reason in experience, by means of the 
guidance afforded by this idea to order and system, and which 
in no respect conflicts with any law of experience. 

This argument always deserves to be mentioned with respect. 
It is the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with 
the common reason of humanity. It animates the study of 
nature, as it itself derives its existence and draws ever new 
strength from that source. It introduces aims and ends into 
a sphere in which our observation could not of itself have 
discovered them, and extends our knowledge of nature, by 
directing our attention to a unity, the principle of which lies 
beyond nature. This knowledge of nature again re-acts upon 
this idea — its cause ; and thus our belief in a divine author of 
the universe rises to the power of an irresistible conviction. 

For these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to 
rob this argument of the authority it has always enjoyed. 
The mind, unceasingly elevated by these considerations, which, 
although empirical, are so remarkably powerful, and continually 
adding to their force, will not suffer itself to be depressed by 
the doubts suggested by subtle speculation ; it tears itself out 
of this state of uncertainty, the moment it casts a look upon 
the wondrous forms of nature and the majesty of the universe, 
and rises from height to height, from condition to condition, 
till it has elevated itself to the supreme and unconditioned 
author of all. 

But although we have nothing to object to the reasonable- 
ness and utility of this procedure, but have rather to commend 
and encourage it, we cannot approve of the claims which this 
argument advances to demonstrative certainty and to a recep- 
tion upon its own merits, apart from favour or support by 
other arguments. Nor can it injure the cause of morality to 
endeavour to lower the tone of the arrogant sophist, and to 
teach him that modesty and moderation which are the proper- 
ties of a belief that brings calm and content into the mind, 
without prescribing to it an unworthy subjection. I maintain, 
theu, that the physico-theological argument is insufficient of 
itself to prove the existence of a Supreme Being, that it must 
entrust this to the ontological argument — to which it serves 
merely as an introduction, and that, consequently, this argu- 
ment contains the only possible (/round of proof (possessed by 
speculative reason) for the existence of this being. 



384 TBAffSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

The chief momenta in the physico-theological argument are 
as follow : 1 . We observe in the world manifest signs of an 
arrangement full of purpose, executed with great wisdom, and 
existing in a whole of a content indescribably various, and of 
an extent without limits. 2. This arrangement of means and 
ends is entirely foreign to the things existing in the world — 
it belongs to them merely as a contingent attribute ; in other 
words, the nature of different things could not of itself, what- 
ever means were employed, harmoniously tend towards certain 
purposes, were they not chosen and directed for these purposes 
by a rational and disposing principle, in accordance with 
certain fundamental ideas. 3. There exists, therefore, a sub- 
lime and wise cause (or several), which is not merely a blind, 
all-powerful nature, producing the beings and events which 
fill the world in unconscious fecundity, but a free and intelli- 
gent cause of the world. 4. The unity of this cause may be 
inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relation existing 
between the parts of the world, as portions of an artistic 
edifice — an inference which all our observation favours, and 
all principles of analogy support. 

In the above argument, it is inferred from the analogy of 
certain products of nature with those of human art, when it 
compels Nature to bend herself to its purposes, as in the case 
of a house, a ship, or a watch, that the same kind of causality 
— namely, understanding and will — resides in nature. It is 
also declared that the internal possibility of this freely-acting 
nature (which is the source of all art, and perhaps also of 
human reason) is derivable from another and superhuman art, 
— a conclusion which would perhaps be found incapable of 
standing the test of subtle transcendental criticism. But to 
neither of these opinions shall we at present object. We shall 
only remark that it must be confessed that, if we are to discuss 
the subject of cause at all, we cannot proceed more securely 
than with the guidance of the analogy subsisting between 
nature and such products of design — these being the only 
products whose causes and modes of origination are completely 
known to us. lleason would be unable to satisfy her own 
requirements, if she passed from a causality which she docs 
know, to obscure and indemonstrable principles of explana- 
tion which she does not know. 

According to the physico-theological argument, the con- 



OF THE PHYSICO-THEOLOGICA.L AEGTTHENT. 385 

nection and harmony existing in the world evidence the con- 
tingency of the form merely, but not of the matter, that is, 
of the substance of the world. To establish the truth of the 
latter opinion, it would be necessary to prove that all things 
would be in themselves incapable of this harmony and order, 
unless they were, even as regards their substance, the product 
of a supreme wisdom. But this would require very different 
grounds of proof from those presented by the analogy with 
human art. This proof can at most, therefore, demonstrate 
the existence of an architect of the world, whose efforts are 
limited by the capabilities of the material with which he works, 
but not of a creator of the world, to whom all things are sub- 
ject. Thus this argument is utterly insufficient for the task 
before us — a demonstration of the existence of an all-sufficient 
being. If we wish to prove the contingency of matter, we 
must have recourse to a transcendental argument, which the 
physico-theologlcal was constructed expressly to avoid. 

We infer, from the order and design visible in the universe, 
as a disposition of a thoroughly contingent character, the ex- 
istence of a cause 'proportionate thereto. The conception of 
this cause must contain certain determinate qualities, and it 
must therefore be regarded as the conception of a being which 
possesses all power, wisdom, and so on, in one word, all per- 
fection — the conception, that is, of an all-sufficient being. 
For the predicates of very great, astonishing, or immeasurable 
power and excellence, give us no determinate conception of 
the thing, nor do they inform us what the thing may be in 
itself. They merely indicate the relation existing between the 
magnitude of the object and the observer, who compares it 
with himself and with his own power of comprehension, and 
are mere expressions of praise and reverence, by which the 
object is either magnified, or the observing subject depreciated 
in relation to the object. Where we have to do with the mag- 
nitude (of the perfection) of a thing, we can discover no 
determinate conception, except that which comprehends all 
possible perfection or completeness, and it is only the total 
{omnitudo) of reality which is completely determined in and 
through its conception alone. 

Now it cannot be expected that any one will be bold enough 
to declare that he has a perfect insight into the relation which 
the magnitude of the world he contemplates, bears (in its extent 

c a 



586 TBANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

as well as in its content) to omnipotence, into that of the order 
and design in the world to the highest wisdom, and that of the 
unity of the world to the absolute unity of a Supreme Being.* 
Physico-theology is therefore incapable of presenting a deter- 
minate conception of a supreme cause of the world, and is 
therefore insufficient as a principle of theology — a theology 
which is itself to be the basis of religion. 

The attainment of absolute totality is completely impos- 
sible on the path of empiricism. And yet this is the path 
pursued in the physico-theological argument. What means 
shall we employ to bridge the abyss ? 

After elevating ourselves to admiration of the magnitude of 
the power, wisdom, and other attributes of the author of 
the world, and finding we can advance no further, we leave 
the argument on empirical grounds, and proceed to infer the 
contingency of the world from the order and conformity to aims 
that are observable in it. From this contingency we infer, by 
the help of transcendental conceptions alone, the existence of 
something absolutely necessary ; and, still advancing, proceed 
from the conception of the absolute necessity of the first 
cause to the completely determined or determining conception 
thereof — the conception of an all-embracing reality. Thus 
the physico-theological, failing in its undertaking, recurs in 
its embarrassment to the cosmological argument ; and, as this 
is merely the ontological argument in disguise, it executes 
its design solely by the aid of pure reason, although it at 
first professed to have no connection with this faculty, and 
to base its entire procedure upon experience alone. 

The physico-theologians have therefore no reason to regard 
with such contempt the transcendental mode of argument, 
and to look down upon it, with the conceit of clear-sighted 
observers of nature, as the brain-cobweb of obscure speculatists. 
For if they reflect upon and examine their own arguments, 
they will find that, after following for some time the path of 
nature and experience, and discovering themselves no nearer 
their object, they suddenly leave this path and pass into the region 

* Kant's meaning is, that no one will be bold enough to declare that 
he is certain that the world could not have existed without an omnipotent 
author ; that none hut the highest wisdom could have produced the har- 
mony and order we ohserve in it ; and that its unity is possihle only undei 
the condition of an absolute unity. — Tr. 



CEITIQEE OF ALL THEOLOGY. 38/ 

of pure possibility, where they hope to reach upon the wings 

of ideas, what had eluded all their empirical investigations. 
Gaining, as they think, a firm footing after this immense 
leap, they extend their determinate conception — into the pos- 
session of which they have come, they know not how — over 
the whole sphere of creation, and explain their ideal, which is 
entirely a product of pure reason, by illustrations drawn from 
experience — though in a degree miserably unworthy of the 
grandeur of the object, while they refuse to acknowledge 
that they have arrived at this cognition or hypothesis by a very 
different road from that of experience. 

Thus the physico-theological is based upon the cosmo- 
logical, and this upon the ontological proof of the existence 
of a Supreme Being ; and as besides these three there is no 
other path open to speculative reason, the ontological proof, 
on the ground of pure conceptions of reason, is the only 
possible one, if any proof of a proposition so far transcending 
the empirical exercise of the understanding is possible at all. 

CHAPTER TRIED. 

Section Seventh. 

Critique of all Theology based v.pon Speculative Principles of 

Reason. 

If by the term Theology I understand the cognition of a 
primal being, that cognition is based either upon reason 
alone {theologia rationalist or upon revelation {theologia re- 
vel at a}. The former cogitates its object either by means of 
pure transcendental conceptions, as an ens originarium, rea- 
lissimuin, ens entium, and is termed transcendental theology; 
or, by means of a conception derived from the nature of our 
own mind, as a supreme intelligence, and must then be entitled 
natural theology. The person who believes in a transcen- 
dental theology alone, is termed a Deist ; he who acknow- 
ledges the possibility of a natural theology also, a Theist. 
The former admits that we can cognize by pure reason alone 
the existence of a supreme being, but at the same time main- 
tains that our conception of this being is purely transcen- 
dental, and that all we can say of it is, that it possesses 
all reality, without being able to define it more closely. The 
second asserts that reason is capable of presenting us, from 

C c 2 



383 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

the analogy with nature, with a more definite conception 01 
this being, and that its operations, as the cause of all things., 
are the results of intelligence and free will. The forrnei 
regards the Supreme Being as the cause of the world — whether 
by the necessity of his nature, or as a free agent, is left un- 
determined ; the latter considers this being as the author of 
the world. 

Transcendental theology aims either at inferring the exist- 
ence of a Supreme Being from a general experience — without 
any closer reference to the world to which this experience 
belongs, and in this case it is called Cosmotheology ; or it en- 
deavours to cognize the existence of such a being, through 
mere conceptions, without the aid of experience, and is then 
termed Ontotheology . 

Natural theology infers the attributes and the existence of 
an author of the world, from the constitution of, the order 
and unity observable in, the world, in which two modes of 
causality must be admitted to exist — those of nature and 
freedom. Thus it rises from this world to a supreme intelli- 
gence, either as the principle of all natural, or of all moral 
order and perfection. In the former case it is termed Phy- 
sico-theology, in the latter Ethical or Moral -theology.* 

As we are wont to understand by the term God not merely 
an eternal nature, the operations of which are insensate and 
blind, but a Supreme Being, who is the free and intelligent 
author of all things, and as it is this latter view alone that can 
be of interest to humanity, we might, in strict rigour, deny to 
the Deist any belief in God at all, and regard him merely as 
a maintainer of the existence of a primal being or thing — the 
supreme cause of all other things. But, as no one ought to 
be blamed, merely because he does not feel himself justified 
in maintaining a certain opinion, as if he altogether denied 
its truth and asserted the opposite, it is more correct — as it is 
less harsh — to say, the Deist believes in a God, the Theist in 
a living God (summa intelligentia). We shall now proceed to 

* Not theological ethics ; for this science contains ethical laws, 
which presuppose the existence of a Supreme Governor of the world; 
while Moral-theology, on the contrary, is the expression of a conviction 
«f the existence of a Supreme Being, founded upon ethical laws. 



CRITIQUE OF ALL THEOLOGY. 38'J 

investigate the sources of all these attempts of reason to esta- 
blish the existence of a Supreme Being. 

It may be sufficient in this place to define theoretical know- 
ledge or cognition as knowledge of that which is, and prac- 
tical knowledge as knowledge of that which ought to be. In 
this view, the theoretical employment of reason is that by 
which I cognize a priori (as necessary) that something is, 
while the practical is that by which I cognize a priori what 
ought to happen. Now, if it is an indubitably certain, though 
at the same time an entirely conditioned truth, that some- 
thing is, or ought to happen, either a certain determinate 
condition of this truth is absolutely necessary, or such a con- 
dition may be arbitrarily presupposed. In the former case 
the condition is postulated (per thesin), in the latter supposed 
(per hypothesin) . There are certain practical laws — those of 
morality — which are absolutely necessary. Now, if these 
laws necessarily presuppose the existence of some being, as 
the condition of the possibility of their obligatory power, this 
being must be postulated, because the conditioned, from which 
we reason to this determinate condition, is itself cognized 
a priori as absolutely necessary. We shall at some future 
time show that the moral laws not merely presuppose the 
existence of a Supreme Being, but also, as themselves abso- 
lutely necessary in a different relation, demand or postulate 
it — although only from a practical point of view. The dis- 
cussion of this argument we postpone for the present. 

When the question relates merely to that which is, not to 
that which ought to be, the conditioned which is presented in 
experience, is always cogitated as contingent. For this reason 
its condition cannot be regarded as absolutely necessary, but 
merely as relatively necessary, or rather as needful; the con- 
dition is in itself and a priori a mere arbitrary presupposition 
in aid of the cognition, by reason, of the conditioned. If, then, 
we are to possess a theoretical cognition of the absolute neces- 
sity of a thing, we cannot attain to this cognition otherwise 
than a priori by means of conceptions ; while it is impos- 
sible in this way to cognize the existence of a cause which 
bears any relation to an existence given in experience. 

Theoretical cognition is speculative when it relates to an 
object or certain conceptions of an object which is not given 
and cannot be discovered by means of experience. It is op- 



390 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

posed to, the cognition of nature, which concerns only those 
objects or predicates which can be presented in a possible 
experience. 

The principle that everything which happens (the empi- 
rically contingent) must have a cause, is a principle of the 
cognition of nature, but not of speculative cognition. For, 
if we change it into an abstract principle, and deprive it of 
its reference to experience and the empirical, we shall find 
that it cannot with justice be regarded any longer as a syn- 
thetical proposition, and that it is impossible to discover any 
mode of transition from that which exists to something en- 
tirely different — termed cause. Nay, more, the conception of 
a cause — as likewise that of the contingent — loses, in this 
speculative mode of employing it, all significance, for its 
objective reality and meaning are comprehensible from expe- 
rience alone. 

When from the existence of the universe and the things in 
it the existence of a cause of the universe is inferred, reason 
is proceeding not in the natural, but in the speculative 
method. For the principle of the former enounces, not that 
things themselves or substances, but only that which happens 
or their states — as empirically contingent, have a cause : 
the assertion that the existence of substance itself is contin- 
gent is not justified by experience, it is the assertion of a 
reason employing its principles in a speculative manner. If, 
again, I infer from the form of the universe, from the way in 
which all things are connected and act and react upon each 
other, the existence of a cause entirely distinct from the 
universe, — this would again be a judgment of purely specula- 
tive reason ; because the object in this case — the cause — can 
never be an object of possible experience. In both these 
cases the principle of causality, which is valid only in the 
field of experience, — useless and even meaningless beyond this 
region, would be diverted from its proper destination. 

Now I maintain that all attempts of reason to establish a 
theology by the aid of speculation alone are fruitless, that the 
principles of reason as applied to nature do not conduct us 
to any theological truths, and, consequently, that a rational 
theology can have no existence, unless it is founded upon 
the laws of morality. For all synthetical principles of the 
understanding are valid only as immanent in experience ; while 



CEITIQUE OP ALL THEOLOGY. 391 

the cognition of a Supreme Being necessitates their being em- 
ployed transcendentally, and of this the understanding is 
quite incapable. If the empirical law of causality is to con- 
duct us to a Supreme Being, this being must belong to the 
chain of empirical objects — in which case it would be, like all 
pheenomena, itself conditioned. If the possibility of passing 
the limits of experience be admitted, by means of the dyna- 
mical law of the relation of an effect to its cause, what kind 
of conception shall we obtain by this procedure ? Certainly 
not the conception of a Supreme Being, because experience 
never presents us with the greatest of all possible effects, and 
it is only an effect of this character that could witness to the 
existence of a corresponding cause. If, for the purpose of 
fully satisfying the requirements of Reason, we recognise her 
right to assert the existence of a perfect and absolutely neces- 
sary being, this can be admitted only from favour, and cannot 
be regarded as the result of irresistible demonstration. The 
physico-theological proof may add weight to others — if other 
proofs there are — by connecting speculation with experience ; 
but in itself it rather prepares the mind for theological 
cognition, and gives it a right and natural direction, than 
establishes a sure foundation for theology. 

It is now perfectly evident that transcendental questions 
admit only of transcendental answers — those presented a priori 
by pure conceptions without the least empirical admixture. 
But the question in the present case is evidently synthetical — 
it aims at the extension of our cognition beyond the bounds 
of experience — it requires an assurance respecting the exist- 
ence of a being corresponding with the idea in our minds, to 
which no experience can ever be adequate. Now it has been 
abundantly proved that all a priori synthetical cognition is 
possible only as the expression of the formal conditions of a 
possible experience ; and that the validity of all principles 
depends upon their immanence in the field of experience, that 
is, their relation to objects of empirical cognition, or pheno- 
mena. Thus all transcendental procedure in reference to 
speculative theology is without result. 

If any one prefers doubting the conclusiveness of the proofs 
of our Analytic to losing the persuasion of the validity of these 
old and time-honoured arguments, he at least cannot declinf 
answering the question — how he can pass the limits of all 



392 TBANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

possible experience by tbe help of mere ideas. If he talks 
of new arguments, or of improvements upon old arguments— 
I request him to spare me. There is certainly no great 
choice in this sphere of discussion, as all speculative argu- 
ments must at last look for support to the ontological, and I 
have, therefore, very little to fear from the argumentative 
fecundity of the dogmatical defenders of a non-sensuous 
reason. Without looking upon myself as a remarkably com- 
bative person, I shall not decline the challenge to detect the 
fallacy and destroy the pretensions of every attempt of specu- 
lative theology. And yet the hope of better fortune never 
deserts those who are accustomed to the dogmatical mode of 
procedure. I shall, therefore, restrict myself to the simple 
and equitable demand that such reasoners will demonstrate, 
from the nature of the human mind as well as from that 
of the other sources of knowledge, how we are to proceed 
to extend our cognition completely d, priori, and to carry it 
to that point where experience abandons us, and no means 
exist of guaranteeing the objective reality of our conceptions. 
In whatever way the understanding may have attained to a 
conception, the existence of the object of the conception 
cannot be discovered in it by analysis, because the cognition 
of the existence of the object depends upon the object's being 
posited and given in itself apart from the conception. But it 
is utterly impossible to go beyond our conception, without the 
aid of experience — which presents to the mind nothing but 
pheenomena, or to attain by the help of mere conceptions to 
a conviction of the existence of new kinds of objects or super- 
natural beings. 

But although pure speculative reason is far from sufficient 
to demonstrate the existence of a Supreme Being, it is of the 
highest utility in correcting our conception of this being — on 
the supposition that we can attain to the cognition of it by some 
other means — in making it consistent with itself and with ail 
other conceptions of intelligible objects, clearing it from all 
that is incompatible with the conception of an ens summum, 
and eliminating from it all limitations or admixture of empi- 
rical elements. 

Transcendental theology is still therefore, notwithstanding 
its objective insufficiency, of importance in a negative respect ; 
it is useful as a test of the procedure of reason when engaged 



CRITIQUE OF ALL THEOLOGY. 393 

with pure ideas, no other than a transcendental standard being 
in this case admissible. For if, from a practical point of view, 
the hypothesis of a Supreme and All-sufficient Being is to 
maintain its validity without opposition, it must be of the 
highest importance to define this conception in a correct and 
rigorous manner — as the transcendental conception of a ne- 
cessary being, to eliminate all phsenomenal elements (anthro- 
pomorphism in its most extended signification), and at the 
same time to overthrow all contradictory assertions — be they 
atheistic, deistic, or anthropomorphic. This is of course very 
easy ; as the same arguments which demonstrated the inability 
of human reason to affirm the existence of a Supreme Being, 
must be alike sufficient to prove the invalidity of its denial. 
For it is impossible to gain from the pure speculation of 
reason demonstration that there exists no Supreme Being, as 
the ground of all that exists, or that this being possesses none 
of those properties which we regard as analogical with the 
dynamical qualities of a thinking being, or that, as the an- 
thropomorphists would have us believe, it is subject to all the 
limitations which sensibility imposes upon those intelligences 
which exist in the world of experience. 

A Supreme Being is, therefore, for the speculative reason, a 
mere ideal, though a faultless one — a conception which per- 
fects and crowns the system of human cognition, but the 
objective reality of which can neither be proved nor disproved 
by pure reason. If this defect is ever supplied by a Moral 
Theology, the problematic Transcendental Theology which has 
preceded, will have been at least serviceable as demonstrating 
the mental necessity existing for the conception, by the 
complete determination of it which it has furnished, and 
the ceaseless testing of the conclusions of a reason often de- 
ceived by sense, and not always in harmony with its own 
ideas. The attributes of necessity, infinitude, unity, exist- 
ence apart from the world (and not as a world-soul), eternity 
— free from conditions of time, omnipresence — free from 
conditions of space, omnipotence, and others, are pure trans- 
cendental predicates ; and thus the accurate conception of p. 
Supreme Being, which every theology requires, is furnished by 
transcendental theology alone. 



394 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

APPENDIX 

TO TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC 

Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason 

The result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not 
only confirms the truth of what we have already proved in our 
Transcendental Analytic, namely, that all inferences which 
would lead us beyond the limits of experience are fallacious 
and groundless, but it at the same time teaches us this im- 
portant lesson, that human reason has a natural inclination to 
overstep these limits, and that transcendental ideas are as 
much the natural property of the reason as categories are of 
the understanding. There exists this difference, however, 
that while the categories never mislead us, outward objects 
being always in perfect harmony therewith, ideas are the 
parents of irresistible illusions, the severest and most subtle 
criticism being required to save us from the fallacies which 
they induce. 

Whatever is grounded in the nature of our powers, will be 
found to be in harmony with the final purpose and proper 
employment of these powers, when once we have discovered 
their true direction and aim. We are entitled to suppose, there- 
fore, that there exists a mode of employing transcendental 
ideas which is proper and immanent ; although, when we mis- 
take their meaning, and regard them as conceptions of actual 
things, their mode of application is transcendent and delusive. 
For it is not the idea itself, but only the employment of the 
idea in relation to possible experience, that is transcendent or 
immanent. An idea is employed transcendently, when it is 
applied to an object falsely believed to be adequate with and 
to correspond to it ; immanently, when it is applied solely to 
the employment of the understanding in the sphere of expe- 
rience. Thus all errors of suhreptio — of misapplication, are 
to be ascribed to defects of judgment, and not to understand- 
ing or reason. 

Reason never has an immediate relation to an object ; it 
relates immediately to the understanding alone. It is only 
through the understanding that it can be employed in 
the field of experience. It does not form conceptions 
of objects, it merely arianges them and gives to them 



0-P THE IDEAS OF PURE REASON. 395 

that unity which they are capable of possessing when the 
sphere of their application has been extended as widely as 
possible. Reason avails itself of the conceptions of the under- 
standing for the sole purpose of producing totality in the dif- 
ferent series. This totality the understanding does not con- 
cern itself with ; its only occupation is the connection of ex- 
periences, by which series of conditions in accordance with 
conceptions are established. The object of reason is there- 
fore the understanding and its proper destination. As the 
latter brings unity into the diversity of objects by means of 
its conceptions, so the former brings unity into the diversity 
of conceptions by means of ideas ; as it sets the final aim of a 
collective unity to the operations of the understanding, which 
without this occupies itself with a distributive unity alone. 

I accordingly maintain, that transcendental ideas can never 
be employed as constitutive ideas, that they cannot be con- 
ceptions of objects, and that, when thus considered, they as- 
sume a fallacious and dialectical character. But, on the other 
hand, they are capable of an admirable and indispensably 
necessary application to objects — as regulative ideas, directing 
the understanding to a certain aim, the guiding lines towards 
which all its laws follow, and in which they all meet in one 
point. This point — though a mere idea (Jocks imaginarius) , 
that is, not a point from which the conceptions of the under- 
standing do really proceed, for it lies beyond the sphere of 
possible experience — serves notwithstanding to give to these 
conceptions the greatest possible unity combined with the great- 
est possible extension. Hence arises the natural illusion which 
induces us to believe that these lines proceed from an object 
which lies out of the sphere of empirical cognition, just as 
objects reflected in a mirror appear to be behind it. But 
this illusion — which we may hinder from imposing upon us 
— is necessary and unavoidable, if we desire to see, not only 
those objects which lie before us, but those which are at a 
great distance behind us ; that is to say, when, in the present 
case, we direct the aims of the understanding, beyond every 
given experience, towards an extension as great as can possi- 
bly be attained. 

If we review our cognitions in their entire extent, we shall 
find that the peculiar business of reason is to arrange them 
into a system, that is to say, to give them connection accord- 



396 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

ing to a principle. This unity presupposes an idea — the 
idea of the form of a whole (of cognition), preceding the de- 
terminate cognition of the parts, and containing the condi- 
tions which determine a priori to every part its place and 
relation to the other parts of the whole system. This idea 
accordingly demands complete unity in the cognition of the 
understanding — not the unity of a contingent aggregate, but 
that of a system connected according to necessary laws. It 
cannot be affirmed with propr-iety that this idea is a concep- 
tion of an object ; it is merely a conception of the complete 
unity of the conceptions of objects, in so far as this unity 
is available to the understanding as a rule. Such concep- 
tions of reason are not derived from nature ; on the contrary, 
we employ them for the interrogation and investigation of 
nature, and regard our cognition as defective so long as it is 
not adequate to them. We admit that such a thing as 
pure earth, pure water, ox pure air, is not to be discovered. 
And yet we require these conceptions (which have their 
origin in the reason, so far as regards their absolute purity 
and completeness) for the purpose of determining the share 
which each of these natural causes has in every phsenomenon. 
Thus the different kinds of matter, are all referred to earths 
— as mere weight, to salts and inflammable bodies — as pure 
force, and finally, to water and air — as the vehinda of the 
former, or the machines employed by them in their opera- 
tions, — for the purpose of explaining the chemical action and 
re-action of bodies in accordance with the idea of a me- 
chanism. For, although not actually so expressed, the in- 
fluence of such ideas of reason is very observable in the pro- 
cedure of natural philosophers. 

If reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from the 
general, and if the general be certain in se and given, it is only 
necessary that the judgment should subsume the particular 
under the general, the particular being thus necessarily deter- 
mined. I shall term this the demonstrative or apodeictic em- 
ployment of reason. If, however, the general is admitted as 
problematical only, and is a mere idea, the particular case is 
certain, but the universality of the rule which applies to this 
particular case remains a problem. Several particular cases, 
the certainty of which is beyond doubt, are then taken and 
examined, for the purpose of discovering whether the rule is 



Or THE IDEAS OP PUEE ItEASO^. 39/ 

applicable to them ; and if it appears that all the particular 
cases "which can be collected follow from the rule, its univer- 
sality is inferred, and at the same time, all the causes which 
have not, or cannot be presented to our observation, are con- 
cluded to be of the same character with those which we have 
observed. This I shall term the hypothetical employment of 
the reason. 

The hypothetical exercise of reason by the* aid of ideas 
employed as problematical conceptions is properly not consti- 
tutive. That is to say, if we consider the subject strictly, 
the truth of the rule, which has been employed as an hypo- 
thesis, does not follow from the use that is made of it by 
reason. For how can we know all the possible cases that 
may arise ? — some of which may, however, prove exceptions 
to the universality of the rule. This employment of reason 
is merely regulative, and its sole aim is the introduction of 
unity into the aggregate of our particular cognitions, and 
thereby the approximating of the rule to universality. 

The object of the hypothetical employment of reason is 
therefore the systematic unity of cognitions ; and this unity is 
the criterion of the truth of a rule. On the other hand, this 
systematic unity — as a mere idea — is in fact merely a unity 
projected, not to be regarded as given, but only in the light 
of a problem — a problem which serves, however, as a principle 
for the various and particular exercise of the understanding 
in experience, directs it with regard to those cases which are 
not presented to our observation, and introduces harmony 
and consistency into all its operations. 

All that we can be certain of from the above considerations 
is, that this systematic unity is a logical principle, whose aim 
is to assist the understanding, where it cannot of itself attain 
to rules, by means of ideas, to bring all these various rules 
under one principle, and thus to ensure the most complete 
consistency and connection that can be attained. But the 
assertion that objects and the understanding by which they 
are cognized are so constituted as to be determined to system- 
atic unity, that this may be postulated d, priori, without any 
reference to the interest of reason, and that we are justified in 
declaring all possible cognitions — empirical and others — to 
possess systematic unity, and to be subject to general principles 
from whicK notwithstanding their various character, they are 



398 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

all derivable, * — such an assertion can be founded only upon a 
transcendental principle of reason, which would render this 
systematic unity not subjectively and logically — in its character 
of -a method, but objectively necessary. 

We shall illustrate this by an example. The conceptions of 
the understanding make us acquainted, among many other 
kinds of unity, with that of t'he causality of a substance, which 
is termed power. The different phsenomenal manifestations 
of the same substance appear at first view to be so very dis- 
similar, that we are inclined to assume the existence of just as 
many different powers as there are different effects — as, in the 
case of the human mind, we have feeling, consciousness, ima- 
gination, memory, wit, analysis, pleasure, desire, and so on. 
Now we are required by a logical maxim to reduce these dif- 
ferences to as small a number as possible, by comparing them 
and discovering the hidden identity which exists. "We must 
inquire, for example, whether or not imagination, (connected 
with consciousness), memory, wit, and analysis are not merely 
different forms of understanding and reason. The idea of a 
fundamental power, the existence of which no effort of logic 
can assure us of, is the problem to be solved, for the system- 
atic representation of the existing variety of powers. The 
logical principle of reason requires us to produce as great a 
unity as is possible in the system of our cognitions ; and the 
more the phsenomena of this and the other power are found 
to be identical, the more probable does it become, that they are 
nothing but different manifestations of one and the same 
power, which maybe called, relatively speaking, & fundamental 
power. And so with other cases. 

These relatively fundamental powers must again be com- 
pared with each other, to discover, if possible, the one radical 
and absolutely fundamental power of which they are but the 
manifestations. But this unity is purely hypothetical. It is 
not maintained, that this unity does really exist, but that we 
must, in the interest of reason, that is, for the establishment 
of principles for the various rules presented by experience, 
try to discover and introduce it, so far as is practicable, into 
the sphere of our cognitions. 

But the transcendental employment of the understanding 
would lead us to believe that this idea of a fundamental power 
is not problematical, but that it possesses objective reality, 



OF THE IDEAS OE PEBE KEASOX. 39P 

and thus the systematic unity of the various powers or forces 
m a substance is demanded by the understanding and erected 
into an apodeictic or necessary principle. For, without 
having attempted to discover the unity of the various powers 
existing in nature, nay, even after all our attempts have failed, 
we notwithstanding presuppose that it does exist, and may be, 
sooner or later, discovered. And this reason does, not only, 
as in the case above adduced, with regard to the unity of sub- 
stance, but where manv substances, although all to a certain ex- 
tent homogeneous, are discoverable, as in the case of matter in 
general. Here also does reason presuppose the existence of 
the systematic unity of various powers — inasmuch as particular 
laws of nature are subordinate to general laws ; and parsimony 
in principles is not merely an economical principle of reason, 
but an essential law of nature. 

We cannot understand, in fact, how a logical principle of 
unity can of right exist, unless we presuppose a transcendental 
principle, by which such a systematic unity — as a property of 
objects themselves — is regarded, as necessary a priori. For 
with what right can reason, in its logical exercise, require us 
to regard the variety of forces which nature displays, as in 
effect a disguised unity, and to deduce them from one funda- 
mental force or power, when she is free to admit that it is 
just as possible that all forces should be different in kind, and 
that a systematic unity is not conformable to the design of 
nature ? In this view of the case, reason would be proceed- 
ing in direct opposition to her own destination, by setting as 
an aim an idea which entirely conflicts with the procedure 
and arrangement of nature. Neither can we assert that reason 
has previously inferred this unity from the contingent nature 
of phsenomena. For the law of reason which requires us to 
seek for this unity is a necessary law, inasmuch as without it 
we should not possess a faculty of reason, nor without reason 
a consistent and self-accordant mode of employing the under- 
standing, nor, in the absence of this, any proper and sufficient 
criterion of empirical truth. In relation to this criterion, 
therefore, we must suppose the idea of the systematic unity of 
nature to possess objective validity and necessity. 

We find this transcendental presupposition lurking in different 
forms in the principles of philosophers, although they have 
neither recognised it nor confessed to themselves its presence. 



400 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

That the diversities of in-dividual things do not exclude identity 
of species, that the various species must he considered as 
merely different determinations of a few genera, and these 
again as divisions of still higher races, and so on, — that, ac- 
cordingly, a certain systematic unity of all possible empirical 
conceptions, in so far as they can be deduced from higher and 
more general conceptions, must be sought for, is a scholastic 
maxim or logical principle, without which reason could not be 
employed by us. For we can infer the particular from the 
general, only in so far as general properties of things constitute 
the foundation upon which the particular rest. 

That the same unity exists in nature is presupposed by 
philosophers in the well-known scholastic maxim, which for- 
bids us unnecessarily to augment the number of entities or 
principles (entia prceter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda). 
This maxim asserts that nature herself assists in the establish- 
ment of this unity of reason, and that the seemingly infinite 
diversity of phenomena should not deter us from the ex- 
pectation of discovering beneath this diversity a unity of 
fundamental properties, of which the aforesaid variety is but 
a more or less determined form. This unity, although a 
mere idea, has been always pursued with so much zeal, that 
thinkers have found it necessary rather to moderate the desire 
than to encourage it. It was considered a great step when 
chemists were able to reduce all salts to two main genera — acids 
and alkalis ; and they regard this difference as itself a mere 
variety, or different manifestation of one and the same funda- 
mental material. The different kinds of earths (stones and 
even metals) chemists have endeavoured to reduce to three, 
and afterwards to two ; but still, not content with this ad- 
vance, they cannot but think that behind these diversities 
there lurks but one genus, — nay, that even salts and earths 
have a common principle. It might be conjectured that this 
is merely an economical plan of reason, for the purpose of 
sparing itself trouble, and an attempt of a purely hypothetical 
character, which, when successful, gives an appearance of 
probability to the principle of explanation employed by the 
reason. But a selfish purpose of this kind is easily to be dis- 
tinguished from the idea, according to which every one pre- 
supposes that this unity is in accordance with the laws of 
nature, and that reason does not in this case request, but re* 



OF THE IDEAS OF PUBE EEASOK. 401 

qui?'es, although we are quite unable to determine the proper 
limits of this unity. 

If the diversity existing in phsenomena — a diversity not of 
form (for in this they may be similar) but of content — were 
so great that the subtlest human reason could never by com- 
parison discover in them the least similarity, (which is not 
impossible), in this case the logical law of genera would 
be without foundation, the conception of a genus, nay, all 
general conceptions would be impossible, and the faculty of 
the understanding, the exercise of which is restricted to the 
world of conceptions, could not exist. The logical principle 
of genera, accordingly, if it is to be applied to nature, (by 
which I mean objects presented to our senses,) presupposes a 
transcendental principle. In accordance with this principle, 
homogeneity is necessarily presupposed in the variety of phse- 
nomena, (although we are unable to determine a priori the 
degree of this homogeneity), because without it no empirical 
conceptions, and consequently no experience, would be pos- 
sible. 

The logical principle of genera, which demands identity in 
phsenomena, is balanced by another principle — that of species, 
which requires variety and diversity in things, notwithstanding 
their accordance in the same genus, and directs the under- 
standing to attend to the one no less than to the other. This 
principle (of the faculty of distinction) acts as a check upon 
the levity of the former (the faculty of wit *) ; and reason ex- 
hibits in this respect a double and conflicting interest, — on 
the one hand the interest in the extent (the interest of gene- 
rality) in relation to genera, on the other that of the content 
(the interest of individuality) in relation to the variety of 
species. In the former case, the understanding cogitates more 
under its conceptions, in the latter it cogitates more in them. 
This distinction manifests itself likewise in the habits of thought 
peculiar to natural philosophers, some of whom — the remark- 
ably speculative heads — may be said to be hostile to hetero- 
geneity in phsenomena, and have their eyes always fixed on 
the unity of genera, while others — with a strong empirical 
tendency — aim unceasingly at the analysis of phsenomena, and 

* Wit is defined by Kant as the faculty which discovers the general 
in the particular. Vid. Anthropologic, p. 123 — Tr. 

D D 



402 TBANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

almost destroy in us the hope of ever being able to estimate 
the character of these according to general principles. 

The latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical 
principle, the aim of which is the systematic completeness of 
all cognitions. This principle authorizes me, beginning at the 
genus, to descend to the various and diverse contained under 
it ; and in this way extension, as in the former case unity, is 
assured to the system. For if we merely examine the sphere 
of the conception which indicates a genus, we cannot discover 
how far it is possible to proceed in the division of that sphere ; 
just as it is impossible, from the consideration of the space 
occupied by matter, to determine how far we can proceed in 
the division of it. Hence every genus must contain different 
species, and these again different sub-species ; and as each of 
the latter must itself contain a sphere, (must be of a certain 
extent, as a conceptus communis), reason demands that no 
species or sub-species is to be considered as the lowest pos- 
sible. For a species or sub-species, being always a conception, 
which contains only what is common to a number of different 
things, does not completely determine any individual thing, 
or relate immediately to it, and must consequently contain 
other conceptions, that is, other sub-species under it. This 
law of specification may be thus expressed : — Entium varietates 
non temere sunt minuends. 

But it is easy to see that this logical law would likewise be 
without sense or application, were it not based upon a trans- 
cendental law of specification, which certainly does not require 
that the differences existing in phaenomena should be infinite 
in number, for the logical principle, which merely maintains 
the indeterminateness of the logical sphere of a conception, in 
relation to its possible division, does not authorize this state- 
ment ; while it does impose upon the understanding the duty 
of searching for sub-species to every species, and minor differ- 
ences in every difference. For, were there no lower concep- 
tions, neither could there be any higher. Now the under- 
standing cognizes only by means of conceptions ; consequently, 
how far soever it may proceed in division, never by mere in- 
tuition, but always by lower and lower conceptions. The cog- 
nition of phaenomena in their complete determination (which 
is possible only by means of the understanding) requires an 
unceasingly continued specification of conceptions, and a pro- 



0"F THE IDEAS OP PURE HE AS OX. 403 

gression to ever smaller differences, of which abstraction had 
been made in the conception of the species, and still more in 
that of the genus. 

This law of specification cannot be deduced from experi- 
ence ; it can never present us with a principle of so universal 
an application. Empirical specification very soon stops in its 
distinction of diversities, and requires the guidance of the 
transcendental law, as a principle of the reason — a law which 
imposes on us the necessity of never ceasing in our search for 
differences, even although these may not present themselves 
to the senses. That absorbent earths are of different kinds, 
could only be discovered by obeying the anticipatory law of 
reason, which imposes upon the understanding the task of 
discovering the differences existing between these earths, and 
supposes that nature is richer in substances than our senses 
would indicate. The faculty of the understanding belongs to 
us just as much under the presupposition of differences in the 
objects of nature, as under the condition that these objects 
are homogeneous, because we could not possess conceptions, 
nor make any use of our understanding, were not the phseno- 
mena included under these conceptions in some respects dis- 
similar, as well as similar, in their character. 

Reason thus prepares the sphere of the understanding for 
the operations of this faculty, 1. by the principle of the 
homogeneity of the diverse in higher genera ; 2. by the prin- 
ciple of the variety of the homogeneous in lower species ; 
and, to complete the systematic unity, it adds, 3. a law of the 
affinity of all conceptions, which prescribes a continuous 
transition from one species to every other by the gradual 
increase of diversity. We may term these the principles of 
the homogeneity, the specification, and the continuity of forms. 
The latter results from the union of the two former, in- 
asmuch as we regard the systematic connection as complete in 
thought, in the ascent to higher genera, as well as in the 
descent to lower species. For all diversities must be related 
to each other, as they all spring from one highest genus, 
descending through the different gradations of a more and 
more extended determination. 

We may illustrate the systematic unity produced by the 
three logical principles in the following manner. Every con- 
ception may be regarded as a point, which, as the stand-point 



404 TKAXSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

of a spectator, -has a certain horizon, which may be said to 
enclose a number of things, that may be viewed, so to speak, 
from that centre. Within this horizon there must be an 
infinite number of other points, each of which has its own 
horizon, smaller and more circumscribed ; in other words, 
every species contains sub-species, according to the principle 
of specification, and the logical horizon consists of smaller 
horizons (sub-species), but not of points (individuals), which 
possess no extent. But different horizons or genera, which 
include under them so many conceptions, may have one com- 
mon horizon, from which, as from a mid-point, they may be 
surveyed ; and we may proceed thus, till we arrive at the 
highest genus, or universal and true horizon, which is deter- 
mined by the highest conception, and which contains under 
itself all differences and varieties, as genera, species, and sub- 
species. 

To this highest stand-point I am conducted by the law of 
homogeneity, as to all lower and more variously-determined 
conceptions by the law of specification. Now as in this way 
there exists no void in the whole extent of all possible con- 
ceptions, and as out of the sphere of these the mind can discover 
nothing, there arises from the presupposition of the universal 
horizon above mentioned, and its complete division, the prin- 
ciple : Non datur vacuum formarum. This principle asserts 
that there are not different primitive and highest genera, which 
stand isolated, so to speak, from each other, but all the vari- 
ous genera are mere divisions and limitations of one highest 
and universal genus ; and hence follows immediately the 
principle : Datur continuum formarum. This principle indi- 
cates that all differences of species limit each other, and do 
not admit of transition from one to another by a saltus, but 
only through smaller degrees of the difference between the one 
species and the other. In one word, there are no species or 
sub-species which (in the view of reason) are the nearest 
possible to each other ; intermediate species or sub-species 
being always possible, the difference of which from each of 
the former is always smaller than the difference existing 
between these. 

The first law, therefore, directs us to avoid the notion that 
there exist different primal genera, and enounces the fact of 
perfect homogeneity ; the second imposes a check upon this 



Or THE IDEAS OF PUKE EEASON. 405 

tendency to unity and prescribes the distinction of sub-species, 
before proceeding* to apply our general conceptions to indi- 
viduals. The third unites both the former, by enouncing the 
fact of homogeneity as existing even in the most various 
diversity, by means of the gradual transition from one species 
to another. Thus it indicates a relationship between the 
different branches or species, in so far as they all spring from 
the same stem. 

But this logical law of the continuum specierwn (formarv.m 
logicarum) presupposes a transcendental principle {lex con- 
tinui in natura), without which the understanding might be 
led into error, by following the guidance of the former, and 
thus perhaps pursuing a path contrary to that prescribed by 
nature. This law must consequently be based upon pure 
transcendental, and not upon empirical considerations. For, 
in the latter case, it would come later than the system ; 
whereas it is really itself the parent of all that is systematic 
in our cognition of nature. These principles are not mere 
hypotheses employed for the purpose of experimenting upon 
nature ; although when any such connection is discovered, it 
forms a solid ground for regarding the hypothetical unity as 
valid in the sphere of nature, — and thus they are in this 
respect not without their use. But we go farther, and main- 
tain that it is manifest that these principles of parsimony in 
fundamental causes, variety in effects, and affinity in phse- 
nomena, are in accordance both with reason and nature, and 
that they are not mere methods or plans devised for the pur- 
pose of assisting us in our observation of the external world. 

But it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, 
to which no adequate object can be discovered in experience. 
And this for two reasons. First, because the species in nature 
are really divided, and hence form quanta discreta ;* and, if 
the gradual progression through their affinity were continuous, 
the intermediate members lying between two given species 
must be infinite in number, which is impossible. Secondly, 
because we cannot make any determinate empirical use of this 
law, inasmuch as it does not present us with any criterion of 
affinity which could aid us in determining how far we ought 
to pursue the graduation of differences : it merely contains a 

* Not quanta continua t like space or a line. See page 128, et seqq 
— Tr. 



406 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

general indication that it is our duty to seek for and, if possi- 
ble, to discover them. 

When we arrange these principles of systematic unity in the 
order conformable to their employment in experience, they 
will stand thus : Variety, Affinity, Unity, each of them, as 
ideas, being taken in the highest degree of their completeness. 
Reason pre-supposes the existence of cognitions of the under- 
standing, which have a direct relation to experience, and aims 
at the ideal unity of these cognitions — a unity which far tran- 
scends all experience or empirical notions. The affinity of the 
diverse, notwithstanding the differences existing between its 
parts, has a relation to things, but a still closer one to the 
mere properties and powers of things. For example, imperfect 
experience may represent the orbits of the planets as circular. 
But we discover variations from this course, and we proceed 
to suppose that the planets revolve in a path which, if not a 
circle, is of a character very similar to it. That is to say, the 
movements of those planets which do not form a circle, will 
approximate more or less to the properties of a circle, and 
probably form an ellipse. The paths of comets exhibit still 
greater variations, for, so far as our observation extends, they 
do not return upon their own course in a circle or ellipse. But 
we proceed to the conjecture that comets describe a parabola, 
a figure which is closely allied to the ellipse. In fact, a para- 
bola is merely an ellipse, with its longer axis produced to an 
indefinite extent. Thus these principles conduct us to a unity 
in the genera of the forms of these orbits, and, proceeding 
further, to a unity as regards the cause of the motions of the 
heavenly bodies — that is, gravitation. But we go on extending 
our conquests over nature, and endeavour to explain all seem- 
ing deviations from these rules, and even make additions to 
our system which no experience can ever substantiate — for 
example, the theory, in affinity with that of ellipses, of hyper- 
bolic paths of comets, pursuing which, these bodies leave our 
solar system, and, passing from sun to sun, unite the most 
distant parts of the infinite universe, which is held together 
by the same moving power. 

The most remarkable circumstance connected with these 
principles is, that they seem to be transcendental, and, although 
only containing ideas for the guidance of the empirical exer- 
cise of reason, and although this empirical employment stands 



OF THE IDEAS OF PUKE REASON. 407 

to these ideas in an asymptotic relation alone (to use a mathe- 
matical term), that is, continually approximate, without ever 
being able to attain to them, they possess, notwithstanding, as 
a priori synthetical propositions, objective though undeter- 
mined validity, and are available as rules for possible expe- 
rience. In the elaboration of our experience, they may also 
be employed with great advantage, as heuristic * principles. 
A transcendental deduction of them cannot be made ; such a 
deduction being always impossible in the case of ideas, as has 
been already shown. 

We distinguished, in the Transcendental Analytic, the dyna- 
mical principles of the understanding, which are regulative 
principles of intuition, from the mathematical, which are con- 
stitutive principles of intuition. These dynamical laws are, 
however, constitutive in relation to experience, inasmuch as 
they render the conceptions without which experience could 
not exist, possible a priori. But the principles of pure reason 
cannot be constitutive even in regard to empirical conceptions, 
because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can be 
discovered, and they cannot therefore have an object in con- 
creto. Now, if I grant that they cannot be employed in the 
sphere of experience, as constitutive principles, how shall I se- 
cure for them employment and objective validity as regulative 
principles, and in what way can they be so employed ? 

The understanding is the object of reason, as sensibility is 
the object of the understanding. The production of syste- 
matic unity in all the empirical operations of the understand- 
ing is the proper occupation of reason ; just as it is the 
business of the understanding to connect the various content 
of phsenomena by means of conceptions, and subject them to 
empirical laws. But the operations of the understanding are, 
without the schemata of sensibility, undetermined ; and, in the 
same manner, the unity of reason is perfectly undetermined as 
regards the conditions under which, and the extent to which, 
the understanding ought to carry the systematic connection of 
its conceptions. But, although it is impossible to discover in 
intuition a schema for the complete systematic unity of 
all the conceptions of the understanding, there must be some 
analogon of this schema. This analogon is the idea of the 
maximum of the division and the connection of our cognition 
* From the Greek tvoicrxu). 



408 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

in one principle. For we may have a determinate notion of a 
maximum and an absolutely perfect, all the restrictive condi- 
tions which are connected with an indeterminate and various 
content, having been abstracted. Thus the idea of reason is 
analogous with a sensuous schema, with this difference, that 
the application of the categories to the schema of reason does 
not present a cognition of any object (as is the case with the 
application of the categories to sensuous schemata), but merely 
provides us with a rule or principle for the systematic unity of 
the exercise of the understanding. Now, as every principle 
which imposes upon the exercise of the understanding a priori 
compliance with the rule of systematic unity, also relates, 
although only in an indirect manner, to an object of experience, 
the principles of pure reason will also possess objective reality 
and validity in relation to experience. But they will not aim 
at determining our knowledge in regard to any empirical 
object ; they will merely indicate the procedure, following 
which, the empirical and determinate exercise of the under- 
standing may be in complete harmony and connection with 
itself — a result which is produced by its being brought into 
harmony with the principle of systematic unity, so far as that 
is possible, and deduced from it. 

I term all subjective principles, which are not derived from 
observation of the constitution of an object, but from the 
interest which Reason has in producing a certain completeness 
in her cognition of that object, maxims of reason. Thus 
there are maxims of speculative reason, which are based solely 
upon its speculative interest, although they appear to be 
objective principles. 

When principles which are really regulative are regarded as 
constitutive, and employed as objective principles, contradic- 
tions must arise ; but if they are considered as mere maxims, 
there is no room for contradictions of any kind, as they then 
merely indicate the different interests of reason, which occa- 
sion differences in the mode of thought. In effect, Reason has 
only one single interest, and the seeming contradiction existing 
between her maxims merely indicates a difference in, and a 
reciprocal limitation of, the methods by which this interest is 
satisfied. 

This reasoner has at heart the interest of diversity — in 
accordance with the principle of specification ; another, the 



OF THE IDEAS OF PUEE EEASOIS". 409 

interest of unity — in accordance with the principle of aggre- 
gation. Each believes that his judgment rests upon a thorough 
insight into the subject he is examining, and yet it has been 
influenced solely by a greater or less degree of adherence to 
some one of the two principles, neither of which are objective, 
but originate solely from the interest of reason, and on this 
account to be termed maxims rather than principles. When 
I observe intelligent men disputing about the distinctive cha- 
racteristics of men, animals, or plants, and even of minerals, 
those on the one side assuming the existence of certain 
national characteristics, certain well-defined and hereditary 
distinctions of family, race, and so on, while the other side 
maintain that nature has endowed all races of men with the 
same faculties and dispositions, and that all differences are 
but the result of external and accidental circumstances, — I 
have only to consider for a moment the real nature of the 
subject of discussion, to arrive at the conclusion that it is 
a subject far too deep for us to judge of, and that there is little 
probability of either party being able to speak from a perfect 
insight into and understanding of the nature of the subject 
itself. Both have, in reality, been struggling for the two-fold 
interest of reason ; the one maintaining the one interest, the 
other the other. But this difference between the maxims of 
diversity and unity may easily be reconciled and adjusted ; 
although, so long as they are regarded as objective principles, 
they must occasion not only contradictions and polemic, but 
place hindrances in the way of the advancement of truth, until 
some means is discovered of reconciling these conflicting 
interests, and bringing reason into union and harmony with 
itself. 

The same is the case with the so-called law discovered by 
Leibnitz,* and supported with remarkable ability by Bonnetf 
— the law of the continuous gradation of created beings, which 
is nothing more than an inference from the principle of 
affinity ; for observation and study of the order of nature 
could never present it to the mind as an objective truth. The 
steps of this ladder, as they appear in experience, are too far 
apart from each other, and the so-called petty differences 
between different kinds of animals are in nature commonly so 

* Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, Liv. iii. ch. 6. 

t Bonnet, Betrachtungen iiber die Natur, pp. 29 — 85. 



410 TKANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

wide separations, that no confidence can be placed in such 
views (particularly when we reflect on the great variety of 
things, and the ease with which we can discover resem- 
blances), and no faith in the laws which are said to express 
the aims and purposes of nature. On the other hand, the 
method of investigating the order of nature in the light of this 
principle, and the maxim which requires us to regard this 
order — it being still undetermined how far it extends — as 
really existing in nature, is beyond doubt a legitimate and 
excellent principle of reason — a principle which extends 
further than any experience or observation of ours, and which, 
without giving us any positive knowledge of anything in the 
region of experience, guides us to the goal of systematic 
unity. 

Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human 
Reason. 

The ideas of pure reason cannot be, of themselves and in 
their own nature, dialectical ; it is from their misemployment 
alone that fallacies and illusions arise. For they originate 
in the nature of reason itself, and it is impossible that this 
supreme tribunal for all the rights and claims of speculation 
should be itself undeserving of confidence and promotive 
of error. It is to be expected, therefore, that these ideas have 
a genuine and legitimate aim. It is true, the mob of so- 
phists raise against reason the cry of inconsistency and con- 
tradiction, and affect to despise the government of that 
faculty, because they cannot understand its constitution, while 
it is to its beneficial influences alone that they owe the position 
and the intelligence which enable them to criticise and to blame 
its procedure. 

We cannot employ an a priori conception with certainty, 
until we have made a transcendental deduction thereof. The 
ideas of pure reason do not admit of the same kind of deduc- 
tion as the categories. But if they are to possess the least 
objective validity, and to represent anything but mere crea- 
tions of thought {entia rationis ratiocinantis), a deduction of 
them must be possible. This deduction will complete the 
critical task imposed upon pure reason ; and it is to this part 
of our labours that we now proceed. 

There is a great difference between a thing's being presented 



OF THE NATURAL DIALECTIC OE HUMAN REASON. 411 

to the mind as an object in an absolute sense, or merely as an 
ideal object. In the former case I employ my conceptions to 
determine the object ; in the latter case nothing is present to 
the mind but a mere schema, which does not relate directly to 
an object, not even in a hypothetical sense, but which is useful 
only for the purpose of representing other objects to the 
mind, in a mediate and indirect manner, by means of their 
relation to the idea in the intellect. Thus I say, the concep- 
tion of a supreme intelligence is a mere idea ; that is to say, 
its objective reality does not consist in the fact that it has an 
immediate relation to an object (for in this sense we have no 
means of establishing its objective validity), it is merely a 
schema constructed according to the necessary conditions of 
the unity of reason — the schema of a thing in general, which 
is useful towards the production of the highest degree of sys- 
tematic unity in the empirical exercise of reason, in which we 
deduce this or that object of experience from the imaginary 
object of this idea, as the ground or cause of the said object 
of experience. In this way, the idea is properly a heuristic, 
and not an ostensive conception ; it does not give us any 
information respecting the constitution of an object, it merely 
indicates how, under the guidance of the idea, we ought to 
investigate the constitution and the relations of objects in the 
world of experience. Now, if it can be shown that the three 
kinds of transcendental ideas (psychological, cosmological, and 
theological), although not relating directly to any object nor 
determining it, do nevertheless, on the supposition of the exist- 
ence of an ideal object, produce systematic unity in the laws 
of the empirical employment of the reason, and extend our 
empirical cognition, without ever being inconsistent or in 
opposition with it, — it must be a necessary maxim of reason to 
regulate its procedure according to these ideas. And this 
forms the transcendental deduction of all speculative ideas, not 
as constitutive principles of the extension of our cognition 
beyond the limits of our experience, but as regulative princi- 
ples of the systematic unity of empirical cognition, which is 
by the aid of these ideas arranged and emended within its own 
proper limits, to an extent unattainable by the operation of 
the principles of the understanding alone. 

I shall make this plainer. Guided by the principles involved 
in these ideas, we must, in the first place, so connect all the 



412 TEAXSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

phenomena, actions and feelings of th^ mind, as if it were a 
simple substance, which, endowed with personal identity, 
possesses a permanent existence (in this life at least), while its 
states, among which those of the body are to be included as 
external conditions, are in continual change. Secondly, in 
cosmology, we must investigate the conditions of all natural 
phaenomena, internal as well as external, as if they belonged 
to a chain infinite and without any prime or supreme member, 
while we do not, on this account, deny the existence of intelli- 
gible grounds of these phenomena, although we never employ 
them to explain phaenomena, for ihe simple reason that they 
are not objects of our cognition. Thirdly, in the sphere of 
theology, we must regard the whole system of possible experi- 
ence as forming an absolute, but dependent and sensuously- 
conditioned unity, and at the same time as based upon a sole, 
supreme, and all-sufficient ground existing apart from the 
world itself — a ground which is a self-subsistent, primeval 
and creative reason, in relation to which w r e so employ our 
reason in the field of experience, as if all objects drew their 
origin from that archetype of all reason. In other words, we 
ought not to deduce the internal phaenomena of the mind 
from a simple thinking substance, but deduce them from 
each other under the guidance of the regulative idea of a 
simple being ; we ought not to deduce the phaenomena, order, 
and unity of the universe from a supreme intelligence, but 
merely draw from this idea of a supremely wise cause the rules 
which must guide reason in its connection of causes and 
effects. 

Now there is nothing to hinder us from admitting these ideas 
to possess an objective and hyperbolic existence, except the 
cosmological ideas, which lead reason into an antinomy : the 
psychological and theological ideas are not antinomial. They 
contain no contradiction ; and how then can any one dispute 
their objective reality, since he who denies it knows as little 
about their possibility, as we who affirm 1 And yet, when we 
wish to admit the existence of a thing, it is not sufficient to 
convince ourselves that there is no positive obstacle in the 
way ; for it cannot be allowable to regard mere creations of 
thought, which transcend, though they do not contradict, all 
our conceptions, as real and determinate objects, solely upon 
the authority of a speculative reason striving to compass its own 



OF THE NATUEAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN REASON. 413 

aims. They cannot, therefore, be admitted to be real in them- 
selves ; they can only possess a comparative reality — that of a 
schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of 
all cognition. They are to be regarded not as actual things, 
but as in some measure analogous to them. We abstract from 
the object of the idea aH the conditions which limit the exer- 
cise of our understanding, but which, on the other hand, are 
the sole conditions of our possessing a determinate conception 
of any given thing. And thus we cogitate a something, of the 
real nature of which we have not the least conception, but 
which we represent to ourselves as standing in a relation to 
the whole system of phsenomena, analogous to that in which 
phsenomena stand to each other. 

By admitting these ideal beings, we do not really extend 
our cognitions beyond the objects of possible experience ; we 
extend merely the empirical unity of our experience, by the 
aid of systematic unity, the schema of which is furnished by 
the idea, which is therefore valid — not as a constitutive, but as 
a regulative principle. For although we posit a thing cor- 
responding to the idea — a something, an actual existence, we 
do not on that account aim at the extension of our cognition 
by means of transcendent conceptions. This existence is 
purely ideal, and not objective ; it is the mere expression of 
the systematic unity which is to be the guide of reason in the 
field of experience. There are no attempts made at deciding 
what the ground of this unity may be, or what the real nature 
of this imaginary being. 

Thus the transcendental and only determinate conception of 
God, which is presented to us by speculative reason, is in the 
strictest sense deistic. In other words, reason does not assure 
us of the objective validity of the conception ; it merely gives 
us the idea of something, on which the supreme and necessary 
unity of all experience is based. This something we cannot, 
following the analogy of a real substance, cogitate otherwise 
than as the cause of all things operating in accordance with 
rational laws, if we regard it as an individual object ; although 
we should rest contented with the idea alone as a regulative 
principle of reason, and make no attempt at completing the 
sum of the conditions imposed by thought. This attempt is, 
indeed, inconsistent with the grand aim of complete syste- 



414 TKANSCEKDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

matic unity in the sphere of cognition — a unity to which no 
bounds are set by reason. 

Hence it happens that, admitting a divine being, I can have 
no conception of the internal possibility of its perfection, or of 
the necessity of its existence. The only advantage of this ad- 
mission is, that it enables me to answer all other questions re- 
lating to the contingent, and to give reason the most complete 
satisfaction as regards the unity which it aims at attaining 
in the world of experience. But I cannot satisfy reason with 
regard to this hypothesis itself ; and this proves that it is not 
its intelligence and insight into the subject, but its speculative 
interest alone which induces it to proceed from a point lying 
far beyond the sphere of our cognition, for the purpose of 
being able to consider all objects as parts of a systematic 
whole. 

Here a distinction presents itself, in regard to the way in 
which we may cogitate a presupposition — a distinction which 
is somewhat subtle, but of great importance in transcendental 
philosophy. I may have sufficient grounds to admit something, 
or the existence of something, in a relative point of view 
(suppositio relativa), without being justified in admitting it in 
an absolute sense (suppositio absolute/). This distinction is 
undoubtedly requisite, in the case of a regulative principle, 
the necessity of which we recognise, though we are ignorant 
of the source and cause of that necessity, and which we 
assume to be based upon some ultimate ground, for the pur- 
pose of being able to cogitate the universality of the principle 
in a more determinate way. For example, I cogitate the ex- 
istence of a being corresponding to a pure transcendental idea. 
But I cannot admit that this being exists absolutely and in 
itself, because all of the conceptions, by which I can cogitate 
an object in a determinate manner, fall short of assuring me 
of its existence ; nay, the conditions of the objective validity 
of my conceptions are excluded by the idea — by the very fact 
of its being an idea. The conceptions of reality, substance, 
causality, nay, even that of necessity in existence, have no 
significance out of the sphere of empirical cognition, and 
cannot, beyond that sphere, determine any object. They 
may, accordingly, be employed to explain the possibility of 
things in the world of sense, but they are utterly inadequate 
to explain the possibility of the universe itself considered as 



OF THE NATURAL DIALECTIC OE HUMAN SEASON. 415 

a whole ; because in this case the ground of explanation must 
lie out of and beyond the world, and cannot, therefore, be an 
object of possible experience. Now, I may admit the existence 
of an incomprehensible being of this nature — the object of a 
mere idea, relatively to the world of sense ; although I have 
no ground to admit its existence absolutely and in itself. For 
if an idea (that of a systematic and complete unity, of which 
I shall presently speak more particularly) lies at the founda- 
tion of the most extended empirical employment of reason, 
and if this idea cannot be adequately represented in concreto, 
although it is indispensably necessary for the approximation 
of empirical unity to the highest possible degree, — I am not 
only authorised, but compelled to realise this idea, that is, to 
posit a real object corresponding thereto. But I cannot profess 
to know this object ; it is to me merely a something, to which, 
as the ground of systematic unity in cognition, I attribute 
such properties as are analogous to the conceptions employed 
by the understanding in the sphere of experience. Following 
the analogy of the notions of reality, substance, causality, and 
necessity, I cogitate a being, which possesses all these attri- 
butes in the highest degree ; and, as this idea is the offspring 
of my reason alone, I cogitate this being as self-subsistent 
reason, and as the cause of the universe operating by means 
of ideas of the greatest possible harmony and unity. Thus I 
abstract all conditions that would limit my idea, solely for the 
purpose of rendering systematic unity possible in the world of 
empirical diversity, and thus securing the widest possible exten- 
sion for the exercise of reason in that sphere. This I am 
enabled to do, by regarding all connections and relations in 
the world of sense, as if they were the dispositions of a su- 
preme reason, of which our reason is but a faint image. I 
then proceed to cogitate this Supreme Being by conceptions 
which have, properly, no meaning or application, except in 
the world of sense. But as I am authorised to employ the 
transcendental hypothesis of such a being in a relative respect 
alone, that is, as the substratum of the greatest possible unity 
in experience, — I may attribute to a being which I regard as 
distinct from the world, such properties as belong solely to the 
sphere of sense and experience. For I do not desire, and am 
not justified in desiring, to cognize this object of my idea, as 
it exists in itself ; for I possess no conceptions sufficient for 



416 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

this task, those of reality, substance, causality, nay, even 
that of necessity in existence, losing all significance, and be- 
coming merely the signs of conceptions, without content and 
without applicability, when I attempt to carry them beyond 
the limits of the world of sense. I cogitate merely the re- 
lation of a perfectly unknown being to the greatest possible 
systematic unity of experience, solely for the purpose of em- 
ploying it as the schema of the regulative principle which 
directs reason in its empirical exercise. 

It is evident, at the first view, that we cannot pre-suppose 
the reality of this transcendental object, by means of the con- 
ceptions of reality, substance, causality, and so on ; because 
these conceptions cannot be applied to anything that is dis- 
tinct from the world of sense. Thus the supposition of a 
Supreme Being or cause is purely relative ; it is cogitated only 
in behalf of the systematic unity of experience ; such a being 
is but a something, of whose existence in itself we have not the 
least conception. Thus, too, it becomes sufficiently manifest, 
why we required the idea of a necessary being in relation to 
objects given by sense, although we can never have the least 
conception of this being, or of its absolute necessity. 

And now we can clearly perceive the result of our transcen- 
dental dialectic, and the proper aim of the ideas of pure 
reason, — which become dialectical solely from misunderstand- 
ing and inconsiderateness. Pure reason is, in fact, occupied 
with itself, and not with any object. Objects are not presented 
to it to be embraced in the unity of an empirical conception ; 
it is only the cognitions of the understanding that are pre- 
sented to it, for the purpose of receiving the unity of a 
rational conception, that is, of being connected according to a 
principle. The unity of reason is the unity of system ; and 
this systematic unity is not an objective principle, extending 
its dominion over objects, but a subjective maxim, extending 
its authority over the empirical cognition of objects. The 
systematic connection which reason gives to the empirical 
employment of the understanding, not only advances the 
extension of that employment, but ensures its correctness, and 
thus the principle of a systematic unity of this nature is also 
objective, although only in an indefinite respect (principium 
vagum). It is not, however, a constitutive principle, deter- 
mining an object to which it directly relates ; it is merely a 



Or THE NATTJEAL DIALECTIC OE HUMAN REASON. 41/ 

regulative principle or maxim, advancing and strengthening the 
empirical exercise of reason, by the opening up of new paths 
of which the understanding is ignorant, while it never conflicts 
with the laws of its exercise in the sphere of experience. 

But reason cannot cogitate this systematic unity, without at 
the same time cogitating an object of the idea — an object that 
cannot be presented in any experience, which contains no 
concrete example of a complete systematic unity. This being 
{ens rationis ratiocinates) is therefore a mere idea, and is not 
assumed to be a thing which is real absolutely and in itself. 
On the contrary, it forms merely the problematical foundation 
of the connection which the mind introduces among the phse- 
nomena of the sensuous world. We look upon this con- 
nection, in the light of the above-mentioned idea, as if it drew 
its origin from the supposed being which corresponds to the 
idea. And yet all we aim at is the possession of this idea as 
a secure foundation for the systematic unity of experience — a 
unity indispensable to reason, advantageous to the under- 
standing, and promotive of the interests of empirical cognition. 

We mistake the true meaning of this idea, when we regard 
it as an enouncement, or even as a hypothetical declaration of 
the existence of a real thing, which we are to regard as the 
origin or ground of a systematic constitution of the universe. 
On the contrary, it is left completely undetermined what the 
nature or properties of this so-called ground may be. The 
idea is merely to be adopted as a point of view, from which 
this unity, so essential to reason and so beneficial to the under- 
standing, may be regarded as radiating. In one word, this 
transcendental thing is merely the schema of a regulative 
principle, by means of which Reason, so far as in her lies, 
extends the dominion of systematic unity over the whole 
sphere of experience. 

The first object of an idea of this kind is the Ego, con- 
sidered merely as a thinking nature or soul. If I wish 
to investigate the properties of a thinking being, I must in- 
terrogate experience. But I find that I can apply none 
of the categories to this object, the schema of these cate- 
gories, which is the condition of their application, being given 
only in sensuous intuition. Bat I cannot thus attain to 
the cognition of a systematic unity of all the phenomena 
of the internal sense. Instead, therefore of an empirical 

E E 



418 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

conception of what the soul really is, reason takes the 
conception of the empirical unity of all thought, and, by 
cogitating this unity as unconditioned and primitive, con- 
structs the rational conception or idea of a simple substance 
which is in itself unchangeable, possessing personal identity, 
and in connection with other real things external to it ; in 
one word, it constructs the idea of a simple self-subsistent 
intelligence. But the real aim of reason in this procedure is 
the attainment of principles of systematic unity for the ex- 
planation of the phaenomena of the soul. That is, reason 
desires to be able to represent all the determinations of the 
internal sense, as existing in one subject, all powers as deduced 
from one fundamental power, all changes as mere varieties 
in the condition of a being which is permanent and always 
the same, and all phcenomena in space as entirely different in 
their nature from the procedure of thought. Essential simpli- 
city (with the other attributes predicated of the Ego) is re- 
garded as the mere schema of this regulative principle ; it is 
not assumed that it is the actual ground of the properties of 
the soul. For these properties may rest upon quite different 
grounds, of which we are completely ignorant ; just as the 
above predicates could not give us any knowledge of the soul 
as it is in itself, even if we regarded them as valid in respect of 
it, inasmuch as they constitute a mere idea, which cannot be 
represented in concreto. Nothing but good can result from 
a psychological idea of this kind, if we only take proper care 
not to consider it as more than an idea ; that is, if we regard it 
as valid merely in relation to the employment of reason, in 
the sphere of the phaenomena of the soul. Under the 
guidance of this idea, or principle, no empirical laws of cor- 
poreal phaenomena are called in to explain that which is a 
phenomenon of the internal sense alone ; no windy hypo- 
theses of the generation, annihilation, and palingenesis of 
souls are admitted. Thus the consideration of this object of 
the internal sense is kept pure, and unmixed with heteroge- 
neous elements ; while the investigation of reason aims at 
reducing all the grounds of explanation employed in this 
sphere of knowledge to a single principle. All this is best 
effected, nay, cannot be effected otherwise than by means of 
such a schema, which requires us to regard this ideal thing 
as an actual existence. The psychological idea is therefore 
meaningless and inapplicable, except as the schema of a regru- 



OF THE NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN SEASON. 419 

lative conception. For, if I ask whether the soul is not really 
of a spiritual nature, — it is a question which has no meaning. 
From such a conception has been abstracted, not merely all 
corporeal nature, but all nature, that is, all the predicates 
of a possible experience ; and consequently, all the conditions 
which enable us to cogitate an object to this conception have 
disappeared. But, if these conditions are absent, it is evident 
that the conception is meaningless. 

The second regulative idea of speculative reason is the con- 
ception of the universe. For nature is properly the only 
object presented to us, in regard to which reason requires 
regulative principles. Nature is twofold— thinking and cor- 
poreal nature. To cogitate the latter in regard to its internal 
possibility, that is, to determine the application of the cate- 
gories to it, no idea is required — no representation which 
transcends experience. In this sphere, therefore, an idea is 
impossible, sensuous intuition being our only guide ; while, in 
the sphere of psychology, we require the fundamental idea 
(I), which contains a priori a certain form of thought, namely, 
the unity of the Ego. Pure reason has therefore nothing left 
but nature in general, and the completeness of conditions in na- 
ture in accordance with some principle. The absolute totality of 
the series of these conditions is an idea, which can never be fully 
realized in the empirical exercise of reason, while it is service- 
able as a rule for the procedure of reason in relation to that 
totality. It requires us, in the explanation of given phseno- 
mena (in the regress or ascent in the series), to proceed, as if 
the series were infinite in itself, that is, were prolonged in 
indefinitum ; while, on the other hand, where reason is 
regarded as itself the determining cause (in the region of free- 
dom), we are required to proceed as if we had not before us 
an object of sense, but of the pure understanding. In this 
latter case, the conditions do not exist in the series of phaeno- 
mena, but may be placed quite out of and beyond it, and the 
series of conditions may be regarded as if it had an absolute 
beginning from an intelligible cause. All this proves that the 
cosmological ideas are nothing but regulative principles, and 
not constitutive ; and that their aim is not to realize an actual 
totality in such series. The full discussion of this subject 
will be found in its proper place in the chapter on the anti» 
nomy of pure reason. 

E E 2 



420 THAN SUES DEtfTAL DIALECTIC. 

The third idea of pure reason, containing the hypothesis of a 
being which is valid merely as a relative hypothesis, is that of 
the one and all-sufficient cause of all cosmologieal series, in 
other words, the idea of God. We have not the slightest 
ground absolutely to admit the existence of an object corre- 
sponding to this idea ; for what can empower or authorize us 
to affirm the existence of a being of the highest perfection — 
a being whose existence is absolutely necessary, merely be- 
cause we possess the conception of such a being? The 
answer is, — it is the existence of the world which renders 
this hypothesis necessary. But this answer makes it perfectly 
evident, that the idea of this being, like all other speculative 
ideas, is essentially nothing more than a demand upon reason 
that it shall regulate the connection which it and its subor- 
dinate faculties introduce into the phsenomena of the world 
by principles of systematic unity, and consequently, that it 
shall regard all phsenomena as originating from one all-em- 
bracing being, as the supreme and all-sufficient cause. From 
this it is plain that the only aim of reason in this procedure is 
the establishment of its own formal rule for the extension of 
its dominion in the world of experience ; that it does not aim 
at an extension of its cognition beyond the limits of experi- 
ence ; and that, consequently, this idea does not contain any 
constitutive principle. 

The highest formal unity, which is based upon ideas alone, 
is the unity of all things — a unity in accordance with an aim 
or purpose ; and the speculative interest of reason renders it 
necessary to regard all order in the world, as if it originated 
from the intention and design of a supreme reason. This 
principle unfolds to the view of reason in the sphere of expe- 
rience new and enlarged prospects, and invites it to connect 
the phsenomena of the world according to teleological laws, and 
in this way to attain to the highest possible degree of sys- 
tematic unity. The hypothesis of a supreme intelligence, as 
the sole cause of the universe — an intelligence which has for 
us no more than an ideal existence, is accordingly always of 
the greatest service to reason. Thus, if we presuppose, in 
relation to the figure of the earth (which is round, but some- 
what flattened at the poles),* or that of mountains or seas, 

* The advantages which a circular form, in the case of the earth, has 
over every other, are well known. But few are aware that the slight 



OF THE NATTTKAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN BEASON. 421 

wise designs on the part of an author of the universe, we 
cannot fail to make, by the light of this supposition, a great 
number of interesting discoveries. If we keep to this hypo- 
thesis, as a principle which is purely regulative, even error 
cannot be very detrimental. For, in this case, error can have 
no more serious consequences than that, where we expected to 
discover a teleological connection {nexus Jinalis), only a me- 
chanical or physical connection appears. In such a case, we 
merely fail to find the additional form of unity we expected, 
but we do not lose the rational unity which the mind requires 
in its procedure in experience. But even a miscarriage of this 
sort cannot aifect the law in its general and teleological rela- 
tions. For although we may convict an anatomist of an error, 
when he connects the limb of some animal with a certain 
purpose ; it is quite impossible to 'prove in a single case, that 
any arrangement of nature, be it what it may, is entirely with- 
out aim or design. And thus medical physiology, by the aid 
of a principle presented to it by pure reason, extends its very 
limited empirical knowledge of the purposes of the different 
parts of an organized body so far, that it may be asserted with 
the utmost confidence, and with the approbation of all reflect- 
ing men, that every organ or bodily part of an animal has its 
use and answers a certain design. Now, this is a supposition, 
which, if regarded as of a constitutive character, goes much 
farther than any experience or observation of ours can justify. 
Hence it is evident that it is nothing more than a regulative 
principle of reason, which aims at the highest degree of syste- 
matic unity, by the aid of the idea of a causality according 
to design in a supreme cause — a cause which it regards as the 
highest intelligence. 

If, however, we neglect this restriction of the idea to a 
purely regulative influence, reason is betrayed into numerous 
errors. For it has then left the ground of experience, in which 

flattening at the poles, which gives it the figure of a spheroid, is the 
only cause which prevents the elevations of continents or even of moun- 
tains, perhaps thrown up by some internal convulsion, from continually 
altering the position of the axis of the earth — and that to some consider- 
able degree in a short time. The great protuberance of the earth under 
the equator serves to overbalance the impetus of all other masses of 
earth, and thus to preserve the axis of the earth, so far as we can ob- 
serve, in its present position. And yet this wise arrangement has been 
unthinkingly explained from the equilibrium of the formerly fluid mass. 



422 TltANSCEKDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

alone are to be found the criteria of truth, and has ventured into 
the region of the incomprehensible and unsearchable, on the 
heights of which it loses its power and collectedness, because 
it has completely severed its connection with experience. 

The first error which arises from our employing the idea of 
a Supreme Being as a constitutive (in repugnance to the very 
nature of an idea), and not as a regulative principle, is the 
error of inactive reason (ignava ratio*). We may so term 
every principle which requires us to regard our investigations of 
nature as absolutely complete, and allows reason to cease its 
inquiries, as if it had fully executed its task. Thus the psycho- 
logical idea of the Ego, when employed as a constitutive 
principle for the explanation of the phsenomena of the soul, 
and for the extension of our knowledge regarding this sub- 
ject beyond the limits of experience — even to the condition 
of the soul after death, is convenient enough for the purposes 
of pure reason, but detrimental and even ruinous to its in- 
terests in the sphere of nature and experience. The dogma- 
tising spiritualist explains the unchanging unity of our per- 
sonality through all changes of condition from the unity of 
a thinking substance, the interest which we take in things 
and events that can happen only after our death, from a con- 
sciousness of the immaterial nature of our thinking subject, 
and so on. Thus he dispenses with all empirical investiga- 
tions into the cause of these internal phaenomena, and with 
all possible explanations of them upon purely natural 
grounds ; while, at the dictation of a transcendent reason, 
he passes by the immanent sources of cognition in experience, 
greatly to his own ease and convenience, but to the sacrifice 
of all genuine insight and intelligence. These prejudicial 
consequences become still more evident, in the case of the 
dogmatical treatment of our idea of a Supreme Intelligence, 
and the theological system of nature (physico-theology) which 
is falsely based upon it. For, in this case, the aims which 

* This was the term applied by the old dialecticians to a sophistical 
argument, which ran thus : If it is your fate to die of this disease, you 
will die, whether you employ a physician or not. Cicero says that this 
mode of reasoning has received this appellation, because, if followed, it 
puts au end to the employment of reason in the affairs of life. For a 
similar reason I have applied this designation to the sophistical argument 
of pure reason. 



Or THE NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN EEASON. 423 

we observe in nature, and often those which we merely fancy 
to exist, make the investigation of causes a very easy task, 
by directing us to refer such and such phenomena imme- 
diately to the unsearchable will and counsel of the Supreme 
Wisdom, while we ought to investigate their causes in the ge- 
neral laws of the mechanism of matter, We are thus re- 
commended to consider the labour of reason as ended, whec 
we have merely dispensed with its employment, which is 
guided surely and safely, only by the order of nature and the 
series of changes in the world — which are arranged according 
to immanent and general laws. This error may be avoided, 
if we do not merely consider from the view-point of final 
aims certain parts of nature, such as the division and struc- 
ture of a continent, the constitution and direction of certain 
mountain- chains, or even the organisation existing in the 
vegetable and animal kingdoms, but look upon this system- 
atic unity of nature in a perfectly general way, in relation to 
the idea of a Supreme Intelligence. If we pursue this advice, 
we lay as a foundation for all investigation the conformity to 
aims of all phsenomena of nature in accordance with universal 
laws, for which no particular arrangement of nature is exempt, 
but only cognized by us with more or less difficulty ; and we 
possess a regulative principle of the systematic unity of a 
teleological connection, which we do not attempt to anticipate 
or predetermine. All that we do, and ought to do, is to 
follow out the physico-mechanical connection in nature ac- 
cording to general laws, with the hope of discovering, sooner 
or later, the teleological connection also. Thus, and thus 
only, can the principle of final unity aid in the extension of 
the employment of reason in the sphere of experience, with- 
out being in any case detrimental to its interests. 

The second error which arises from the misconception of 
the principle of systematic unity is that of perverted reason 
(perveisa ratio, varzpov Kporepov rationis). The idea of 
systematic unity is available as a regulative principle in the 
connection of phsenomena according to general natural laws ; 
and, how far soever we have to travel upon the path of expe- 
rience to discover some fact or event, this idea requires us to 
believe that we have approached all the more nearly to the 
completion of its use in the sphere of nature, although that 
completion can never be attained. But this error reverses the 



424 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

procedure of reason. We begin by hypostatising the prin- 
ciple of systematic unity, and by giving an anthropomorphic 
determination to the conception of a Supreme Intelligence, 
and then proceed forcibly to impose aims upon nature. Thus 
not only does teleology, which ought to aid in the completion 
of unity in accordance with general laws, operate to the de- 
struction of its influence, but it hinders reason from attaining 
its proper aim, that is, the proof, upon natural grounds, of 
the existence of a supreme intelligent cause. For, if we can- 
not presuppose supreme finality in nature a priori, that is, 
as essentially belonging to nature, how can we be directed 
to endeavour to discover this unity, and, rising gradually 
through its different degrees, to approach the supreme per- 
fection of an author of all — a perfection which is absolutely 
necessary, and therefore cognizable a priori ? The regulative 
principle directs us to presuppose systematic unity absolutely, 
and, consequently, as following from the essential nature of 
things — but only as a unity of nature, not merely cognized 
empirically, but presupposed a priori, although only in an in- 
determinate manner. But if I insist on basing nature upon the 
foundation of a supreme ordaining Being, the unity of nature 
is in effect lost. For, in this case, it is quite foreign and un- 
essential to the nature of things, and cannot be cognized from 
the general laws of nature. And thus arises a vicious cir- 
cular argument, what ought to have been proved having been 
presupposed. 

To take the regulative principle of systematic unity in 
nature for a constitutive principle, and to hypostatise and 
make a cause out of that which is properly the ideal ground 
of the consistent and harmonious exercise of reason, involves 
reason in inextricable embarrassments. The investigation of 
nature pursues its own path under the guidance of the chain 
of natural causes, in accordance with the general laws of 
nature, and ever follows the light of the idea of an author 
of the universe — not for the purpose of deducing the finality, 
which it constantly pursues, from this Supreme Being, but 
to attain to the cognition of his existence from the finality 
which it seeks in the existence of the phaenomena of nature, 
and, if possible, in that of all things — to cognize this being, 
consequently, as absolutely necessary. Whether this latter 
purpose succeed or not, the idea is and must always be a true 



01 THE XATUBAL DIALECTIC OE HUMAN SEASON. 425 

one, and its employment, when merely regulative, must always 
be accompanied by truthful and beneficial results. 

Complete unity, in conformity with aims, constitutes abso- 
lute perfection. But if we do not find this unity in the 
nature of the things which go to constitute the world of ex- 
perience, that is, of objective cognition, consequently in the 
universal and necessary laws of nature, how can we infer from 
this unity the idea of the supreme and absolutely necessary 
perfection of a primal being, which is the origin of all cau- 
sality ? The greatest systematic unity, and consequently 
teleological unity, constitutes the very foundation of the pos- 
sibility of the most extended employment of human reason. 
The idea of unity is therefore essentially and indissolubly 
connected with the nature of our reason. This idea is a 
legislative one ; and hence it is very natural that we should 
assume tbe existence of a legislative reason corresponding to 
it, from which the systematic unity of nature — the object of 
the operations of reason — must be derived. 

In the course of our discussion of the antinomies, we stated 
that it is always possible to answer all the questions which 
pure reason may raise ; and that the plea of the limited na- 
ture of our cognition, which is unavoidable and proper in 
many questions regarding natural phsenomena, cannot in this 
case be admitted, because the questions raised do not relate 
to the nature of things, but are necessarily originated by the 
nature of reason itself, and relate to its own internal constitu- 
tion. We can now establish this assertion, which at first sight 
appeared so rash, in relation to the two questions in which 
reason takes the greatest interest, and thus complete our dis- 
y cussion of the dialectic of pure reason., 

If, then, the question is asked, in relation to transcendental 
theology ;* first, whether there is anything distinct from the 
world, which contains the ground of cosmical order and con- 
nection according to general laws? The answer is, Cer- 

* After what has been said of the psychological idea of the Ego and 
its proper employment as a regulative principle of the operations of 
reason, I need not enter into details regarding the transcendental illu- 
sion by which the systematic unity of all the various phsenomena of the 
internal sense is hypostatised. The procedure is in this case very simi- 
lar to that which has been discussed in our remarks on the theological 
ideal. 



426 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

tainly. For the world is a sum of phenomena ; there must 
therefore be some transcendental basis of these phaenomena, 
that is, a basis cogitable by the pure understanding alone. If, 
secondly, the question is asked, whether this being is sub- 
stance, whether it is of the greatest reality, whether it is ne- 
cessary, and so forth ? I answer that this question is utterly 
without meaning. For all the categories whicli aid me in 
forming a conception of an object, cannot be employed except 
in the world of sense, and are without meaning, when not ap- 
plied to objects of actual or possible experience. Out of this 
sphere, they are not properly conceptions, but the mere marks 
or indices of conceptions, which we may admit, although 
they cannot, without the help of experience, help us to un- 
derstand any subject or thing. If, thirdly, the question is, 
whether we may not cogitate this being, which is distinct from 
the world, in analogy with the objects of experience ? The 
answer is, undoubtedly, but only as an ideal, and not as a 
real object. That is, we must cogitate it only as an unknown 
substratum of the systematic unity, order, and finality of the 
world — a unity which reason must employ as the regulative 
principle of its investigation of nature. Nay, more, we may 
admit into the idea certain anthromorphic elements, which 
are promotive of the interests of this regulative principle. 
For it is no more than an idea, which does not relate directly 
to a being distinct from the world, but to the regulative prin- 
ciple of the systematic unity of the world, by means, however, 
of a schema of this unity — the schema of a Supreme Intel- 
ligence, who is the wisely-designing author of the universe. 
What this basis of cosmical unity may be in itself, we know 
not — we cannot discover from the idea ; we merely know how 
we ought to employ the idea of this unity, in relation to the 
systematic operation of reason in the sphere of experience. 

But, it will be asked again, can we on these grounds, admit 
the existence of a wise and omnipotent author of the world ? 
Without doubt ; and not only so, but we must assume the ex- 
istence of such a being. But do we thus extend the limits of 
our knowledge beyond the field of possible experience 1 By 
no means. For we have merely presupposed a something, of 
which we have no conception, which we do not know as it is 
in itself ; but, in relation to the systematic disposition of the 
universe, which we must presuppose in all our observation oi 



OF THE NATTTEAL DIALECTIC OE HUMAN SEASON. 427 

nature, we have cogitated this unknown being in analogy 
with an intelligent existence (an empirical conception), that 
is to say, we have endowed it with those attributes, which, 
judging from the nature of our own reason, may contain the 
ground of such a systematic unity. This idea is therefore 
valid only relatively to the employment in experience of our 
reason. But if we attribute to it absolute and objective vali- 
dity, we overlook the fact that it is merely an ideal being that 
we cogitate ; and, by setting out from a basis which is not 
determinable by considerations drawn from experience, we 
place ourselves in a position which incapacitates us from ap- 
plying this principle to the empirical employment of reason. 

But, it will be asked further, can I make any use of this 
conception and hypothesis in my investigations into the 
world and nature ? Yes, for this very purpose was the idea 
established by reason as a fundamental basis. But may I re- 
gard certain arrangements, which seemed to have been made in 
conformity with some fixed aim, as the arrangements of design, 
and look upon them as proceeding from the divine will, with 
the intervention, however, of certain other particular arrange- 
ments disposed to that end ? Yes, you may do so ; but at the 
same time you must regard it as indifferent, whether it is 
asserted that divine wisdom has disposed all things in confor- 
mity with his highest aims, or that the idea of supreme wisdom 
is a regulative principle in the investigation of nature, and 
at the same time a principle of the systematic unity of 
nature according to general laws, even in those cases where 
we are unable to discover that unity. In other words, it must 
be perfectly indifferent to you, whether you say, when you 
have discovered this unity — God has wisely willed it so, or, 
nature has wisely arranged this. For it was nothing but the 
systematic unity, which reason requires as a basis for the in- 
vestigation of nature, that justified you in accepting the idea 
of a supreme intelligence as a schema for a regulative princi- 
ple ; and, the farther you advance in the discovery of design 
and finality, the more certain the validity of your idea. 
But, as the whole aim of this regulative principle was the dis- 
covery of a necessary and systematic unity in nature, we 
nave, in so far as we attain this, to attribute our success to the 
idea of a Supreme Being ; while, at the same time, we cannot, 
without involving ourselves in contradictions, overlook the 



428 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

general laws of nature, as it was in reference to them alone 
that this idea was employed. We cannot, I say, overlook 
the general laws of nature, and regard this conformity to 
aims observable in nature as contingent or hyperphysical in 
its origin ; inasmuch as there is no ground which can justify 
us in the admission of a being with such properties distinct 
from and above nature. All that we are authorized to assert 
is, that this idea may be employed as a principle, and that 
the properties of the being which is assumed to correspond 
to it may be regarded as systematically connected in analogy 
with the causal determination of phsenomena. 

For the same reasons we are justified in introducing into 
the idea of the supreme cause other anthropomorphic elements 
(for without these we could not predicate anything of it) ; 
we may regard it as allowable to cogitate this cause as a being 
with understanding, the feelings of pleasure and displeasure, 
and faculties of desire and will corresponding to these. 
At the same time, we may attribute to this being infinite 
perfection — a perfection which necessarily transcends that 
which our knowledge of the order and design in the world 
would authorize us to predicate of it. For the regulative law 
of systematic unity requires us to study nature on the suppo- 
sition that systematic and final unity in infinitum is every- 
where discoverable, even in the highest diversity. For, 
although we may discover little of this cosmical perfection, it 
belongs to the legislative prerogative of reason, to require us 
always to seek for and to expect it ; while it must always be 
beneficial to institute all inquiries into nature in accord- 
ance with this principle. But it is evident that, by this 
idea of a supreme author of all, which I place as the founda- 
tion of all inquiries into nature, I do not mean to assert the 
existence of such a being, or that I have any knowledge of 
its existence ; and, consequently, I do not really deduce any- 
thing from the existence of this being, but merely from its 
idea, that is to say, from the nature of things in this world, 
in.aceordance with this idea. A certain dim consciousness of 
the true use of this idea seems to have dictated to the philo- 
sophers of all times the moderate language used by them 
regarding the cause of the world. We find them employ- 
ing the expressions, wisdom and care of nature, and divine 
wisdom, as synonymous, — nay, in purely speculative discus- 



OF THE NATT7EAL DIALECTIC OF HITMAN EEA80K. 42P 

sions, preferring the former, because it does not carry the ap- 
pearance of greater pretensions than such as we are entitled to 
make, and at the same time directs reason to its proper field 
of action — nature and her phenomena. 

Thus, pure reason, which at first seemed to promise us 
nothing less than the extension of our cognition beyond the 
limits of experience, is found, when thoroughly examined, to 
contain nothing but regulative principles, the virtue and 
function of which is to introduce into our cognition a higher 
degree of unity than the understanding could of itself . These 
principles, by placing the goal of all our struggles at so great a 
distance, realise for us the most thorough connection between 
the different parts of our cognition, and the highest degree of 
systematic unity. But, on the other hand, if misunder- 
stood and employed as constitutive principles of transcendent 
cognition, they become the parents of illusions and contradic- 
tions, while pretending to introduce us to new regions of 
knowledge. 



Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds 
from thence to conceptions, and ends with ideas. Although 
it possesses in relation to all three elements, a priori sources 
of cognition, which seemed to transcend the limits of all 
experience, a thorough-going criticism demonstrates, that 
speculative reason can never, by the aid of these elements, 
pass the bounds of possible experience, and that the proper 
destination of this highest faculty of cognition, is to employ 
all methods, and all the principles of these methods, for the 
purpose of penetrating into the innermost secrets of nature, 
by the aid of the principles of unity, (among all kinds of 
which teleological unity is the highest;, while it ought not 
to attempt to soar above the sphere of experience, beyond 
which there lies nought for us but the void inane. The criti- 
cal examination, in our Transcendental Analytic, of all the 
propositions which professed to extend cognition beyond the 
sphere of experience, completely demonstrated that they can 
only conduct us to a possible experience. If we were 
not distrustful even of the clearest abstract theorems, if we 
were not allured by specious and inviting prospects to escape 
from the constraining power of their evidence, we might 



430 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 

spare ourselves the laborious examination of all the dia- 
lectical arguments which a transcendent reason adduces in 
support of its pretensions ; for we should know with the 
most complete certainty that, however honest such professions 
might be, they are null and valueless, because they relate to a 
kind of knowledge to which no man can by any possibility 
attain. But, as there is no end to discussion, if we cannot 
discover the true cause of the illusions by which even the 
wisest are deceived, and as the analysis of all our transcendent 
cognition into its elements is of itself of no slight value as a 
psychological study, while it is a duty incumbent on every 
philosopher, — it was found necessary to investigate the dialec- 
tical procedure of reason in its primary sources. And as the 
inferences of which this dialectic is the parent, are not only 
deceitful, but naturally possess a profound interest for hu- 
manity, it was advisable at the same time, to give a full ac- 
count of the momenta of this dialectical procedure, and to 
deposit it in the archives of human reason, as a warning to 
all future metaphysicians to avoid these causes of speculative 
error. 



II. 

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

If we regard the sum of the cognition of pure speculative 
reason as an edifice, the idea of which, at least, exists in the 
human mind, it may be said that we have in the Transcendental 
Doctrine of Elements examined the materials and determined 
to what edifice these belong, and what its height and stability. 
We have found, indeed, that, although we had purposed 
to build for ourselves a tower which should reach to Heaven, 
the supply of materials sufficed merely for a habitation, which 
was spacious enough for all terrestrial purposes, and high 
enough to enable us to survey the level plain of experience, 
but that the bold undertaking designed necessarily failed for 
want of materials, — not to mention the confusion of tongues, 
which gave rise to endless disputes among the labourers on 
the plan of the edifice, and at last scattered them over all the 
world, each to erect a separate building for himself, according 
to his own plans and his own inclinations. Our present task 
relates not to the materials, but to the plan of an edifice ; 
and, as we have had sufficient warning not to venture blindly 
upon a design which may be found to transcend our natural 
powers, while, at the same time, we cannot give up the in- 
tention of erecting a secure abode for the mind, we must pro- 
portion our design to the material which is presented to us, 
and which is, at the same time, sufficient for all our wants. 

I understand, then, by the transcendental doctrine of me- 
thod, the determination of the formal conditions of a com- 
plete system of pure reason. We shall accordingly have to 
treat of the Discipline, the Canon, the Architectonic, and, 
finally, the History of pure reason. This part of our Critique 
will accomplish, from the transcendental point of view, what 
has been usually attempted, but miserably executed, under 
the name of practical logic. It has been badly executed, I 



432 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

say, because general logic, not being limited to any particular 
kind of cognition (not even to the pure cognition of the un- 
derstanding) nor to any particular objects, it cannot, without 
borrowing from other sciences, do more than present merely the 
titles or signs of possible methods and the technical expressions, 
which are employed in the systematic parts of all sciences ; and 
thus the pupil is made acquainted with names, the meaning and 
application of which he is to learn only at some future time. 



TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 
CHAPTER FIRST. 

THE DISCIPLINE OE PURE REASON. 

Negative judgments — those which are so not merely as re- 
gards their logical form, but in respect of their content — 
are not commonly held in especial respect. They are, on the 
contrary, regarded as jealous enemies of our insatiable desire 
for knowledge ; and it almost requires an apology to induce 
us to tolerate, much less to prise and to respect them. 

All propositions, indeed, may be logically expressed in a 
negative form ; but, in relation to the content of our cogni- 
tion, the peculiar province of negative judgments is solely to 
prevent error. For this reason, too, negative propositions, 
which are framed for the purpose of correcting false cognitions 
where error is absolutely impossible, are undoubtedly true, 
but inane and senseless ; that is, they are in reality purposeless, 
and for this reason often very ridiculous. Such is the pro- 
position of the schoolman, that Alexander could not have 
subdued any countries without an army. 

But where the limits of our possible cognition are very 
much contracted, the attraction to new fields of knowledge 
great, the illusions to which the mind is subject of the most 
deceptive character, and the evil consequences of error of no 
inconsiderable magnitude,— the negative element in knowledge, 
which is useful only to guard us against error, is of far more 
importance than much of that positive instruction which 
makes additions to the sum of our knowledge. The restraint 
which is employed to repress, and finally to extirpate the con- 



THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON. 433 

stant inclination to depart from certain rules, is termed Disci- 
pline. It is distinguished from culture, which aims at the 
formation of a certain degree of skill, without attempting to 
repress or to destroy any other mental power, already exist- 
ing. In the cultivation of a talent, which has given evidence 
of an impulse towards self-development, discipline takes a 
negative,* culture and doctrine, a positive part. 

That natural dispositions and talents (such as imagination and 
wit), which ask a free and unlimited development, require in 
many respects the corrective influence of discipline, every one 
will readily grant. But it may well appear strange, that 
reason, whose proper duty it is to prescribe rules of discipline 
to all the other powers of the mind, should itself require this 
corrective. It has, in fact, hitherto escaped this humiliation, 
only because, in presence of its magnificent pretensions and 
high position, no one could readily suspect it to be capable of 
substituting fancies for conceptions, and words for things. 

Reason, when employed in the field of experience, does not 
stand in need of criticism, because its principles are subjected 
to the continual test of empirical observations. Nor is criti- 
cism requisite in the sphere of mathematics, where the con- 
ceptions of reason must always be presented in concreto in pure 
intuition, and baseless or arbitrary assertions are discovered 
without difficulty. But where reason is not held in a plain 
track by the influence of empirical or of pure intuition, that 
is, when it is employed in the transcendental sphere of pure 
conceptions, it stands in great need of discipline, to restrain 
its propensity to overstep the limits of possible experience, 
and to keep it from wandering into error. In fact, the 
utility of the philosophy of pure reason is entirely of this 
negative character. Particular errors may be corrected by 
particular animadversions, and the causes of these errors may 
be eradicated by criticism. But where we find, as in the case 
of pure reason, a complete system of illusions and fallacies, 

* I am well aware that, in the language of the schools, the term disci- 
pline is usually employed as synonymous with instruction. But there are 
so. many cases in which it is necessary to distinguish the notion of the 
former, as a course of corrective training, from that of the latter, as the 
communication of knowledge, and the nature of things itself demands the 
appropriation of the most suitable expressions for this distinction, that it 
is my desire that the former term should never be employed in any other 
than a negative signification. 



434 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

closely connected with each other and depending upon grand 
general principles, there seems to be required a peculiar and 
negative code of mental legislation, which, under the de- 
nomination of a discipline, and founded upon the nature of 
reason and the objects of its exercise, shall constitute a system 
of thorough examination and testing, which no fallacy will be 
able to withstand or escape from, under whatever disguise or 
concealment it may lurk. 

But the reader must remark that, in this the second division 
of our Transcendental Critique, the discipline of pure reason 
is not directed to the content, but to the method of the cog- 
nition of pure reason. The former task has been com- 
pleted in the Doctrine of Elements. But there is so much 
similarity in the mode of employing the faculty of reason, 
whatever be the object to which it is applied, while, at the 
same time, its employment in the transcendental sphere is so 
essentially different in kind from every other, that, without the 
warning negative influence of a discipline specially directed to 
that end, the errors are unavoidable which spring from the 
unskilful employment of the methods which are originated by 
reason but which are out of place in this sphere. 

CHAPTER FIRST. 

Section First. 
The Discipline of Pure Reason in the sphere of Dogmatism. 

The science of Mathematics presents the most brilliant ex- 
ample of the extension of the sphere of pure reason without 
the aid of experience. Examples are always contagious ; and 
they exert an especial influence on the same faculty, which na- 
turally flatters itself that it will have the same good fortune in 
other cases, as fell to its lot in one fortunate instance. Hence 
pure reason hopes to be able to extend its empire in the trans- 
cendental sphere with equal success and security, especially 
when it applies the same method which was attended with such 
brilliant results in the science of Mathematics. It is, there- 
fore, of the highest importance for us to know, whether the 
method of arriving at demonstrative certainty, which is termed 
mathematical, be identical with that by which we endeavour to 
attain the same degree of certainty in philosophy, and which 
is termed in that science dogmatical. 



THE DISCIPLINE OF PUEE EEASON". 435 

Philosophical cognition is the cognition of reason by means 
of conceptions ; mathematical cognition is cognition by means 
of the construction of conceptions. The construction of 
a conception is the presentation a priori of the intuition 
which corresponds to the conception. For this purpose a 
non-empirical intuition is requisite, which, as an intuition, is 
an individual object ; while, as the construction of a concep- 
tion (a general representation), it must be seen to be univer- 
sally valid for all the possible intuitions which rank under 
that conception. Thus I construct a triangle, by the presenta- 
tion of the object which corresponds to this conception, either 
by mere imagination — in pure intuition, or upon paper — in 
empirical intuition, in both cases completely a priori, without 
borrowing the type of that figure from any experience. The 
individual figure drawn upon paper is empirical ; but it serves, 
notwithstanding, to indicate the conception, even in its univer- 
sality, because in this empirical intuition we keep our eye 
merely on the act of the construction of the conception, and 
pay no attention to the various modes of determining it, for 
example, its size, the length of its sides, the size of its angles, 
these not in the least affecting the essential character of the 
conception. 

Philosophical cognition, accordingly, regards the particular 
only in the general ; mathematical the general in the particu- 
lar, nay, in the individual. This is done, however, entirely 
a priori and by means of pure reason, so that, as this indi- 
vidual figure is determined under certain universal condi- 
tions of construction, the object of the conception, to which 
this individual figure corresponds as its schema, must be 
cogitated as universally determined. 

The essential difference of these two modes of cognition 
consists, therefore, in this formal quality ; it does not regard 
the difference of the matter or objects of both. Those thinkers 
who aim at distinguishing philosophy from mathematics by 
asserting that the former has to do with quality merely, and 
the latter with quantity, have mistaken the effect for the cause. 
The reason why mathematical cognition can relate only to 
quantity, is to be found in its form alone. For it is the con- 
ception of quantities only that is capable of being constructed, 
that is, presented a priori in intuition ; while qualities cannot be 
given in any other thau an empirical intuition. Hence the 

E y 2 



48fJ TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

cognition of qualities by reason is possible only through con- 
ceptions. No one can find an intuition which shall correspond 
to the conception of reality, except in experience ; it cannot be 
presented to the mind a priori, and antecedently to the empirical 
consciousness of a reality. We can form an intuition, by means 
of the mere conception of it, of a cone, without the aid of ex- 
perience ; but the colour of the cone we cannot know except 
from experience. I cannot present an intuition of a cause, 
except in an example, which experience offers to me. Besides, 
philosophy, as well as mathematics, treats of quantities ; as, 
for example, of totality, infinity, and so on. Mathematics, 
too, treats of the difference of lines and surfaces — as spaces 
of different quality, of the continuity of extension — as a quality 
thereof. But, although in such cases they have a common 
object, the mode in which reason considers that object is very 
different in philosophy from what it is in mathematics. The 
former confines itself to the general conceptions ; the latter 
can do nothing with a mere conception, it. hastens to intuition. 
In this intuition it regards the conception in concreto, not 
empirically, but in an a priori intuition, which it has con- 
structed ; and in which, all the results which follow from the 
general conditions of the construction of the conception, are 
in all cases valid for the object of the constructed conception. 
Suppose that the conception of a triangle is given to a phi- 
losopher, and that he is required to discover, by the philoso- 
phical method, what relation the sum of its angles bears to 
a right angle. He has nothing before him but the concep- 
tion of a figure enclosed within three right lines, and, conse- 
quently, with the same number of angles. He may analyze 
the conception of a right line, of an angle, or of the number 
three as long as he pleases, but he will not discover any pro- 
perties not contained in these conceptions. But, if this ques- 
tion is proposed to a geometrician, he at once begins by con- 
structing a triangle.* He knows that two right angles are 
equal to the sum of all the contiguous angles which proceed 
from one point in a straight line ; and he goes on to produce 
one side of his triangle, thus forming two adjacent angles which 
are together equal to two right angles. He then divides the 
exterior of these angles, by drawing a line parallel with the 

* Either in his own mind — in pure intuition, or upon paper — in em- 
pirical intuition. — '/'/-. 



THE DISCIPLINE OF PUEE REASON". 43/ 

opposite side of the triangle, and immediately perceives that he 
has thus got an exterior adjacent angle which is equal to the in- 
terior. Proceeding in this way, through a chain of inferences, 
and always on the ground of intuition, he arrives at a clear 
and universally valid solution of the question. 

But mathematics does not confine itself to the construction 
of quantities {quanta), as in the case of geometry ; it occupies 
itself with pure quantity also (quantitas), as in the case of 
algebra, where complete abstraction is made of the properties 
of the object indicated by the conception of quantity. In 
algebra, a certain method of notation by signs is adopted, and 
these indicate the different possible constructions of quantities, 
the extraction of roots, and so on. After having thus denoted 
the general conception of quantities, according to their different 
relations, the different operations by which quantity or number 
is increased or diminished are presented in intuition in accord- 
ance with general rules. Thus, when one quantity is to be 
divided by another, the signs which denote both are placed in 
the form peculiar to the operation of division ; and thus alge- 
bra, by means of a symbolical construction of quantity, just 
as geometry, with its ostensive or geometrical construction 
(a construction of the objects themselves), arrives at results 
which discursive cognition cannot hope to reach by the aid of 
mere conceptions, 

Now, what is the cause of this difference in the fortune of 
the philosopher and the mathematician, the former of whom 
follows the path of conceptions, while the latter pursues that 
of intuitions, which he represents, a priori, in correspondence 
with his conceptions. The cause is evident, from what has 
been already demonstrated in the introduction to this Critique. 
We do not, in the present case, want to discover analytical 
propositions, which may be produced merely by analysing our 
conceptions — for in this the philosopher would have the ad- 
vantage over his rival ; we aim at the discovery of synthetica* 
propositions — such synthetical propositions, moreover, as can 
be cognized a priori. I must not confine myself to that 
which I actually cogitate in my conception of a triangle, for 
this is nothing more than the mere definition ; I must try to 
go beyond that, and to arrive at properties which are not 
contained in, although they belong to, the conception. Now, 
this is impossible, unless I determine the object present to 



438 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTEINE OP METHOD. 

my mind according to the conditions, either of empirical, or of 
pure intuition. In the former case, I should have an empirical 
proposition (arrived at by actual measurement of the angles 
of the triangle), which would possess neither universality nor 
necessity ; but that would be of no value. In the latter, I pro- 
ceed by geometrical construction, by means of which I collect, 
in a pure intuition, just as I would in an empirical intuition, 
all the various properties which belong to the schema of a tri- 
angle in general, and consequently to its conception, and thus 
construct synthetical propositions which possess the attribute 
of universality. 

It would be vain to philosophize upon the triangle, that is, 
to reflect on it discursively ; I should get no further than the 
definition with which I had been obliged to set out. There 
are certainly transcendental synthetical propositions which 
are framed by means of pure conceptions, and which form the 
peculiar distinction of philosophy ; but these do not relate to 
any particular thing, but to a thing in general, and enounce 
the conditions under which the perception of it may become a 
part of possible experience. But the science of mathematics 
has 'nothing to do with such questions, nor with the question 
of existence in any fashion ; it is concerned merely with the 
properties of objects in themselves, only in so far as these are 
connected with the conception of the objects. 

In the above example, we have merely attempted to show 
the great difference which exists between the discursive em- 
ployment of reason in the sphere of conceptions, and its intui- 
tive exercise by means of the construction of conceptions. 
The question naturally arises — what is the cause which neces- 
sitates this twofold exercise of reason, and how are we to 
discover whether it is the philosophical or the mathematical 
method which reason is pursuing in an argument ? 

All our knowledge relates, finally, to possible intuitions, for 
it is these alone that present objects to the mind. An a 
priori or non-empirical conception contains either a pure 
intuition — and in this case it can be constructed ; or it con- 
tains nothing but the synthesis of possible intuitions, which 
are not given a priori. In this latter case, it may help us to 
form synthetical a priori judgments, but only in the discur- 
sive method, by conceptions, not in the intuitive, by means of 
the construction of conceptions. 



THE DISCIPLINE OF PUBE REASON. 439 

The only a priori intuition is that of the pure form of 
phaenomena — space and time. A conception of space and 
time as quanta may be presented a priori in intuition, that is, 
constructed, either along with their quality (figure), or as 
pure quantity (the mere synthesis of the homogeneous), by 
means of number. But the matter of phaenomena, by which 
things are given in space and time, can be presented only in 
perception, a posteriori. The only conception which repre- 
sents a priori this empirical content of phaenomena, is the 
conception of a thing in general ; and the a priori synthetical 
cognition of this conception can give us nothing more than 
the rule for the synthesis of that which may be contained in 
the corresponding a posteriori perception ; it is utterly inade- 
quate to present an a priori intuition of the real object, which 
must necessarily be empirical. 

Synthetical propositions, which relate to things in general, 
an a priori intuition of which is impossible, are transcen- 
dental. For this reason transcendental propositions cannot 
be framed by means of the construction of conceptions ; they 
are a priori, and based entirely on conceptions themselves. 
They contain merely the rule, by which we are to seek in the 
world of perception or experience the synthetical unity of 
that which cannot be intuited a priori. But they are incom- 
petent to present any of the conceptions which appear in 
them in an a priori intuition ; these can be given only a pos- 
te?'iori, in experience, which, however, is itself possible only 
through these synthetical principles. 

If we are to form a synthetical judgment regarding a con- 
ception, we must go beyond it, to the intuition in which it is 
given. If we keep to what is contained in the conception, the 
judgment is merely analytical — it is merely an explanation of 
what we have cogitated in the conception. But I can pass 
from the conception to the pure or empirical intuition which 
corresponds to it. I can proceed to examine my conception 
in concreto, and to cognize, either a priori or a posteriori, 
what I find in the object of the conception. The former — a 
priori cognition — is rational-mathematical cognition by means 
of the con str action of the conception ; the latter — a posteriori 
cognition — is purely empirical cognition, which does not 
possess the attributes of necessity and universality. Thus I 
may analyze the conception I have of gold ; but I gain no 



440 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

new information from this analysis, I merely enumerate the 
different properties which I had connected with the notion in- 
dicated by the word. My knowledge has gained in logical 
clearness and arrangement, but no addition has been made to 
it. But if I take the matter which is indicated by this name, 
and submit it to the examination of my senses, I am enabled 
to form several synthetical — although still empirical — propo- 
sitions. The mathematical conception of a triangle I should 
construct, that is, present a priori in intuition, and in this 
way attain to rational-synthetical cognition. But when the 
transcendental conception of reality, or substance, or power 
is presented to my mind, I find that it does not relate to 
or indicate either an empirical or pure intuition, but that it 
indicates merely the synthesis of empirical intuitions, which 
cannot of course be given a priori. The synthesis in such a 
conception cannot proceed a priori — without the aid of expe- 
rience — to the intuition which corresponds to the conception ; 
and, for this reason, none of these conceptions can produce a 
determinative synthetical proposition, they can never present 
more than a principle of the synthesis* of possible empirical 
intuitions. A transcendental proposition is, therefore, a syn- 
thetical cognition of reason by means of pure conceptions and 
the discursive method, and it renders possible all synthetical 
unity in empirical cognition, though it cannot present us with 
any intuition a priori. 

There is thus a twofold exercise of reason. Both modes 
have the properties of universality and an a priori origin in 
common, but are, in their procedure, of widely different cha- 
racter. The reason of this is, that in the world of phseno- 
mena, in which alone objects are presented to our minds, there 
are two main elements — the form of intuition (space and 
time), which can be cognized and determined completely 
a priori, and the matter or content — that which is presented 
in space and time, and which, consequently, contains a some- 

* In the case of the conception of cause, I do really go beyond the em- 
pirical conception of an event — hut not to the intuition which presents 
this conception in concreto, hut only to the time-conditions, which may 
he found in experience to correspond to the conception. My procedure 
is, therefore, strictly according to conceptions ; I cannot in a case of this 
kind employ the construction of conceptions, because the conception is 
merely a rule for the synthesis of perceptions, which are not pure intui- 
tions, and which, therefore, cannot be given a priori. 



TIiE DISCIPLINE OE PURE EEASON. 441 

thing — an existence corresponding to our powers of sensation. 
As regards the latter, which can never be given in a deter- 
minate mode except by experience, there are no a priori no- 
tions which relate to it, except the undetermined conceptions 
of the synthesis of possible sensations, in so far as these 
belong (in a possible experiences) to the unity of consciousness. 
As regards the former, we can determine our conceptions 
a priori in intuition, inasmuch as we are ourselves the creators 
of the objects of the conceptions in space and time — these ob- 
jects being regarded simply as quanta. In the one case, reason 
proceeds according to conceptions, and can do nothing more 
than subject phsenomena to these — which can only be deter- 
mined empirically, that is, a posteriori — in conformity, however, 
with those conceptions as the rules of all empirical synthesis. 
In the other case, reason proceeds by the construction of con- 
ceptions ; and, as these conceptions relate to an a priori in- 
tuition, they may be given and determined in pure intuition 
a priori, and without the aid of empirical data. The exa- 
mination and consideration of everything that exists in space 
or time — whether it is a quantum or not, in how far the par- 
ticular something (which fills space or time) is a primary sub- 
stratum, or a mere determination of some other existence, 
whether it relates to anything else — either as cause or effect, 
whether its existence is isolated or in reciprocal connection 
with and dependence upon others, the possibility of this ex- 
istence, its reality and necessity or their opposites, — all these 
form part of the cognition of reason on the ground of concep- 
tions, and this cognition is termed philosophical. But to de- 
termine a priori an intuition in space (its figure), to divide 
time into periods, or merely to cognize the quantity of an in- 
tuition in space and time, and to determine it by number, — 
all this is an operation of reason by means of the construction 
of conceptions, and is called mathematical. 

The success which attends the efforts of reason in the sphere 
of mathematics, naturally fosters the expectation that the 
same good fortune will be its lot, if it applies the mathematical 
method in other regions of mental endeavour besides that of 
quantities. Its success is thus great, because it can sup- 
port all its conceptions by a priori intuitions, and in this way, 
make itself a master, as it were, over nature ; while pure 
philosophy, with its a priori discursive conceptions, bungles 



442 TBANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OT METHOD. 

about in the world of nature, and cannot accredit or show 
any a priori evidence of the reality of these conceptions. 
Masters in the science of mathematics are confident of the 
success of this method ; indeed, it is a common persuasion, 
that it is capable of being applied to any subject of human 
thought. They have hardly ever reflected or philosophized 
on their favourite science — a task of great difficulty ; and the 
specific difference between the two modes of employing the 
faculty of reason has never entered their thoughts. Rules 
current in the field of common experience, and which com- 
mon sense stamps everywhere with its approval, are regarded 
by them as axiomatic. From what source the conceptions of 
space and time, with which (as the only primitive quanta) 
they have to deal, enter their minds, is a question which they 
do not trouble themselves to answer; and they think it just 
as unnecessary to examine into the origin of the pure concep- 
tions of the understanding and the extent of their validity. 
All they have to do with them is to employ them. In all 
this they are perfectly right, if they do not overstep the limits 
of the sphere of nature. But they pass, unconsciously, from 
the world of sense to the insecure ground of pure transcen- 
dental conceptions (instabilis tellus, innabilis undo), where they 
can neither stand nor swim, and where the tracks of their foot- 
steps are obliterated by time ; while the march of mathematics 
is pursued on a broad and magnificent highway, which the latest 
posterity shall frequent without fear of danger or impediment. 
As we have taken upon us the task of determining, clearly 
and certainly, the limits of pure reason in the sphere ot 
transcendentalism, and as the efforts of reason in this direction 
are persisted in, even after the plainest and most expressive 
warnings, hope still beckoning us past the limits of experi- 
ence into the splendours of the intellectual world, — it becomes 
necessary to cut away the last anchor of this fallacious and 
fantastic hope. We shall accordingly show that the mathe- 
matical method is unattended in the sphere of philosophy by 
the least advantage — except, perhaps, that it more plainly 
exhibits its own inadequacy, — that geometry and philosophy 
are two quite different things, although they go hand in hand 
in the field of natural science, and, consequently, that the 
procedure of the one can never be imitated by the other. 



THE DISCIPLINE OE PUEE EEASON". 443 

The evidence of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms, 
and demonstrations. I shall be satisfied with showing that 
none of these forms can be employed or imitated in philosophy 
in the sense in which they are understood by mathematicians ; 
and that the geometrician, if he employs his method in 
philosophy, will succeed only in building card-castles, while 
the employment of the philosophical method in mathema- 
tics, can result in nothing but mere verbiage. The essential 
business of philosophy, indeed, is to mark out the limits of 
the science ; and even the mathematician, unless his talent is 
naturally circumscribed and limited to this particular depart- 
ment of knowledge, cannot turn a deaf ear to the warnings of 
philosophy, or set himself above its direction. 

1. Of Definitions. — A definition is, as the term itself indi- 
cates, the representation, upon primary grounds, of the complete 
conception of a thing within its own limits.* Accordingly, 
an empirical conception cannot be defined, it can only be 
explained. For, as there are in such a conception only a 
certain number of marks or signs, which denote a certain 
class of sensuous objects, we can never be sure that we do 
not cogitate under the word which indicates the same object, 
at one time a greater, at another a smaller number of signs. 
Thus, one person may cogitate in his conception of gold, in 
addition to its properties of weight, colour, malleability, that 
of resisting rust, while another person may be ignorant of this 
quality. We employ certain signs only so long as we require 
them for the sake of distinction ; new observations abstract 
some and add new ones, so that an empirical conception never 
remains within permanent limits. It is, in fact, useless to 
define a conception of this kind. If, for example, we are 
speaking of water and its properties, we do not stop at what 
we actually think by the word water, but proceed to observa- 
tion and experiment ; and the word, with the few signs 

* The definition must describe the conception completely, that is, omit 
none of the marks or signs of which it is composed ; within its own limits, 
that is, it must be precise, and enumerate no more signs than belong to 
the conception ; and on primary grounds, that is to say, the limitation of 
the bounds of the conception must not be deduced from other concep- 
tions, as in this case a proof vould be necessary, and the so-called 
definition would be incapable of taking its place at the head of all the 
judgments we have to form regarding an object. 



444 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTEINE OF METHOD. 

attached to it, is more properly a designation than a concep- 
tion of the thing. A definition in this case, would evidently 
be nothing more than a determination of the word. In the 
second place, no a priori conception, such as those of sub- 
stance, cause, right, fitness, and so on, can be defined. For 
I can never be sure, that the clear representation of a given 
conception (which is given in a confused state) has been fully 
developed, until I know that the representation is adequate 
with its object. But, inasmuch as the conception, as it is 
presented to the mind, may contain a number of obscure 
representations, which we do not observe in our analysis, 
although we employ them in our application of the concep- 
tion, I can never be sure that my analysis is complete, while 
examples may make this probable, although they can never 
demonstrate the fact. Instead of the word definition, I should 
rather employ the term exposition — a more modest expression, 
which the critic may accept without surrendering his doubts 
as to the completeness of the analysis of any such concep- 
tion. As, therefore, neither empirical nor a priori concep- 
tions are capable of definition, we have to see whether the 
only other kind of conceptions — arbitrary conceptions — can 
be subjected to this mental operation. Such a conception 
can always be defined ; for I must know thoroughly what I 
wished to cogitate in it, as it was I who created it, and it was 
not given to my mind either by the nature of my understand- 
ing or by experience. At the same time, I cannot say that, 
by such a definition, I have defined a real object. If the 
conception is based upon empirical conditions, if, for example, 
I have a conception of a clock for a ship, this arbitrary con- 
ception does not assure me of the existence or even of the 
possibility of the object. My definition of such a conception 
would with more propriety be termed a declaration of a pro- 
ject than a definition of an object. There are no other 
conceptions which can bear definition, except those which 
contain an arbitrary synthesis, which can be constructed a 
priori. Consequently, the science of mathematics alone 
possesses definitions. For the object here thought is pre- 
sented a priori in intuition ; and thus it can never contain 
more or less than the conception, because the conception of 
the object has been given by the definition — and primarily, 
that is, without deriving the definition from any other source 



THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE EEASON". 445 

Philosophical definitions are, therefore, merely expositions of 
given conceptions, while mathematical definitions are con- 
structions of conceptions originally formed by the mind itself; 
the former are produced by analysis, the completeness of 
which is never demonstratively certain, the latter by a syn- 
thesis. In a mathematical definition the conception is formed, 
in a philosophical definition it is only explained. From this 
it follows : 

a. That w T e must not imitate, in philosophy, the mathe- 
matical usage of commencing with definitions — except byway 
of hypothesis or experiment. For, as all so-called philoso- 
phical definitions are merely analyses of given conceptions, 
these conceptions, although only in a confused form, must 
precede the analysis ; and the incomplete exposition must pre- 
cede the complete, so that we may be able to draw certain in- 
ferences from the characteristics which an incomplete analysis 
has enabled us to discover, before we attain to the complete 
exposition or definition of the conception. In one word, a 
full and clear definition ought, in philosophy, rather to form 
the conclusion than the commencement of our labours.* In 
mathematics, on the contrary, we cannot have a conception 
prior to the definition ; it is the definition which gives us the 
conception, and it must for this reason form the commence- 
ment of every chain of mathematical reasoning. 

b. Mathematical definitions cannot be erroneous. For the 
conception is given only in and through the definition, and 
thus it contains only what has been cogitated in the definition. 
But although a definition cannot be incorrect, as regards its 
content, an error may sometimes, although seldom, creep into 
the form. This error consists in a want of precision. Thus 
the common definition of a circle — that it is a curved 
line, every point in which is equally distant from another 

* Philosophy abounds in faulty definitions, especially such as contain 
some of the elements requisite to form a complete definition. If a con- 
ception could not he employed in reasoning before it had been defined, it 
would fare ill with all philosophical thought. But, as incompletely defined 
conceptions may always be employed without detriment to truth, so far as 
our analysis of the elements contained in them proceeds, imperfect defi- 
nitions, that is, propositions which are properly not definitions, but merely 
approximations thereto, may be used with great advantage. In ma- 
thematics, definition belongs ad esse, in philosophy ad melius esse. 1 
is a difficult task to construct a proper definition. Jurists are still without 
a complete definition of the idea of light. 



446 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OE METHOD. 

point called the centre — is faulty, from the fact that the 
determination indicated by the word curved is superfluous. 
For there ought to be a particular theorem, which may be 
easily proved from the definition, to the effect that every line, 
which has all its points at equal distances from another point, 
must be a curved line — that is, that not even the smallest part 
of it can be straight. Analytical definitions, on the other 
hand, may be erroneous in many respects, either by the in- 
troduction of signs which do not actually exist in the concep- 
tion, or by wanting in that completeness which forms the es« 
sential of a definition. In the latter case, the definition is 
necessarily defective, because we can never be fully certain of 
the completeness of our analysis. For these reasons, the me- 
thod of definition employed in mathematics cannot be imitated 
in philosophy. 

2. Of Axioms. These, in so far as they are immediately 
certain, are a priori synthetical principles. Now, one con- 
ception cannot be connected synthetically and yet immediately 
with another ; because, if we wish to proceed out of and beyond 
a conception, a third mediating cognition is necessary! And, 
as philosophy is a cognition of reason by the aid of concep- 
tions alone, there is to be found in it no principle which de- 
serves to be called an axiom. Mathematics, on the other hand, 
may possess axioms, because it can always connect the pre- 
dicates of an object a priori, and without any mediating term, 
by means of the construction of conceptions in intuition. 
Such is the case with the proposition, three points can always 
lie in a plane. On the other hand, no synthetical principle 
which is based upon conceptions, can ever be immediately 
certain, (for example, the proposition, Everything that hap- 
pens has a cause), because I require a mediating term to con- 
nect the two conceptions of event and cause — namely, the con- 
dition of time- determination in an experience, and I cannot 
cognize any such principle immediately and from conceptions 
alone. Discursive principles are, accordingly, very different 
from intuitive principles or axioms.' The former always re- 
quire deduction, which in the case of the latter may be alto- 
gether dispensed with. Axioms are, for this reason, always 
self-evident, while philosophical principles, whatever may be 
the degree of certainty they possess, cannot lay any claim to 
such a distinction. No synthetical proposition of pure trans- 



THE DISCIPLINE OE PUEE EEASON. 14/ 

cendental reason can be so evident, as is often rashly enough 
declared, as the statement, twice two are four. It is true that 
in the Analytic I introduced into the list of principles of the 
pure understanding, certain axioms of intuition ; but the prin- 
ciple there discussed was not itself an axiom, but served merely 
to present the principle of the possibility of axioms in general, 
while it was really nothing more than a principle based upon 
conceptions. For it is one part of the duty of transcendental 
philosophy to establish the possibility of mathematics itself. 
Philosophy possesses, then, no axioms, and has no right to 
impose its a priori principles upon thought, until it has 
established their authority and validity by a thorough-going 
deduction. 

3. Of Demonstrations. Only an apodeictic proof, based 
upon intuition, can he termed a demonstration. Experience 
teaches us what is, but it cannot convince us that it might 
have been otherwise. Hence a proof upon empirical grounds 
cannot be apodeictic. A priori conceptions, in discursive cogni- 
tion, can never produce intuitive certainty or evidence, however 
certain the judgment they present may be. Mathematics alone, 
therefore, contains demonstrations, because it does not deduce 
its cognition from conceptions, but from the construction of 
conceptions, that is, from intuition, which can be given a priori 
in accordance with conceptions. The method of algebra, in 
equations, from which the correct answer is deduced by re- 
duction, is a kind of construction — not geometrical, but by 
symbols — in which all conceptions, especially those of the re- 
lations of quantities, are represented in intuition by signs ; 
and thus the conclusions in that science are secured from errors 
by the fact that every proof is submitted to ocular evidence. 
Philosophical cognition does not possess this advantage, it 
being required to consider the general always in abstracto (by 
means of conceptions), while mathematics can always consider 
it m concreto (in an individual intuition}, and at the same time 
by means of a priori representation, whereby all errors are ren- 
dered manifest to the senses. The former — discursive proofs 
— ought to be termed acroamatic* proofs, rather than demon- 
strations, as only words are employed in them, while demon- 
strations proper, as the term itself indicates, always require a 
reference to the intuition of the object. 

* From (iKpoaiiariKOQ. — Tr. 



448 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

It follows from all these considerations, that it is not con- 
sonant with the nature of philosophy, especially in the 
sphere of pure reason, to employ the dogmatical method, and 
to adorn itself with the titles and insignia of mathematical 
science. It does not belong to that order, and can only hope 
for a fraternal union with that science. Its attempts at ma- 
thematical evidence are vain pretensions, which can only keep 
it back from its true aim, which is to detect the illusory pro- 
cedure of reason when transgressing its proper limits, and by 
fully explaining and analysing our conceptions, to conduct us 
from the dim regions of speculation, to the clear region of 
modest self-knowledge. Reason must not, therefore, in its 
transcendental endeavours, look forward with such confidence, 
as if the path it is pursuing led straight to its aim, nor reckon 
with such security upon its premises, as to consider it un- 
necessary to take a step back, or to keep a strict watch for 
errors, which, overlooked in the principles, may be detected 
in the arguments themselves — in which case it may be requisite 
either to determine these principles with greater strictness, 
or to change them entirely. 

I divide all apodeictic propositions, whether demonstrable 
or immediately certain, into dogmata and mathemata. A 
direct synthetical proposition, based on conceptions, is a 
dogma ; a proposition of the same kind, based on the con- 
struction of conceptions, is a mathema, Analytical judgments 
do not teach us any more about an object, than what was con- 
tained in the conception we had of it ; because they do not 
extend our cognition beyond our conception of an object, 
they merely elucidate the conception. They cannot there- 
fore be with propriety termed dogmas. Of the two kinds of 
a priori synthetical propositions above-mentioned, only those 
which are employed in philosophy can, according to the ge- 
neral mode of speech, bear this name ; those of arithmetic or 
geometry would not be rightly so denominated. Thus the 
customary mode of speaking confirms the explanation given 
above, and the conclusion arrived at, that only those judg- 
ments which are based upon conceptions, not on the construc- 
tion of conceptions, can be termed dogmatical. 

Thus, pure reason, in the sphere of speculation, does not 
contain a single direct synthetical judgment based upon con- 
ceptions. By means of ideas, it is, as we have shown, in- 



THE DISCIPLINE OE PCEE REASON. 449 

capable of producing synthetical judgments, which are ob- 
jectively valid ; by means of the conceptions of the under- 
standing, it establishes certain indubitable principles, not, 
however, directly on the basis of conceptions, but only indi- 
rectly by means of the relation of these conceptions to some- 
thing of a purely contingent nature, namely, possible experi- 
ence. When experience is presupposed, these principles are 
apodeictically certain, but in themselves, and directly, they 
cannot even be cognized a priori. Thus the given concep- 
tions of cause and event will not be sufficient for the demon- 
stration of the proposition, every event has a cause. For this 
reason, it is not a dogma ; although from another point of 
view — that of experience, it is capable of being proved to 
demonstration. The proper term for such a proposition is 
principle, and not theorem (although it does require to be 
proved), because it possesses the remarkable peculiarity of 
being the condition of the possibility of its own ground of 
pooof, that is, experience, and of forming a necessary presup- 
position in all empirical observation. 

If then, in the speculative sphere of pure reason, no dog- 
mata are to be found ; all dogmatical methods, whether bor- 
rowed from mathematics, or invented by philosophical thinkers, 
are alike inappropriate and inefficient. They only serve to 
conceal errors and fallacies, and to deceive philosophy, whose 
duty it is to see that reason pursues a safe and straight path. 
A philosophical method may, however, be systematical. For 
our reason is, subjectively considered, itself a system, and, in 
the sphere of mere conceptions, a system of investigation ac- 
cording to principles of unity, the material being supplied by 
experience alone. But this is not the proper place for discuss- 
ing the peculiar method of transcendental philosophy, as our 
present task is simply to examine whether our faculties are 
capable of erecting an edifice on the basis of pure reason, 
and how far they may proceed with the materials at their 
command. 

CHAPTER FIRST. 

Section Second. 
The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics. 
Reason must be subject, in all its operations, to criticism, 



450 TBANSOENDENTAL DOCTEIFE OE METHOD. 

which must always be permitted to exercise its functions with- 
out restraint ; otherwise its interests are imperilled, and its in- 
fluence obnoxious to suspicion. There is nothing, however 
useful, however sacred it may be, that can claim exemption 
from the searching examination of this supreme tribunal, 
which has no respect of persons. The very existence of 
reason depends upon this freedom ; for the voice of reason 
is not that of a dictatorial and despotic power, it is rather like 
the vote of the citizen of a free state, every member of which 
must have the privilege of giving free expression to his doubts, 
%nd possess even the right of veto. 

But while reason can never decline to submit itself to the 
tribunal of criticism, it has not always cause to dread the 
judgment of this court. Pure reason, however, when engaged 
in the sphere of dogmatism, is not so thoroughly conscious of 
a strict observance of its highest laws, as to appear before a 
higher judicial reason with perfect confidence. On the con- 
trary, it must renounce its magnificent dogmatical pretensions 
in philosophy. 

Very different is the case, when it has to defend itself, not 
before a judge, but against an equal. If dogmatical assertions 
are advanced on the negative side, in opposition to those made 
by reason on the positive side, its justification xar avOgwrrov 
is complete, although the proof of its propositions is xar 
akrikiav unsatisfactory. 

By the polemic of pure reason I mean the defence of its 
propositions made by reason, in opposition to the dogmatical 
counter-propositions advanced by other parties. The question 
here is not whether its own statements may not also be false ; 
it merely regards the fact that reason proves that the oppo- 
site cannot be established with demonstrative certainty, nor 
even asserted with a higher degree of probability. Reason 
does not hold her possessions upon sufferance ; for, although 
she cannot show a perfectly satisfactory title to them, no one 
can prove that she is not the rightful possessor. 

It is a melancholy reflection, that reason, in its highest exer- 
cise, falls into an antithetic ; and that the supreme tribunal 
for the settlement of differences, should not be at union with 
itself. It is true that we had to discuss the question of an 
apparent antithetic, but we found that it was based upon a 
misconception. In conformity with the common prejudice, 



THE DISCIPLINE OF PT7BE SEASON. 451 

phaenoinena were regarded as things in themselves, and thus 
an absolute completeness in their synthesis was required in 
the one mode or in the other, (it was shown to be impossible 
in both) ; a demand entirely out of place in regard to pheeno- 
mena. There was, then, no real self-contradiction of reason 
in the propositions — the series of phsenomena given in them- 
selves has an absolutely first beginning, and, fins series is abso- 
lutely and in itself without beginning. The two propositions 
are perfectly consistent with each other, because phenomena 
as phaenomena, are in themselves nothing, and consequently 
the hypothesis that they are things in themselves, must lead to 
self-contradictory inferences. 

But there are cases in which a similar misunderstanding can- 
not be provided against, and the dispute must remain unsettled. 
Take, for example, the theistic proposition : There is a Supreme 
Being ; and on the other hand, the atheistic counter-statement : 
There exists no Supreme Being ; or, in psychology : Every- 
thing that thinks, possesses the attribute of absolute and 
permanent unity, which is utterly different from the transitory 
unity of material phsenomena ; and the counter proposition : 
The soul is not an immaterial unity, and its nature is transi- 
tory, like that of phaenomena. The objects of these questions 
contain no heterogeneous or contradictory elements, for they 
relate to things in themselves, and not to phaenomena. There 
would arise indeed, a real contradiction, if reason came for- 
ward with a statement on the negative side of these ques- 
tions alone. As regards the criticism to which the grounds of 
proof on the affirmative side must be subjected, it may be 
freely admitted, without necessitating the surrender of the 
affirmative propositions, which have, at least, the interest of 
reason in their favour — an advantage which the opposite 
party cannot lay claim to. 

I cannot agree with the opinion of several admirable think- 
ers — Sulzer among the rest — that in spite of the weakness of 
the arguments hitherto in use, we may hope, one day, to see 
sufficient demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of 
pure reason — the existence of a Supreme Being, and the 
immortality of the soul. I am certain, on the contrary, that 
this will never be the case. For on what ground can reason 
base such synthetical propositions, which do not relate to the 
objects of experience and their internal possibility I — But it 



452 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

is also demonstratively certain that no one will ever be able to 
maintain the contrary with the least show of probability. 
For, as he can attempt such a proof solely upon the basis of 
pure reason, he is bound to prove that a Supreme Being, and a 
thinking subject in the character of a pure intelligence, are 
impossible. But where will he find the knowledge which 
can enable him to enounce synthetical judgments in regard to 
things which transcend the region of experience ? We may, 
therefore, rest assured that the opposite never will be demon- 
strated. We need not, then, have recourse to scholastic argu- 
ments ; we may always admit the truth of those propositions 
which are consistent with the speculative interests of reasor 
in the sphere of experience, and form, moreover, the only 
means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest. 
Our opponent, who must not be considered here as a critic 
solely, we can be ready to meet with a non liquet which can- 
not fail to disconcert him ; while we cannot deny his right to 
a similar retort, as we have on our side the advantage of 
the support of the subjective maxim of reason, and can 
therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with calm in- 
difference. 

From this point of view, there is properly no antithetic of 
pure reason. For the only arena for such a struggle would 
be upon the field of pure theology and psychology ; but on 
this ground there can appear no combatant whom we need to 
fear. Ridicule and boasting can be his only weapons ; and 
these may be laughed at, as mere child's play. This consi- 
deration restores to Reason her courage ; for what source of 
confidence could be found, if she, whose vocation it is to de- 
stroy error, were at variance with herself and without any 
reasonable hope of ever reaching a state of permanent repose? 

Everything in nature is good for some purpose. Even 
poisons are serviceable ; they destroy the evil effects of other 
poisons generated in our system, and must always find a 
place in every complete pharmacopoeia. The objections raised 
against the fallacies and sophistries of speculative reason, are 
objections given by the nature of this reason itself, and must 
therefore have a destination and purpose which can only be 
for the good of humanity. For what purpose has Providence 
raised many objects, in which we have the deepest interest, 
bo far above us, that we vainly try to cognize them with cer- 



THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON. 453 

tainty, and our powers of mental vision are rather excited 
than satisfied by the glimpses we may chance to seize 1 It is 
very doubtful whether it is for our benefit to advance bold 
affirmations regarding subjects involved in such obscurity ; 
perhaps it would even be detrimental to our best interests. 
But it is undoubtedly always beneficial to leave the investi- 
gating, as well as the critical reason, in perfect freedom, and 
permit it to take charge of its own interests, which are ad- 
vanced as much by its limitation, as by its extension of its 
views, and which always suffer by the interference of foreign 
powers forcing it, against its natural tendencies, to bend to cer- 
tain pre-conceived designs. 

Allow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable, and 
combat him only with the weapons of reason. Have no anx- 
iety for the practical interests of humanity — these are never 
imperilled in a purely speculative dispute. Such a dispute 
serves merely to disclose the antinomy of reason, which, as it 
has its source in the nature of reason, ought to be thoroughly 
investigated. Reason is benefited by the examination of a 
subject on both sides, and its judgments are corrected by 
being limited. It is not the matter that may give occasion to 
dispute, but the manner. For it is perfectly permissible to 
employ, in the presence of reason, t'he language of a firmly- 
rooted faith, even after we have been obliged to renounce all 
pretensions to knowledge. 

If we were to ask the dispassionate David Hume — a phi- 
losopher endowed, in a degree that few are, with a well- 
balanced judgment : What motive induced you to spend so 
much labour and thought in undermining the consoling and 
I beneficial persuasion that Reason is capable of assuring us of 
the existence, and presenting us with a determinate conception 
/of a Supreme Being ? — His answer would be : Nothing but 
the desire of teaching Reason to know its own powers better, 
and, at the same time, a dislike of the procedure by which 
I that faculty was compelled to support foregone conclusions, 
\ and prevented from confessing the internal weaknesses which 
\it cannot but feel when it enters upon a rigid self-examina- 
tion. If, on the other hand, we were to ask Priestley-^n 
philosopher who had no taste for transcendental speculation, 
but was entirely devoted to the principles of empiricism — what 
his motives were for overturning those two main pillars of 



454 TEANSCEKDENTAL DOCTEINE OF METHOD. 

religion — the doctrines of the freedom of the will and the 
immortality of the soul (in his view the hope of a future life 
is but the expectation of the miracle of resurrection,) — -this 
philosopher, himself a zealous and pious teacher of religion, 
could give no other answer than this : I acted in the interest 
of reason, which always suffers, when certain objects are ex- 
plained and judged by a reference to other supposed laws 
than those of material nature — the only laws which we know 
in a determinate manner. It would be unfair to decry the 
latter philosopher, who endeavoured to harmonize his para- 
doxical opinions with the interests of religion, and to under- 
value an honest and reflecting man, because he finds himself 
at a loss the moment he has left the field of natural science. 
The same grace must be accorded to Hume, a man not less 
well-disposed, and quite as blameless in his moral character, 
and who pushed his abstract speculations to an extreme length, 
because, as he rightly believed, the object of them lies en- 
tirely beyond the bounds of natural science, and within the 
sphere of pure ideas. 

What is to be done to provide against the danger which 
seems in the present case to menace the best interests of hu- 
manity ? The course to be pursued in reference to this 
subject is a perfectly plain and natural one. Let each thinker 
pursue his own path ; if he shews talent, if he gives evidence 
of profound thought, in one word, if he shows that he pos- 
sesses the power of reasoning, — reason is always the gainer. 
If you have recourse to other means, if you attempt to coerce 
reason, if you raise the cry of treason to humanity, if you 
excVe the feelings of the crowd, which can neither understand 
nor sympathise with such subtle speculations, — you will only 
make yourselves ridiculous. For the question does not con- 
cern the advantage or disadvantage which we are expected to 
reap from such inquiries ; the question is merely, how far 
reason can advance in the field of speculation, apart from all 
kinds of interest, and whether we may depend upon the exer- 
tions of speculative reason, or must renounce all reliance on 
it. Instead of joining the combatants, it is your part to be 
a tranquil spectator of the struggle — a laborious struggle for 
the parties engaged, but attended, in its progress as well as in 
its result, with the most advantageous consequences for the 
interests of thought and knowledge. It is absurd to expect 



THE DISCIPLINE OP PEEE EEASOX. 455 

to be enlightened by Reason, and at the same time to prescribe 

to her what side of the question she must adopt. Moreover, 
reason is sufficiently held in check by its own power, the 

limits imposed on it by its own nature are sufficient ; it is un- 
necessary for you to place over it additional guards, as if its 
power were dangerous to the constitution of the intellectual 
state. In the dialectic of reason there is no victory gained, 
which needs in the least disturb your tranquillity. 

Tlie strife of dialectic is a necessity of reason, and we can- 
not but wish that it had been conducted long ere this with 
that perfect freedom which ought to be its essential condition. 
In this case, we should have had at an earlier period a ma- 
tured and profound criticism, which must have put an end to 
dialectical disputes, by exposing the illusions and preju* 
dices in which they originated. 

There is in human nature an unworthy propensity — a pro- 
pensity which, like everything that springs from nature, must 
in its final purpose be conducive to the good of humanity — 
to conceal our real sentiments, and to give expression only to 
certain received opinions, which are regarded as at once safe 
and promotive of the common good. It is true, this ten- 
dency, not only to conceal our real sentiments, but to profess 
those which may gain us favour in the eyes of society, has 
not only civilized, but, in a certain measure, moralized us ; 
as no one can break through the outward covering of re- 
spectability, honour, and morality, and thus the seemingly- 
good examples which we see around us, form an excellent 
school for moral improvement, so long as our belief in their 
genuineness remains unshaken. But this disposition to re- 
present ourselves as better than we are, and to utter opinions 
which are not our own, can be nothing more than a land of 
provisionaru arrangement of nature to lead us from the rude- 
ness of an uncivilised state, and to teach us how to assume 
at least the appearance and manner of the good we see. But 
when true principles have been developed, and have obtained 
a sure foundation in our habit of thought, this convention- 
alism must be attacked with earnest vigour, otherwise it cor- 
rupts the heart, and checks the growth of good dispositions 
with the mischievous weed of fair appearances. 

I am sorry to remark the same tendency to misrepresenta- 
tion and hypocrisy in the sphere of speculative discussion, 



456 TEA.NSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OE METHOD. 

where there is less temptation to restrain the free expression of 
thought. For what can be more prejudicial to the interests 
of intelligence, than to falsify our real sentiments, to conceal 
the doubts which we feel in regard to our statements, or to 
maintain the validity of grounds of proof which we well know 
to be insufficient ? So long as mere personal vanity is the 
source of these unworthy artifices, — and this is generally the 
case in speculative discussions, which are mostly destitute of 
practical interest, and are incapable of complete demonstra- 
tion, — the vanity of the opposite party exaggerates as much 
on the other side ; and thus the result is the same, although 
it is not brought about so soon as if the dispute had been 
conducted in a sincere and upright spirit. But where 
the mass entertains the notion that the aim of certain subtle 
speculators is nothing less than to shake the very founda- 
tions of public welfare and morality, — it seems not only 
prudent, but even praiseworthy, to maintain the good cause 
by illusory arguments, rather than to give to our supposed 
opponents the advantage of lowering our declarations to the 
moderate tone of a merely practical conviction, and of com- 
pelling us to confess our inability to attain to apodeictic cer- 
tainty in speculative subjects. But we ought to reflect that 
there is nothing in the world more fatal to the maintenance 
of a good cause than deceit, misrepresentation, and falsehood. 
That the strictest laws of honesty should be observed in the 
discussion of a purely speculative subject, is the least require- 
ment that can be made. If we could reckon with security 
even upon so little, the conflict of speculative reason regarding 
the important questions of God, immortality, and freedom, 
would have been either decided long ago, or would very soon 
be brought to a conclusion. But, in general, the uprightness 
of the defence stands in an inverse ratio to the goodness of 
the cause ; and perhaps more honesty and fairness are shown 
by those who deny, than by those who uphold these doc- 
trines. 

I shall persuade myself, then, that I have readers who do 
not wish to see a righteous cause defended by unfair argu- 
ments. Such will now recognise the fact that, according to 
the principles of this Critique, if we consider not what is, but 
what ought to be the case, there can be really no polemic of 
pure reason. For how can two persons dispute about a thing, 



THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE ItEASOX. 457 

the reality of which neither can present in actual or even in 
possible experience ? Each adopts the plan of meditating on his 
idea for the purpose of drawing from the idea, if he can, what 
is more than the idea, that is, the reality of the object which 
it indicates. How shall they settle the dispute, since neither is 
able to make his assertions directly comprehensible and cer- 
tain, but must restrict himself to attacking and confuting 
those of his opponent? All statements enounced by pure 
reason transcend the conditions of possible experience, beyond 
the sphere of which we can discover no criterion of truth, 
while they are at the same time framed in accordance with 
the laws of the understanding, which are applicable only to 
experience ; and thus it is the fate of all such speculative dis- 
cussions, that while the one party attacks the weaker side of 
his opponent, he infallibly lays open his own weaknesses. 

The critique of pure reason may be regarded as the highest 
tribunal for all speculative disputes ; for it is not involved in 
these disputes, which have an immediate relation to certain ob- 
jects and not to the laws of the mind, but is instituted for the 
purpose of determining the rights and limits of reason. 

Without the control of criticism reason is, as it were, in a 
state of nature, and can only establish its claims and assertions 
by war. Criticism, on the contrary, deciding all questions 
according to the fundamental laws of its own institution, 
secures to us the peace of law and order, and enables us to 
discuss all differences in the more tranquil manner of a legal 
process. In the former case, disputes are ended by victory, 
which both sides may claim, and which is followed by a hollow 
armistice ; in the latter, by a sentence, which, as it strikes 
at the root of all speculative differences, ensures to all con- 
cerned a lasting peace. The endless disputes of a dog- 
matising reason compel us to look for some mode of arriving 
at a settled decision by a critical investigation of reason itself; 
just as Hobbes maintains that the state of nature is a state of 
injustice and violence, and that we must leave it and submit 
ourselves to the constraint of law, which indeed limits indi- 
vidual freedom, but only that it may consist with the freedom 
of others and with the common good of all. 

This freedom will, among other things, permit of our openly 
stating the difficulties and doubts which we are ourselves un- 
able to solve, without being decried on that account as tur- 



458 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

bulent and dangerous citizens. This privilege forms part of 
the native rights of human reason, which recognises no other 
judge than the universal reason of humanity ; and as this 
reason is the source of all progress and improvement, such a 
privilege is to be held sacred and inviolable. It is unwise, 
moreover, to denounce as dangerous, any bold assertions 
against, or rash attacks upon, an opinion which is held by the 
largest and most moral class of the community ; for that 
would be giving them an importance which they do not de- 
serve. When I hear that the freedom of the will, the hope 
of a future life, and the existence of God have been over- 
thrown by the arguments of some able writer, I feel a strong 
desire to read his book ; for I expect that he will add to my 
knowledge, and impart greater clearness and distinctness to 
my views by the argumentative power shown in his writings. 
But I am perfectly certain, even before I have opened the 
book, that he has not succeeded in a single point, not because 
I believe I am in possession of irrefutable demonstrations of 
these important propositions, but because this transcendental 
critique, which has disclosed to me the power and the limits 
of pure reason, has fully convinced me that, as it is insuffi- 
cient to establish the affirmative, it is as powerless, and even 
more so, to assure us of the truth of the negative answer to 
these questions. From what source does this free-thinker 
derive his knowledge that there is, for example, no Supreme 
Being? This proposition lies out of the field of possible ex- 
perience, and, therefore, beyond the limits of human cogni- 
tion. But I would not read at all the answer which the dog- 
matical maintainer of the good cause makes to his opponent, 
because I know well beforehand, that he will merely attack 
the fallacious grounds of his adversary, without being able to 
establish his own assertions. Besides, a new illusory argu- 
ment, in the construction of which talent and acuteness are 
shown, is suggestive of new ideas and new trains of reasoning, 
and in this respect the old and every-day sophistries are quite 
useless. Again, the dogmatical opponent of religion gives 
employment to criticism, and enables us to test and correct 
its principles, while there is no occasion for anxiety in regard 
to the influence and results of his reasoning. 

But, it will be said, must we not warn the youth entrusted 
to academical care against such writings, must we not pre* 



THE DISCIPLINE OF PT7EE BEASOW. 459 

serve them from the knowledge of these dangerous assertions, 
until their judgment is ripened, or rather until the doctrines 
which we wish to inculcate are so firmly rooted in their 
minds as to withstand all attempts at instilling the contrary 
dogmas, from whatever quarter they may come ? 

If we are to confine ourselves to the dogmatical procedure 
in the sphere of pure reason, and find ourselves unable to 
settle such disputes otherwise than by becoming a party in them, 
and setting counter-assertions against the statements advanced 
by our opponents, there is certainly no plan more advisable 
for the moment, but, at the same time, none more absurd and 
inefficient for the future, than this retaining of the youthful 
mind under guardianship for a time, and thus preserving it 
— for so long at least — from seduction into error. But 
when, at a later period, either curiosity, or the prevalent 
fashion of thought, places such writings in their hands, will 
the so-called convictions of their youth stand firm ? The 
young thinker, who has in his armory none but dogmatical 
weapons with which to resist the attacks of his opponent, 
and who cannot detect the latent dialectic which lies in his 
own opinions as well as in those of the opposite party, sees 
the advance of illusory arguments and grounds of proof which 
have the advantage of novelty, against as illusory grounds of 
proof destitute of this advantage, and which, perhaps, excite 
the suspicion that the natural credulity of his youth has been 
abused by his instructors. He thinks he can find no better 
means of shewing that he has outgrown the discipline of his 
minority, than by despising those well-meant warnings, and, 
knowing no system of thought but that of dogmatism, he 
drinks deep draughts of the poison that is to sap the principles 
in which his early years were trained. 

Exactly the opposite of the system here recommended 
ought to be pursued in academical instruction. This can 
only be effected, however, by a thorough training in the critical 
investigation of pure reason. For, in order to bring the prin- 
ciples of this critique into exercise as soon as possible, and to 
demonstrate their perfect sufficiency, even in the presence of 
the highest degree of dialectical illusion, the student ought to 
examine the assertions made on both sides of speculative 
questions step by step, and to test them by these principles. 
It cannot be a difficult task for him to show the fallacies 



460 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

inherent in these propositions, and thus he begins early to 
feel his own power of securing himself against the influence 
of such sophistical arguments, which must finally lose, for 
him, all their illusory power. And, although the same blows 
winch overturn the edifice of his opponent are as fatal to his 
own speculative structures, if such he has wished to rear ; he 
need not feel any sorrow in regard to this seeming misfortune, 
as he has now before him a fair prospect into the practical region, 
in which he may reasonably hope to find a more secure foun- 
dation for a rational system. 

There is, accordingly, no proper polemic in the sphere of 
pure reason. Both parties beat the air and fight with their 
own shadows, as they pass beyond the limits of nature, and 
can find no tangible point of attack — no firm footing for their 
dogmatical conflict. Fight as vigorously as they may, the 
shadows which they hew down, immediately start up again, 
like the heroes in Walhalla, and renew the bloodless and un- 
ceasing contest. 

But neither can we admit that there is any proper sceptical 
employment of pure reason, such as might be based upon the 
principle of neutrality in all speculative disputes. To excite 
reason against itself, to place weapons in the hands of the 
party on the one side as well as in those of the other, and to 
remain an undisturbed and sarcastic spectator of the fierce 
struggle that ensues, seems, from the dogmatical point of view, 
to be a part fitting only a malevolent disposition. But, when 
the sophist evidences an invincible obstinacy and blindness, 
and a pride which no criticism can moderate, there is no other 
practicable course than to oppose to this pride and obstinacy 
similar feelings and pretensions on the other side, equally 
well or ill founded, so that reason, staggered by the reflections 
thus forced upon it, finds it necessary to moderate its con- 
fidence in such pretensions, and to listen to the advices of 
criticism. But we cannot stop at these doubts, much less 
regard the conviction of our ignorance, not only as a cure for 
the conceit natural to dogmatism, but as the settlement of the 
disputes in which reason is involved with itself. On the con- 
trary, scepticism is merely a means of awakening reason from 
its dogmatic dreams, and exciting it to a more careful investi- 
gation into its own powers and pretensions. But, as scepticism 



SCEPTICISM NOT A PERMANENT STATE FOE REASON. 461 

appears to be the shortest road to a permanent peace in the 
domain of philosophy, and as it is the track pursued by the 
many who aim at giving a philosophical colouring to their 
contemptuous dislike of all inquiries of this kind, I think it 
necessary to present to my readers this mode of thought 
in its true light. 

Scepticism not a Permanent State for Human Reason. 

The consciousness of ignorance — unless this ignorance i3 
recognized to be absolutely necessary — ought, instead of form- 
ing the conclusion of my inquiries, to be the strongest motive 
to the pursuit of them. All ignorance is either ignorance 
of things, or of the limits of knowledge. If my ignorance 
is accidental and not necessary, it must incite me, in the 
first case, to a dogmatical inquiry regarding the objects of 
which I am ignorant ; in the second, to a critical investigation 
into the bounds of all possible knowledge. But that my 
ignorance is absolutely necessary and unavoidable, and that it 
consequently absolves from the duty of all farther investiga- 
tion, is a fact which cannot be made out upon empirical 
grounds — from observation, but upon critical grounds alone, 
that is, by a thorough-going investigation into the primary 
sources of cognition. It follows that the determination of 
the bounds of reason can be made only on a priori grounds ; 
while the empirical limitation of reason, which is merely an 
indeterminate cognition of an ignorance that can never be com- 
pletely removed, can take place only a posteriori. In other 
words, our empirical knowledge is limited by that which yet 
remains for us to know. The former cognition of our ignorance, 
which is possible only on a rational basis, is a science ; the 
latter is merely a perception, and we cannot say how far the 
inferences drawn from it may extend. If I regard the earth, 
as it really appears to my senses, as a flat surface, I am igno- 
rant how far this surface extends. But experience teaches me 
that, how far soever I go, I always see before me a space in 
which I can proceed farther ; and thus I know the limits — 
merely visual — of my actual knowledge of the earth, although 
I am ignorant of the limits of the earth itself. But if I have 
got so far as to know that the earth is a sphere, and that its 
surface is spherical, I can cognize a priori and determine 
upon principles, from my knowledge of a small part of this 



462 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

surface — say to the extent of a degree — the diameter and cir- 
cumference of the earth ; and although I am ignorant of the 
objects which this surface contains, I have a perfect know- 
ledge of its limits and extent. 

The sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems 
to us to be a level surface, with an apparent horizon — that 
which forms the limit of its extent, and which has been 
termed by us the idea of unconditioned totality. To reach 
this limit by empirical means is impossible, and all attempts 
to determine it a priori according to a principle, are alike in 
vain. But all the questions raised by pure reason relate to 
that which lies beyond this horizon, or, at least, in its boundary 
line. 

The celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers 
of human reason who believe that they have given a sufficient 
answer to all such questions, by declaring them to lie beyond the 
horizon of our knowledge — a horizon which, however, Hume 
was unable to determine. His attention especially was directed 
to the principle of causality ; and he remarked with perfect 
justice, that the truth of this principle, and even the objective 
validity of the conception of a cause, was not commonly based 
upon clear insight, that is, upon a priori cognition. Hence he 
concluded that this law does not derive its authority from its 
universality and necessity, but merely from its general appli- 
cability in the course of experience, and a kind of subjective 
necessity thence arising, which he termed habit. From the 
inability of reason to establish this principle as a necessary 
law for the acquisition of all experience, he inferred the nullity 
of all the attempts of reason to pass the region of the 
empirical. 

This procedure, of subjecting the facta of reason to exami- 
nation, and, if necessary, to disapproval, may be termed the 
censura of reason. This censura must inevitably lead us to 
doubts regarding all transcendent employment of principles. 
But this is only the second step in our inquiry. The first step 
in regard to the subjects of pure reason, and which marks 
the infancy of that faculty, is that of dogmatism. The 
second, which we have just mentioned, is that of scepticism, 
and it gives evidence that our judgment has been improved by 
experience. But a third step is necessary — indicative of the 
maturity and manhood of the judgment, which now lays a firm 



SCEPTICISM NOT A PEEHANENT STATE FOE SEASON. 463 

foundation upon universal and necessary principles. This is 
the period of criticism, in which we do not examine the facta 
of reason, but reason itself, in the whole extent of its powers, 
and in regard to its capability of a priori cognition ; and thus 
we determine not merely the empirical and ever-shifting 
bounds of our knowledge, but its necessary and eternal limits. 
We demonstrate from indubitable principles, not merely our 
ignorance in respect to this or that subject, but in regard to 
all possible questions of a certain class. Thus scepticism is a 
resting-place for reason, in which it may reflect on its dog- 
matical wanderings, and gain some knowledge of the region 
in which it happens to be, that it may pursue its way with 
greater certainty ; but it cannot be its permanent dwelling- 
place. It must take up its abode only in the region of com- 
plete certitude, whether this relates to the cognition of objects 
themselves, or to the limits which bound all our cognition. 

Reason is not to be considered as an indefinitely extended 
plane, of the bounds of which we have only a general know- 
ledge ; it ought rather to be compared to a sphere, the radius 
of which may be found from the curvature of its surface — 
that is, the nature of a priori synthetical propositions — and, 
consequently, its circumference and extent. Beyond the 
sphere of experience there are no objects which it can cognize ; 
nay, even questions regarding such supposititious objects relate 
only to the subjective principles of a complete determination 
of the relations which exist between the understanding-con- 
ceptions which lie within this sphere. 

We are actually in possession of a priori synthetical cog- 
nitions, as is proved by the existence of the principles of the 
understanding, which anticipate experience. If any one cannot 
comprehend the possibility of these principles, he may have 
some reason to doubt whether they are really a priori; but 
he cannot on this account declare them to be impossible, and 
affirm the nullity of the steps which reason may have taken 
under their guidance. He can only say : If we perceived their 
origin and their authenticity, we should be able to determine 
the extent and limits of reason ; but, till we can do this, all 
propositions regarding the latter are mere random assertions. 
In this view, the doubt respecting all dogmatical philosophy, 
which proceeds without the guidance of criticism, is well 
grounded ; but we cannot therefore deny to reason the ability 



464 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTEINE OF METHOD. 

to construct a sound philosophy, when the way has been 
prepared by a thorough critical investigation. All the con- 
ceptions produced, and all the questions raised, by pure 
reason, do not lie in the sphere of experience, but in that of 
reason itself, and hence they must be solved, and shown to be 
either valid or inadmissible, by that faculty. We have no 
right to decline the solution of such problems, on the ground 
that the solution can be discovered only from the nature of 
things, and under pretence of the limitation of human facul- 
ties, for reason is the sole creator of all these ideas, and is 
therefore bound either to establish their validity or to expose 
their illusory nature. 

The polemic of scepticism is properly directed against the 
dogmatist, who erects a system of philosophy without having 
examined the fundamental objective principles on which it is 
based, for the purpose of evidencing the futility of his designs, 
and thus bringing him to a knowledge of his own powers. 
But, in itself, scepticism does not give us any certain informa- 
tion in regard to the bounds of our knowledge. All unsuccess- 
ful dogmatical attempts of reason are facta, which it is always 
useful to submit to the censure of the sceptic. But this can- 
not help us to any decision regarding the expectations which 
reason cherishes of better success in future endeavours ; the 
investigations of scepticism cannot, therefore, settle the dispute 
regarding the rights and powers of human reason. 

Hume is perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of all scep- 
tical philosophers, and his writings have, undoubtedly, ex- 
erted the most powerful influence in awakening reason to a 
thorough investigation into its own powers. It will, therefore, 
well repay our labours to consider for a little the course of 
reasoning which he followed, and the errors into which he 
strayed, although setting out on the path of truth and 
certitude. 

Hume was probably aware, although he never clearly de- 
veloped the notion, that we proceed in judgments of a certain 
class beyond our conception of the object. I have termed 
this kind of judgments synthetical. As regards the manner in 
which I pass beyond my conception by the aid of experience, 
no doubts can be entertained. Experience is itself a synthesis 
of perceptions ; and it employs perceptions to increment the 
conception, which I obtain by mepns of another perception, 



THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON. 465 

But we feel persuaded that we are able to proceed beyond 
a conception, and to extend our cognition a priori. We 
attempt this in two ways — either, through the pure un- 
derstanding, in relation to that which may become an object 
of experience, or, through pure reason, in relation to such 
properties of things, or of the existence of things, as can never 
be presented in any experience. This sceptical philosopher 
did not distinguish these two kinds of judgments, as he ought 
to have done, but regarded this augmentation of conceptions, 
and, if we may so express ourselves, the spontaneous gene- 
ration of understanding and reason, independently of the 
impregnation of experience, as altogether impossible. The 
so-called a priori principles of these faculties he consequently 
held to be invalid and imaginary, and regarded them as 
nothing but subjective habits of thought originating in ex- 
perience, and therefore purely empirical and contingent rules, 
to which we attribute a spurious necessity and universality. 
In support of this strange assertion, he referred us to the 
generally acknowledged principle of the relation between cause 
and effect. No faculty of the mind can conduct us from the 
conception of a thing to the existence of something else ; and 
hence he believed he could infer that, without experience, we 
possess no source from which we can augment a conception, 
and no ground sufficient to justify us in framing a judgment 
that is to extend our cognition a priori. That the light of the 
sun, which shines upon a piece of wax, at the same time melts 
it, while it hardens clay, no power of the understanding could 
infer from the conceptions which we previously possessed of 
these substances ; much less is there any a priori law that 
could conduct us to such a conclusion, which experience alone 
can certify. On the other hand, we have seen in our discussion 
of Transcendental Logic, that, although we can never proceed 
immediately beyond the content of the conception which is 
given us, we can always cognize completely a priori — in rela- 
tion, however, to a third term, namely, possible experience — the 
law of its connection with other things. For example, if I ob- 
serve that a piece of wax melts, I can cognize a priori that there 
must have been something (the sun's heat) preceding, which 
this effect follows according to a fixed law ; although, without 
the aid of experience, I could not cognize a priori and in a de- 
terminate manner, either the cause from the effect, or the effect 

11 H 



466 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTEINE OF METHOD. 

from the cause. Hume was therefore wrong in inferring, 
from the contingency of the determination according to law, 
the contingency of the law itself ; and the passing beyond 
the conception of a thing to possible experience (which is an 
a priori proceeding, constituting the objective reality of the 
conception), he confounded with our synthesis of objects in 
actual experience, which is always, of course, empirical. Thus, 
too, he regarded the principle of affinity, which, has its seat 
in the understanding and indicates a necessary connection, as 
a mere rule of association, lying in the imitative faculty of 
imagination, which can present only contingent, and not ob- 
jective connections. 

The sceptical errors of this remarkably acute thinker arose 
principally from a defect, which was common to him with the 
dogmatists, namely, that he had never made a systematic 
review of all the different kinds of a priori synthesis performed 
by the understanding. Had he done so, he would have found, 
to take one example among many, that the principle of per- 
manence was of this character, and that it, as well as the 
principle of causality, anticipates experience. In this way he 
might have been able to describe the determinate limits of the 
a priori operations of understanding and reason. But he 
merely declared the understanding to be limited, instead of 
showing what its limits were ; he created a general mistrust 
in the power, of our faculties, without giving us any determi- 
nate knowledge of the bounds of our necessary and unavoidable 
ignorance ; he examined and condemned some of the princi- 
ples of the understanding, without investigating all its powers 
with the completeness necessary to criticism. He denies, 
with truth, certain powers to the understanding, but he goes 
further, and declares it to be utterly inadequate to the a priori 
extension of knowledge, although he has not fully examined 
all the powers which reside in the faculty ; and thus the fate 
which always overtakes scepticism meets him too. That is to 
say, his own declarations are doubted, for his objections were 
based upon /acta, which are contingent, and not upon prin- 
ciples, which can alone demonstrate the necessary invalidity of 
all dogmatical assertions. 

As Hume makes no distinction between the well-grounded 
claims of the understanding and the dialectical pretensions of 
reason, against which, however, his attacks are mainly directed. 



THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON. 467 

reason does not feel itself shut out from all attempts at the 
extension of a priori cognition, and hence it refuses, in spite of 
a few checks in this or that quarter, to relinquish such efforts. 
For one naturally arms one's-self to resist an attack, and be- 
comes more obstinate in the resolve to establish the claims he 
has advanced. But a complete review of the powers of reason, 
and the conviction thence arising that we are in possession of 
a limited field of action, while we must admit the vanity of 
higher claims, puts an end to all doubt and dispute, and in- 
duces reason to rest satisfied with the undisturbed possession 
of its limited domain. 

To the uncritical dogmatist, who has not surveyed the sphere 
of his understanding, nor determined, in accordance with prin- 
ciples, the limits of possible cognition, who, consequently, is 
ignorant of his own powers, and believes he will discover them 
by the attempts he makes in the field of cognition, these at- 
tacks of scepticism are not only dangerous, but destructive. 
For if there is one proposition in his chain of reasoning which 
he cannot prove, or the fallacy in which he cannot evolve in 
accordance with a principle, suspicion falls on all his state- 
ments, however plausible they may appear. 

And thus scepticism, the bane of dogmatical philosophy, 
conducts us to a sound investigation into the understanding 
and the reason. When we are thus far advanced, we need 
fear no further attacks ; for the limits of our domain are 
clearly marked out, and we can make no claims nor become 
involved in any disputes regarding the region that lies beyond 
these limits. Thus the sceptical procedure in philosophy does 
not present any solution of the problems of reason, but it 
forms an excellent exercise for its powers, awakening its cir- 
cumspection, and indicating the means whereby it may most 
fully establish its claims to its legitimate possessions. 

CHAPTER FIRST. 

Section Third. 

The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis. 

This critique of reason has now taught us that all its efforts 
to extend the bounds of knowledge, by means of pure specu- 
lation, are utterly fruitless. So much the wider field, it may 

ee2 



468 TEANSCEKDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

appear, lies open to hypothesis ; as, where we cannot know 
with certainty, we are at liberty to make guesses, and to form 
suppositions. 

Imagination may be allowed, under the strict surveillance 
of reason, to invent suppositions ; but, these must be based 
on something that is perfectly certain — and that is the possi- 
bility of the object. If we are well assured upon this point, 
it is allowable to have recourse to supposition in regard to 
the reality of the object ; but this supposition must, unless 
it is utterly groundless, be connected, as its ground of ex- 
planation, with that which is really given and absolutely cer- 
tain. Such a supposition is termed a hypothesis. 

It is beyond our power to form the least conception a priori 
of the possibility of dynamical connection in phsenomena ; 
and the category of the pure understanding will not enable 
us to excogitate any such connection, but merely helps us to 
understand it, when we meet with it in experience. For this 
reason we cannot, in accordance with the categories, imagine 
or invent any object or any property of an object not given, 
or that may not be given in experience, and employ it in a 
hypothesis ; otherwise, we should be basing our chain of rea- 
soning upon mere chimerical fancies, and not upon concep- 
tions of things. Thus, we have no right to assume the ex- 
istence of new powers, not existing in nature, — for example, an 
understanding with a non-sensuous intuition, a force of at- 
traction without contact, or some new kind of substances 
occupying space, and yet without the property of impenetra- 
bility ; and, consequently, we cannot assume that there is any 
other kind of community among substances than that observ- 
able in experience, any kind of presence than that in space, 
or any kind of duration than that in time. In one word, the 
conditions of possible experience are for reason the only con- 
ditions of the possibility of things; reason cannot venture to 
form, independently of these conditions, any conceptions of 
things, because such conceptions, although not self-contradic- 
tory, are without object and without application. 

The conceptions of reason are, as we have already shown, 
mere ideas, and do not relate to any object in any kind of ex- 
perience. At the same time, they do not indicate imaginary 
or possible objects. They are purely problematical in their 
nature, and, as aids to the heuristic exercise of the faculties, 



THE DISCIPLINE OE PUEE EEASON. 469 

form the basis of the regulative principles for the systematic 
employment of the understanding in the field of experience. 
If we leave this ground of experience, they become mere 
fictions of thought, the possibility of which is quite indemon- 
strable ; and they cannot consequently be employed, as hypo- 
theses, in the explanation of real pheenomena. It is quite 
admissible to cogitate the soul as simple, for the purpose of 
enabling ourselves to employ the idea of a perfect and neces- 
sary unity of all the faculties of the mind as the principle of 
all our inquiries into its internal phsenomena, although we 
cannot cognize this unity in concreto. But to assume that the 
soul is a simple substance (a transcendental conception) would 
be enouncing a proposition which is not only indemonstrable 
— as many physical hypotheses are, but a proposition which 
is purely arbitrary, and in the highest degree rash. The 
simple is never presented in experience ; and, if by substance 
is here meant the permanent object of sensuous intuition, the 
possibility of a simple phenomenon is perfectly inconceivable. 
Reason affords no good grounds for admitting the existence of 
intelligible beings, or of intelligible properties of sensuous 
things, although — as we have no conception either of their 
possibility or of their impossibility — it will always be out of 
our power to affirm dogmatically that they do not exist. 

In the explanation of given phaenoniena, no other things 
and no other grounds of explanation can be employed, than 
those which stand in connection with the given phenomena 
according to the known laws of experience. A transcendental 
hypothesis, in which a mere idea of reason is employed to ex- 
plain the phsenomena of nature, would not give us any better 
insight into a phaenomenon, as we should be trying to ex- 
plain what we do not sufficiently understand from known em- 
pirical principles, by what we do not understand at all. The 
principle of such a hypothesis might conduce to the satisfac- 
tion of reason, but it would not assist the understanding in 
its application to objects. Order and conformity to aims in 
the sphere of nature must be themselves explained upon 
natural grounds and according to natural laws ; and the wild- 
est hypotheses, if they are only physical, are here more ad- 
missible than a hyperphysical hypothesis, such as that of a 
divine author. For such a hypothesis would introduce the 
principle of ignava ratio, which requires us to give up the 



470 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OE METHOD. 



search for causes that might be discovered in the course of 
experience, and to rest satisfied with a mere idea. As regards 
the absolute totality of the grounds of explanation in the series 
of these causes, this can be no hindrance to the understanding 
in the case of phaenomena ; because, as they are to us nothing 
more than phaenomena, we have no right to look for anything 
like completeness in the synthesis of the series of their con- 
ditions. 

Transcendental hypotheses are therefore inadmissible ; and we 
cannot use the liberty of employing, in the absence of physical, 
hyperphysical grounds of explanation. And this for two 
reasons ; first, because such hypotheses do not advance reason, 
but rather stop it in its progress ; secondly, because this licence 
would render fruitless all its exertions in its own proper sphere, 
which is that of experience. For, when the explanation of 
natural phaenomena happens to be difficult, we have constantly 
at hand a transcendental ground of explanation, which lifts 
us above the necessity of investigating nature ; and our in- 
quiries are brought to a close, not because we have obtained all 
the requisite knowledge, but because we abut upon a principle, 
which is incomprehensible, and which, indeed, is so far back 
in the track of thought, as to contain the conception of the 
absolutely primal being. 

The next requisite for the admissibility of a hypothesis is 
its sufficiency. That is, it must determine a priori the conse- 
quences which are given in experience, and which are supposed 
to follow from the hypothesis itself. If we require to employ 
auxiliary hypotheses, the suspicion naturally arises that they 
are mere fictions ; because the necessity for each of them 
requires the same justification as in the case of the original 
hypothesis, and thus their testimony is invalid. If we suppose 
the existence of an infinitely perfect cause, we possess suffi- 
cient grounds for the explanation of the conformity to aims, 
the order and the greatness which we observe in the universe ; 
but we find ourselves obliged, when we observe the evil in the 
world and the exceptions to these laws, to employ new hypo- 
theses in support of the original one. We employ the idea 
of the simple nature of the human soul as the foundation 
of all the theories we may form of its phaenomena ; but when 
we meet with difficulties in our way, when we observe in the 
soul phaenomena similar to the changes which take place in 



THE DISCIPLINE OF PUBE EEASON. 471 

matter, we require to call in new auxiliary hypotheses. These 
may, indeed, not be false, but we do not know them to be true, 
because the only witness to their certitude is the hypothesis 
which they themselves have been called in to explain. 

We are not discussing the above-mentioned assertions re- 
garding the immaterial unity of the soul and the existence of 
a Supreme Being, as dogmata, which certain philosophers pro- 
fess to demonstrate a priori, but purely as hypotheses. In the 
former case, the dogmatist must take care that his arguments 
possess the apodeictic certainty of a demonstration. For the 
assertion that the reality of such ideas is probable, is as absurd 
as a proof of the probability of a proposition in geometry. 
Pure abstract reason, apart from all experience, can either cog- 
nize a proposition entirely a priori, and as necessary, or it can 
cognize nothing at all ; and hence the judgments it enounces 
are never mere opinions, they are either apodeictic certainties, 
or declarations that nothing can be known on the subject. 
Opinions and probable judgments on the nature of things 
can only be employed to explain given phsenomena, or they 
may relate to the effect, in accordance with empirical laws, of 
an actually existing cause. In other words, we must restrict 
the sphere of opinion to the world of experience and nature. 
Beyond this region opinion is mere invention ; unless we are 
groping about for the truth on a path not yet fully known, 
and have some hopes of stumbling upon it by chance. 

But, although hypotheses are inadmissible in answers to 
the questions of pure speculative reason, they may be em- 
ployed in the defence of these answers. That is to say, hypo- 
theses are admissible in polemic, but not in the sphere of 
dogmatism. By the defence of statements of this character, 
I do not mean an attempt at discovering new grounds for 
their support, but merely the refutation of the arguments of 
opponents. All a priori synthetical propositions possess the 
peculiarity, that, although the philosopher who maintains the 
reality of the ideas contained in the proposition, is not in pos- 
session of sufficient knowledge to establish the certainty of 
his statements, his opponent is as little able to prove the truth 
of the opposite. This equality of fortune does not allow the 
one party to be superior to the other in the sphere of specu- 
lative cognition ; and it is this sphere accordingly that is the 
proper arena of these endless speculative conflicts. But we 



472 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

shall afterwards show that, in relation to its practical exercise, 
Reason has the right of admitting what, in the field of pure 
speculation, she would not be justified in supposing, except 
upon perfectly sufficient grounds ; because all such supposi- 
tions destroy the necessary completeness of speculation — a 
condition which the practical reason, however, does not con- 
sider to be requisite. In this sphere, therefore, Reason is mis- 
tress of a possession, her title to which she does not require 
to prove — which, in fact, she could not do. The burden of 
proof accordingly rests upon the opponent. But as he has 
just as little knowledge regarding the subject discussed, and 
is as little able to prove the non-existence of the object of an 
idea, as the philosopher on the other side is to demonstrate 
its reality, it is evident that there is an advantage on the side 
of the philosopher who maintains his proposition as a practi- 
cally necessary supposition (melior est conditio possidentis). 
For he is at liberty to employ, in self-defence, the same wea- 
pons as his opponent makes use of in attacking him ; that is, 
he has a right to use hypotheses not for the purpose of sup- 
porting the arguments in favour of his own propositions, but 
to show that his opponent knows no more than himself re- 
garding the subject under discussion, and cannot boast of any 
speculative advantage. 

Hypotheses are, therefore, admissible in the sphere of pure 
reason, only as weapons for self-defence, and not as supports 
to dogmatical assertions. But the opposing party we must 
always seek for in ourselves. Eor speculative reason is, in the 
sphere of transcendentalism, dialectical in its own nature. The 
difficulties and objections we have to fear lie in ourselves. 
They are like old but never superannuated claims ; and we 
must seek them out, and settle them once and for ever, if we are 
to expect a permanent peace. External tranquillity is hollow 
and unreal. The root of these contradictions, which lies in 
the nature of human reason, must be destroyed ; and this can 
only be done, by giving it, in the first instance, freedom to 
grow, nay, by nourishing it, that it may send out shoots, and 
thus betray its own existence. It is our duty, therefore, to try 
to discover new objections, to put weapons in the hands of 
our opponent, and to grant him the most favourable position 
in the arena that he can wish. We have nothing to fear from 
these concessions ; on the contrary, we may rather hope that 



THE DISCIPLINE OF PTJEE EEASON. 473 

we shall thus make ourselves master of a possession which 
no one will ever venture to dispute. 

The thinker requires, to be fully equipped, the hypotheses 
of pure reason, which, although but leaden weapons, (for they 
have not been steeled in the armoury of experience), areas 
useful as any that can be employed by his opponents. If, ac- 
cordingly, we have assumed, from a non-speculative point of 
view, the immaterial nature of the soul, and are met by the ob- 
jection that experience seems to prove that the growth and decay 
of our mental faculties are mere modifications of the sensuous 
organism, — we can weaken the force of this objection, by the 
assumption that the body is nothing but the fundamental phse- 
nomenon, to which, as a necessary condition, all sensibility, 
and consequently all thought, relates in the present state of 
our existence ; and that the separation of soul and body forms 
the conclusion of the sensuous exercise of our power of cog- 
nition, and the beginning of the intellectual. The body 
would, in this view of the question, be regarded, not as the 
cause of thought, but merely as its restrictive condition, as 
promotive of the sensuous and animal, but as a hindrance 
to the pure and spiritual life ; and the dependence of the 
animal life on the constitution of the body, would not prove 
that the whole life of man was also dependent on the state of 
the organism. We might go still farther, and discover new 
objections, or carry out to their extreme consequences those 
which have already been adduced. 

Generation, in the human race as well as among the ir- 
rational animals, depends on so many accidents — of occasion, 
of proper sustenance, of the laws enacted by the government 
of a country, of vice even, that it is difficult to believe in the 
eternal existence of a being, whose life has begun under cir- 
cumstances so mean and trivial, and so entirely dependent upon 
our own control. As regards the continuance of the ex- 
istence of the whole race, we need have no difficulties, for 
accident in single cases is subject to general laws ; but, in the 
case of each individual, it would seem as if we could hardly ex- 
pect so wonderful an effect from causes so insignificant. But, in 
answer to these objections, we may adduce the transcendental 
hypothesis, that all life is properly intelligible, and not subject 
to changes of time, and that it neither began in birth, nor will 
end in death. We may assume that thi* life is nothing more 



474 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

than a sensuous representation of pure spiritual life ; that the 
whole world of sense is but an image, hovering before the 
faculty of cognition which we exercise in this sphere, and with 
no more objective reality than a dream ; and that if we could 
intuite ourselves and other things as they really are, we should 
see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures, our connection 
with which did not begin at our birth, and will not cease with 
the destruction of the body. And so on. 

We cannot be said to know what has been above asserted, 
nor do we seriously maintain the truth of these assertions ; 
and the notions therein indicated are not even ideas of reason, 
they are purely jfctitious conceptions. But this hypothetical 
procedure is in perfect conformity with the laws of reason. 
Our opponent mistakes the absence of empirical conditions for 
a proof of the complete impossibility of all that we have as- 
erted ; and we have to show him that he bas not exhausted the 
whole sphere of possibility, and that he can as little compass 
that sphere by the laws of experience and nature, as we can 
lay a secure foundation for the operations of reason beyond 
the region of experience. Such hypothetical defences against 
the pretensions of an opponent must not be regarded as de- 
clarations of opinion. The philosopher abandons them, so 
soon as the opposite party renounces its dogmatical eonceit. 
To maintain a simply negative position in relation to propo- 
sitions which rest on an insecure foundation, well befits the 
moderation of a true philosopher ; but to uphold the objections 
urged against an opponent as proofs of the opposite statement, 
is a proceeding just as unwarrantable and arrogant as it is to 
attack the position of a philosopher who advances affirmative 
propositions regarding such a subject. 

It is evident, therefore, that hypotheses, in the speculative 
sphere, are valid, not as independent propositions, but only 
relatively to opposite transcendent assumptions. For, to make 
the principles of possible experience conditions of the possi- 
bility of things in general is just as transcendent a procedure 
as to maintain the objective reality of ideas which can be ap- 
plied to no objects except such as lie without the limits of 
possible experience. The judgments enounced by pure reason 
must be necessary, or they must not be enounced at all. 
Reason cannot trouble herself with opinions. But the hy- 
potheses we have been discussing are merely, problematica. 



THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON. 475 

judgments, which can neither be confuted nor proved ; while, 
therefore, they are not personal opinions, they are indispensable 
as answers to objections which are liable to be raised. But we 
must take care to confine them to this function, and guard 
against any assumption on their part of absolute validity, a 
proceeding which would involve reason in inextricable diffi- 
culties and contradictions. 

CHAPTER FIRST. 

Section Fourth. 

The Discipline of Pure Reason in relation to Proofs. 

It is a peculiarity which distinguishes the proofs of tran- 
scendental synthetical propositions from those of all other 
a priori synthetical cognitions, that reason, in the case of the 
former, does not apply its conceptions directly to an object, 
but is first obliged to prove, a priori, the objective validity of 
these conceptions and the possibility of their syntheses. This 
is not merely a prudential rule, it is essential to the very possi- 
bility of the proof of a transcendental proposition. If I am 
required to pass, a priori, beyond the conception of an object, 
I find that it is utterly impossible without the guidance of 
something which is not contained in the conception. In 
mathematics, it is a priori intuition that guides my synthesis ; 
and, in this case, all our conclusions may be drawn imme- 
diately from pure intuition. In transcendental cognition, so 
long as we are dealing only with conceptions of the under- 
standing, we are guided by possible experience. That is to 
say, a proof in the sphere of transcendental cognition does 
not show that the given conception (that of an event, for ex- 
ample,) leads directly to another conception (that of a cause) — 
for this would be a saltus which nothing can justify ; but it 
shows that experience itself, and consequently the object of 
experience, is impossible without the connection indicated by 
these conceptions. It follows that such a proof must demon- 
strate the possibility of arriving, synthetically and a priori, 
at a certain knowledge of things, which was not contained in 
our conceptions of these things. Unless we pay particular 
attention to this requirement, our proofs, instead of pursuing 



476 TEA.NSCEKDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

the straight path indicated by reason, follow the tortuous road 
of mere subjective association. The illusory conviction, which 
rests upon subjective causes of association, and which is con- 
sidered as resulting from the perception of a real and objective 
natural affinity, is always open to doubt and suspicion. For 
this reason, all the attempts which have been made to prove 
the principle of sufficient reason, have, according to the uni- 
versal admission of philosophers, been quite unsuccessful ; 
and, before the appearance of transcendental criticism, it was 
considered better, as this principle could not be abandoned, 
to appeal boldly to the common sense of mankind (a proceed- 
ing which always proves that the problem, which reason 
ought to solve, is one in which philosophers find great diffi- 
culties), rather than attempt to discover new dogmatical proofs. 
But, if the proposition to be proved is a proposition of pure 
reason, and if I aim at passing beyond my empirical concep- 
tions by the aid of mere ideas, it is necessary that the proof 
should first show that such a step in synthesis is possible 
(which it is not), before it proceeds to prove the truth of the 
proposition itself. The so-called proof of the simple nature 
of the soul from the unity of apperception, is a very plausible 
one. But it contains no answer to the objection, that, as the 
notion of absolute simplicity is not a conception which is 
directly applicable to a perception, but is an idea which must 
be inferred — if at all — from observation, it is by no means 
evident, how the mere fact of consciousness, which is contained 
in all thought, although in so far a simple representation, can 
conduct me to the consciousness and cognition of a thing 
which is purely a thinking substance. When I represent to 
my mind the power of my body as in motion, my body in this 
thought is so far absolute unity, and my representation of it 
is a simple one ; and hence I can indicate this representation 
by the motion of a point, because I have made abstraction of 
the size or volume of the body. But I cannot hence infer that, 
given merely the moving power of a body, the body may be 
cogitated as simple substance, merely because the representa- 
tion in my mind takes no account of its content in space, and 
is consequently simple. The simple, in abstraction, is very 
different from the objectively simple ; and hence the Ej;o, 
which is simple in the first sense, may, in the second sense, as 



THE DISCIPLINE OE PUKE SEASON. 477 

indicating the soul itself, be a very complex conception, with 
a very various content. Thus it is evident, that in all such 
arguments, there lurks a paralogism. We guess (for without 
some such surmise our suspicion would not be excited in refer- 
ence to a proof of this character,) at the presence of the 
paralogism, by keeping ever before us a criterion of the pos- 
sibility of those synthetical propositions which aim at proving 
more than experience can teach us. This criterion is obtained 
from the observation that such proofs do not lead us directly 
from the subject of the proposition to be proved to the required 
predicate, but find it necessary to presuppose the possibility of 
extending our cognition a priori by means of ideas. We must, 
accordingly, always use the greatest caution ; we require, 
before attempting any proof, to consider how it is possible to 
extend the sphere of cognition by the operations of pure 
reason, and from what source we are to derive knowledge, 
which is not obtained from the analysis of conceptions, nor 
relates, by anticipation, to possible experience. We shall 
thus spare ourselves much severe and fruitless labour, by ^ot 
expecting from reason what is beyond its power, or rather by 
subjecting it to discipline, and teaching it to moderate its 
vehement desires for the extension of the sphere of cognition. 
The first rule for our guidance is, therefore, not to attempt 
a transcendental proof, before we have considered from what 
source we are to derive the principles upon which the proof is 
to be based, and what right we have to expect that our con- 
clusions from these principles will be veracious. If they 
are principles of the understanding, it is vain to expect that 
we should attain by their means to ideas of pure reason ; for 
these principles are valid only in regard to objects of possible 
experience. If they are principles of pure reason, our labour 
is alike in vain. For the principles of reason, if employed as 
objective, are without exception dialectical, and possess no 
validity or truth, except as regulative principles of the syste- 
matic employment of reason in experience. But when such 
delusive proofs are presented to us, it is our duty to meet 
them with the non liquet of a matured judgment ; and, 
although we are unable to expose the particular sophism upon 
which the proof is based, we have a right to demand a deduc- 
tion of the principles employed in it ; and, if these principles 
have their origin in pure reason alone, such a deduction is 



4/8 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

absolutely impossible. And thus it is unnecessary that we should 
trouble ourselves with the exposure and confutation of every 
sophistical illusion ; we may, at once, bring all dialectic, 
which is inexhaustible in the production of fallacies, before 
the bar of critical reason, which tests the principles upon 
which all dialectical procedure is based. The second peculi- 
arity of transcendental proof is, that a transcendental propo- 
sition cannot rest upon more than a single proof. If I am 
drawing conclusions, not from conceptions, but from intuition 
corresponding to a conception, be it pure intuition, as in 
mathematics, or empirical, as in natural science, the intuition 
which forms the basis of my inferences, presents me with ma- 
terials for many synthetical propositions, which I can connect 
in various modes, while, as it is allowable to proceed from dif- 
ferent points in the intention, I can arrive by different paths 
at the same proposition. 

But every transcendental proposition sets out from a con- 
ception, and posits the synthetical condition of the possibility 
of an object according to this conception. There must, there- 
fore, be but one ground of proof, because it is the conception 
alone which determines the object ; and thus the proof cannot 
contain anything more than the determination of the object 
according to the conception. In our Transcendental Analytic, 
for example, we inferred the principle, Every event has a 
cause, from the only condition of the objective possibility of 
our conception of an event. This is, that an event cannot be 
determined in time, and consequently cannot form a part of 
experience, unless it stands under this dynamical law. This 
is the only possible ground of proof ; for our conception of an 
event possesses objective validity, that is, is a true conception, 
only because the law of causality determines an object to which 
it can refer. Other arguments in support of this principle 
have been attempted — such as that from the contingent nature 
of a phaenomenon ; but when this argument is considered, we 
can discover no criterion of contingency, except the fact of an 
event — of something happening, that is to say, the existence 
which is preceded by the non-existence of an object, and thus 
we fall back on the very thing to be proved. If the propo- 
sition, Every thinking being is simple, is to be proved, we 
keep to the conception of the Ego, which is simple, and to 
which all thought has a relation. The same is the case with 



THE DISCIPLINE OE PTJEE EEASON. 47 C J 

the transcendental proof of the existence of a Deity, which ia 
based solely upon the harmony and reciprocal fitness of the 
conceptions of an ens realissimum and a necessary being, and 
cannot be attempted in any other manner. 

This caution serves to simplify very much the criticism of 
all propositions of reason. When reason employs conceptions 
alone, only one proof of its thesis is possible, if any. When, 
therefore, the dogmatist advances with ten arguments in favour 
of a proposition, we may be sure that not one of them is con- 
clusive. For if he possessed one which proved the proposi- 
tion he brings forward to demonstration — as must always be 
the case with the propositions of pure reason — what need is 
there for any more ? His intention can only be similar to that 
of the advocate, who had different arguments for different 
judges ; thus availing himself of the weakness of those who 
examine his arguments, who, without going into any profound 
investigation, adopt the view of the case which seems most 
probable at first sight, and decide according to it. 

The third rule for the guidance of pure reason in the 
conduct of a proof is, that all transcendental proofs must never 
be apagogic or indirect, but always ostensive or direct. The 
direct or ostensive proof not only establishes the truth of the 
proposition to be proved, but exposes the grounds of its truth ; 
the apagogic, on the other hand, may assure us of the truth of 
the proposition, but it cannot enable us to comprehend the 
grounds of its possibility. The latter is, accordingly, rather 
an auxiliary to an argument, than a strictly philosophical 
and rational mode of procedure. In one respect, however, they 
have an advantage over direct proofs, from the fact, that the 
mode of arguing by contradiction, which they employ, renders 
our understanding of the question more clear, and approxi- 
mates the proof to the certainty of an intuitional demonstra- 
tion. 

The true reason why indirect proofs are employed in dif- 
ferent sciences, is this. When the grounds upon which we 
seek to base a cognition are too various or too profound, we 
try whether or not we may not discover the truth of our cog- 
nition from its consequences. The modus ponens of reasoning 
from the truth of its inferences to the truth of a proposition, 
would be admissible if all the inferences that can be drawn 
from it are known to be true : for in this case there can be 



480 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTEINE OE METHOD. 

only one possible ground for these inferences, and that is the 
true one. But this is a quite impracticable procedure, as it 
surpasses all our powers to discover all the possible inferences 
that can be drawn from a proposition. But this mode of 
reasoning is employed, under favour, when we wish to prove 
the truth of a hypothesis ; in whieh case we admit the truth 
of the conclusion — which is supported by analogy — that, if all 
the inferences we have drawn and examined agree with the 
proposition assumed, all other possible inferences will also 
agree with it. But, in this way, an hypothesis can never be 
established as a demonstrated truth. The modus tollens of 
reasoning from known inferences to the unknown proposition, 
is not only a rigorous, but a very easy mode of proof. For, 
if it can be shown that but one inference from a proposition 
is false, then the proposition must itself be false. Instead, 
then, of examining, in an ostensive argument, the whole series 
of the grounds on which the truth of a proposition rests, we 
need only take the opposite of this proposition, and if one 
inference from it be false, then must the opposite be itself 
false ; and, consequently, the proposition which we wished to 
prove, must be true. 

The apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those 
sciences where it is impossible to mistake a subjective re- 
presentation for an objective cognition. Where this is pos- 
sible, it is plain that the opposite of a given proposition may 
contradict merely the subjective conditions of thought, and not 
the objective cognition ; or it may happen that both proposi- 
tions contradict each other only under a subjective condition, 
which is incorrectly considered to be objective, and, as the 
condition is itself false, both propositions may be false, and it 
will, consequently, be impossible to conclude the truth of the 
One from the falseness of the other. 

In mathematics such subreptions are impossible ; and it is 
in this science, accordingly, that the indirect mode of proof 
has its true place. In the science of nature, where all asser- 
tion is based upon empirical intuition, such subreptions may 
be guarded against by the repeated comparison of observa- 
tions ; but this mode of proof is of little value in this sphere 
of knowledge. But the transcendental efforts of pure reason 
are all made in the sphere of the subjective, which is the real 
medium of all dialectical illusion ; and thus reason endeavours, 



THE DISCIPLINE OF PUBE BEAS03". 481 

in its premisses, to impose upon us subjective representations 
for objective cognitions. In the transcendental sphere of 
pure reason, then, and in the case of synthetical propositions, 
it is inadmissible to support a statement by disproving the 
counter- statement. For only two cases are possible ; either, 
the counter-statement is nothing but the enouncement of the 
inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the subjective con- 
ditions of reason, which does not affect the real case (for 
example, we cannot comprehend the unconditioned necessity 
of the existence of a being, and hence every speculative proof 
of the existence of such a being must be opposed on subjective 
grounds, while the possibility of this being in itself cannot 
with justice be denied) ; or, both propositions, being dia- 
lectical in their nature, are based upon an impossible con- 
ception. In this latter case the rule applies — non entis nulla 
sunt predicata ; that is to say, what we affirm and what we 
deny, respecting such an object, are equally untrue, and the 
apagogic mode of arriving at the truth is in this case impos- 
sible. If, for example, we presuppose that the world of 
sense is given in itself in its totality, it is false, either that 
is infinite, or that it is finite and limited in space. Both are 
false, because the hypothesis is false. For the notion of 
phsenomena (as mere representations) which are given in 
themselves (as objects) is self- contradictory 5 and the infinitude 
of this imaginary whole would, indeed, be unconditioned, 
but would be inconsistent (as every thing in the phseno- 
menal world is conditioned) with the unconditioned deter- 
mination and finitude of quantities which is presupposed in 
our conception. 

The apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illu- 
sions which have always had so strong an attraction for the 
admirers of dogmatical philosophy. It may be compared to 
a champion, who maintains the honour and claims of the party 
he has adopted, by offering battle to all who doubt the validity 
of these claims and the purity of that honour ; while nothing 
can be proved in this way, except the respective strength of 
the combatants, and the advantage, in this respect, is always 
on the side of the attacking party. Spectators, observing that 
each party is alternately conqueror and conquered, are led to 
regard the subject of dispute as beymd the power of man to 

I I 



482 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD 

decide upon. But such an opinion cannot be justified ; and 
it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners the remark : — 

Non defensoribus istis 
Terapus eget. 

Each must try to establish his assertions by a transcendental 
deduction of the grounds of proof employed in his argument, 
and thus enable us to see in what way the claims of reason 
may be supported. If an opponent bases his assertions upon 
subjective grounds, he may be refuted with ease ; not, how- 
ever to the advantage of the dogmatist, who likewise depends 
upon subjective sources of cognition, and is in like manner 
driven into a corner by his opponent. But, if parties employ 
the direct method of procedure, they will soon discover the 
difficulty, nay, the impossibility of proving their assertions, 
and will be forced to appeal to prescription and precedence ; or 
they will, by the help of criticism, discover with ease the 
dogmatical illusions by which they had been mocked, and 
compel reason to renounce its exaggerated pretensions to 
speculative insight, and to confine itself within the limits of 
its proper sphere — that of practical principles. 

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

CHAPTER SECOND. 

The Canon or Pure Reason. 

It is a humiliating consideration for human reason, that it 
is incompetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation, 
but, on the contrary, stands in need of discipline to check its 
deviations from the straight path, and to expose the illusions 
which it originates. But, on the other hand, this consider- 
ation ought to elevate and to give it confidence, for this disci- 
pline is exercised by itself alone, and it is subject to the 
censure of no other power. The bounds, moreover, which it 
is forced to set to its speculative exercise, form likewise a 
check upon the fallacious pretensions of opponents ; and thus 
what remains of its possessions, after these exaggerated 
claims have been disallowed, is secure from attack or usurpa- 
tion. The greatest, and perhaps the only, use of all philo- 
sophy of pure reason is, accordingly, of a purely negative 



THE CANON OF PUEE REASON. 483 

character, it is not an organon for the extension, but a dis- 
cipline for the determination of the limits of its exercise ; and. 
without laying claim to the discovery of new truth, it has the 
modest merit of guarding against error. 

At the same time, there must be some source of positive 
cognitions which belong to the domain of pure reason, and 
which become the causes of error only, from our mistaking 
their true character, while they form the goal towards which 
reason continually strives. How else can we account for the 
inextinguishable desire in the human mind to find a firm foot- 
ing in some region beyond the limits of the world of experi- 
ence 1 — It hopes to attain to the possession of a knowledge in 
which it has the deepest interest. It enters upon the path of 
pure speculation ; but in vain. We have some reason, however, 
to expect that, in the only other way that lies open to it, — the 
path of practical reason, — it may meet with better success. 

I understand by a canon a list of the a priori principles of 
the proper employment of certain faculties of cognition. Thus 
general log c, in its analytical department, is a formal canon 
for the faculties of understanding and reason. In the same 
way, Transcendental Analytic was seen to be a canon of the pure 
understanding ; for it alone is competent to enounce true a 
priori synthetical cognitions. But, when no proper employ- 
ment of a faculty of cognition is possible, no canon can exist. 
But the synthetical cognition of pure speculative reason is, as 
has been shown, completely impossible. There cannot, there- 
fore, exist any canon for the speculative exercise of this faculty 
— for its speculative exercise is entirely dialectical ; and conse- 
quently, transcendental logic, in this respect, is merely a dis- 
cipline, and not a canon. If, then, there is any proper mode 
of employing the faculty of pure reason, — in which case there 
must be a canon for this faculty, — this canon will relate, not to 
the speculative, but to the practical use of reason. This canon 
we now proceed to investigate. 

THE CANON OF PUEE REASON. 

Section Fiest. 
Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason. 

There exists in the faculty of reason a natural desire to 
Tenture beyond the field of experience, to attempt to reach the 



484 TBAtfSCETSDETCTAL DOCTBOTE OV METHOD. 

utmost bounds of all cognition by the help of ideas alone, and 
not to rest satisfied, until it has fulfilled its course and raised 
the sum of its cognitions into a self-snbsistent systematic 
whole. Is the motive for this endeavour to be found in its 
speculative, or in its practical interests alone ? 

Setting aside, at present, the results of the labours of pure 
reason in its speculative exercise, I shall merely inquire re- 
garding the problems, the solution of which forms its ultimate 
ai m _ w hether reached or not, and in relation to which all 
other aims are but partial and intermediate. These highest 
aims must, from the nature of reason, possess complete unity ; 
otherwise the highest interest of humanity could not be suc- 
cessfully promoted. 

The transcendental speculation of reason relates to three 
things : the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, 
and°the existence of God. The speculative interest which 
reason has in those questions is very small ; and, for its sake 
alone we should not undertake the labour of transcendental 
investigation— a labour full of toil and ceaseless struggle. We 
should be loth to undertake this labour, because the dis- 
coveries we might make would not be of the smallest use in 
the sphere of concrete or physical investigation. We may 
find out that the will is free, but this knowledge only relates 
to the intelligible cause of our volition. As regards the 
phsenomena or expressions of this will, that is, our actions, 
we are bound, in obedience to an inviolable maxim, without 
which reason cannot be employed in the sphere of experience, 
to explain these in the same way as we explain all the other 
phsenomena of nature, that is to say, according to its un- 
changeable laws. We may have discovered the spirituality 
and immortality of the soul, but we cannot employ this know 
ledge to explain the phcenomena of this life, nor the peculiar 
nature of the future ; because our conception of an incorporeal 
nature is purely negative and does not add anything to our 
knowledge, and the only inferences to be drawn from it are 



purely fictitious. If, again, we prove the existence of a supreme 
intelligence, we should be able from it to make the conformity 
to aims existing in the arrangement of the world comprehen- 
sible ; but we should not be justified in deducing from it any 
particular arrangement or disposition, or, inferring any, where 
it is not perceived. For it is a necessary rule of the specula- 



THE CANON OP PUEE SEASON. 485 

tive use of reason, that we must not overlook natural causes, 
or refuse to listen to the teaching of experience, for the sake 
of deducing what we know and perceive from something that 
transcends all our knowledge. In one word, these three pro- 
positions are, for the speculative reason, always transcendent, 
and cannot be employed as immanent principles in relation to 
the objects of experience ; they are, consequently, of no use to 
us in this sphere, being but the valueless results of the severe 
but unprofitable efforts of reason. 

If, then, the actual cognition of these three cardinal propo- 
sitions is perfectly useless, while Reason uses her utmost en- 
deavours to induce us to admit them, it is plain that their real 
value and importance relate to our practical, and not to our 
speculative interest. 

I term all that is possible through free-will, practical. But if 
the conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical, 
reason can have only a regulative, and not a constitutive, influ- 
ence upon it, and is serviceable merely for the introduction of 
unity into its empirical laws. In the moral philosophy of 
prudence, for example, the sole business of reason is to bring 
about a union of all the ends, which are aimed at by our 
inclinations, into one ultimate end — that of happiness, and to 
show the agreement which should exist among the means of 
attaining that end. In this sphere, accordingly, reason cannot 
present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action, 
for our guidance towards the aims set up by the senses, and 
is incompetent to give us laws which are pure and determined 
completely a priori. On the other hand, pure practical laws, 
the ends of which have been given by reason entirely a priori, 
and which are not empirically conditioned, but are, on the 
contrary, absolutely imperative in their nature, would be pro- 
ducts of pure reason. Such are the moral laws ; and these 
alone belong to the sphere of the practical exercise of reason, 
and admit of a canon. 

All the powers of reason, in the sphere of what may be 
termed pure philosophy, are, in fact, directed to the three 
above-mentioned problems alone. These again have a still 
higher end — the answer to the question, what we ought to do, 
if the will is free, if there is a God, and a future world. Now, 
as this problem relates to our conduct, in reference to the 
highest aim of humanitv, it is evident that the ultimate inten- 



4S6 TBANECEKDENTAL DOCTEINE OF METHOD. 

tion of nature, in the constitution of our reason, has been 
directed to the moral alone. 

We must take care, however, in turning our attention to an 
object which is foreign* 1 to the sphere of transcendental philoso- 
phy, not to injure the unity of our system by digressions, nor, 
on the other hand, to fail in clearness, by saying too little on 
the new subject of discussion. I hope to avoid both extremes, 
by keeping as close as possible to the transcendental, and ex- 
cluding all psychological, that is, empirical elements. 

I have to remark, in the first place, that at present I treat 
of the conception of freedom in the practical sense only, and 
set aside the corresponding transcendental conception, which 
cannot be employed as a ground of explanation in the phse- 
nomenal world, but is itself a problem for pure reason. A 
will is purely animal (arbitrium brutum), when it is determined 
by sensuous impulses or instincts only, that is, when it is de- 
termined in a pathological manner. A will, which can be de- 
termined independently of sensuous impulses, consequently 
by motives presented by reason alone, is called a. freewill [ar- 
bitrium liberum) ; and everything which is connected with 
this free will, either as principle or consequence, is termed 
practical. The existence of practical freedom can be proved 
from experience alone. For the human will is not determined 
by that alone which immediately affects the senses ; on the 
contrary, we have the power, by calling up the notion of what 
is useful or hurtful in a more distant relation, of overcoming 
the immediate impressions on our sensuous faculty of desire. 
But these considerations of what is desirable in relation to our 
whole state, that is, is in the end good and useful, are based 
entirely upon reason. This faculty, accordingly, enounces 
laws, which are imperative or objective laws of freedom, and 
which tell us what ought to take place, thus distinguishing 
themselves from the laws of nature, which relate to that which 
does take place The laws of freedom or of free will are 
hence termed practical laws. 

* All practical conceptions relate to objects of pleasure and pain, and 
consequently, — in an indirect manner, at least, — to objects of feeling. But 
as feeling is not a faculty of representation, but lies out of the sphere of 
our powers of cognition, the elements of our judgments, in so far as 
they relate to pleasure or pain, that is, the elements of our practical 
judgments, do not belong to transcendental philosophy, which has to do 
with pure a priori cognitions alone. 



THE CANON OF PTJEE REASON. 487 

Whether reason is not itself, in the actual delivery of these 
laws, determined in its turn by other influences, and whether the 
action which, in relation to sensuous impulses, we call free, may 
not, in relation to higher and more remote operative causes, 
really form a part of nature,— these are questions which do not 
here concern us. They are purely speculative questions ; and all 
we have to do, in the practical sphere, is to inquire into the 
rule of conduct which reason has to present. Experience de- 
monstrates to us the existence of practical freedom as one of 
the causes which exist in nature, that is, it shows the causal 
power of reason in the determination of the will. The idea 
of transcendental freedom, on the contrary, requires that 
reason — in relation to its causal power of commencing a series 
of phaenomena — should be independent of all sensuous de- 
termining causes ; and thus it seems to be in opposition to the 
law of nature and to all possible experience. It therefore re- 
mains a problem for the human mind. But this problem 
does not concern reason in its practical use ; and we have, 
therefore, in a canon of pure reason, to do with only two 
questions, which relate to the practical interest of pure reason 
— -Is there a God ? and, Is there a future life ? The question 
of transcendental freedom is purely speculative, and we may 
therefore set it entirely aside when we come to treat of practical 
reason. Besides, we have already fully discussed this subject 
in the antinomy of pure reason. 

THE CANON OF PURE REASON. 

Section Second. 

Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground 
of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason. 

Reason conducted us, in its speculative use, through the field 
of experience, and, as it can never find complete satisfaction 
in that sphere, from thence to speculative ideas, — which, how- 
ever, in the end brought us back again to experience, and 
thus fulfilled the purpose of reason, in a manner which, though 
useful, was not at all in accordance with our expectations. It 
now remains for us to consider whether pure reason can be 
employed in a practical sphere, and whether it will here conduct 
us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure reason, 



48S TEANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD, 

as we have just stated them. We shall thus ascertain whether, 
from the point of view of its practical interest, reason may 
not be able to supply us with that which, on the speculative 
side, it wholly denies us. 

The whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, 
is centred in the three following questions : 

1. What can I E^row? 

2. What ought I to do? 

3. What mat I hope ? 

The first question is purely speculative. We have, as I natter 
myself, exhausted all the replies of which it is susceptible, 
and have at last found the reply with which reason must con- 
tent itself, and with which it ought to be content, so long as it 
pays no regard to the practical. But from the two great ends 
to the attainment of which all these efforts of pure reason 
were in fact directed, we remain just as far removed as if we 
had consulted our ease, and declined the task at the outset. 
So far, then, as knowledge is concerned, thus much, at least, is 
established, that, in regard to those two problems, it lies beyond 
our reach. 

The second question is purely practical. As such it may 
indeed fall within the province of pure reason, but still it is 
not transcendental, but moral, and consequently cannot in it- 
self form the subject of our criticism. 

The third question, If I act as I ought to do, what may I 
then hope 1 — is at once practical and theoretical. The prac- 
tical forms a clue to the answer of the theoretical, and — in 
its highest form — speculative question. For all hoping has 
happiness for its object, and stands in precisely the same re- 
lation to the practical and the law of morality, as knowing to 
the theoretical cognition of things and the law of nature. 
The former arrives finally at the conclusion that something is 
(which determines the ultimate end), because something ought 
to take place ; the latter, that something is (which operates 
as the highest cause), because something does take place. 

Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires ; extensive, 
in regard to their multiplicity ; intensive, in regard to their 
degree ; and protensive, in regard to their duration. The 
practical law based on the motive of happiness, I term a prag- 
matical law (or prudential rule) ; but that law, assuming such 
to exist, which has no other motive than the worthiness of 



THE CA^ON OE PTJEE EEASOK. 489 

being happy, I term a moral or ethical law. The first tells us 
what we have to do, if we wish to .become possessed of happiness ; 
the second dictates how we ought to act, in order to deserve 
happiness. The first is based upon empirical principles ; for 
it is only by experience that I can learn either what incli- 
nations exist which desire satisfaction, or what are the natural 
means of satisfying them. The second takes no account of 
our desires or the means of satisfying them, and regards only 
the freedom of a rational being, and the necessary conditions 
under which alone this freedom can harmonize with the dis- 
tribution of happiness according to principles. This second 
law may therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure reason, and 
may be cognized a priori. 

I assume tha^ there are pure moral laws which determine, 
entirely a priori (without regard to empirical motives, that is, 
to happiness), the conduct of a rational being, or in other 
words, the use which it makes of its freedom, and that these 
laws are absolutely imperative (not merely hypothetically, on 
the supposition of other empirical ends), and therefore in all 
respects necessary. I am warranted in assuming this, not 
only by the arguments of the most enlightened moralists, but 
by the moral judgment of every man who will make the at- 
tempt to form a distinct conception of such a law. 

Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative, but 
in its practical, or, more strictly, its moral use, principles of 
the possibility of experience, of such actions, namely, as, in 
accordance with ethical precepts, might be met with in the 
history of man. For since reason commands that such actions 
should take place, it must be possible for them to take place ; 
and hence a particular kind of systematic unity — the moral, 
must be possible. We have found, it is true, that the syste- 
matic unity of nature could not be established according to 
speculative principles of reason, because, while reason possesses 
a causal power in relation to freedom, it has none in relation 
to the whole sphere of nature ; and, while moral principles 
of reason can produce free actions, they cannot produce 
natural laws. It is, then, in its practical, but especially in its 
moral use, that the principles of pure reason possess objective 
reality. 

I call the world a moral worla\ in so far as it may be in 
accordance with all the ethical laws — which, by virtue of the 



490 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTUINE OF METHOD. 

freedom of reasonable beings, it can be, and according to the 
necessary laws of morality it ought to be. But this world 
must be conceived only as an intelligible world, inasmuch as 
abstraction is therein made of all conditions (ends), and even 
of all impediments to morality (the weakness or pravity of 
human nature). So far, then, it is a mere idea, — though still 
a practical idea, — which may have, and ought to have, an in- 
fluence on the world of sense, so as to bring it as far as pos- 
sible into conformity with itself. The idea of a moral world 
has, therefore, objective reality, not as referring to an object 
of intelligible intuition, — for of such an object we can form no 
conception whatever, — but to the world of sense, — conceived, 
however, as an object of pure reason in its practical use, — and 
to a corpus mysticum of rational beings in it, in so far as the 
liberum arbitrium of the individual is placed, under and by 
virtue of moral laws, in complete systematic unity both with 
itself, and with the freedom of all others. 

That is the answer to the first of the two questions of pure 
reason which relate to its practical interest : — Do that which 
wilt render thee worthy of happiness. The second question is 
this : If I conduct myself so as not to be unworthy of happi- 
ness, may I hope thereby to obtain happiness ? In order to 
arrive at the solution of this question, we must inquire whether 
the principles of pure reason, which prescribe a priori the law, 
necessarily also connect this hope with it. 

I say, then, that just as the moral principles are necessary 
according to reason in its practical use, so it is equally neces- 
sary according to reason in its theoretical use, to assume that 
every one has ground to hope for happiness in the measure in 
which he has made himself worthy of it in his conduct, and 
that therefore the system of morality is inseparably (though 
only in the idea of pure reason) connected with that of hap- 
piness. 

Now in an intelligible, that is, in the moral world, in the 
conception of which we make abstraction of all the impedi- 
ments to morality (sensuous desires), such a system of happi- 
ness, connected with and proportioned to morality, may be 
conceived as necessary, because freedom of volition — partly 
incited, and partly restrained by moral laws — would be itself 
the cause of general happiness ; and thus rational beings, under 
the guidance of such principles, would be themselves the authors 



THE CAtfOff OF PTTBE EEASON. 491 

both of their own enduring welfare and that of others. But 
such a system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the 
carrying out of which depends upon the condition that every 
one acts as he ought ; in other words, that all actions of 
reasonable beings be such as they would be if they sprung 
from a Supreme Will, comprehending in, or under, itself all 
particular wills. But since the moral law is binding on each 
individual in the use of his freedom of volition, even if others 
should not act in conformity with this law, neither the nature 
of things, nor the causality of actions and their relation to 
morality, determine how the consequences of these actions will 
be related to happiness ; and the neeessary connection of the 
hope of happiness with the unceasing endeavour to become 
worthy of happiness, cannot be cognized by reason, if we 
take nature alone for our guide. This connection can be 
hoped for only on the assumption that the cause of nature is 
a supreme reason, which governs according to moral laws. 

I term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most 
perfect will, united with supreme blessedness, is the cause of 
all happiness in the world, so far as happiness stands in strict 
relation to morality (as the worthiness of being happy), the 
IdeaVof the Supreme Good. It is only, then, in the ideal of 
the supreme original good, that pure reason can find the ground 
of the practically necessary connection of both elements of 
the highest derivative good, and accordingly of an intelligible, 
that is, moral world. Now since we are necessitated by reason 
to conceive ourselves as belonging to such a world, while the 
senses present to us nothing but a world of phaenomena, we 
must assume the former as a consequence of our conduct in 
the world of sense (since the world of sense gives us no hint 
of it), and therefore as future in relation to us. Thus God 
and a future life are two hypotheses which, according to the 
principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the obligation 
which this reason imposes upon us. 

Morality per se constitutes a system. But we can form no 
system of happiness, except in so far as it is dispensed in strict 
proportion to morality. But this is only possible in the in- 
telligible world, under a wise author and ruler. Such a ruler, 
together with life in such a world, which we must look upon 
as future, reason finds itself compelled to assume ; or it must 
regard the moral laws as idle dreams, since the necessary con- 



492 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

sequence which this same reason connects with them, must, 
without this hypothesis, fall to the ground. Hence also the 
moral laws are universally regarded as commands, which they 
could not be, did they not connect a priori adequate conse- 
quences with their dictates, and thus carry with them promises 
and threats. But this, again, they could not do, did they not 
reside in a necessary being, as the Supreme Good, which alone 
can render such a teleological unity possible. 

Leibnitz termed the world, when viewed in relation to the 
rational beings which it contains, and the moral relations in 
which they stand to each other, under the government of 
the Supreme Good, the kingdom of Grace, and distinguished 
it from the kingdom of Nature, in which these rational beings 
live, under moral laws, indeed, but expect no other conse- 
quences from their actions than such as follow according to the 
course of nature in the world of sense. To view ourselves, 
therefore, as in the kingdom of grace, in which all happiness 
awaits us, except in so far as we ourselves Kmit our partici- 
pation in it by actions which render us unworthy of happiness, 
is a practically necessary idea of reason. 

Practical laws, in so far as they are subjective grounds of 
actions, that is, subjective principles, are termed maxims. The 
judgments of morality, in its purity and ultimate results, are 
framed according to ideas ; the observance of its laws, accord- 
ing to maxims. 

The whole course of our life must be subject to moral 
maxims ; but this is impossible, unless with the moral law, 
which is a mere idea, reason connects an efficient cause which 
ordains to all conduct which is in conformity with the moral 
law an issue either in this or in another life, which is in exact 
conformity with our highest aims. Thus, without a God and 
without a world, invisible to us now, but hoped for, the glorious 
ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of approbation and of 
admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose and action. 
For they do not satisfy all the aims which are natural to every 
rational being, and which are determined a priori by pure 
reason itself, and necessary. 

Happiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from being 
the complete good. Reason does not approve of it (however 
much inclination may desire it), except as united with desert. 
On the other hand, morality alone, and with it, mere desert % 



THE CANON OF PUEE SEASON. 49.* 

is likewise iar from being the complete good. To make it 
complete, lie who conducts himself in a manner not unworthy 
of happiness, must be able to hope for the possession of hap- 
piness. Even reason, unbiassed by private ends, or interested 
considerations, cannot judge otherwise, if it puts itself in the 
place of a being whose business it is to dispense all happiness 
to others. For in the practical idea both points are essen- 
tially combined, though in such a way that participation in 
happiness is rendered possible by the moral disposition, as its 
condition, and not conversely, the moral disposition by the 
prospect of happiness. For a disposition which should re- 
quire the prospect of happiness as its necessary condition, 
would not be moral, and hence also would not be worthy of 
complete happiness — a happiness which, in the view of reason, 
recognizes no limitation but such as arises from our own im- 
moral conduct. 

Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality 
of rational beings (whereby they are made worthy of happi- 
ness), constitutes alone the supreme good of a world into which 
we absolutely must transport ourselves according to the com- 
mands of pure but practical reason. This world is, it is true, 
only an intelligible world ; for of such a systematic unity of 
ends as it requires, the world of sense gives us no hint. Its 
reality can be based on nothing else but the hypothesis of a 
supreme original good. In it independent reason, equipped 
with all the sufficiency of a supreme cause, founds, maintains, 
and fulfils the universal order of things, with the most perfect 
teleological harmony, however much this order may be hidden 
from us in the world of sense. 

This moral theology has the peculiar advantage, in contrast 
with speculative theology, of leading inevitably to the concep- 
tion of a sole, perfect, and rational First Cause, whereof specu- 
lative theology does not give us any indication on objective 
grounds, far less any convincing evidence. For we find neither 
in transcendental nor in natural theology, however far reason 
may lead us in these, any ground to warrant us in assuming 
the existence of one only Being, which stands at the head of 
all natural causes, and on which these are entirely dependent. 
On the other hand, if we take our stand on moral unity as a 
necessary law of the universe, and from this point of view 
consider what is necessary to give this law adequate efficiency 



494 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

and, for us, obligatory force, we must come to the conclusion 
that there is one only supreme will, which comprehends all 
these laws in itself. For how, under different wills, should 
we find complete unity of ends 1 This will must be omni- 
potent, that all nature and its relation to morality in the world 
may be subject to it ; omniscient, that it may have knowledge 
of the most secret feelings and their moral worth ; omni- 
present, that it may be at hand to supply every necessity to 
which the highest weal of the world may give rise ; eternal, 
that this harmony of nature and liberty may never fail ; and 
so on. 

But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelli- 
gences — which, as mere nature, is only a world of sense, but 
as a system of freedom of volition, may be termed an in- 
telligible, that is, moral world (reynum gratice) — leads in- 
evitably also to the teleological unity of all things which con- 
stitute this great whole, according to universal natural laws, — 
just as the unity of the former is according to universal and 
necessary moral laws, — and unites the practical with the specu- 
lative reason. The world must be represented as having 
originated from an idea, if it is to harmonize with that use of 
reason without which we cannot even consider ourselves as 
worthy of reason, — namely, the moral use, which rests entirely 
on the idea of the supreme good. Hence the investigation of 
nature receives a teleological direction, and becomes, in its 
widest extension, physico-theology. But this, taking its rise 
in moral order as a unity founded on the essence of freedom, 
and not accidentally instituted by external commands, estab- 
lishes the teleological view of nature on grounds which must 
be inseparably connected with the internal possibility of things. 
This gives rise to a transcendental theology, which takes the 
ideal of the highest ontological perfection as a principle of 
systematic unity ; and this principle connects all things ac- 
cording to universal and necessary natural laws, because all 
things have their origin in the absolute necessity of the one 
only Primal Being. 

What use can we make of our understanding, even in re- 
spect of experience, if we do not propose ends to ourselves ? 
But the highest end3 are those of morality, and it is only 
pure reason that can give us the knowledge of these. Though 
supplied with these, and putting ourselves under their guid- 



THE CANON OF PTTBE EEASON. 495 

ance, we crn make no teleological use of the knowledge of 
nature, as regards cognition, unless nature itself has estab- 
lished teleological unity. For without this unity we should 
not even possess reason, because we should have no school 
for reason, and no cultivation through objects which afford 
the materials for its conceptions. But teleological unity is 
a necessary unity, and founded on the essence of the indi- 
vidual will itself. Hence this will, which is the condition of 
the application of this unity in concreto, must be so likewise. 
In this way tne transcendental enlargement of our rational 
cognition would be, not the . cause, but merely the effect of 
the practical teleology, which pure reason imposes upon us. 

Hence, also, we find in the history of human reason that, 
before the moral conceptions were sufficiently purified and 
determined, and before men had attained to a perception of 
the systematic unity of ends according to these conceptions 
and from necessary principles, the knowledge of nature, and 
even a considerable amount of intellectual culture in many 
other sciences, could produce only rude and vague concep- 
tions of the Deity, sometimes even admitting of an astonish- 
ing indifference with regard to this question altogether. But 
the more enlarged treatment of moral ideas, which was ren- 
dered necessary by the extremely pure moral law of our religion, 
awakened the interest, and thereby quickened the perceptions 
of reason in relation to this object. In this way, and without 
the help either of an extended acquaintance with nature, or of 
a reliable transcendental insight, (for these have been wanting 
in all ages), a conception of the Divine Being was arrived at, 
which we now hold to be the correct one, not because specu- 
lative reason convinces us of its correctness, but because it 
accords with the moral principles of reason. Thus it is to 
pure reason, but only in its practical use, that we must ascribe 
the merit of having connected with our highest interest a 
cognition, of which mere speculation was able only to form 
a conjecture, but the validity of which it was unable to estab- 
lish, — and of having thereby rendered it, not indeed a demon- 
strated dogma, but a hypothesis absolutely necessary to the 
essential ends of reason. 

But if practical reason has reached this elevation, and has 
attained to the conception of a sole Primal Being, as the 
supreme good, it must not, therefore, imagine that it ha3 



4U6 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTKINE OF METHOD. 

transcended the empirical conditions of its application, ami 
risen to the immediate cognition of new objects ; it must 
not presume to start from the conception which it has gained, 
and to deduce from it the moral laws themselves. For it was 
these very laws, the internal practical necessity of which led 
us to the hypothesis of an independent cause, or of a wise 
ruler of the universe, who should give them effect. Hence 
we are not entitled to regard them as accidental and derived 
from the mere will of the ruler, especially as we have no con- 
ception of such a will, except as formed in accordance with 
these laws. So far, then, as practical reason has the right to 
conduct us, we shall not look upon actions as binding on us, 
because they are the commands of God, but we shall regard them 
as divine commands, because we are internally bound by 
them. We shall study freedom under the teleologicai unity 
which accords with principles of reason ; we shall look upon 
ourselves as acting in conformity with the divine will only 
in so far as we hold sacred the moral law which reason 
teaches us from the nature of actions themselves, and we 
shall believe that we can obey that will only by promoting 
the weal of the universe in ourselves and in others. Moral 
theology is, therefore, only of immanent use. It teaches us 
to fulfil our destiny here in the world, by placing ourselves 
in harmony with the general system of ends, and warns ua 
against the fanaticism, nay, the crime of depriving reason of 
its legislative authority in the moral conduct of life, for 
the purpose of directly connecting this authority with the 
idea of the Supreme Being. For this would be, not an imma- 
nent, but a transcendent use of moral theology, and, like the 
transcendent use of mere speculation, would inevitably per- 
vert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason. 

THE CANON OF PURE REASON. 

Section III. 

Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief. 

The holding of a thing to be true, is a phsenomenon in our 
understanding which may rest on objective grounds, but re- 
quires, also, subjective causes in the mind of the person 
judging. If a judgment is valid for every rational being, 
theu its ground is objectively sufficient, and it is termed a con- 



THE CANON OF PUKE REASON. 497 

faction. If, on the other hand, it has its ground in the 
particular character of the subject, it is termed a persuasion. 

Persuasion is a mere illusion, the ground of the judgment, 
which lies solely in the subject, being regarded as objective. 
Hence a judgment of this kind has only private validity — is 
only valid for the individual who judges, and the holding 
of a thing to be true in this way cannot be communicated. 
But truth depends upon agreement with the object, and 
consequently the judgments of all understandings, if true, 
must be in agreement with each other ; (consentienlia uni 
tertio consentiunt inter se). Conviction may, therefore, be 
distinguished, from an external point of view, from persua- 
sion, by the possibility of communicating it, and by showing 
its validity for the reason of every man ; for in this case the 
presumption, at least, arises, that the agreement of all judg- 
ments with each other, in spite of the different characters of 
individuals, rests upon the common ground of the agreement of 
each with the object, and thus the correctness of the judg- 
ment is established. 

Persuasion, accordingly, cannot be subjectively distin- 
guished from conviction, that is, so long as the subject 
views its judgment simply as a phsenomenon of its own mind. 
But if we inquire whether the grounds of our judgment, which 
are valid for us, produce the same effect on the reason of 
others as on our own, we have then the means, though only 
subjective means, not, indeed, of producing conviction, but of 
detecting the merely private validity of the judgment ; in other 
words, of discovering that there is in it the element of mere 
persuasion. 

If we can, in addition to this, develope the subjective 
causes of the judgment, which we have taken for its objective 
grounds, and thus explain the deceptive judgment as a phse- 
nomenon in our mind, apart altogether from the objective 
character of the object, we can then expose the illusion and 
need be no longer deceived by it, although, if its subjective 
cause lies in our nature, we cannot hope altogether to escape 
its influence. 

I can only maintain, that is, affirm as necessarily valid for 
every one, that which produces conviction. Persuasion I may 
keep for myself, if it is agreeable to me ; but I cannot, and 
ought not, to attempt to impose it as binding upon others. 

K K 



498 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTBINE OF METHOD. 

Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgment 
in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objec- 
tively valid), has the three following degrees : Opinion, Belief, 
and Knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judg- 
ment, subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjec- 
tively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively in- 
sufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively 
sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for 
myself) ; objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for all). 
I need not dwell longer on the explanation of such simple 
conceptions. 

I must never venture to be of opinion, without knowing 
something, at least, by which my judgment, in itself merely 
problematical, is brought into connection with the truth, — 
which connection, although not perfect, is still something 
more than an arbitrary fiction. Moreover, the law of such a 
connection must be certain. For if, in relation to this law, I 
have nothing more than opinion, my judgment is but a play 
of the imagination, without the least relation to truth. — In the 
judgments of pure reason, opinion has no place. For as 
they do not rest on empirical grounds, and as the sphere of 
pure reason is that of necessary truth and a priori cognition, 
the principle of connection in it requires universality and ne- 
cessity, and consequently perfect certainty, — otherwise we 
should have no guide to the truth at all. Hence it is absurd 
to have an opinion in pure mathematics ; we must know, or 
abstain from forming a judgment altogether. The case is the 
same with the maxims of morality. For we must not hazard 
an action on the mere opinion that it is allowed, but we must 
know it to be so. 

In the transcendental sphere of reason, on the other hand, 
the term opinion is too weak, while the word knowledge is too 
strong. From the merely speculative point of view, therefore, 
we cannot form a judgment at all. For the subjective grounds 
of a judgment, such as produce belief, cannot be admitted in 
speculative enquiries, inasmuch as they cannot stand without 
empirical support, and are incapable of being communicated 
to others in equal measure. 

But it is only from the practical point of view that a theo- 
retically insufficient judgment can be termed belief. Now the 
practical reference is either to skill or to morality ; to the 



THE CANON OE PTJEE EEASON. 499 

former, when the end proposed is arbitrary and accidental, to 
the latter, when it is absolutely necessary. 

If we propose to ourselves any end whatever, the conditions 
of its attainment are hypothetically necessary. The necessity 
is subjectively, but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I am 
acquainted with no other conditions under which the end can 
be attained. On the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely, 
and for every one, if I know for certain that no one can be 
acquainted with any other conditions, under which the attain- 
ment of the proposed end would be possible. In the former 
case my supposition — my judgment with regard to certain 
conditions, is a merely accidental belief ; in the latter it is a 
necessary belief. The physician must pursue some course in 
the case of a patient who is in danger, but is ignorant of the 
nature of the disease. He observes the symptoms, and con- 
cludes, according to the best of his judgment, that it is a case 
of phthisis. His belief is, even in his own judgment, only 
contingent : another man might, perhaps, come nearer the 
truth. Such a belief, contingent indeed, but still forming the 
ground of the actual use of means for the attainment of certain 
ends, I term pragmatical belief. 

The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is 
merely his persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that 
is, his firm belief, is a bet. It frequently happens that a man 
delivers his opinions with so much boldness and assurance, that 
he appears to be under no apprehension as to the possibility 
of his being in error. The offer of a bet startles him, and makes 
him pause. Sometimes it turns out that his persuasion may 
be valued at a ducat, but not at ten. For he does not hesi- 
tate, perhaps, to venture a ducat, but if it is proposed to stake 
ten, he immediately becomes aware of the possibility of his 
being mistaken — a possibility which has hitherto escaped bis 
observation. If we imagine to ourselves that we .have to stake 
the happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposi- 
tion, our judgment drops its air of triumph, we take the alarm, 
and discover the actual strength of our belief. Thus prag- 
matical belief has degrees, varying in proportion to the inter- 
ests at stake. 

Now, in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of 
action in reference to some object, and where, accordingly, our 
judgment is purely theoretical, we can stiil represent to our- 

£E2 



500 TBANSCEKDENTAL DOCTEINE OF METUOD. 

selves, in thought, the possibility of a course of action, for 
which we suppose that we have sufficient grounds, if any means 
existed of ascertaining the truth of the matter. Thus we find 
in purely theoretical judgments an analogon of practical judg- 
ments, to which the word belief may properly be applied, and 
which we may term doctrinal belief. I should not hesitate to 
stake my all on the truth of the proposition, — if there were any 
possibility of bringing it to the test of experience, — that, at 
least, some one of the planets, which we see, is inhabited. 
Hence I say that I have not merely the opinion, but the 
strong belief, on the correctness of which I would stake even 
many of the advantages of life, that there are inhabitants in 
other worlds. 

Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of 
God belongs to doctrinal belief. For, although in respect to 
the theoretical cognition of the universe I do not require to 
form any theory which necessarily involves this idea, as the 
condition of my explanation of the phenomena which the 
\iniverse presents, but, on the contrary, am rather bound so 
to use my reason as if everything were mere nature, still 
teleological unity is so important a condition of the application 
of my reason to nature, that it is impossible for me to ignore 
it — especially since, in addition to these considerations, 
abundant examples of it are supplied by experience. But the 
sole condition, so far as my knowledge extends, under which 
this unity can be my guide in the investigation of nature, is the 
assumption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things 
according to the wisest ends. Consequently the hypothesis 
of a wise author of the universe is necessary for my guidance 
in the investigation of nature — is the condition under which 
alone I can fulfil an end which is contingent indeed, but by 
no means unimportant. Moreover, since the result of my at- 
tempts so frequently confirms the utility of this assumption, 
and since nothing decisive can be adduced against it, it follows 
that it would be saying far too little to term my judgment, in 
this case, a mere opinion, and that, even in this theoretical con- 
nection, I may assert that I firmly believe in God. Still, if 
we use words strictly, this must not be called a practical, but 
a doctrinal belief, which the theology of nature (physico- 
theology) must also produce in my mind. In the wisdom of 
a Supreme Being, and in the shortness of life, so inadequate 



THE CANON Or PTJEE SEASON. 501 

to the development of the glorious powers of human nature,, 
we may find equally sufficient grounds for a doctrinal belief 
in the future life of the human soul. 

The expression of belief is, in such cases, an expression of 
modesty from the objective point of view, but, at the same 
time, of firm confidence, from the subjective. If I should 
venture to term v this merely theoretical judgment even so 
much as a hypothesis which I am entitled to assume ; a more 
complete conception, with regard to another world and to 
the cause of the world, might then be justly required of me 
than I am, in reality, able to give. For, if I assume anything, 
even as a mere hypothesis, I must, at least, know so much of 
the properties of such a being as will enable me, not to form 
the conception, but to imagine the existence of it. But the 
word belief refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, 
and to its subjective influence on the conduct of my reason, 
which forces me to hold it fast, though I may not be in a 
position to give a speculative account of it. 

But mere doctrinal belief is, to some extent, wanting in sta- 
bility. We often quit our hold of it, in consequence of the 
difficulties which occur in speculation, though in the end we 
inevitably return to it again. 

It is quite otherwise with moral belief. For in this sphere 
action is absolutely necessary, that is, I must act in obedience 
to the moral law in all points. The end is here ineontrover- 
tibly established, and there is only one condition possible, 
according to the best of my perception, under which this end 
can harmonize with all other ends, and so have practical 
validity — namely, the existence of a God and of a future world. 
I know also, to a certainty, that no one can be acquainted with 
any other conditions which conduct to the same unity of ends 
under the moral law. But since the moral precept is, at the 
same time, my maxim (as reason requires that it should be), I 
am irresistibly constrained to believe in the existence of God 
and in a future life ; and I am sure that nothing can make me 
waver in this belief, since I should thereby overthrow my 
moral maxims, the renunciation of which would render me 
hateful in my own eyes. 

Thus, while all tne ambitious attempts of reason to pene- 
trate beyond the limits of experience end in disappointment, 
there is still enough left to satisfy us in a practical point of 



502 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OE METHOD. 

view. No one, it is true, will be able to boast that he knows 
that there is a God and a future life ; for, if he knows this, he 
is just the man whom I have long wished to find. All know- 
ledge, regarding an object of mere reason, can be communi- 
cated ; and I should thus be enabled to hope that my own 
knowledge would receive this wonderful extension, through the 
instrumentality of his instruction. No, my conviction is not 
logical, but moral certainty ; and since it rests on subjective 
grounds (of the moral sentiment), I must not even say : It is 
morally certain that there is a God, &c, but : 1 am morally 
certain, that is, my belief in God and in another world is so 
interwoven with my moral nature, that I am under as little 
apprehension of having the former torn from me as of losing 
the latter. 

The only point in this argument that may appear open to 
suspicion, is that this rational belief presupposes the existence 
of moral sentiments. If we give up this assumption, and take 
a man who is entirely indifferent with regard to moral laws, 
the question which reason proposes, becomes then merely a 
problem for speculation, and may, indeed, be supported by 
strong grounds from analogy, but not by such as will compel 
the most obstinate scepticism to give way.* But in these ques- 
tions no man is free from all interest. For though the want 
of good sentiments may place him beyond the influence of 
moral interests, still even in this case enough may be left 
to make h'\m fear the existence of God and a future life. For 
he cannot pretend to any certainty of the non-existence of 
God and of a future life, unless — since it could only be proved 
by mere reason, and therefore apodeictically — he is prepared 
to establish the impossibility of both, which certainly no 
reasonable man would undertake to do. This would be a 
negative belief, which could* not, indeed, produce morality and 
good sentiments, but still could produce an analogon of these, 
by operating as a powerful restraint on the outbreak of evil 
dispositions. 

But, it will be said, is this all that pure reason can effect, 

* The human mind (as, I helieve, every rational being must of necessity 
do,) takes a natural interest in morality, although this interest is not un- 
divided, and may not he practically in preponderance. If you strengthen 
and increase it, you will rind the reason become docile, more enlightened, 
and more capable of uniting the speculative interest with the practical. But 
if you do not take care at the outset, or at least mid-way, to make mcu 
good, you will never force them into an honest belief. 



THE ARCHITECTONIC OF PURE REASON. 503 

in opening up prospects beyond the limits of experience ? 
Nothing more than two articles of belief? Common sense 
could have done as much as this, without taking the philoso- 
phers to counsel in the matter ! 

I shall not here eulogize philosophy for the benefits which 
the laborious efforts of its criticism have conferred on human 
reason, — even granting that its merit should turn out in the 
end to be only negative, — for on this point something more 
will be said in the next section. But I ask, do you require that 
that knowledge which concerns all men, should transcend the 
common understanding, and should only be revealed to you by 
philosophers ? The very circumstance which has called forth 
your censure, is the best confirmation of the correctness of 
our previous assertions, since it discloses, what could not have 
been foreseen, that Nature is not chargeable with any partial 
distribution of her gifts in those matters which concern all 
men without distinction, and that in respect to the essential 
ends of human nature, we cannot advance further with the 
help of the highest philosophy, than under the guidance which 
nature has vouchsafed to the meanest understanding. 

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

The Architectonic of Pure Reason. 

By the term Architectonic I mean the art of constructing a 
system. Without systematic unity, our knowledge cannot be- 
come science ; it will be an aggregate, and not a system. Thus 
Architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in cognition, and 
therefore necessarily forms part of our Methodology. 

Reason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an uncon- 
nected and rhapsodistic state, but requires that the sum of 
our cognitions should constitute a system. It is thus alone 
that they can advance the ends of reason. By a system 
I mean the unity of various cognitions under one idea. This 
idea is the conception — given by reason — of the form of a 
whole, in so far as the conception determines a priori not 
only the limits of its content, but the place which each of 
its parts is to occupy. The scientific idea contains, there- 
fore, the end, and the form of the whole which is in accord- 



504 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OP METHOD. 

ance with that end. The unity of the end, to which all the 
parts of the system relate, and through which all have a re- 
lation to each other, communicates unity to the whole system, 
so that the absence of any part can be immediately detected 
from our knowledge of the rest ; and it determines a priori the 
limits of the system, thus excluding all contingent or arbitrary 
additions. The whole is thus an organism (articulatio), and 
not an aggregate (coacervatio) ; it may grow from within (per 
intussusceptionem) , but it cannot increase by external additions 
{per appositionem) . It is thus like an animal body, the growth 
of which does not add any limb, but, without changing their 
proportions, makes each in its sphere stronger and more 
active. 

We require, for the execution of the idea of a system, a 
schema, that is, a content and an arrangement of parts deter- 
mined a priori by the principle which the aim of the system 
prescribes. A schema which is not projected in accordance 
with an idea, that is, from the stand-point of the highest aim 
of reason, but merely empirically, in accordance with acciden- 
tal aims and purposes (the number of which cannot be pre- 
determined), can give us nothing more than technical unity. 
But the schema which is originated from an idea (in which 
case reason presents us with aims a priori, and does not look 
for them to experience), forms the basis of architectonical 
unity. A science, in the proper acceptation of that term, 
cannot be formed technically, that is, from observation of 
the similarity existing between different objects, and the purely 
contingent use we make of our knowledge in concreto with 
reference to all kinds of arbitrary external aims ; its consti- 
tution must be framed on architectonical principles, that is, 
its parts must be shown to possess an essential affinity, and be 
capable of being deduced from one supreme and internal aim 
or end, which forms the condition of the possibility of the 
scientific whole. The schema of a science must give a priori 
the plan of it (inonoyramma), and the division of the whole 
into parts, in conformity with the idea of the science ; and it 
must also distinguish this whole from all others, according to 
certain understood principles. 

No one will attempt to construct a science, unless he have 
«ome idea to rest on as a proper basis. But, in the elaboration 
of the science he finds that the schema, nay, even the deft- 



THE ARCHITECTONIC OF PURE REASON. 5\)5 

n?tion which he at first gave of the science, rarely corresponds 
with his idea ; for this idea lies, like a germ, in our reason, 
its parts undeveloped and hid even from microscopical obser- 
vation. For this reason, we ought to explain and define 
sciences, not according to the description which the originator 
gives of them, but according to the idea which we find based 
in reason itself, and which is suggested by the natural unity of 
the parts of the science already accumulated. For it will often 
be found, that the originator of a science, and even his latest 
successors, remain attached to an erroneous idea, which they 
cannot render clear to themselves, and that they thus fail in 
determining the true content, the articulation or systematic 
unity, and the limits of their science. 

It is unfortunate that, only after having occupied ourselves 
for a long time in the collection of materials, under the guid- 
ance of an idea which lies undeveloped in the mind, but not 
according to any definite plan of arrangement, — nay, only after 
we have spent much time and labour in the technical dispo- 
sition of our materials, does it become possible to view the 
idea of a science in a clear light, and to project, according to 
architectonical principles, a plan of the whole, in accordance 
with the aims of reason. Systems seem, like certain worms, 
to be formed by a kind of generatio cequivoca — by the mere 
confluence of conceptions, and to gain completeness only with 
the progress of time. But the schema or germ of all lies in 
reason ; and thus is not only every system organized accord- 
ing to its own idea, but all are united into one grand system 
of human knowledge, of which they form members. For 
this reason, it is possible to frame an architectonic of all hu- 
man cognition, the formation of which, at the present time, 
considering the immense materials collected or to be found in 
the ruins of old systems, would not indeed be very difficult. 
Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan of the 
Architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason ; and we 
begin from the point where the main root of human know- 
ledge divides into two, one of which is reason. By reason I 
understand here the whole higher faculty of cognition, the 
rational being placed in contradistinction to the empirical. 

If I make complete abstraction of the content of cognition, 
objectively considered, all cognition is, from a subjective 
point of view, either historical or rational. Historical cogni- 



506 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

tion is cognitio ex datis, rational, cognitio ex principiis. What- 
ever may be the original source of a cognition, it is, in 
relation to the person who possesses it, merely historical, 
if he knows only what has been given him from another 
quarter, whether that knowledge was communicated by direct 
experience or by instruction. Thus the person who has 
learned a system of philosophy, — say the Wolfian, — although 
he has a perfect knowledge of all the principles, definitions 
and arguments in that philosophy, as well as of the divisions 
that have been made of the system, he possesses really no 
more than a historical knowledge of the Wolfian system ; 
he knows only what has been told him, his judgments are 
only those which he has received from his teachers. Dispute 
the validity of a definition, and he is at completely a loss to find 
another. He has formed his mind on another's ; but the 
imitative faculty is not the productive. His knowledge has not 
been drawn from reason ; and, although, objectively consi- 
dered, it is rational knowledge, subjectively, it is merely histo- 
rical. He has learned this or that philosophy, and is merely 
a plaster-cast of a living man. Rational cognitions which are 
objective, that is, which have their source in reason, can be 
so termed from a subjective point of view, only when they 
have been drawn by the individual himself from the sources 
of reason, that is, from principles ; and it is in this way alone 
that criticism, or even the rejection of what has been already 
learned, can spring up in the mind. 

All rational cognition is, again, based either on conceptions, 
or on the construction of conceptions. The former is termed 
philosophical, the latter mathematical. I have already shewn 
the essential difference of these two methods of cognition in 
the first chapter. A cognition may be objectively philosophi- 
cal and subjectively historical, — as is the case with the majority 
of scholars and those who cannot look beyond the limits of 
their system, and who remain in a state of pupillage all their 
lives. But it is remarkable that mathematical knowledge, 
when committed to memory, is valid, from the subjective 
point of view, as rational knowledge also, and that the same 
distinction cannot be drawn here as in the case of philosophi- 
cal cognition. The reason is, that the only way of arriving at 
this knowledge is through the essential principles of reason, 
and thus it is always certain and indisputable ; because reason 



THE AECHITECTOITIC OF PT7EE EEASON. 507 

is employed in concreto — but at the same time a priori — 
that is, in pure, and therefore, infallible intuition ; and thus 
all causes of illusion and error are excluded. Of all the a priori 
sciences of reason, therefore, mathematics alone can be learned. 
Philosophy — unless it be in an historical manner — cannot be 
learned ; we can at most learn to philosophise. 

Philosophy is the system of all philosophical cognition. 
"We must use this term in an objective sense, if we understand 
by it the archetype of all attempts at philosophizing, and the 
standard by which all subjective philosophies are to be judged. 
In this sense, philosophy is merely the idea of a possible 
science, which does not exist in concreto, but to which we 
endeavour in various ways to approximate, until we have disco- 
vered the right path to pursue — a path overgrown by the errors 
and illusions of sense, — and the image we have hitherto tried to 
shape in vain, has become a perfect copy of the great proto- 
type. Until that time, we cannot learn philosophy — it does 
not exist ; if it does, where is it, who possesses it, and how 
shall we know it? "We can only learn to philosophize; in 
other words, we can only exercise our powers of reasoning in 
accordance with general principles, retaining at the same time, 
the right of investigating the sources of these principles, of 
testing, and even of rejecting them'. 

Until then, our conception of philosophy is only a scho- 
lastic conception — a conception, that is, of a system of cogni- 
tion which we are trying to elaborate into a science ; all that 
we at present know, being the systematic unity of this cogni- 
tion, and consequently the logical completeness of the cogni- 
tion for the desired end. But there is also a cosmical concep- 
tion (concept us cosmicus) of philosophy, which has always 
formed the true basis of this term, especially when philosophy 
was personified and presented to us in the ideal of a philoso- 
pher. In this view, philosophy is the science of the relation 
of all cognition to the ultimate and essential aims of human 
reason (teleologia rationis humance), and the philosopher is not 
merely an artist — who occupies himself with conceptions, but 
a law-giver — legislating for human reason. In this sense of 
the word, it would be in the highest degree arrogant to as- 
sume the title of philosopher, and to pretend that we had 
reached the perfection of the prototype which lies in the idea 
alone. 



508 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. 

The mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the logi- 
cian, — how far soever the first may have advanced in rational, 
and the two latter in philosophical knowledge, — are merely 
artists, engaged in the arrangement and formation of concep- 
tions ; they cannot be termed pi -hers. Above them all, 
there is the ideal teacher, who employs them as instruments 
for the advancement of the essential aims of human reason. 
Him alone can we call philosopher ; but he nowhere exists. 
But the idea of his legislative power resides in the mind of 
every man, and it alone teaches us what kind of systematic 
unity philosophy demands in view of the ultimate aims of rea- 
son. This idea is, therefore, a cosmical conception.* 

In view of the complete systematic unity of reason, there 
can only be one ultimate end of all the operations of the mind. 
To this all other aims are subordinate, and nothing more than 
means for its attainment. This ultimate end is the destina- 
tion of man, and the philosophy which relates to it is termed 
Moral Philosophy. The superior position occupied by moral 
philosophy, above all other spheres for the operations of 
reason, sufficiently indicates the reason why the ancients 
always included the idea — and in an especial manner — of 
Moralist in that of Philosopher. Even at the present day, 
we call a man who appears to have the power of self-govern- 
ment, even although his knowledge may be very limited, by 
the name of philosopher. 

The legislation of human reason, or philosophy, has two 
objects — Nature and Freedom, and thus contains not only the 
laws of nature, but also those of ethics, at first in two separate 
systems, which, finally, merge into one grand philosophical 
system of cognition. The philosophy of Nature relates to that 
which is, that of Ethics to that which ought to be. 

But all philosophy is either cognition on the basis of pure 
reason, or the cognition of reason on the basis of empirical 
principles. The former is termed pure, the latter empirical 
philosophy. 

The philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic, that is, 
an inquiry into the powers of reason in regard to pure a priori 

* Bv a cosmical conception, I mean one in which all men necessarily 
take an interest; the aim of a science must accordingly be determined ac- 
cording to scholastic [or partial] conceptions, if it is regarded merely as 
a means to certain arbitrarily proposed ends. 



THE ARCHITECTONIC OF PUKE SEASON. 509 

cognition, and is termed Critical Philosophy ; or it is, secondly, 
the system of pure reason — a science containing the syste- 
matic presentation of the whole body of philosophical know- 
ledge, true as well as illusory, given by pure reason, and is 
called Metaphysic. TI : ie may, however, be also given 

to the whole system of pure philosophy, critical philosophy 
included, and may designate the investigation into the sources 
or possibility of a priori cognition, as well as the presentation 
of the a 'priori cognitions which form a system of pure philo- 
sophy — excluding, at the same time, all empirical and mathe- 
matical elements. 

Metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and that 
of the practical use of pure reason, and is, accordingly, either 
the Metaphysic of Nature, or the Metaphysic of Ethics. The 
former contains all the pure rational principles — based upon 
conceptions alone (and thus excluding mathematics) — of all 
theoretical cognition ; the latter, the principles which deter- 
mine and necessitate a priori ail action. Now moral philo- 
sophy alone contains a code of laws — for the regulation of our 
actions — which are deduced from principles entirely a priori. 
Hence the Metaphysic of Ethics is the only pure moral philo- 
sophy, as it is not based upon anthropological or other empi- 
rical considerations. The metaphysic of speculative reason is 
what is commonly called Metaphysic in the more limited sense. 
But as pure Moral Philosophy properly forms a part of this 
system of cognition, we must allow it to retain the name of 
Metaphysic, although it is not requisite that we should insist 
on so terming it in our present discussion. 

It is of the highest importance to separate those cognitions 
which differ from others both in kind and in origin, and to 
take great care that they are not confounded with those, with 
which they are generally found connected. What the chemist 
does in the analysis of substances, what the mathematician in 
pure mathematics, is, in a still higher degree, the duty of the 
philosopher, that the value of each different kind of cognition, 
and the part it takes in the operations of the mind, may be 
clearly defined. Human reason has never wanted a Metaphysic 
of some kind, since it attained the power of thought, or rather 
of reflection ; but it has never been able to keep this sphere 
cf thought and cognition pure from all admixture of foreign 
elements. The idea of a science of this kind is as old as 



510 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCmiNE OE METHOD. 

speculation itself ; and what mind does not speculate — either 
in the scholastic or in the popular fashion ? At the same 
time, it must be admitted that even thinkers by profession 
have been unable clearly to explain the distinction between the 
two elements of our cognition — the one completely a priori, 
the other a posteriori; and hence the proper definition of a 
peculiar kind of cognition, and with it the just idea of a 
science which has so long and so deeply engaged the attention 
of the human mind, has never been established. When it was 
said — Metaphysic is the science of the first principles of human 
cognition, this definition did not signalise a peculiarity in kind, 
but only a difference in degree ; these first principles were thus 
declared to be more general than others, but no criterion of 
distinction from empirical principles was given. Of these 
some are more general, and therefore higher, than others ; 
and — as we cannot distinguish what is completely a priori, 
from that which is known to be a posteriori — where shall we 
draw the line which is to separate the higher and so-called 
first principles, from the lower and subordinate principles of 
cognition ? What would be said if we were asked to be satis- 
fied with a division of the epochs of the world into the earlier 
centuries and those following them ? Does the fifth, or the 
tenth century belong to the earlier centuries ? it would be 
asked. In the same way I ask : Does the conception of ex- 
tension belong to metaphysics? You answer, yes. Well, that 
of body too ? Yes. And that of a fluid body? You stop, 
you are unprepared to admit this; for if you do, everything 
will belong to metaphysics. From this it is evident that the 
mere degree of subordination — of the particular to the general 
— cannot determine the limits of a science ; and that, in the 
present case, we must expect to find a difference in the con- 
ceptions of metaphysics both in kind and in origin. The fun- 
damental idea of metaphysics was obseured on another side, 
by the fact that this kind of a priori cognition showed a certain 
similarity in character with the science of mathematics. Both 
have the property in common of possessing an a priori origin ; 
but, in the one, our knowledge is based upon conceptions, in 
the other, on the construction of conceptions. Thus a de- 
cided dissimilarity between philosophical and mathematical 
cognition comes out — a dissimilarity which was always felt, 
but which could not be made distinct for want of an insight 



THE ABCHITECTCXNTC OF PUEE EEASO^T. 511 

into the criteria of the difference. And thus it happened that, 
as philosophers themselves failed in the proper development oi 
the idea of their science, the elaboration of the science could 
not proceed with a definite aim, or under trustworthy guid- 
ance. Thus, too, philosophers, ignorant of the path they 
ought to pursue, and always disputing with each other re- 
garding the discoveries which each asserted he had made, 
brought their science into disrepute with the rest of the world, 
and finally, even among themselves. 

All pure a priori cognition forms, therefore, in view of the 
peculiar faculty which originates it, a peculiar and distinct 
unity ; and metaphysic is the term applied to the philo- 
sophy which attempts to represent that cognition in this syste- 
matic unity. The speculative part of metaphysic, which has 
especially appropriated this appellation, — that, which we have 
called the Metaphysic of Nature, — and which considers every- 
thing, as it is (not as it ought to be), by means of a priori 
conceptions, is divided in the following manner. 

Metaphysic, in the more limited acceptation of the term, 
consists of two parts — Transcendental Philosophy and the 
Physiology of pure reason. The former presents the system 
of all the conceptions and principles belonging to the under- 
standing and the reason, and which relate to objects in general, 
but not to any particular given objects (Ontologia) ; the latter 
has nature for its subject-matter, that is, the sum of given 
objects — whether given to the senses, or, if we will, to some 
other kind of intuition, — and is accordingly Physiology, al- 
though only rationalis. But the use of the faculty of reason 
in this rational mode of regarding nature is either physical or 
hyperphysical, or, more properly speaking, immanent or tran- 
scendent. The former relates to nature, in so far as our know- 
ledge regarding it may be applied in experience {in concreto) ; 
the latter to that connection of the objects of experience, 
which transcends all experience. Transcendent Physiology 
has, again, an internal and an external connection with its 
object, both, however, transcending possible experience ; the 
former is the Physiology of nature as a whole, or transcenden- 
tal cognition of the world, the latter of the connection of the 
whole of nature with a being above nature, or transcendental 
cognition of God. 

Immanent physiology, on the contrary, considers nature ai 



512 TBANSCEKDENTAL DOCTKINE OF METHOD. 

the sum of all sensuous objects, consequently, as it is pre- 
sented to us — but still according to a priori conditions, for it is 
under these alone that nature can be presented to our minds 
at all. The objects of immanent physiology are of two kinds : 
1. those of the external senses, or corporeal nature ; 2. the 
object of the internal sense, the soul, or, in accordance with 
our fundamental conceptions of it, thinking nature. The 
metaphysics of corporeal nature is called Physics, but, as it 
must contain only the principles of an a priori cognition of 
nature, we must term it rational physics. The metaphysics 
of thinking nature is called Psychology, and for the same 
reason is to be regarded as merely the rational cognition of 
the soul. 

Thus the whole system of metaphysics consists of four 
principal parts : 1. Ontology; 2. Rational Physiology; 3. 
Rational Cosmology ; and 4. Rational Theology . The second 
part — that of the rational doctrine of nature — may be sub- 
divided into two, physica rationalis * and psychologia ratio- 
nalis. 

The fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason of 
necessity dictates this division ; it is, therefore, architectonical 
— in accordance with the highest aims of reason, and not 
merely technical, or according to certain accidentally-observed 
similarities existing between the different parts of the whole 
science. For this reason, also, is the division immutable and 
of legislative authority. But the reader may observe in it a 
few points to which he ought to demur, and which may 
weaken his conviction of its truth and legitimacy. 

In the first place, how can I desire an a priori cognition or 
metaphysic of objects, in so far as they are given a posteriori? 
and how is it possible to cognize the nature of things accord- 

* It must not be supposed that I mean by this appellation what is 
generally called physica yeneralis, and which is rather mathematics, than 
a philosophy of nature. For the metaphysic of nature is completely 
different from mathematics, nor is it so rich in results, although it is of 
great importance as a critical test of the application of pure understand- 
ing-cognition to nature. For want of its guidance, even mathematicians, 
adopting certain common notions — which are, in fact, metaphysical — have 
unconsciously crowded their theories of nature with hypotheses, the 
fallacy of which becomes evident upon the application of the princi- 
ples of this metaphysic, without detriment, however, to the employment 
of mathematics in this sphere of cognition. 



THE HISTORY OE PUKE EEA.SON. 517 

sound reason, or common sense — can give a more satisfactory 
answer to the most important questions of metaphysics than 
speculation is able to do. He must maintain, therefore, that 
we can determine the content and circumference of the moon 
more certainly by the naked eye, than by the aid of mathe- 
matical reasoning. But this system is mere misology reduced 
to principles ; and, what is the most absurd thing in this 
doctrine, the neglect of all scientific means is paraded as a 
peculiar method of extending our cognition. As regards those 
who are naturalists because they know no better, they are 
certainly not to be blamed. They follow common sense, 
without parading their ignorance as a method which is to teach 
us the wonderful secret, how we are to find the truth which 
lies at the bottom of the well of Democritus. 

Quod sapio satis est mihi, non ego euro 
Esse quod Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones,— Pers. 

is their motto, under which they may lead a pleasant and 
praiseworthy life, without troubling themselves with science, 
or troubling science with them. 

As regards those who wish to pursue a scientific method, 
they have now the choice of following either the dogmatical 
or the sceptical, while they are bound never to desert the 
systematic mode of procedure. When I mention, in relation 
to the former, the celebrated Wolf, and as regards the latter, 
David Hume, I may leave, in accordance with my present in- 
tention, all others unnamed. The critical path alone is still open. 
If my reader has been kind and patient enough to accom- 
pany me on this hitherto untravelled route, he can now judge 
whether, if he and others will contribute their exertions 
towards making this narrow foot-path a high-road of thought, 
that, which many centuries have failed to accomplish, may 
not be executed before the close of the present — namely, to 
bring Reason to perfect contentment in regard to that which 
has always, but without permanent results, occupied he* 
powers and engaged her ardent desire for knowledge. 



THE EKD. 



ERRATA. 

50, iote, far " venranfterkenntnisses," read " vernunfterkenntniss." 
109, 1. 13, /or " lind difficulty in rendering perceptible to sight," rend 

"find some little difficulty in reviewing." 
156, head-line, for " principles," read " principle." 
190, 1. 3, for " substitution of the transcendental for," read "cGnfu* 

sion of the transcendental with." 



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